Free Will and Determinism

[shunyadragon]

Is the rational human spirit that does make choices a product of the brain Shuny?

The rational human spirit is the soul distinct and apart from the mind which is a product of the brain. This is a question for the other thread.

So it is the immaterial rational soul that governs the physical brain.

No, that is not what the citation you gave from the Baha'i writings stated. The mind, a product of the brain, has the choice to exercise the powers of the spiritual and rational soul and “discover the realities of things, comprehend the peculiarities of beings, and penetrate the mysteries of existence. All sciences, knowledge, arts, wonders, institutions, discoveries and enterprises come from the exercised intelligence of the rational soul.” or the mind can choose not to. The Baha'i Faith endorses a degree of Free Will, but not libertarian Free Will, to make these choices by one's mind.

[Jim B.]

Your drawing conclusions that are false concerning the relationship between quantum indeterminancy and cause and effect events in the macro world. Quantum indeterminancy is only a cause and effect relationship in the Quantum level of existence. Absolutely no such relationship can be inferred. No, libertarian free is not a viable assumption that would make us robotic.

Were you responding to my post?!? I was assuming, for the sake of argument, that quantum indeterminacy did NOT scale up to the macro level. I wasn't inferring a relationship. Why would you think I said that libertarian free will would make us robotic? It's just the opposite.

Actually, the relationship of cause and effect relationships in the real world and the relationship and function in brains in both humans and animals, as well as ALL of our macro existence is a fractal relationships as described in Chaos Theory. This in and of itself would preclude any possibility of a robotic deterministic nature of everything including the relationship and nature of the brain and the mind.

How do fractal relationships as described by Chaos Theory explain free will? The preclusion of a "robotic deterministic nature" though necessary, is not sufficient for establishing free will.

All this remains the product of physical processes that are obviously manifest in the physical world. The distinction is artificial without a clear boundary.

So you're claiming that consciousness, as well as the thoughts I am expressing right now, as well as Hamlet and Beethoven's 9th etc etc are all "physical" processes. What's the argument again?

There is Frank Jackson's epistemic argument featuring 'Mary'. We could start there.

If some other substrate, like a silicon-based computer, could produce consciousness, then consciousness cannot be identical to its physical substrate, whether silicon, brains, etc.

Leibniz's Law (the indiscernability of identicals): If two things are identical, they have all the same properties. Phenomenal and physical concepts don't have all the same properties,therefore they're not identical.

If you believe that you know that your ideas are physical things, that knowledge cannot be a physical thing without an infinite regress of knowledges. The representation of a thing cannot be identical to the thing itself. If my knowledge were a physical thing, there'd be no way of my knowing that that is true. Knowledge is representation and not identity. There must be a distinction between my knowledge and what I know in order for the term to have any meaning.

[shunyadragon]

Were you responding to my post?!? I was assuming, for the sake of argument, that quantum indeterminacy did NOT scale up to the macro level. I wasn't inferring a relationship. Why would you think I said that libertarian free will would make us robotic? It's just the opposite.

No I did not say libertarian free would make us robotic, neither is a likely possibility.

So it seems that you are not an epiphenomenalist? Do you believe in libertarian free will? If consciousness is purely a physical process, then it must conform to event causation (assuming that quantum indeterminacy gets cancelled out at macro scales) which would be strictly deterministic.

Epiphenomenalism is too simplistic, and does not reflect my view.

Than your post was not clear you seemed to think the relationship that (Quantum determinism cancels out? (bad wording) would translate to 'event causation which would be strictly deterministic.' This is foolishness. There is no relationship here that would determine the result is a deterministic world.

How do fractal relationships as described by Chaos Theory explain free will? The preclusion of a "robotic deterministic nature" though necessary, is not sufficient for establishing free will.

Research has shown the function of our brain, thought processes, and choices show a distinct fractal relationship where we do make decisions within a range of choices that reflect a fractal pattern, and we do frequently make different choices within a range of possibilities that are not deterministic in nature. Actually, neither libertarian free will nor determinism is likely considering the present objective evidence. A variation of the compatibilist view is more likely.

So you're claiming that consciousness, as well as the thoughts I am expressing right now, as well as Hamlet and Beethoven's 9th etc etc are all "physical" processes. What's the argument again?

They ALL are a product of physical processes, and result in results expressed in the physical world. There is no evidence to support any other cause and effect relationship. If you have any evidence other than anecdotal conjecture I am willing to listen.

There is Frank Jackson's epistemic argument featuring 'Mary'. We could start there.

No help relies on conjecture and anecdotal assumptions, not reality. There is no evidence presented in this hypothetical example that any other information was necessary other than physical information. At best this is an argument from ignorance trying to demonstrate what physical information is not.

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/

4.1 Doubts about the Thought Experiment
Some authors have raised doubts about the thought experiment itself. It is sometimes pointed out, for example, that merely confining Mary to a monochromatic environment would not prevent her from having color experiences (see Thompson 1995, 264) or that, after release, she would not be able to see colors. But the example can be refined to meet these objections. Mary might be monochromatic from birth and changed into a normal perceiver by some medical procedure. It is sometimes objected that already accepted or future results of visual science are or might be incompatible with the existence of a Mary-case (a person with monochromatic experience who becomes a normal color perceiver later) or that such results might require (to preserve consistence with visual science) the introduction of so many additional assumptions that the conceivability of the example becomes doubtful. To this one might reply that the thought experiment need not be compatible with visual science. If the case of a person with monochromatic vision who turns into a normal perceiver really does involve serious difficulties for materialism, then the mere fact (if it were one) that our visual apparatus excludes the actual existence of such a case does not seem to provide a convincing reply for the materialist. But this point (the relevance or irrelevance of visual science in this context) has not received much discussion in the literature. It has, however, been pointed out (see Graham and Horgan, 2000, footnote 4 with its reference to Shepard 1993) that at least presently available results of color vision science do not exclude a Mary-case. (The psychologist Knut Nordby was a real life case of a color vision specialist who was also a complete achromat. See his paper ‘Vision in a Complete Achromat: A Personal Account’, linked into in the Other Internet Resources section and Nordby, 2007.)

Another doubt about the thought experiment is raised by the claim that a person who is confined to a monochromatic environment but knows everything physical there is to know about visual color experience would be able to figure out what colored things look like and thus would e.g. be able to imagine the kind of color experience produced in normal perceivers when looking at the cloudless sky during the day (see e.g. Dennett 1991; Dennett 2007; Churchland 1989; Maloney 1985, 36). Probably the most common reaction to this is simply to doubt the claim. But it is not clear that the claim, if correct, would undermine the knowledge argument. The opponent would have to show that complete physical knowledge necessarily involves the capacity to imagine blue. One may doubt that this claim is compatible with the widely accepted assumption that physical knowledge can be acquired independently of one's particular perceptual apparatus. (Arguably a subject whose visual apparatus is not suited for visual experiences at all will not be able to develop the capacity to imagine colors on the basis of physical knowledge alone, even if this were true for Mary).

Some have argued that Mary would recognize the colors when first seeing them on the basis of her complete physical knowledge about color vision (see Hardin 1992). According to this claim she would think something like “oh, so this is red” when first confronted with a red patch and she could not be fooled by what Dennett calls ‘the blue banana trick’: when shown a blue banana she would know that it has the wrong color (see Dennett 1991). A possible and common response is to simply doubt these claims. But, in any case, it is not clear that these claims undermine the knowledge argument. One may respond along the following lines: If Mary when first confronted with red were able to conclude that she is now seeing what people call red, she thereby acquires a large set of new beliefs about red experiences (that they are produced by roses, such-and-such wavelength combinations and so on). On the basis of seeing red she (a) acquires a new phenomenal concept of red and (b) she forms new beliefs involving that new concept using her previously acquired physical knowledge. But if this description is correct, then her previous knowledge was incomplete (for a detailed discussion of Dennett's argument involving the blue banana trick see Dale 1995).

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If some other substrate, like a silicon-based computer, could produce consciousness, then consciousness cannot be identical to its physical substrate, whether silicon, brains, etc.

'Cannot' is an unwarranted assumption concerning what we are capable of in the future.

Leibniz's Law (the indiscernability of identicals): If two things are identical, they have all the same properties. Phenomenal and physical concepts don't have all the same properties,therefore they're not identical.

When they both reflect originating physical properties and resulting in the expression in physical properties is not distinguishable as two things.

If you believe that you know that your ideas are physical things, . . .

Ideas originate from physical things, and can result and translate in physical things.

. . . that knowledge cannot be a physical thing without an infinite regress of knowledge.

Knowledge is the result of a physical thing the brain. All objective evidence clearly demonstrates we do not have knowledge without the brain.

Infinite regress arguments are hockus bogus ridiculous. 'Infinite regress' is concept in math to understand a particular type of infinity, and not any sort of barrier in the nature of our physical existence.

The representation of a thing cannot be identical to the thing itself.

The representation of a thing is physical relationship to the thing itself. The representation of thing cannot exist without the thing existing. This means nothing.

If my knowledge were a physical thing, there'd be no way of my knowing that that is true. Knowledge is representation and not identity.

Of course, knowledge is a representation and not an identity. Your knowledge would be the result of a physical thing the neurological activity of your brain.

There must be a distinction between my knowledge and what I know in order for the term to have any meaning.

The distinction is not clear.

No problem, what you know is a product of the neurological activity of the brain in response to the relationship to the nature of the world around you both subjective and objective. It has been objectively observed that their is relationship between knowledge, meaning and the relationship to the sensory experience of the world beyond the brain. 'Must be' is not a determining assumption of the nature of the relationship between the brain and the mind,

[Jim B.]

No I did not say libertarian free would make us robotic, neither is a likely possibility.

It's not always easy to know exactly what you're saying. I'm trying my best, though.

Epiphenomenalism is too simplistic, and does not reflect my view.

In what sense do you think epiphenomenalism is not the case, or "too simplistic"?

Than your post was not clear you seemed to think the relationship that (Quantum determinism cancels out? (bad wording) would translate to 'event causation which would be strictly deterministic.' This is foolishness. There is no relationship here that would determine the result is a deterministic world.

What other kind of true (ontological) indeterminacy does scientific research currently point to other than quantum indeterminacy?

Research has shown the function of our brain, thought processes, and choices show a distinct fractal relationship where we do make decisions within a range of choices that reflect a fractal pattern, and we do frequently make different choices within a range of possibilities that are not deterministic in nature. Actually, neither libertarian free will nor determinism is likely considering the present objective evidence. A variation of the compatibilist view is more likely.

Are you conflating unpredictability with indeterminsim? Chaos theory is deterministic:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory

You're apparently confusing ontology with epistemology.

Compatibilism is the theory that free will is the freedom to act without external hindrance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

This is not the metaphysical freedom I have been referring to in my posts on this thread. On the definition of freedom I have clearly been using, compatibilism is a type of determinism.

They ALL are a product of physical processes, and result in results expressed in the physical world. There is no evidence to support any other cause and effect relationship. If you have any evidence other than anecdotal conjecture I am willing to listen.

You haven't been able to understand, or perhaps haven't wanted to understand, what I've written thus far so what's the point? Your argument seems to be:

1.Scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of knowledge.
2.If there were any other type of justifiable knowledge, there would be scientifically verifiable evidence to support that claim.
3.There is no such evidence.
4.Therefore, scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of evidence.

http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/circular.html

No help relies on conjecture and anecdotal assumptions, not reality. There is no evidence presented in this hypothetical example that any other information was necessary other than physical information. At best this is an argument from ignorance trying to demonstrate what physical information is not.

You continue to misconstrue the argument form ignorance. Absence of evidence is different from evidence of absence.

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/

4.1 Doubts about the Thought Experiment
Some authors have raised doubts about the thought experiment itself. It is sometimes pointed out, for example, that merely confining Mary to a monochromatic environment would not prevent her from having color experiences (see Thompson 1995, 264) or that, after release, she would not be able to see colors. But the example can be refined to meet these objections. Mary might be monochromatic from birth and changed into a normal perceiver by some medical procedure. It is sometimes objected that already accepted or future results of visual science are or might be incompatible with the existence of a Mary-case (a person with monochromatic experience who becomes a normal color perceiver later) or that such results might require (to preserve consistence with visual science) the introduction of so many additional assumptions that the conceivability of the example becomes doubtful. To this one might reply that the thought experiment need not be compatible with visual science. If the case of a person with monochromatic vision who turns into a normal perceiver really does involve serious difficulties for materialism, then the mere fact (if it were one) that our visual apparatus excludes the actual existence of such a case does not seem to provide a convincing reply for the materialist. But this point (the relevance or irrelevance of visual science in this context) has not received much discussion in the literature. It has, however, been pointed out (see Graham and Horgan, 2000, footnote 4 with its reference to Shepard 1993) that at least presently available results of color vision science do not exclude a Mary-case. (The psychologist Knut Nordby was a real life case of a color vision specialist who was also a complete achromat. See his paper ‘Vision in a Complete Achromat: A Personal Account’, linked into in the Other Internet Resources section and Nordby, 2007.)

Another doubt about the thought experiment is raised by the claim that a person who is confined to a monochromatic environment but knows everything physical there is to know about visual color experience would be able to figure out what colored things look like and thus would e.g. be able to imagine the kind of color experience produced in normal perceivers when looking at the cloudless sky during the day (see e.g. Dennett 1991; Dennett 2007; Churchland 1989; Maloney 1985, 36). Probably the most common reaction to this is simply to doubt the claim. But it is not clear that the claim, if correct, would undermine the knowledge argument. The opponent would have to show that complete physical knowledge necessarily involves the capacity to imagine blue. One may doubt that this claim is compatible with the widely accepted assumption that physical knowledge can be acquired independently of one's particular perceptual apparatus. (Arguably a subject whose visual apparatus is not suited for visual experiences at all will not be able to develop the capacity to imagine colors on the basis of physical knowledge alone, even if this were true for Mary).

Some have argued that Mary would recognize the colors when first seeing them on the basis of her complete physical knowledge about color vision (see Hardin 1992). According to this claim she would think something like “oh, so this is red” when first confronted with a red patch and she could not be fooled by what Dennett calls ‘the blue banana trick’: when shown a blue banana she would know that it has the wrong color (see Dennett 1991). A possible and common response is to simply doubt these claims. But, in any case, it is not clear that these claims undermine the knowledge argument. One may respond along the following lines: If Mary when first confronted with red were able to conclude that she is now seeing what people call red, she thereby acquires a large set of new beliefs about red experiences (that they are produced by roses, such-and-such wavelength combinations and so on). On the basis of seeing red she (a) acquires a new phenomenal concept of red and (b) she forms new beliefs involving that new concept using her previously acquired physical knowledge. But if this description is correct, then her previous knowledge was incomplete (for a detailed discussion of Dennett's argument involving the blue banana trick see Dale 1995).

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That excerpt seems to support the knowledge argument. It does not support your objection. Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red.

'Cannot' is an unwarranted assumption concerning what we are capable of in the future.

It doesn't have to be limited to what we are capable of in the future. There is neuro-scientific evidence that when two people have the same occurrent belief, eg that today is x date, different physical processes are going on in their brains. Either they are not having the same belief or the same belief is not identical to a physical state.

When they both reflect originating physical properties and resulting in the expression in physical properties is not distinguishable as two things.



Ideas originate from physical things, and can result and translate in physical things.

Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes? We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

Knowledge is the result of a physical thing the brain. All objective evidence clearly demonstrates we do not have knowledge without the brain.

No one's disputing that.

Infinite regress arguments are hockus bogus ridiculous. 'Infinite regress' is concept in math to understand a particular type of infinity, and not any sort of barrier in the nature of our physical existence.

Exactly. Infinite regress is a barrier to our reasonable existence, to the self-consistency or lack of it of our ideas and arguments.

Of course, knowledge is a representation and not an identity. Your knowledge would be the result of a physical thing the neurological activity of your brain.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.

[shunyadragon]

In what sense do you think epiphenomenalism is not the case, or "too simplistic"?

Source: plato.stanford.edu/.../epiphenomen...

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs.

Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)

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It is too simplistically mechanistic and robotic. Though the argument for epiphenomenalism does agree with concerning the argument for 'other minds' other than the obvious 'other minds' of the humans around us.

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#ObvAbs

Our reason for believing in other minds is inference from behavioral effects to mental event causes. But epiphenomenalism denies such a causal connection. Therefore, epiphenomenalism implies the (exceedingly implausible) conclusion that we do not know that others have mental events. (Jackson, 1982, replies to this and several other arguments against epiphenomenalism. The argument is stated, and accepted, by Benecke, 1901.)

The first premise of this argument is a widely held dogma, but it can be denied without absurdity. (See Robinson, 1997.) It is perfectly obvious to everyone that the bodies of human beings are very much alike in their construction, and it requires no sophisticated reasoning to infer that if others are made like me, they probably hurt when affected like me, e.g., when their bodies are stuck with pins, beaten, cut and so on. There is no principle that makes an inference from similar effects to similar causes more secure than an inference from similar causes to similar effects; on the contrary, the latter inference is more secure, because there can sometimes be quite different causes of extremely similar effects. Thus, an inference to other minds that is allowed by epiphenomenalism must be at least as strong as the inferential route to other minds with which it is incompatible.

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What other kind of true (ontological) indeterminacy does scientific research currently point to other than quantum indeterminacy?

Not clear. Why are you asking for another kind of true? ontological indeterminacy.

Are you conflating unpredictability with indeterminsim?

No

Chaos theory is deterministic:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory

No, fractal math, Chaos Theory is neither deterministic nor indeterminate randomness.

In human behavior of choices of alternatives when faced with a decision, the alternatives show a fractal pattern in which we make decisions, which indicate some degree of free will.

You're apparently confusing ontology with epistemology.

No.

Compatibilism is the theory that free will is the freedom to act without external hindrance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Your reaching beyond the definition of compatibilism to arrive at this conclusion.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.[1] Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.[2] They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions.

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This is not the metaphysical freedom I have been referring to in my posts on this thread. On the definition of freedom I have clearly been using, compatibilism is a type of determinism.

What freedom are you referring to. I know of no definition of compatibilism that describes it as a type of comparibilism. Please provide a source, unless you are coming up with your own definition.





You haven't been able to understand, or perhaps haven't wanted to understand, what I've written thus far so what's the point? Your argument seems to be:

1.Scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of knowledge.

No.

2.If there were any other type of justifiable knowledge, there would be scientifically verifiable evidence to support that claim.

The evidence you propose is subjective and anecdotal.

There is no other verifiable evidence, regardless of the source for the claim.

3.There is no such evidence.

True, your claims are based on your faith and belief, and anecdotal and subjective claims which are not verifiable.

4.Therefore, scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of evidence.

False generalization to conclusions of all different sources of knowledge.

You continue to misconstrue the argument form ignorance. Absence of evidence is different from evidence of absence.

No, you are claiming absence of evidence to support your argument.

That excerpt seems to support the knowledge argument. It does not support your objection. Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red.

Not demonstrated by the evidence.

It doesn't have to be limited to what we are capable of in the future. There is neuro-scientific evidence that when two people have the same occurrent belief, eg that today is x date, different physical processes are going on in their brains. Either they are not having the same belief or the same belief is not identical to a physical state.

You still used absolute terms here that science 'cannot,' which is a problem already cited.

The evidence remains that beliefs, but the only evidence we have is that ALL beliefs are a result of a physical state. There is no evidence that beliefs are not identical or not, nor not a result of a physical state, nor that the two people experiencing a concurrent belief are identical or not.

Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes?

No.

We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

Ideas maybe ideas,so what?!?!?! Ideas remain a product of physical neurological activity. There is no evidence for any other source.

Exactly. Infinite regress is a barrier to our reasonable existence, to the self-consistency or lack of it of our ideas and arguments.

Not exactly at all. Infinite regress is no such barrier to anything.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.

So we agree? I never claimed the above, beliefs are a direct result result of a physical process. There is no other evidence of any other source of beliefs.

[shunyadragon]

I thought it would be worth while to comment on your post further particularly after I gave more thought to your misuse of 'identical.'

You haven't been able to understand, or perhaps haven't wanted to understand, what I've written thus far so what's the point? Your argument seems to be:

Read the references and you will understand my argument, in particular the Stanford Philosophical Dictionary,

That excerpt seems to support the knowledge argument. It does not support your objection. Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red.

The argument does support my view. The view in the reference is that Mary's comprehension of red is based on her neurological (and optical) abilities to process, which she has in common with most humans, and comprehend the color red, and not a new phenomenal concept other than her own natural abilities.

It doesn't have to be limited to what we are capable of in the future. There is neuro-scientific evidence that when two people have the same occurrent belief, eg that today is x date, different physical processes are going on in their brains. Either they are not having the same belief or the same belief is not identical to a physical state.

This an important misconception concerning the evidence concerning the similarity of concurrent beliefs of different individuals. The observed evidence of the fractal nature of the physical world, and the neurological nature of our brains pretty much excludes the likely hood of beliefs in different individual being 'identical.' Yes there is obviously similar beliefs, but not identical. The fractal nature of our physical existence can demonstrated by observation such as: All Maple leaves and clouds look like Maple leaves and clouds, but no two Maple leaves nor clouds are 'identical.'

The previous source on epiphenomilism concerning 'other minds' pretty much demonstrates the limitations of the theological concepts of other minds, and addresses the observed similarities of 'other minds based on the similarities of the physical nature of human beings,



Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes? We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.[/QUOTE]

[shunyadragon]

Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes? We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.

I apologize. I missed this. I want to emphasize that beliefs, thoughts, ideas and consciousness are not physical processes, nor effects identical with causes, but simply the result of physical neurological processes of the brain. In tis manner they can be identified with a physical process.

Your confusion over Ontology and Epistemology needs clarifying.

Source: https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=epistemology

Epistemology - the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion.

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The question here is an overlapping epistemological/ontological question as to whether your view is knowledge or opinion. There is an epistemological element here 'about the way we know' the relationship between the mind and the brain, and an ontological issue concerning 'about what the brain and the mind are.'

Source: http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/engl257/classical/ontology_and_epistemology.htm

Ontology and Epistemology

Ontology: The branch of metaphysics (philosophy concerning the overall nature of what things are) is concerned with identifying, in the most general terms, the kinds of things that actually exist. In other words addressing the question: What is existence? and What is the nature of existence? When we ask deep questions about "what is the nature of the universe?" or "Is there a god?" or "What happens to us when we die?" or "What principles govern the properties of matter?" we are asking inherently ontological questions.

Epistemology: The branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge itself, its possibility, scope, and general basis. More broadly: How do we go about knowing things? or How do we separate true ideas from false ideas? or How do we know what is true? or "How can we be confident when we have located 'truth'?" "What are the systematic ways we can determine when something is good or bad?"

So ontology is about what is true and epistemology then is about methods of figuring out those truths.

The split between Plato and Aristotle is both ontological and epistemic. The split between religion and science is both ontological and epistemic. For example, religion and science offer two very different ontologies (theories about what is out there) and epistemology (ways to figure out what is out there). And the split between Plato and Aristotle matches exactly the split between religion and science...and you should leave this class understanding why and how!

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[Jim B.]

Source: plato.stanford.edu/.../epiphenomen...

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs.

Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)

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Taylor is an agent causation theorist. Of course he would think that. The point of philosophy is to take assumptions that are "just plain obvious" and that seem ridiculous to doubt and subject them to rational inquiry, including empirical research and arguments.




Jackson is the author of the knowledge argument. Our reasons for believing in other minds is on a par with our believing in folk psycholgical entities. I believe that these beliefs can be justified, but they must be justified! One cannot just revert to argument from tradition and/or authority, e.g. "it's just plain obvious" or "everyone knows that..."

The first premise of this argument is a widely held dogma, but it can be denied without absurdity. (See Robinson, 1997.) It is perfectly obvious to everyone that the bodies of human beings are very much alike in their construction, and it requires no sophisticated reasoning to infer that if others are made like me, they probably hurt when affected like me, e.g., when their bodies are stuck with pins, beaten, cut and so on. There is no principle that makes an inference from similar effects to similar causes more secure than an inference from similar causes to similar effects; on the contrary, the latter inference is more secure, because there can sometimes be quite different causes of extremely similar effects. Thus, an inference to other minds that is allowed by epiphenomenalism must be at least as strong as the inferential route to other minds with which it is incompatible. [/cite]

But the argument for other minds is different than the ones for causal efficacy/epiphenomenalism. We cannot assume that just because others have minds similar to our own that epiphenomenalism is false: this all assumes the crucial point, that my phenomenal states are causing my behaviors. I agree that they are, but such beliefs have to be justified. It's circular reasoning.

[Jim B.]

No, fractal math, Chaos Theory is neither deterministic nor indeterminate randomness.

From the Wikipedia article: Chaos Theory:
This happens even though these systems are deterministic, meaning that their future behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements involved.[3] In other words, the deterministic nature of these systems does not make them predictable.[

In human behavior of choices of alternatives when faced with a decision, the alternatives show a fractal pattern in which we make decisions, which indicate some degree of free will.

You assume the point at issue once again. Non-linearity is not the same as indeterminism. Please provide an explanation how non-linearity can get us to any conception of free will.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.[1] Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.[2] They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions.

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You're just repeating what you said before without addressing my points. Freedom from outside hindrances is not the definition of 'freedom' I have been using so far in this thread. I'm referring to libertarian or metaphysical free will.This kind of free will is the idea that given the same initial conditions, I could have chosen/acted differently. This is different from chaotic systems which exhibit extreme sensitivity to initial conditions.

What freedom are you referring to. I know of no definition of compatibilism that describes it as a type of comparibilism. Please provide a source, unless you are coming up with your own definition.

"Comparibilism" must have been a typo.

True, your claims are based on your faith and belief, and anecdotal and subjective claims which are not verifiable.

All claims are based on belief. Please provide actual evidence that anything I am claiming is based upon 'faith,' as in religious faith. I could make a similar claim that your beliefs are based upon your faith in science. Without substantiation, these are ad hominem attacks andnhave no place here. This is getting very tiresome.

No, you are claiming absence of evidence to support your argument.

How?!? Provide evidence and argument for once.

You still used absolute terms here that science 'cannot,' which is a problem already cited.

This is silly. You apparently misunderstand the different sense of the words "can" and "cannot." It's not as if I am impugning the powers and capabilities of science by saying it has an actual nature and definition. To say that things 'cannot' be other than they are is all I am saying. If you disagree with that, please cite actual reasons just this once.

Ideas maybe ideas,so what?!?!?! Ideas remain a product of physical neurological activity. There is no evidence for any other source.

So we agree? I never claimed the above, beliefs are a direct result result of a physical process. There is no other evidence of any other source of beliefs.

Causal and ontological reduction are different. You keep conflating the two. I am the 'cause' of my actions. I am not my actions.

[Jim B.]

I thought it would be worth while to comment on your post further particularly after I gave more thought to your misuse of 'identical.'

You have not demonstrated that you understand the term "identical." There are several understandings of this terms and you haven't exhibited an understanding of any of them yet. All you do is repeat the same causal points, which miss the point.

The argument does support my view. The view in the reference is that Mary's comprehension of red is based on her neurological (and optical) abilities to process, which she has in common with most humans, and comprehend the color red, and not a new phenomenal concept other than her own natural abilities.

Please show specifically in the excerpt you quoted, where that is argued for. The "gaining an ability" argument is a variant on behaviorism which does not address the central point of Kripke's et al's "rigid designator" argument.

This an important misconception concerning the evidence concerning the similarity of concurrent beliefs of different individuals. The observed evidence of the fractal nature of the physical world, and the neurological nature of our brains pretty much excludes the likely hood of beliefs in different individual being 'identical.' Yes there is obviously similar beliefs, but not identical. The fractal nature of our physical existence can demonstrated by observation such as: All Maple leaves and clouds look like Maple leaves and clouds, but no two Maple leaves nor clouds are 'identical.'

Do you mean "occurrent"? And are you saying that my belief that 1=1 is only "similar" to yours? Pray tell!

The previous source on epiphenomilism concerning 'other minds' pretty much demonstrates the limitations of the theological concepts of other minds, and addresses the observed similarities of 'other minds based on the similarities of the physical nature of human beings,

What do 'theological concepts' have to do with any of this?!? Arguments for epiphenomenalism and other minds are not the same. Justifying one does not necessarily support the other.

[Jim B.]

I apologize. I missed this. I want to emphasize that beliefs, thoughts, ideas and consciousness are not physical processes, nor effects identical with causes, but simply the result of physical neurological processes of the brain. In tis manner they can be identified with a physical process.

Your confusion over Ontology and Epistemology needs clarifying.

You're confused about what I was saying. I was pointing out the ontology and epistemology difference in reference to the free will issue. Unpredictability is an epistemological concept (what we or any minds can predict to a given level of certainty) as opposed to indeterminacy, which does not depend upon what we or any minds can know. Indeterminacy is an ontological property. A given state is indeterministic inherently and not just relative to a knower. I hope this clears things up a bit.

[HumbleThinker]

I have no problem with the idea that our choices are limited, even severely limited, and that there are all sorts of constraints on our thoughts and actions. One question I have is: If I am "free" to make only one possible choice in any given situation, in what sense am I morally responsible for that choice? I can "endorse" that choice as being one that falls in line with who I am, i.e. my beliefs and desires up to the moment of that choice, but that just pushes the question of ultimate responsibility back one step further, since I wouldn't be responsible for my beliefs and desires, etc. The subjective sense that I have that my choice was "my" choice, one that I as a conscious subject could have chosen differently about given the same conditions, would be a "user illusion" along with the whole concept of moral responsibility. Those things would be nothing more than "stances" as Daniel Dennett would say.

I would say that you are morally responsible for such a choice if, and only if, your prior free will actions led to this forced choice. This is similar, though perhaps not identical, to why someone who freely choses to become intoxicated is morally responsible for assaulting someone, either with their fists or with a car. This is different than, say, someone whose mental disability caused them to assault someone; they had no choice in entering that mental state. I would guess that these situations would be the exception rather than the rule, though.

And perhaps I am misunderstanding your last couple of sentences, but wouldn't the "subjective sense that I have that my choice was "my" choice" be a "user illusion" in compatiblism? Or is that what you are saying in the first place?

[shunyadragon]

You're confused about what I was saying. I was pointing out the ontology and epistemology difference in reference to the free will issue. Unpredictability is an epistemological concept (what we or any minds can predict to a given level of certainty) as opposed to indeterminacy, which does not depend upon what we or any minds can know. Indeterminacy is an ontological property. A given state is indeterministic inherently and not just relative to a knower. I hope this clears things up a bit.

I so not believe I am confused at all. You are taking only one point, or aspect of our discussion and trying to make a clear and specific distinct between epistemology and ontology in our discussion. It is best you address the issues of our discussion and not try and make an artificial distinction. I believe that indeterminancy and unpredictability can both have ontological and epistemological applications in reference to the 'free will' issue.

[HumbleThinker]

The big question is the relationship of consciousness and the free will question. Is consciousness epiphenomenal or does it really have causal impact? There are good reasons to think that it's not a physical process, even if caused by physical processes. If that's the case, how could this non-physical thing have an impact on physical processes? If it's selected for, then what is its selectional advantage, other than the ability to make choices?

The common hypothesis I am familiar with is that consciousness is an emergent property of a complex brain. Those traits that led to our complex brain absolutely were selected for based on the intellectual and physical advantages they gave those who had these traits over those that didn't.

[HumbleThinker]

So it seems that you are not an epiphenomenalist? Do you believe in libertarian free will? If consciousness is purely a physical process, then it must conform to event causation (assuming that quantum indeterminacy gets cancelled out at macro scales) which would be strictly deterministic.

I can think of things that, even if they are the "products of physical processes," wouldn't be physical processes: mathematical objects, the ideas that I'm expressing right now as I type these keys, ...

You may be interested in research of stochastic neural networks as models for our neurology.