God Is Not Simple

[Kenny]

According to the classic doctrine of divine simplicity, God lacks any sort of metaphysical complexity whatsoever. According to this doctrine, not only does God lack the sort of complexity associated with having spatial or temporal proper parts (something that any orthodox theist would agree with), but God also lacks the sort of complexity associated with having attributes. According to the classical doctrine of divine simplicity, God does not have attributes; God is identical to his attributes. E.g. God doesn’t have the property wisdom; God is wisdom. God doesn’t have the property of being just; God is justice.

There are deep problems with this doctrine, I think. Alvin Plantinga has pointed out that, on the face of it, the doctrine appears to be absurd for two reasons. First, since attributes are things that can be exemplified, if God is identical to an attribute, God is the sort of thing that can be exemplified. But God, being concrete, obviously isn’t the sort of thing that can be exemplified. Second, if God is identical to his attributes, then all of God’s attributes are identical to one another. But clearly that’s not the case. Clearly, wisdom is not identical to justice, for example.

To be sure, there have been responses to Plantinga’s criticism of the doctrine of divine simplicity in the literature. Responders have rightly pointed out that advocates of divine simplicity like Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas probably had a different theory of what properties are than Plantinga’s own contemporary Platonic theory of what properties are. But that goes to show that, at the very least, adopting the view that God is simple requires that one give up a contemporary Platonist view of properties. For those who (like myself) find a contemporary Platonist view of properties to be compelling, that is a high price to pay. I would say it’s too high of a price to pay unless the classical doctrine of divine simplicity itself has compelling motivations behind it.

But I don’t think that there are any compelling motivations behind the classical doctrine of divine simplicity. The best motivation behind the doctrine, as far as I can see, is that it is an attempt to preserve the doctrine of divine aseity – the doctrine that God does not depend on anything other than himself for his existence and characteristics and that all other things depend on God for their existence and characteristics. A worry is that if one accepts a Platonic view of properties, then one must also accept that God is dependent on other necessary, eternally existing beings (i.e. properties) for his own characteristics, and also that there are all these other eternal, necessary beings that exist independently of God. But while I feel that worry, I also think there are ways for a theistic Platonist to evade it. The best way, I think, is for the theistic Platonist to adopt a view like the view that Thomas Morris and Christopher Menzel have advocated, according to which abstract objects are themselves causally dependent on God’s mental activities (some of which God engages in all possible worlds) for their existence. I also think that a theist should deny a component of some (but not all) contemporary Platonist views – namely, the view that the truth of propositions expressed by sentences involving predication (e.g. propositions expressed by sentences of the form ‘A is F’) is in some sense to be explained by the fact that an object exemplifies a certain attribute (like the fact that A exemplifies F-ness). A theistic Platonist should affirm, for example, that the reason that God exemplifies Wisdom is because God is wise, rather than the other way around.

Bottom line: I think that the classical doctrine of divine simplicity has deep problems and I think there is no compelling reason orthodox Christian theists to adopt it.

[Jaltus]

I agree, though on theological grounds as opposed to philosophical ones.

How can the Trinity fit within simplicity? It cannot, AFAIK.

[Kenny]

How can the Trinity fit within simplicity? It cannot, AFAIK.

It's not obvious to me that the doctrine of the Trinity is incompatible with the doctrine of divine simplicity, though I'm not sure that it is either.

[Jaltus]

The issue for me is that Jesus is both God and man, that should rule out simplicity.

[Kenny]

The issue for me is that Jesus is both God and man, that should rule out simplicity.

I think that the doctrine of the incarnation probably does pose some serious difficulties for the doctrine of divine simplicity -- more so, I think, than does the doctrine of the Trinity.

[Jaltus]

I think that the doctrine of the incarnation probably does pose some serious difficulties for the doctrine of divine simplicity -- more so, I think, than does the doctrine of the Trinity.

It is the combination that is the problem. If one holds to Christ being both God and man, no problem. If one holds to God being both God and man, there is the problem for simplicity. I always find it humorous that so many theologians divorce the incarnation from the Trinity.

[Kenny]

It is the combination that is the problem. If one holds to Christ being both God and man, no problem. If one holds to God being both God and man, there is the problem for simplicity. I always find it humorous that so many theologians divorce the incarnation from the Trinity.

I don't see how the combination itself creates a problem whereas the doctrine of the incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity by themselves do not. I'm not saying there isn't a problem. I just don't see what it is. I'd need you to spell this out more.

[RBerman]

The trinity aside, when we say "God is loving" or "God is love," we're not saying that God measures up to some external standard of love. We're saying that God's actions define what "love" means. God cannot be unloving, due not to the definition of "God," but the definition of "love." As far as Plato goes, I believe the Socratic dialogue with Euthyphro is the one that goes into this.

[Kenny]

The trinity aside, when we say "God is loving" or "God is love," we're not saying that God measures up to some external standard of love.

Agreed.

We're saying that God's actions define what "love" means.

It certainly may be that what it is to love is to act (in certain respects) as God acts. It may also be that God’s ways of acting are what fix the reference of our term ‘love’.

God cannot be unloving, due not to the definition of "God," but the definition of "love."

If (per impossible) God did things like torture the innocent just for fun, for example, then wouldn’t you agree that God would not be acting in loving ways?

As far as Plato goes, I believe the Socratic dialogue with Euthyphro is the one that goes into this.

Yep. That’s certainly relevant (the Euthyphro question here would be ‘Is it loving because it’s the way God acts or does God act that way because it’s loving?’).

But, fyi, I didn’t mention “contemporary Platonism” to draw any explicit historical connections to Plato’s views. Historical Platonism, imho, bears only a superficial resemblance to the view that I would describe as “contemporary Platonism about abstract objects”.

[RBerman]

1) It certainly may be that what it is to love is to act (in certain respects) as God acts. It may also be that God’s ways of acting are what fix the reference of our term ‘love’.

2) If (per impossible) God did things like torture the innocent just for fun, for example, then wouldn’t you agree that God would not be acting in loving ways?

If I agree with (1), which I do, I don't see how I can affirm (2) since it appears to set up a standard for "love" external to God, which is what (1) denies. Lots of people read the Bible and say, "God can't be like that. It's not loving, and God is loving." But the Bible tells us that God is loving, and the Bible also shows us what it means for God to be loving.

[Kenny]

If I agree with (1), which I do, I don't see how I can affirm (2) since it appears to set up a standard for "love" external to God, which is what (1) denies.

Something can be the standard that fixes the reference of one of our predicates without its being the case that the meaning of our predicate tracks what the standard is like in every conceivable counterfactual situation. Consider for example that the standard meter bar might have been less than a meter long.

Furthermore, one could even affirm (2) if one held that acting as God does somehow figures into the analysis of what it is to be loving. It could be that the analysis of what it is to be loving refers to acting in ways that God, by his very nature, acts. And one could then go on to consider the antecedent in (2) to be an impossible antecedent that describes God as acting in ways that are contrary to his very nature.

Lots of people read the Bible and say, "God can't be like that. It's not loving, and God is loving."

Well, I think that people who say such things are wrong. But I also agree that it would be very empty to say that God is loving if ‘loving’ just meant something like ‘whatever God does’. If that were so, the claim that God is loving would just be the claim that God does whatever God does. The latter is hardly as inspiring as the former!

[RBerman]

Something can be the standard that fixes the reference of one of our predicates without its being the case that the meaning of our predicate tracks what the standard is like in every conceivable counterfactual situation. Consider for example that the standard meter bar might have been less than a meter long.

Furthermore, one could even affirm (2) if one held that acting as God does somehow figures into the analysis of what it is to be loving. It could be that the analysis of what it is to be loving refers to acting in ways that God, by his very nature, acts. And one could then go on to consider the antecedent in (2) to be an impossible antecedent that describes God as acting in ways that are contrary to his very nature.

That's fine. The correct answer to "What if God did X?" will include "Is X consistent with how we know God is from Scripture?

Well, I think that people who say such things are wrong. But I also agree that it would be very empty to say that God is loving if ‘loving’ just meant something like ‘whatever God does’. If that were so, the claim that God is loving would just be the claim that God does whatever God does. The latter is hardly as inspiring as the former!

But still technically true. I prefer to educate people to let God be who God is and come into line with that, rather than encourage them to measure God against their own conceptions of what love, or justice, or holiness is.

[Kenny]

But still technically true.

I don’t think that it’s technically true that ‘God is loving’ just means something like ‘God does whatever God does’. The former is informative. The latter is not.

I prefer to educate people to let God be who God is and come into line with that, rather than encourage them to measure God against their own conceptions of what love, or justice, or holiness is.

It’s true that because we are fallen, our conceptions of such things are distorted and we need to allow them to be corrected by revelation. However, that does not entail that we have no independent grasp on what it is to be loving, just or holy either. If we didn’t, the Scriptures would fail to be informative to us when they told us that God has these attributes.