Plantinga's Evolutionary argument against naturalism

[Virgil]

Ok i was reading Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism .
(If you want to see it watch -part 1 -part 2)
His paper is here.
I think I get what he is basically saying. Evolution basically does not care if our beliefs or cognitive faculties are true. I get what this would imply for Hominid Paul when he tries to escape the tiger.
But what does it imply for a modern person today. Cant we test and use things like the scientific method to confirm what our senses tell us? Check out our stuff with other people.
Is there something to this argument I'm missing?

[Philosophickle]

Ok i was reading Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism .
(If you want to see it watch -part 1 -part 2)
His paper is here.
I think I get what he is basically saying. Evolution basically does not care if our beliefs or cognitive faculties are true. I get what this would imply for Hominid Paul when he tries to escape the tiger.
But what does it imply for a modern person today. Cant we test and use things like the scientific method to confirm what our senses tell us? Check out our stuff with other people.
Is there something to this argument I'm missing?

A few things here. Plantinga is not attacking our senses or the information they confer. Set our actual senses aside for a moment. Now, imagine that during the course of our evolutionary history nature produces a human with true beliefs and another with false beliefs. According the Plantinga, a human with false beliefs (or no beliefs, for that matter) is just as viable for selection as long as he is able to get his body parts in the right location at the proper time. So, unless the naturalist wants to say that there is a necessary link between belief and behavior (which there isn't) the naturalist is left with consciousness unexplained (sorry Dennett).

[Virgil]

A few things here. Plantinga is not attacking our senses or the information they confer. Set our actual senses aside for a moment. Now, imagine that during the course of our evolutionary history nature produces a human with true beliefs and another with false beliefs. According the Plantinga, a human with false beliefs (or no beliefs, for that matter) is just as viable for selection as long as he is able to get his body parts in the right location at the proper time. So, unless the naturalist wants to say that there is a necessary link between belief and behavior (which there isn't) the naturalist is left with consciousness unexplained (sorry Dennett).

But not all beliefs are inherited. And as I said I could see how this would imply that hominid Paul would have false beliefs and never know.But what about modern day humans with access to science and the like. Couldn't they compare their data with other people to obtain true beliefs?

[ENeGMA]

The more I think about this argument the more confused I think it is.

A few things here. Plantinga is not attacking our senses or the information they confer. Set our actual senses aside for a moment. Now, imagine that during the course of our evolutionary history nature produces a human with true beliefs and another with false beliefs.

First of all, exactly what is meant by 'belief' here? Propositional statement of the 'that' form? "To believe THAT... tigers are dangerous" etc.?

I contest a few things here:

One, that evolution 'produces' beliefs. Evolution produces brain hardware. Experience plus brain hardware produces belief.

I think there's a fatal misunderstanding here in terms of belief acquisition.

Two, this begs the question by presuming that evolution could, just as easily, produce a being with true or false beliefs, which is of course the question at hand.

Third, there's an issue with exactly what beliefs are 'true' and 'false'. Presumably you mean here a being with all true beliefs and a being with all false beliefs. But this is a total misnomer as evolution couldn't produce either. Evolution isn't in the belief producing business, in the first place, and second, evolution isn't perfect, and thus can't create a being with perfect access to truth OR perfect access to falsity.

Every living creature is a mixture of true and false beliefs, and to hypothesize a being that isn't is to completely abandon the naturalistic framework in which Plantinga is trying to draw a conclusion. No naturalist would grant evolution the power to produce a being with absolutely true or false beliefs.

So rather it's a question of creatures with a mixture of true and false beliefs.

According the Plantinga, a human with false beliefs (or no beliefs, for that matter) is just as viable for selection as long as he is able to get his body parts in the right location at the proper time.

But beliefs are somatic, not genetic.

So even if a creature with "all false beliefs" COULD reproduce, then his progeny could still have the capacity to acquire true beliefs.

You might say that he'd teach his progeny his false beliefs, but I don't quite understand how.

So, unless the naturalist wants to say that there is a necessary link between belief and behavior (which there isn't)

A brain wired a certain way won't produce a certain belief?

Since a belief is arrangement of neurons (In the naturalistic worldview) and behavior is just the successful action of a brain (again, according to naturalism), how is belief not necessarily linked to behavior?

the naturalist is left with consciousness unexplained (sorry Dennett).

I'd like to see Dennett take on this argument, given his love of evolution.

I suspect he'd shred it.

[Philosophickle]

One, that evolution 'produces' beliefs. Evolution produces brain hardware. Experience plus brain hardware produces belief.

That is your presupposition. But even granting that brains must produce mental content, you have to further prove that this mental content must produce true beliefs in order to confer an evolutionary advantage.

Two, this begs the question by presuming that evolution could, just as easily, produce a being with true or false beliefs, which is of course the question at hand.

Plantinga allows for all possibilities, which includes those statements. As long as it is possible for mental-inessentialism, then his argument goes through. The burden of proof lies on someone who would say that mental-inessentialism is not true.

Third, there's an issue with exactly what beliefs are 'true' and 'false'.

No, there really isn't. Your paragraph here is completely misleading and doesn't bear on the present discussion. Plantinga explicitly propounds what counts as cognitive reliability.

A brain wired a certain way won't produce a certain belief?

Since a belief is arrangement of neurons (In the naturalistic worldview) and behavior is just the successful action of a brain (again, according to naturalism), how is belief not necessarily linked to behavior?

It may be physically "necessary", but it isn't logically or metaphysically necessary.

I'd like to see Dennett take on this argument, given his love of evolution.

I suspect he'd shred it.

Ha! Like he shredded the Kalam Cosmological Argument?? And besides, Dennett has tried his hand at evolutionary epistemology and was "shredded" by Owen Flanagan.

[Philosophickle]

But not all beliefs are inherited. And as I said I could see how this would imply that hominid Paul would have false beliefs and never know.But what about modern day humans with access to science and the like. Couldn't they compare their data with other people to obtain true beliefs?

Sure, but that is because we were designed to acquire true beliefs.

[Von Smith]

That is your presupposition.

Within the context of EAAN, it is also Plantinga's.

But even granting that brains must produce mental content, you have to further prove that this mental content must produce true beliefs in order to confer an evolutionary advantage.

He doesn't need to show that at all; to refute Plantinga's argument, it is sufficient to show that reliable cognitive faculties *can* confer an evolutionary advantage, and that they are a particularly efficient way of furnishing that advantage. Actually, one doesn't even need to show that; rather, one need only show that it is reasonable for a naturalist to think that this might be the case.

It may be physically "necessary", but it isn't logically or metaphysically necessary.

Recall again that Plantinga is ostensibly presupposing naturalism for the sake of argument; naturalist possiblities are the only relevant metaphysical or logical possibilities we need consider. Furhtermore, he seems mainly interested in the materialist or physicalist flavors of naturalism. Within this latter subset, physical necessity would be de facto equivalent to logical and/or metaphysical necessity.

[Philosophickle]

He doesn't need to show that at all; to refute Plantinga's argument, it is sufficient to show that reliable cognitive faculties *can* confer an evolutionary advantage, and that they are a particularly efficient way of furnishing that advantage. Actually, one doesn't even need to show that; rather, one need only show that it is reasonable for a naturalist to think that this might be the case.

Granted. But just showing that it's broadly possible isn't going to show that it's reasonable to believe that that it would be the case.

Recall again that Plantinga is ostensibly presupposing naturalism for the sake of argument; naturalist possiblities are the only relevant metaphysical or logical possibilities we need consider.

From what I can see, there are no significant differences between naturalistic logical possibilities and any other kind of logical possibilities.

Furhtermore, he seems mainly interested in the materialist or physicalist flavors of naturalism. Within this latter subset, physical necessity would be de facto equivalent to logical and/or metaphysical necessity.

This doesn't seem to be true. Are you saying that a materialist must deny that logical possibilities are really possible because of some state of affairs in the physical world?

[Seasanctuary]

Humans aren't automatically great at finding truth over 'useful beliefs.'

What a backfire.

[Philosophickle]

Humans aren't automatically great at finding truth over 'useful beliefs.'

Is that a true statement or a false statement?

[Seasanctuary]

Is that a true statement of a false statement?

I present the variety of metaphysical beliefs as evidence is is true.

[Philosophickle]

I present the variety of metaphysical beliefs as evidence is is true.

I don't know what that means.

[Seasanctuary]

I don't know what that means.

Oh, so you're being obtuse and vague. Nevermind.

EDIT - On the off chance you really didn't understand. People believe in different religious and other metaphysical systems which are contradictory. Obviously humans aren't magically great at coming up with only true beliefs. The point of this thread relies on the idea that humans are great at coming up with true beliefs.

[Philosophickle]

Oh, so you're being obtuse and vague. Nevermind.

I'm going to forget the past few posts.

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Are you suggesting that Plantinga's (R) (our cognitive faculties are generally reliable) is false? That doesn't cause the argument to backfire. That proposal is also a defeater of N & E, as both N & E were produced by our cognitive faculties.

[ENeGMA]

That is your presupposition. But even granting that brains must produce mental content, you have to further prove that this mental content must produce true beliefs in order to confer an evolutionary advantage.

As Von Smith pointed out, Plantinga is accepting the evolutionary point of view for the purposes of his argument.

What I said about belief formation is, to my mind, doctrinaire evolutionist thought, so if Plantinga isn't accepting and using that, then he isn't refuting what actual evolutionists believe, and thus isn't accomplishing anything.

Plantinga allows for all possibilities, which includes those statements. As long as it is possible for mental-inessentialism, then his argument goes through. The burden of proof lies on someone who would say that mental-inessentialism is not true.

What do mean by mental-inessentialism? I sense this term is going to be problematic in many ways.

Second, it doesn't matter what Plantinga "allows." The point is that he accepts the standards and methods of evolution in order to point out a problem he sees in naturalism.

And then you tell me how he conjectures these beings which have "all true beliefs" and "all false beliefs", which is ridiculous from an evolutionary point of view. Evolution isn't in the business of producing beings 'all true beliefs' or 'all false beliefs'.

The whole point of his argument is to demonstrate a problem in evolutionary thinking BY ACCEPTING the central tenets of evolution. But he's not doing that, from what you're telling me, and thus what he's refuting isn't standard Darwinian evolution, and thus isn't relevant.

No, there really isn't. Your paragraph here is completely misleading and doesn't bear on the present discussion. Plantinga explicitly propounds what counts as cognitive reliability.

I think there is.

In his tiger example (roughly paraphrased), he mentions a false belief as being "I want to pet the tiger" and accomplishing that by running away.

I question this is a false belief.

Under proper analysis, in this context "I want to pet the tiger" could just mean "I'm scared. I'm going to run from this tiger."

Obviously HE means "I want to pet the tiger" literally but again, that's the issue at hand. I take issue with the notion that a being could understand what the term "pet" means and then think that it was accomplishing that by running away. Obviously in this case you'd point out that this is the falsity of the belief.

But this isn't obvious to me. If you interperet the sentence "I want to pet the tiger" as a mental token in the 'false-believer's' mind MEANING "I'm scared; I want to run away from the tiger" then he has a true belief, just not in our language.

My broader point here is I don't think you (or Plantinga) can give me a proper functional analysis of just how these false beliefs work without being true in some non-trivial way.

Yes, they're "false' is you accept by fiat what Plantinga regards as true, but there are different theories on language use. Take a Wittgensteinian approach in analyzing the "false" statements and you come to a different conclusion, namely that if people in that society utter the 'false' statement "I want to pet the tiger" and then run away from tigers, that statement, in that society, means "I'm scared; I'm going to run away from the tiger."

There are just levels upon levels of confusion in this argument. I honestly don't know which of a dozen ways it would most profitable to attack it from.

It may be physically "necessary", but it isn't logically or metaphysically necessary.

Hold on a minute. If you grant that it may be physically necessary in this world (as I think you'd do well to do) then there ceases to be an argument.

If Plantinga is willing to concede that in THIS world his argument is null because it's physically necessary that certain brains produce certain actions, then he's conceded the argument -- in this world.

Ha! Like he shredded the Kalam Cosmological Argument??

Haven't read anything by him on that.

And besides, Dennett has tried his hand at evolutionary epistemology and was "shredded" by Owen Flanagan.

In what context? I know they exchanged articles over the zombie issue -- is that what you mean?

Also Flanagan, I suspect, would have little trouble with this argument either.