Free Will and Determinism

[shunyadragon]

From the Wikipedia article: Chaos Theory:
This happens even though these systems are deterministic, meaning that their future behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements involved.[3] In other words, the deterministic nature of these systems does not make them predictable.

Your misreading the definition of Chaos Theory. This is not saying Chaos Theory is deterministic. It is saying the Chaos Theory applies to all systems, even those that may be considered deterministic. The concept of being deterministic in your reference applies to the definition of the systems, not Chaos Theory, which is neutral as to whether a system is deterministic or not.

You assume the point at issue once again. Non-linearity is not the same as indeterminism. Please provide an explanation how non-linearity can get us to any conception of free will.

All ready addressed this, Chaos Theory creates a pattern of many options to make choices in human decision making processes. The evidence for free will decisions is that humans do make free will rational decisions within the constraints of this diversity. If the alternatives were strictly linear, you would not have the diversity of choices in the reality of our world.

Example: If the nature of human choices were strictly linear and robotic when presented with a choice of twenty different types of pie, one would choice their favorite pie every time, but since their is a chaotic nature of the possible choices with many factors other than just 'the favorite pie,' allow for free will to make choices based on many variables. This is clearly the evidence concerning the nature of human choices in reality.

You're just repeating what you said before without addressing my points. Freedom from outside hindrances is not the definition of 'freedom' I have been using so far in this thread. I'm referring to libertarian or metaphysical free will.This kind of free will is the idea that given the same initial conditions, I could have chosen/acted differently. This is different from chaotic systems which exhibit extreme sensitivity to initial conditions.

I am repeating some points because of your failure to comprehend. The highlighted above indicates you are taking an extreme libertarian view of 'freedom' for your own narrow definition, which does not apply to 'freedom' in compatibilism. You still have not provided justification for your view that compatibilism is a variation of determinism. This view is yours alone and is not reflected in the current academic view of the contrasting libertarian, compatibilism, and deterministic natures of the potential will. You have failed to provide a good reference that would also define compatibilism as a form of determinism.

"Comparibilism" must have been a typo.

Yes, but it should not effect the context of the discussion.

All claims are based on belief. Please provide actual evidence that anything I am claiming is based upon 'faith,' as in religious faith. I could make a similar claim that your beliefs are based upon your faith in science. Without substantiation, these are ad hominem attacks and have no place here. This is getting very tiresome.

Your conclusions concerning the results of the reference concerning Mary's knowledge of red remain anecdotal and subjective and based on belief and not the objective reality of the anecdotal observations, which the skeptics of this work are justified to point out.

Your failure to comprehend and respond coherently on subjects such as a academic reference for supporting compatibilism as a form of determinism is also very tiring.

How?!? Provide evidence and argument for once.

This is matter of fact of the nature of your argument. There is no objective evidence either way.

This is silly. You apparently misunderstand the different sense of the words "can" and "cannot." It's not as if I am impugning the powers and capabilities of science by saying it has an actual nature and definition. To say that things 'cannot' be other than they are is all I am saying. If you disagree with that, please cite actual reasons just this once.

There is no objective evidence to conclude nor justify 'cannot.' It is an unwarranted claim as to what science may determine things 'cannot' be what they appear to be are at present' at a future date. This clearly true of some scientific view like those of Quantum Mechanics, and behavioral science.

Causal and ontological reduction are different. You keep conflating the two. I am the 'cause' of my actions. I am not my actions.

They are of course different, but as far as our discussion they cannot be distinctly separated as I cited in the reference. Of course you are materially not your actions, but you are the 'cause' of your actions. You and your actions are clear not entirely separable in terms of cause and effect relationships. Again it is best to address the discussion and not 'split frog hairs.'

[Jim B.]

Your misreading the definition of Chaos Theory. This is not saying Chaos Theory is deterministic. It is saying the Chaos Theory applies to all systems, even those that may be considered deterministic. The concept of being deterministic in your reference applies to the definition of the systems, not Chaos Theory, which is neutral as to whether a system is deterministic or not.

No, it says that chaos theory applies to certain types of deterministic systems, ones that are non-linear and aperiodic. Once again, from the Wikipedia article:

This behavior is known as deterministic chaos, or simply chaos. The theory was summarized by Edward Lorenz as:[6]

Chaos: When the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future.

Do you see where it says "deterministic chaos, or simply chaos"? That means they are synonymous; they are different ways of expressing the same thing. Lorenz defines Chaos as "When the present determines the future." Chaos theory is the study of a certain type of deterministic system. Chaotic systems are deterministic even if they are unpredictable. Cloud formation and population movements are chaotic systems but they are not indeterministic.

The definitions I have been using in this thread for terms like "free will,""determinism" and the like are the metaphysical definitions. This is what I wanted the thread to be about. If you want it to be about something else, that's fine, but at least justify why you reject my definitions and/or start your own thread.

All ready addressed this, Chaos Theory creates a pattern of many options to make choices in human decision making processes. The evidence for free will decisions is that humans do make free will rational decisions within the constraints of this diversity. If the alternatives were strictly linear, you would not have the diversity of choices in the reality of our world.

Already addressed this. Chaos theory implies extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. It doesn't allow for the ability to have done otherwise.

This does not address the central problem of determinism. Here is the standard definition of determinism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

The metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.

To avoid determinism defined metaphysically, per above, one would have to invoke some form of indeterminism. Chaos theory does not provide that. There is a theory being developed called quantum chaology which attempts to reconcile chaos theory with true metaphysical indeterminism. This field would not be necessary if chaos theory could already account for indeterministic systems.

The standard definition of determinism, quoted above, means that, according to compatibilist free will, given the same past leading up to my action, I could not have acted differently. In other words, compatibilists are saying that even though I am determined metaphysically (per the SEP definition above) I am still 'free' in the sense that I still bear moral responsibility for at least some of my actions. Compatibilism is not a metaphysical theory; it's one about ascribability of moral responsibility.

I am repeating some points because of your failure to comprehend. The highlighted above indicates you are taking an extreme libertarian view of 'freedom' for your own narrow definition, which does not apply to 'freedom' in compatibilism. You still have not provided justification for your view that compatibilism is a variation of determinism. This view is yours alone and is not reflected in the current academic view of the contrasting libertarian, compatibilism, and deterministic natures of the potential will. You have failed to provide a good reference that would also define compatibilism as a form of determinism.

Metaphysics is what this thread is about.

Your conclusions concerning the results of the reference concerning Mary's knowledge of red remain anecdotal and subjective and based on belief and not the objective reality of the anecdotal observations, which the skeptics of this work are justified to point out.

Nowhere in the excerpt you quoted does it argue for Mary gaining an ability. "Based on belief." What does that mean? Everything we say and write are based on our beliefs. The question is and remains "Are our beliefs justified?" The knowledge argument is about the subjective; it is not itself subjective. You're confusing the medium and the object of thought. How do you justify what Mary learns as nothing more than gaining an ability?

Your failure to comprehend and respond coherently on subjects such as a academic reference for supporting compatibilism as a form of determinism is also very tiring.

Please point out to me where I have failed to understand such a reference and I will try again.

There is no objective evidence to conclude nor justify 'cannot.' It is an unwarranted claim as to what science may determine things 'cannot' be what they appear to be are at present' at a future date. This clearly true of some scientific view like those of Quantum Mechanics, and behavioral science.

This is not an attack upon science. It says that science has, at present, an actual meaning and definition. I have no idea what you meant in the bolded passage. Science is a human activity. it is part of human society. As a heuristic device, science in the 17th century excluded certain things, such as consciousness intentionality and purpose form its purview in order to better isolate and control the variables for certain other kinds of phenomena. Science may expand to be able to accomodate these other features, but within the 17th century model, it doesn't seem able to.

[Jim B.]

I would say that you are morally responsible for such a choice if, and only if, your prior free will actions led to this forced choice. This is similar, though perhaps not identical, to why someone who freely choses to become intoxicated is morally responsible for assaulting someone, either with their fists or with a car. This is different than, say, someone whose mental disability caused them to assault someone; they had no choice in entering that mental state. I would guess that these situations would be the exception rather than the rule, though.

But the buck has to stop somewhere, right? The original choice to get drunk is a free choice in what sense, do you think? At least some compatibilists would say that my original choice to get drunk was my free choice if it was in line with my character, etc; ie if there were no external constraints on my choice. I think that at least some of our choices have to be done out of a freedom that's more robust than that. I think some of my choices would have to be where I could have truly decided differently, given the same conditions up to my decision.

And perhaps I am misunderstanding your last couple of sentences, but wouldn't the "subjective sense that I have that my choice was "my" choice" be a "user illusion" in compatiblism? Or is that what you are saying in the first place?

Yes, that's what I'm saying that Dennett and other compatibilists would think. I tend to disagree with that.

[Jim B.]

I so not believe I am confused at all. You are taking only one point, or aspect of our discussion and trying to make a clear and specific distinct between epistemology and ontology in our discussion. It is best you address the issues of our discussion and not try and make an artificial distinction. I believe that indeterminancy and unpredictability can both have ontological and epistemological applications in reference to the 'free will' issue.

How?

[Jim B.]

The common hypothesis I am familiar with is that consciousness is an emergent property of a complex brain. Those traits that led to our complex brain absolutely were selected for based on the intellectual and physical advantages they gave those who had these traits over those that didn't.

Like the ability to make choices based on fine-grained discriminations? That would argue against epiphenomenalism.

[Jim B.]

You may be interested in research of stochastic neural networks as models for our neurology.

That sounds interesting. Can you provide a link?

[shunyadragon]

No, it says that chaos theory applies to certain types of deterministic systems, ones that are non-linear and aperiodic. Once again, from the Wikipedia article:

This behavior is known as deterministic chaos, or simply chaos. The theory was summarized by Edward Lorenz as:[6]

Chaos: When the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future.

Do you see where it says "deterministic chaos, or simply chaos"? That means they are synonymous; they are different ways of expressing the same thing. Lorenz defines Chaos as "When the present determines the future." Chaos theory is the study of a certain type of deterministic system. Chaotic systems are deterministic even if they are unpredictable. Cloud formation and population movements are chaotic systems but they are not indeterministic.

You are selectively citing applications of Chaos Theory. It is simply based on fractal math that describes the variability of ALL possible systems deterministic and non-deterministic systems.

The definitions I have been using in this thread for terms like "free will,""determinism" and the like are the metaphysical definitions. This is what I wanted the thread to be about. If you want it to be about something else, that's fine, but at least justify why you reject my definitions and/or start your own thread.

First, this is not your thread. The opening thread defined compatabilism as a metaphysical concept for the compatability of free will and determinism as the subject of the thread. Another way of looking at is his assumption of the concept he proposes the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism as a strictly metaphysical concept may in of itself be too limiting.

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#DetCha

Metaphysical arguments on this issue are not currently very popular. But philosophical fashions change at least twice a century, and grand systemic metaphysics of the Leibnizian sort might one day come back into favor. Conversely, the anti-systemic, anti-fundamentalist metaphysics propounded by Cartwright (1999) might also come to predominate. As likely as not, for the foreseeable future metaphysical argument may be just as good a basis on which to discuss determinism's prospects as any arguments from mathematics or physics.

© Copyright Original Source

This does not address the central problem of determinism. Here is the standard definition of determinism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

The metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.

According to the SEofC this does not include compatabilism.

To avoid determinism defined metaphysically, per above, one would have to invoke some form of indeterminism. Chaos theory does not provide that. There is a theory being developed called quantum chaology which attempts to reconcile chaos theory with true metaphysical indeterminism. This field would not be necessary if chaos theory could already account for indeterministic systems.

The purpose of Chaos Theory is not to account for deterministic nor indeterministic systems. It simply describes the fractal math for ALL systems.

The standard definition of determinism, quoted above, means that, according to compatibilist free will, given the same past leading up to my action, I could not have acted differently. In other words, compatibilists are saying that even though I am determined metaphysically (per the SEP definition above) I am still 'free' in the sense that I still bear moral responsibility for at least some of my actions. Compatibilism is not a metaphysical theory; it's one about ascribability of moral responsibility.

Your not citing anything to support your view above concerning compatibilism being a form of determinism. Compatibilism allows for a degree of free will decisions that are not deterministic.

Decision of moral responsibility remain a part of the decision making process as to whether humans have free will or not.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not define compatabilism as a form of determinism. Address this issue and do not come up with your own definition of compatabilism.

What you are proposing is not the standard understanding of compatibilism.

The following does not remotely fit your narrow definition of freedom to suite your view. Freedom from a compatabilistic view;

Metaphysics is what this thread is about.

I consider this a dodge to avoid a complete open discussion on the issues of free will. Metaphysics covers an awful lot of turf, and in one way limits the discussion of the question of free will too artificially.

Nowhere in the excerpt you quoted does it argue for Mary gaining an ability. "Based on belief." What does that mean? Everything we say and write are based on our beliefs. The question is and remains "Are our beliefs justified?" The knowledge argument is about the subjective; it is not itself subjective. You're confusing the medium and the object of thought. How do you justify what Mary learns as nothing more than gaining an ability?

Like the source, I propose Mary gains nothing the recognition of red is simply based on Mary's natural abilities to recognize colors, and no new gain of an ability is necessary. The problem is justifying the necessity of gaining an ability, and not the possibility of gaining an ability.

This is not an attack upon science. It says that science has, at present, an actual meaning and definition.

It is a statement of an artificial limitation on science that is unwarranted.

But not a limiting meaning and definition as you proposed.

I have no idea what you meant in the bolded passage.

Exactly what it says.

Science is a human activity. it is part of human society. As a heuristic device, science in the 17th century excluded certain things, such as consciousness intentionality and purpose form its purview in order to better isolate and control the variables for certain other kinds of phenomena. Science may expand to be able to accomodate these other features, but within the 17th century model, it doesn't seem able to.

We are not in the 17th century. Is the bolded above a change from the assertion 'cannot.'

[shunyadragon]

How?

Simply by the nature of our existence and forcing an artifical distinction.

[HumbleThinker]

That sounds interesting. Can you provide a link?

It's been a while since I've looked some up and it is far from my field of expertise. This is a recent study I found when looking it up for your post: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4925698/. Though I do not think it is mentioned in this article, the basic idea from what I can gather is that neural receptors exhibit Brownian motion, which produces statistically random neural processes, thus making our thought processes not strictly deterministic. Though, again to the best of my understanding, they are not strictly non-deterministic, or truly random, either.

[HumbleThinker]

But the buck has to stop somewhere, right? The original choice to get drunk is a free choice in what sense, do you think? At least some compatibilists would say that my original choice to get drunk was my free choice if it was in line with my character, etc; ie if there were no external constraints on my choice. I think that at least some of our choices have to be done out of a freedom that's more robust than that. I think some of my choices would have to be where I could have truly decided differently, given the same conditions up to my decision.


Yes, that's what I'm saying that Dennett and other compatibilists would think. I tend to disagree with that.

I think getting drunk in that case would be a free choice in that there was a less than 100% chance of choosing to drink to the point of intoxication. This is a bit of a cheat because there are numerous choices that could be made in the span of a night that would still result in the person becoming drunk, but I think this is good enough for the level of conversation we are having.

We seem to agree on a good amount here :)

[shunyadragon]

It's been a while since I've looked some up and it is far from my field of expertise. This is a recent study I found when looking it up for your post: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4925698/. Though I do not think it is mentioned in this article, the basic idea from what I can gather is that neural receptors exhibit Brownian motion, which produces statistically random neural processes, thus making our thought processes not strictly deterministic. Though, again to the best of my understanding, they are not strictly non-deterministic, or truly random, either.

I believe this is presently described as fractal neural events, not 'random neural processes.' Processes in and of themselves are not random nor fractal. The nature of the neural activity would have fractal properties. I believe that the evidence demonstrates that all natural systems function in a fractal manner, whether deterministic or not.

It may be argued that all of the nature of our physical existence in the universal perspective may be considered ultimately deterministic based on the constraints of Natural Laws. All events must obey Natural Laws. This does not preclude the possible existence non-deterministic/deterministic systems such as the neural processes of our brain that may result in a 'degree' of free will. I believe that any concept of libertarian free will is unrealistic and idealistic. It would be terribly naive to assume that much of human behavior and decision making processes are not determined by the constraints of natural law and the evolved behavior of the nature of humanity.

[HumbleThinker]

I believe this is presently described as fractal neural events, not 'random neural processes.' Processes in and of themselves are not random nor fractal. The nature of the neural activity would have fractal properties. I believe that the evidence demonstrates that all natural systems function in a fractal manner, whether deterministic or not.

It may be argued that all of the nature of our physical existence in the universal perspective may be considered ultimately deterministic based on the constraints of Natural Laws. All events must obey Natural Laws. This does not preclude the possible existence non-deterministic/deterministic systems such as the neural processes of our brain that may result in a 'degree' of free will. I believe that any concept of libertarian free will is unrealistic and idealistic. It would be terribly naive to assume that much of human behavior and decision making processes are not determined by the constraints of natural law and the evolved behavior of the nature of humanity.

I agree with you on all points :)

[Jim B.]

You are selectively citing applications of Chaos Theory. It is simply based on fractal math that describes the variability of ALL possible systems deterministic and non-deterministic systems.

I'm not selecting anything, but merely stating what Chaos theory is. It is the study of a certain kind of deterministic system. Fractal math may be topic neutral as to determinism, but that has nothing to do with whether chaotic systems can be indeterministic, which is the issue here. Even if fractal math can describe indeterministic systems, and I have yet to see any citation in support of that, that would in no way explain how human deliberation and action would be indeterministic. That is what we are discussing, or I thought we were discussing. The point at issue is not what could do the describing but what it is being described.

First, this is not your thread. The opening thread defined compatabilism as a metaphysical concept for the compatability of free will and determinism as the subject of the thread. Another way of looking at is his assumption of the concept he proposes the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism as a strictly metaphysical concept may in of itself be too limiting.

You're right. I'm sorry. I thought that this was the free will thread I had started. Even of it had been, you're right; you can take it in any direction you want.

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#DetCha

Metaphysical arguments on this issue are not currently very popular. But philosophical fashions change at least twice a century, and grand systemic metaphysics of the Leibnizian sort might one day come back into favor. Conversely, the anti-systemic, anti-fundamentalist metaphysics propounded by Cartwright (1999) might also come to predominate. As likely as not, for the foreseeable future metaphysical argument may be just as good a basis on which to discuss determinism's prospects as any arguments from mathematics or physics.

© Copyright Original Source

This seems to contradict what you said the OP said about metaphysics as being too limiting for this topic. The quote just above says it's as good as any other basis for now.

The purpose of Chaos Theory is not to account for deterministic nor indeterministic systems. It simply describes the fractal math for ALL systems.

Do you have a source on that? The sources I've found and quoted all agree that Chaos Theory describes a sub-set of deterministic systems.

Your not citing anything to support your view above concerning compatibilism being a form of determinism. Compatibilism allows for a degree of free will decisions that are not deterministic.

No, the compatibilist view of freedom is compatible with determinism. It's the idea that free will, in the sense of aptness for moral responsibility, is compatible with determinism. Compatible means the two things can exist together, side by side, that there's no conflict between them.

Here's an overview of it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Note it says that Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.[1] Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.[2] They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions.

This conception of freedom is compatible with the conception of determinism I quoted from the SEP, that the laws of nature in conjunction with the past entail every fact about the future. If this is true, then I could never have acted otherwise than I acted, even though I can still bear responsibility for my actions.

What you are proposing is not the standard understanding of compatibilism.

This is from the SEP article "Compatibilism":
Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

Compatibilism is the thesis that, even though I am determined, I still am morally responsible for at least some of my actions.

The following does not remotely fit your narrow definition of freedom to suite your view. Freedom from a compatabilistic view;

This is exactly what I've been saying. Compatibilist free will is doing what one wishes in the absence of external impediments. This view of free will is perfectly compatible with the standard definition of determinism from SEP.

I consider this a dodge to avoid a complete open discussion on the issues of free will. Metaphysics covers an awful lot of turf, and in one way limits the discussion of the question of free will too artificially.

No, this is the actual debate about free will. The central issue is how to understand these terms such as free will. If you reject metaphysical free will, then should be justified as such. You are the one artificially limiting it. I am trying to understand what these terms actually mean. That is why compatibilists have to defend compatibilism against incompatibilism (or either variety). You cannot assume that your position, whatever it is, is the right one. You have to defend it against all of the alternatives.

Like the source, I propose Mary gains nothing the recognition of red is simply based on Mary's natural abilities to recognize colors, and no new gain of an ability is necessary. The problem is justifying the necessity of gaining an ability, and not the possibility of gaining an ability.

This has nothing to do with the argument at all. Let's just drop this since you don't understand and you show no signs of wanting to understand.

It is a statement of an artificial limitation on science that is unwarranted.

But not a limiting meaning and definition as you proposed.



Exactly what it says.



We are not in the 17th century. Is the bolded above a change from the assertion 'cannot.'

This is really silly. To say that something has a nature is not to artificially impose limitations. Science cannot successfully account for consciousness within the present 17th century paradigm. Dogs cannot speak. I cannot run a 4 minute mile. Are these absolute metaphysically certain truths? Of course not, but that is not how the word 'cannot' functions in language.Yes, in terms of the basic underlying assumptions of science, it is still operating within the paradigm established in the 17th century. Scince is a human construct with a history and presuppositions. It did not appear miraculously on golden tablets. But the truly amazing thing about science is that it is self-correcting and revolutionary. It can undergo and often does, revolutions where old paradigms are superseded. To respect something is different from uncritically worshipping it.

[shunyadragon]

Chaos Theory defined;



Nothing here about Chaos Theory being deterministic. It is simple a descriptive math describing the variation of events in systems with nonlinear and the unpredictable behavior with many variables.

[Jim B.]

It doesn't say one way or the other, but the sources I have quoted several times now DO STATE DEFINITIVELY THAT CHAOTIC SYSTEMS ARE DETERMINISTIC. Chaos theory is the attempt to understand chaotic systems. Chaos theory makes no sense independently of the thing it's intended to understand.

We are not talking about the mathematics but the phenomena that the math is trying to formalize. Chaos, or aperiodicity and non-linearity, are intrinsic features of some systems. If some properties of the brain are chaotic, that alone would not indicate indeterminism.

Unpredictability: Because we can never know all the initial conditions of a complex system in sufficient (i.e. perfect) detail, we cannot hope to predict the ultimate fate of a complex system. Even slight errors in measuring the state of a system will be amplified dramatically, rendering any prediction useless. Since it is impossible to measure the effects of all the butterflies (etc) in the World, accurate long-range weather prediction will always remain impossible.

This states that because we can never know the initial conditions, that we can never predict the outcomes. This means that the unpredictability is not inherent in the systems but in our lack of knowledge. A super-intelligent race of aliens who could know all of the initial conditions could predict the outcomes (in principle). This is an example of the distinction I was trying to draw above between epistemic and ontological issues, which you dismissed as "splitting frog hairs." Indeterminism is a feature that is intrinsic to a system. Unpredictability is observer-relative. The aliens could not predict quantum indeterministic systems.

No one can predict the weather beyond a given level of approximation, but this doesn't mean that the weather is indeterministic.