Free Will and Determinism

[shunyadragon]

I think you mis-read them. They don't propose that humans are mechanical automata. They only propose the idea of a self-caused cause as incoherent. I can see their point but am not entirely convinced. This is a framing problem. I think a lot of it has been mis-framed up til now.

I disagree following thread and citations by bling, WLC and others it is clear that omniscience determinism is what they believe.

It does not contradict free will. As far as man is concerned we are moving along some linear time line, which God is on, but also everywhere else on that time line. From our perspective it might "appear" we are making the same choice we made before, so it is not free will, but we are actually make the choice one time.

You might think of it like this: God at the end of time sends back to Himself at the beginning of time all human free will choice made during man's time, so God knows every choice we "will" make during our life time because historically that is the choice we made of our own free will. Our free will choice in history limits our choices we "will" make, but we ourselves limited our choices.

Source: [url

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/tachyons-time-travel-and-divine-omniscience#ixzz4JQBgVjV3][/url]

Committed to the biblical doctrine of divine foreknowledge as well as to human freedom, Christian thinkers had to explain how it is either that God knows future contingents without future contingent propositions' being antecedently true or false or that God's knowing the truth value of such propositions does not after all entail fatalism. The problem of theological fatalism seemed especially acute since God's foreknowledge of some future event is itself a fact of past history and therefore temporally necessary; that is to say, it no longer has any potential to be otherwise. Therefore, what God foreknew must necessarily come to pass, since it is impossible that God's knowledge be mistaken. In our own day, philosophers such as A. N. Prior, Richard Taylor, Steven Cahn, Nelson Pike, and Paul Helm have argued that from the temporal necessity of

1. God foreknew p.

and the logical necessity of

2. If God foreknows p, then p.

it follows, for any future-tense proposition p, that necessarily p. The majority of contemporary philosophers have, however, disputed the cogency of such reasoning. From the fact that God foreknows that I shall do x, it follows, not that I cannot do otherwise, but only that I shall not do otherwise. It remains within my power not to do x, but, given God's foreknowledge, we know that I shall not in fact exercise that power. Were I to do otherwise, then God would have known different future-tense propositions than He in fact knows.1 As for so-called "temporal necessity," this notion is notoriously difficult, and, if this is a legitimate kind of modality, it is not at all evident that God's foreknowledge of some future event is characterized by such necessity.2 This does not mean that it is within one's power to change the past. Rather it is to assert the truth of the counterfactuals:

3. If I were to do x, God would have foreknown that I would do x.

© Copyright Original Source

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/tachy...#ixzz4JQBgVjV3

[Jim B.]

I was referring to the traditional view of omniscience believed by many Christians that God's knowledge is universal and all things past present and future, which I reject depicting God as a puppet master. There are potentially other views of omniscience I am willing to discuss.

My point was that even ifGod is omnisicient in this way, that omniscience would not entail pre-determinism.

Your view that this belief in omniscience was obsolete, because it was 'dealt with by Boethus over a millennia and half ago,' is an illusion, because it remains a prevalent belief among many Christians today.

I guess I wasn't clear. Boethius accepted this form of omniscience for God, but he argued that this type of omniscience does not mean that our actions are pre-determined. Knowledge and causation are two different things.

[Jim B.]

I disagree following thread and citations by bling, WLC and others it is clear that omniscience determinism is what they believe.

You're getting things mixed up. The first quote by me referred to arguments by Strawson and Van Inwagen that free will may be an incoherent idea. My links to those arguments were what you were responding to when you said that you don't accept them and think they imply that humans are automata . Now it seems you're responding to the issue of God's omniscience and how that impacts free will. That's a different matter. Let's pick one or the other.

Source: [url

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/tachyons-time-travel-and-divine-omniscience#ixzz4JQBgVjV3][/url]

Committed to the biblical doctrine of divine foreknowledge as well as to human freedom, Christian thinkers had to explain how it is either that God knows future contingents without future contingent propositions' being antecedently true or false or that God's knowing the truth value of such propositions does not after all entail fatalism. The problem of theological fatalism seemed especially acute since God's foreknowledge of some future event is itself a fact of past history and therefore temporally necessary; that is to say, it no longer has any potential to be otherwise. Therefore, what God foreknew must necessarily come to pass, since it is impossible that God's knowledge be mistaken. In our own day, philosophers such as A. N. Prior, Richard Taylor, Steven Cahn, Nelson Pike, and Paul Helm have argued that from the temporal necessity of

1. God foreknew p.

and the logical necessity of

2. If God foreknows p, then p.

it follows, for any future-tense proposition p, that necessarily p. The majority of contemporary philosophers have, however, disputed the cogency of such reasoning. From the fact that God foreknows that I shall do x, it follows, not that I cannot do otherwise, but only that I shall not do otherwise. It remains within my power not to do x, but, given God's foreknowledge, we know that I shall not in fact exercise that power. Were I to do otherwise, then God would have known different future-tense propositions than He in fact knows.1 As for so-called "temporal necessity," this notion is notoriously difficult, and, if this is a legitimate kind of modality, it is not at all evident that God's foreknowledge of some future event is characterized by such necessity.2 This does not mean that it is within one's power to change the past. Rather it is to assert the truth of the counterfactuals:

3. If I were to do x, God would have foreknown that I would do x.

© Copyright Original Source

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/tachy...#ixzz4JQBgVjV3

The majority of contemporary philosophers have, however, disputed the cogency of such reasoning. From the fact that God foreknows that I shall do x, it follows, not that I cannot do otherwise, but only that I shall not do otherwise. It remains within my power not to do x, but, given God's foreknowledge, we know that I shall not in fact exercise that power. Were I to do otherwise, then God would have known different future-tense propositions than He in fact knows.1 As for so-called "temporal necessity," this notion is notoriously difficult, and, if this is a legitimate kind of modality, it is not at all evident that God's foreknowledge of some future event is characterized by such necessity.2 This does not mean that it is within one's power to change the past. Rather it is to assert the truth of the counterfactuals:

3. If I were to do x, God would have foreknown that I would do x.

So even if we accept the idea of divine foreknowledge, it's not apparent that it entails pre-determinism. But there's also the argument that God doesn't foreknow but timelessly knows. I don't accept God's omnisicience in this sense anyway. Even if God knows all that is, if the future is not yet, then the future would not be within God's certain knowledge in terms of particulars but maybe only in terms of probability.

[shunyadragon]

You're getting things mixed up. The first quote by me referred to arguments by Strawson and Van Inwagen that free will may be an incoherent idea. My links to those arguments were what you were responding to when you said that you don't accept them and think they imply that humans are automata . Now it seems you're responding to the issue of God's omniscience and how that impacts free will. That's a different matter. Let's pick one or the other.






So even if we accept the idea of divine foreknowledge, it's not apparent that it entails pre-determinism. But there's also the argument that God doesn't foreknow but timelessly knows. I don't accept God's omnisicience in this sense anyway. Even if God knows all that is, if the future is not yet, then the future would not be within God's certain knowledge in terms of particulars but maybe only in terms of probability.

No. I do not believe omniscience necessarily entails determinism. Many Protestants, most of Islam, believe this is a necessity of total omniscience determinism based on their interpretation of scripture. The Orthodox and Roman Church do not hold to this extreme view, and take modified position of some kind of free will concerning the choice of individuals to sincerely embrace the true faith and be saved.

The Baha'i Faith believes that the ultimate destiny of Creation including all possible worlds, universes and multi-verses is predetermined on the grand scale, but our existence is not clock work puppeteer physical existence, and everything is not predetermined.

[shunyadragon]

The common hypothesis I am familiar with is that consciousness is an emergent property of a complex brain. Those traits that led to our complex brain absolutely were selected for based on the intellectual and physical advantages they gave those who had these traits over those that didn't.

I do question the use of 'absolutely' in the above highlighted. I eo not believe all elements of the mind nor our consciousness are absolutely selected for based on the intellectual and physical advantages, though those necessary for survival are selected for.