Arguments you should not use

[Carrikature]

I wanted to address this line of reasoning before I get back to the main discussion I was having with Sparko.

So you would hold someone morally responsible for what they can't help but do? And that would be just - how?

Well how am I responsible for what I can't help but to do?

Oxford, responsible: Being the primary cause of something and so able to be blamed or credited for it.

Without free will there can be no responsibility for our actions. Therefore no laws.

Without free will there is no responsibility for any action. That is the logical consequence of determinism.

Again, Oxford, responsible: Being the primary cause of something and so able to be blamed or credited for it.

No only is there no moral responsibility there is no responsibility, no blame or credit in your world. So when a man rapes a child he is not responsible - no blame.

I could not help myself.

Mother nature made me do it!

if so then Allah cannot hold them responsible for their actions, can he?

Nonsense, he is still not responsible in any real sense of the word. And how just is it to take ones liberty away for doing what he could not help?

The short answer is that 'responsibility' isn't necessarily the foundation upon which we base laws. We can focus primarily on the action taken and the actor itself in terms of self-preservation. I don't really have to care why you did what you did beyond what it tells me about how likely you are to do it again. In this, I agree with Hobbes that self-preservation is a basic instinct.

[Sparko]

I wanted to address this line of reasoning before I get back to the main discussion I was having with Sparko.



















The short answer is that 'responsibility' isn't necessarily the foundation upon which we base laws. We can focus primarily on the action taken and the actor itself in terms of self-preservation. I don't really have to care why you did what you did beyond what it tells me about how likely you are to do it again. In this, I agree with Hobbes that self-preservation is a basic instinct.

except motive is a vital component of justice and the law. The same action can be moral or immoral depending on WHY it was done. If I shoot you because I think you are trying to harm me, it is self defense. If I shoot you because I want your wallet, it is murder. Yet if there is no free will, then neither instance is different than the other. Both happened because of biology and mechanics, not motive or free will. No responsibility.

[seer]

The short answer is that 'responsibility' isn't necessarily the foundation upon which we base laws. We can focus primarily on the action taken and the actor itself in terms of self-preservation. I don't really have to care why you did what you did beyond what it tells me about how likely you are to do it again. In this, I agree with Hobbes that self-preservation is a basic instinct.

Except the law does take into consideration diminished mental abilities. If you really are mentally stunted and did not have the ability to restrain yourself that often is a defense. You make have to remove an insane person from civil society to protect us but we don't consider him responsible for his acts.

[Carrikature]

again you are not making sense in your objections. If the will is part of the mind, then you have to have a mind to have a will.

See my apples and pie analogy. You can have apples without having an apple pie, even if they are an integral part of apple pie. You wouldn't make the claim that if apples are necessary for apple pie, apple pie must be necessary for apples. That's essentially the same claim you're making with regards to will and mind.

Consciousness is self awareness. That is pretty much the definition of consciousness.

They're often used interchangeably in everyday conversation, but they are distinct things. To borrow from philosophy of language, there's an added layer of recursion that's required for self-awareness. It's not just a matter of having feelings and thoughts but of having awareness of one's own thoughts and feelings as such.

It's the difference between saying "I know X" and saying "I know that I know X". I could be mad without knowing I'm mad, and I could know that I'm mad without knowing why I'm mad. Humans have layers of recursion like that. There are very few animals that show signs of doing something similar.

where are you coming up with this stuff? It is not the "standard definitions" by a long shot.

I come up with this stuff using science and philosophy. You can google "definition of will", "definition of mind", and "will (philosophy)" to see a lot of places using pretty similar definitions to what I provided for those two terms. I also know that we test animals for self-recognition (google mirror test) while having recognized over four years ago that a number of non-human animals have consciousness.

Let's go with your definitions though. He does have the ability to teach himself to not be afraid. He used to be afraid to go up stairs, but he taught himself not to be afraid of steps.

But did he? Did he say to himself "I don't have to be scared of these anymore" and kept telling himself that every time he came to the stairs? People can do that, but we don't have any reason to believe dogs can. It's much more likely that whatever internal associations he had with stairs lessened, or that his desire to follow you became greater than his fear (either one could have been aided by your coaching).

I like dogs, and there are some really intelligent ones. They're not anywhere near our level, though. That sort of thinking is more anthropomorphic than actually demonstrable.

You are not a prisoner in your head. Your observations lead to actions. since you can decide what actions you want to take, it is obvious that you have free will.

One would only be a prisoner if the actions made were different than the actions one wanted to make. That's not what the 'observer' description entails, though. Deciding actions means will, even if not necessarily 'free'. I don't have argue that I can't make decisions, only that the process by which I make decisions isn't directed by an internal third-party.

The mind is the part of yourself that actually does do things and makes decisions and considers things and is aware of what is going on and understands. It is the "why" you do what you do. If your actions are determined by anything it is your mind.

I agree! I don't believe that my mind is truly distinct from my brain, though. I'm a neutral monist in that respect.

again, you seem to be missing what I am saying. It is not about mapping our environment. It is about understanding that map. To be able to think about your environment, and to make decisions based on that, and with your own thoughts and desires.

Oh I understand it. I even agree with you. I just don't think the added layer of recursion (I know that I know) is necessary to do that.

It is self-evident that we are making freewill decisions.

And yet there are centuries of debate on the matter? It's not self-evident at all. If anything, it's become less self-evident over time.

[Carrikature]

except motive is a vital component of justice and the law. The same action can be moral or immoral depending on WHY it was done. If I shoot you because I think you are trying to harm me, it is self defense. If I shoot you because I want your wallet, it is murder. Yet if there is no free will, then neither instance is different than the other. Both happened because of biology and mechanics, not motive or free will. No responsibility.

I would say that motive is actually part of determining what happened. We're ok with self-defense. That's not a threat to self-preservation (quite the opposite).

It's not true that free will is a requirement for motive, though. Animals kill other animals for food. That's a motive.

Except the law does take into consideration diminished mental abilities. If you really are mentally stunted and did not have the ability to restrain yourself that often is a defense. You make have to remove an insane person from civil society to protect us but we don't consider him responsible for his acts.

It does, but this isn't necessarily a question of responsibility. A mentally-handicapped person is no less responsible for killing another human, but we don't consider them nearly the threat as a serial killer. Self-preservation entails determining threat level and appropriate response.

[The Thinker]

And so how do predictions of scientists prevent miracles from happening?

Equivocations on "rule out", "description", ducking and weaving just to avoid point. But that's what we expected from you, "thinker".

Remember here, we're talking about what's going on inside every person's brain/body every moment they are awake. We're not talking about some supposed historical event in the past that we can never reproduce that happened 1 time. If you believe that LFW is true it must be the case that every person is performing a miracle every time they make a "free" decision. But we've put people under scientific scrutiny when asked to make free decisions, and there is no miracle.

So LFW is scientifically ruled out, full stop, in addition to being logically ruled out.

Keep digging your stupidity hole, you're almost at China.

[seer]

It does, but this isn't necessarily a question of responsibility. A mentally-handicapped person is no less responsible for killing another human, but we don't consider them nearly the threat as a serial killer. Self-preservation entails determining threat level and appropriate response.

But he is not responsible in the sense of the oxford definition. And an insane person could just as well be a serial killer.

[shunyadragon]

This thread has wandered to debating individual subjects and not the original topic of the thread;
Arguments you should not use

I had a specific problem concerning the argument of 'free will, mind and consciousness; concerning the existence of God and why the argument should not be used, and no response. This problem also applies to such arguments concerning 'objective morality.'

The reason that this argument should not be used is that there is no objective evidence that humans could naturally be a deterministic machine or as claimed a robot without free will. Human nature is what it is naturally with consciousness, a mind, and a (free?) will regardless, and there is no way to compare the possible options of an existence with nor without God. This is the same for the weak argument for an objective morality, because human nature and morality is as it is whether God exists or not, and there is no way to compare a hypothetical world with a God and one without God.

[Sparko]

See my apples and pie analogy. You can have apples without having an apple pie, even if they are an integral part of apple pie. You wouldn't make the claim that if apples are necessary for apple pie, apple pie must be necessary for apples. That's essentially the same claim you're making with regards to will and mind.

so you are saying that although the will is a part of the mind, it can exist without a mind? The will isn't an apple that is somehow baked into a mind pie. It is a piece of the mind. The mind creates the will just like the brain creates the mind. It isn't just a separate component that got stuck into the mind. It is noncorporeal. It doesn't have a separate existence.

give me an example of a will without a mind.

They're often used interchangeably in everyday conversation, but they are distinct things. To borrow from philosophy of language, there's an added layer of recursion that's required for self-awareness. It's not just a matter of having feelings and thoughts but of having awareness of one's own thoughts and feelings as such.

It's the difference between saying "I know X" and saying "I know that I know X". I could be mad without knowing I'm mad, and I could know that I'm mad without knowing why I'm mad. Humans have layers of recursion like that. There are very few animals that show signs of doing something similar.

I understand what you are saying but I am saying you can't be conscious unless you are self-aware. and vice versa. You do have to have a part of you that is aware of your thoughts and feelings. You are cpnscious that you are aware and aware that you are conscious.

I come up with this stuff using science and philosophy. You can google "definition of will", "definition of mind", and "will (philosophy)" to see a lot of places using pretty similar definitions to what I provided for those two terms. I also know that we test animals for self-recognition (google mirror test) while having recognized over four years ago that a number of non-human animals have consciousness.

they have varying levels of consciousness and self awareness. And a lot of the mirror test is biased because of how animals recognize themselves vs others. Like dogs. They see a dog in the mirror, but just don't give a crap. Why? Because dogs recognize more by scent than sight. So do they recognize the "other dog" as themselves or not? Kinda hard to determine since they don't have the greatest eyesight. From a distance they will see a blurry dog and think it is another dog and bark at it. Up close they might still think it is another dog, or they might not. A lot of times they don't pay attention to the dog in the mirror. Is it because they recognize themselves and don't care or because they don't smell the other dog and so they don't care?

But did he? Did he say to himself "I don't have to be scared of these anymore" and kept telling himself that every time he came to the stairs? People can do that, but we don't have any reason to believe dogs can. It's much more likely that whatever internal associations he had with stairs lessened, or that his desire to follow you became greater than his fear (either one could have been aided by your coaching).

I like dogs, and there are some really intelligent ones. They're not anywhere near our level, though. That sort of thinking is more anthropomorphic than actually demonstrable.

I don't think dogs think on a verbal level. But they do reason things out and learn. So yeah he learned not to be afraid of stairs. He learned how to maneuver on them and became unafraid of them. But to be afraid in the first place shows he reasoned the future possibility of getting hurt on these unfamiliar objects. Just like he did with being on a high object and considering jumping off and getting hurt. He has to have a sense of self, and what injury is, and what the situation is. That requires some reasoning and some self awareness.

One would only be a prisoner if the actions made were different than the actions one wanted to make. That's not what the 'observer' description entails, though. Deciding actions means will, even if not necessarily 'free'. I don't have argue that I can't make decisions, only that the process by which I make decisions isn't directed by an internal third-party.

If you are doing actions that you wanted to make, then you are exercising free will. That pretty much is the definition of free will.

I agree! I don't believe that my mind is truly distinct from my brain, though. I'm a neutral monist in that respect.

I agree! but just because your brain is involved doesn't make it a non-free will action. Your brain provides the hardware for the software of your mind, but your mind can actually affect the brain. Your mind can cause new pathways to be created in your brain. That is how we learn and memorize things. It has been shown that we don't just remember everything that happens to us, but what we pay attention to. And that "attention" is determined by your mind and interests. You pay attention to certain things and commit them to memory which is hardwired into your neurons. Other things you don't pay attention to and they are not recorded. So not only does the brain affect the mind, but the mind affects the brain. But neither way eliminates free will. We are not biological robots.

Oh I understand it. I even agree with you. I just don't think the added layer of recursion (I know that I know) is necessary to do that.




And yet there are centuries of debate on the matter? It's not self-evident at all. If anything, it's become less self-evident over time.

It is self-evident. Even when discussing it philosophically, the philosophers are assuming free will to make their arguments against it. How else can they be making the arguments or expect to convince others?

And the first time you punch one of those philosophers in the nose, or steal their wallet, they will demand that you be held responsible for your actions.

[Sparko]

I would say that motive is actually part of determining what happened. We're ok with self-defense. That's not a threat to self-preservation (quite the opposite).

It's not true that free will is a requirement for motive, though. Animals kill other animals for food. That's a motive.

it is a motive, and as far as hunting for food it is not wrong. As far as an animal that is acting within its own instincts we do not consider them moral beings. They are amoral, because they do not understand their motivations and the concept of "right" and "wrong" - we do. So while there can be motive without free will, their can't be motive and responsibility for actions without free will . And when you do have free will, you can determine whether an action is moral or immoral based on the motive. But without free will you can't claim something was moral or immoral. It just was. So killing someone becomes an amoral action, and motive doesn't matter as far as responsibility goes and you can't say that killing someone for any reason is wrong. It just happened because of physics and brain mechanics.

It does, but this isn't necessarily a question of responsibility. A mentally-handicapped person is no less responsible for killing another human, but we don't consider them nearly the threat as a serial killer. Self-preservation entails determining threat level and appropriate response.

No we don't hold them responsible. They were acting irrationally. We might lock them up or put them under psychiatric care to keep them from hurting someone else, but we don't consider them morally responsible for their actions.

[Sparko]

This thread has wandered to debating individual subjects and not the original topic of the thread;
Arguments you should not use

Thank you thread nanny.

[Carrikature]

But he is not responsible in the sense of the oxford definition. And an insane person could just as well be a serial killer.

Sure. As I said before, responsibility isn't really the issue for me. Threat is. I care about assessing the threat and addressing it. If that means you can be altered in some way to no longer be a threat (meds maybe?), awesome. If there's no solution but quarantine, so be it.

[Carrikature]

it is a motive, and as far as hunting for food it is not wrong. As far as an animal that is acting within its own instincts we do not consider them moral beings. They are amoral, because they do not understand their motivations and the concept of "right" and "wrong" - we do. So while there can be motive without free will, their can't be motive and responsibility for actions without free will . And when you do have free will, you can determine whether an action is moral or immoral based on the motive. But without free will you can't claim something was moral or immoral. It just was. So killing someone becomes an amoral action, and motive doesn't matter as far as responsibility goes and you can't say that killing someone for any reason is wrong. It just happened because of physics and brain mechanics.

As I said before, responsibility isn't an issue in the self-defense concept. I don't have to say that any action is wrong, only that it's a threat to my continued well-being.

No we don't hold them responsible. They were acting irrationally. We might lock them up or put them under psychiatric care to keep them from hurting someone else, but we don't consider them morally responsible for their actions.

They're not responsible in the sense that we think they knew what they were doing. They're responsible in the sense that they are the agent that caused the undesired effect. Like I said, we don't have to assess moral responsibility to recognize a threat and react appropriately. You're no less a threat if you're incapable of knowing why you shouldn't act in a certain way. Quite the opposite.

[shunyadragon]

Thank you thread nanny.

Is this the best you can do in response;

This thread has wandered to debating individual subjects and not the original topic of the thread;
Arguments you should not use

I had a specific problem concerning the argument of 'free will, mind and consciousness; concerning the existence of God and why the argument should not be used, and no response. This problem also applies to such arguments concerning 'objective morality.'

The reason that this argument should not be used is that there is no objective evidence that humans could naturally be a deterministic machine or as claimed a robot without free will. Human nature is what it is naturally with consciousness, a mind, and a (free?) will regardless, and there is no way to compare the possible options of an existence with nor without God. This is the same for the weak argument for an objective morality, because human nature and morality is as it is whether God exists or not, and there is no way to compare a hypothetical world with a God and one without God.

[Carrikature]

Sorry, Sparko. Forgot about this portion of the conversation.

so you are saying that although the will is a part of the mind, it can exist without a mind? The will isn't an apple that is somehow baked into a mind pie. It is a piece of the mind. The mind creates the will just like the brain creates the mind. It isn't just a separate component that got stuck into the mind. It is noncorporeal. It doesn't have a separate existence.

give me an example of a will without a mind.

I'm not sure if a will can exist without a mind, but per the definitions it's at least theoretically possible. It might be the case that will is the special ingredient that crosses that threshold into having a mind. If so, there aren't any cases of will without mind. I think we can point to lower order animals that have decision making processes that qualify as a will, but we don't have any method for determining what creatures other than us actually have minds. It would be useful if we did, though.

I agree that a will doesn't have a separate existence, but I do so for the same reason I don't thing minds do. It's not that they're noncorporeal, but that they're merely useful terms for describing processes. It's much the same way we use numbers. They don't actually exist as independent things, but we can use them as concepts to express all sorts of things. 'Mind' is especially useful as it encompasses a whole class of physically intangible ideas (like emotions and thoughts).

I understand what you are saying but I am saying you can't be conscious unless you are self-aware. and vice versa. You do have to have a part of you that is aware of your thoughts and feelings. You are conscious that you are aware and aware that you are conscious.

In laymen terms, this is correct. Consciousness can mean a lot of different things, though:

Source: SEP

2.1 Creature Consciousness

An animal, person or other cognitive system may be regarded as conscious in a number of different senses.

Sentience. It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being a sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world (Armstrong 1981). Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined. Are fish conscious in the relevant respect? And what of shrimp or bees?

Wakefulness. One might further require that the organism actually be exercising such a capacity rather than merely having the ability or disposition to do so. Thus one might count it as conscious only if it were awake and normally alert. In that sense organisms would not count as conscious when asleep or in any of the deeper levels of coma. Again boundaries may be blurry, and intermediate cases may be involved. For example, is one conscious in the relevant sense when dreaming, hypnotized or in a fugue state?

Self-consciousness. A third and yet more demanding sense might define conscious creatures as those that are not only aware but also aware that they are aware, thus treating creature consciousness as a form of self-consciousness (Carruthers 2000). The self-awareness requirement might get interpreted in a variety of ways, and which creatures would qualify as conscious in the relevant sense will vary accordingly. If it is taken to involve explicit conceptual self-awareness, many non-human animals and even young children might fail to qualify, but if only more rudimentary implicit forms of self-awareness are required then a wide range of nonlinguistic creatures might count as self-conscious.

What it is like. Thomas Nagel's (1974) famous“what it is like” criterion aims to capture another and perhaps more subjective notion of being a conscious organism. According to Nagel, a being is conscious just if there is “something that it is like” to be that creature, i.e., some subjective way the world seems or appears from the creature's mental or experiential point of view. In Nagel's example, bats are conscious because there is something that it is like for a bat to experience its world through its echo-locatory senses, even though we humans from our human point of view can not emphatically understand what such a mode of consciousness is like from the bat's own point of view.

Subject of conscious states. A fifth alternative would be to define the notion of a conscious organism in terms of conscious states. That is, one might first define what makes a mental state a conscious mental state, and then define being a conscious creature in terms of having such states. One's concept of a conscious organism would then depend upon the particular account one gives of conscious states (section 2.2).

Transitive Consciousness. In addition to describing creatures as conscious in these various senses, there are also related senses in which creatures are described as being conscious of various things. The distinction is sometimes marked as that between transitive and intransitive notions of consciousness, with the former involving some object at which consciousness is directed (Rosenthal 1986).

© Copyright Original Source

That 'sentience' vs 'self-consciousness' is what I'm talking about. I don't deny sentience in most animals. I deny self-consciousness, but we don't have a good way of knowing.

they have varying levels of consciousness and self awareness. And a lot of the mirror test is biased because of how animals recognize themselves vs others. Like dogs. They see a dog in the mirror, but just don't give a crap. Why? Because dogs recognize more by scent than sight. So do they recognize the "other dog" as themselves or not? Kinda hard to determine since they don't have the greatest eyesight. From a distance they will see a blurry dog and think it is another dog and bark at it. Up close they might still think it is another dog, or they might not. A lot of times they don't pay attention to the dog in the mirror. Is it because they recognize themselves and don't care or because they don't smell the other dog and so they don't care?

I agree it has issues. The problem is that we don't have useful alternatives. We have subjective anecdotes about people who accept consciousness that have no testable support (and too frequently just look like anthropomorphism). That's not a solid basis for any sort of claim.

I don't think dogs think on a verbal level. But they do reason things out and learn. So yeah he learned not to be afraid of stairs. He learned how to maneuver on them and became unafraid of them. But to be afraid in the first place shows he reasoned the future possibility of getting hurt on these unfamiliar objects. Just like he did with being on a high object and considering jumping off and getting hurt. He has to have a sense of self, and what injury is, and what the situation is. That requires some reasoning and some self awareness.

Maybe. Or maybe there's a basic default for unknown situations. Maybe that default is aggression for some animals and fear for others. That fear/aggression default would explain a huge amount of behavior from animals across the spectrum, and it doesn't require any special reasoning ability to accomplish.

If you are doing actions that you wanted to make, then you are exercising free will. That pretty much is the definition of free will.

From a compatibilist point of view, I agree with you. There's more than one way to affirm this claim, though. Premise #1: I'm programmed to want to do certain things. Premise #2: There are no obstructions to my actions. Premise #3: Where nothing obstructs my actions, I will act according to my programming. Given these three, I will be doing the actions that I wanted to make. This isn't what most people think of when they say free will, but it meets your definition here. Most people use think of LFW, which is effectively a denial of #1.

I agree! but just because your brain is involved doesn't make it a non-free will action. Your brain provides the hardware for the software of your mind, but your mind can actually affect the brain. Your mind can cause new pathways to be created in your brain. That is how we learn and memorize things. It has been shown that we don't just remember everything that happens to us, but what we pay attention to. And that "attention" is determined by your mind and interests. You pay attention to certain things and commit them to memory which is hardwired into your neurons. Other things you don't pay attention to and they are not recorded. So not only does the brain affect the mind, but the mind affects the brain. But neither way eliminates free will. We are not biological robots.

Understand that I can effectively supplement 'mind' with 'brain' in the above and get the exact same description of events. The brain can affect the brain, it can cause new pathways to be created, it can focus attention on certain things (or not). The brain isn't one homogenous lump, but a collection of distinct functions working in concert. There's everything necessary for the brain to affect itself.

It is self-evident. Even when discussing it philosophically, the philosophers are assuming free will to make their arguments against it. How else can they be making the arguments or expect to convince others?

Because they're using a different conception of free will than what you presented above. Free will arguments are basically libertarian vs determinism. Determinism considers the process formulaic. For any given value of X (knowledge) and Y (priorities), you can determine the course of action decided. For the course of action to be different necessitates different values for X or Y (usually both). Libertarianism rejects that, stating that X and Y are either irrelevant to the decision-making process or subjected to Z (in practice, an RNG).

It's not incoherent for a determinist to attempt to change another person's values for X and Y even while admitting that they do so because of their own values for X and Y.

And the first time you punch one of those philosophers in the nose, or steal their wallet, they will demand that you be held responsible for your actions.

Of course. Disagreement over how we make decisions doesn't change who the actor in question is. Responsibility is primarily a question of who acted.