Arguments about God

[technomage]

Right. But I don't assume it's being guided by an intellect to begin with.

Then you are equivocating on the use of the word "purpose."

Maybe I didn't choose the best terms - this is a deductive argument, it's either teleology or eliminativism, and it's not based on which "best explains" the situation but which doesn't lead to absurdities.

You present not only a false dichotomy, but a comparison of apples to buggy whips. The opposite of teleology could be called accidentalism. Eliminativism has absolutely nothing to do with design (or a lack thereof).

Furthermore, I'm not interested in what you consider to be absurd. You have to demonstrate that accidentalism is self-contradictory.

Even if the function is the result of accident there is still teleology behind it.

Not in any accurate sense. Claiming teleology behind an accidental function is nothing more (and nothing less) than claiming the face on mars is an artifact--both are making false claims about a final cause.

(And I would, by the way, say this even if teleology didn't imply an intellect).

Here you are attempting to make a separation that does not exist. Teleology does not imply intellect--it necessitates it. What's worse, I am of the opinion that you are quite aware of that necessity, and are hoping to lay a "argument trap" for those who are not.

So in A, there is no way things "should" act, they just do?

That is to say, it is not the case that the heart ought to pump blood or has any ends, it just pumps blood (over any other effect) by coincidence? There is no "proper" functioning?

Define "should," "ought," and "proper"--the words are multivalent. Are you speaking in a descriptive sense, or a proscriptive sense?

[GioD]

Then you are equivocating on the use of the word "purpose."

A purpose is the end of something's function, for which the function is performed.

You present not only a false dichotomy, but a comparison of apples to buggy whips. The opposite of teleology could be called accidentalism. Eliminativism has absolutely nothing to do with design (or a lack thereof).

Eliminativism is when you eliminate the concept of final causality. Accidentalism is a red herring, once again.

Not in any accurate sense. Claiming teleology behind an accidental function is nothing more (and nothing less) than claiming the face on mars is an artifact--both are making false claims about a final cause.

I was hoping you were finally understanding what teleology is. Teleology is when things function based on their proper ends. The teleological argument argues that nature is grounded in an intellect who intends things' proper ends. Evolution could be completely random and teleology is still a reality in need of explanation - when I say the heart ought to pump blood I don't mean it is designed to pump blood but that the purpose of its functions is to pump blood - its functions are performed for this end. Evolution doesn't have to be aiming for something, there just has to be ends of any sort.

Here you are attempting to make a separation that does not exist. Teleology does not imply intellect--it necessitates it.

What's the difference? Either way it's a legitimate form of modus ponens.

Define "should," "ought," and "proper"--the words are multivalent. Are you speaking in a descriptive sense, or a proscriptive sense?

It's a proscriptive sense. Should and ought are the way functions are supposed to act - it is when they are going for the ends that fit their nature. A proper end is an end that fits their nature.

[technomage]

A purpose is the end of something's function, for which the function is performed.

Eliminativism is when you eliminate the concept of final causality.

Sorry, Giod, that word is already taken, and it does not mean what you say it means. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminativism

Accidentalism is a red herring, once again.

You accude me falsely. Accidentalism (or Tychism, if you prefer) is an argument that denies that events occur or result from a definite cause. I do not take accidentalism to its full extent--in my usage, "accidentalism" simply means that functionality can develop with no guiding intelligence. It is an explicit denial of teleology.

I was hoping you were finally understanding what teleology is.

I already understand what teleology is. You, however, are using the word according to an idiosyncratic usage, then attempting to slide to the mainstream usage. That is not honest argumentation, GioD--it is a form of rhetoric.

Evolution could be completely random and teleology is still a reality in need of explanation

Again, no, it is not. If evolution is completely random, then our concept of teleology (as applied to natural phenomena) is false--an error. If evolution is a random process, teleology does not exist, despite the claims of those who believe in it--those claims are based on pareidolia.

What's the difference? Either way it's a legitimate form of modus ponens.

Because your original claim was that you were not assuming a designer. Teleos necessitates a designer--if you claim teleos, your designer is "built in" from the beginning.

It's a proscriptive sense.

Then once again, you're back to attempting to dictate to the universe.

Now, once again (since you failed to answer the question last time), how do you discern if you are in universe A, or universe B? You can choose to believe you are in one or the other--but I am not interested in belief. What intersubjectively verifiable means do you use to determine which universe you are in?

[GioD]

Sorry, Giod, that word is already taken, and it does not mean what you say it means. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminativism

The term is applied outside of that form of materialism, but whatever.

I already understand what teleology is. You, however, are using the word according to an idiosyncratic usage, then attempting to slide to the mainstream usage. That is not honest argumentation, GioD--it is a form of rhetoric.

As if you're all reason without rhetoric, techno. I never consciously changed the definition of teleology throughout the debate. If I unconsciously shifted its meaning please explain where I did so.

Again, no, it is not. If evolution is completely random, then our concept of teleology (as applied to natural phenomena) is false--an error. If evolution is a random process, teleology does not exist, despite the claims of those who believe in it--those claims are based on pareidolia.

Simply false! Teleology is when things function to fulfill their ends. The idea that this is refuted by evolution is a complete non-sequitur. The heart still functions to pump blood, evolution doesn't change this.

Because your original claim was that you were not assuming a designer. Teleos necessitates a designer--if you claim teleos, your designer is "built in" from the beginning.

You're getting causal relations confused again. This is one of the cases where causal relationship are reversed when proving.

Then once again, you're back to attempting to dictate to the universe.

Teleology entails some things have a proper end, and that is how it is proscriptive. So this isn't me forcing the universe to my view but things having a way they are actually supposed to be. Unless you want to reject the entire field of medicine as "attempting to dictate the universe".

Now, once again (since you failed to answer the question last time), how do you discern if you are in universe A, or universe B? You can choose to believe you are in one or the other--but I am not interested in belief. What intersubjectively verifiable means do you use to determine which universe you are in?

I can tell which universe I am in based on whether medicine makes sense. If there is no way our organs should act, then medicine wouldn't make sense. Medicine has to be proscriptive, but if functions are descriptive and not end-driven, it doesn't make sense.

And no, this isn't "dictating the universe" before you complain, medicine is a completely human-designed set of actions and if they're not justifiable they should be rejected.

[technomage]

The term is applied outside of that form of materialism, but whatever.

It's better to stick with mainstream terminology, otherwise we start arguing over whether or not the slithey toves really did outgrabe.

Speaking of terminology, I'm going to use the word "telos" for the more restrictive "purpose for design." It makes things easier, since the English words "design" or "purpose" are multivalent.

As if you're all reason without rhetoric, techno.

I actually try to be, reserving rhetoric for those moments when I am exaggerating an argument that I've already established by logic.

I never consciously changed the definition of teleology throughout the debate.

You did not? Then I apologize for accusing you of doing so.

If I unconsciously shifted its meaning please explain where I did so.

When you said that teleology was evident with "function." (Post 149) Functionality is not the indicator of teleology--purpose and design are the indicators of teleology. Function can be accidental or deliberate--it is not an automatic indication of telos.

Even Aristotle makes a distinction between function and telos--in his views, telos could help us understand function better, but he treats them as separate cases. Furthermore, Aristotle himself denied that telos indicated deity--remember his prime mover could neither perceive nor interact with the material world.

Teleology is when things function to fulfill their ends.

Again, "end" implies purpose.

The idea that this is refuted by evolution is a complete non-sequitur. The heart still functions to pump blood, evolution doesn't change this.

This is the part you seem to be having problems with. If the existence and function of the heart is accidental, there is no "telos". There may be the appearance of telos, but such an appearance is a pareidolic phenomenon, and has no basis in reality.

You're getting causal relations confused again.

No, I'm not confused, but my explanation is. (Sorry about that--the fibro makes it difficult to concentrate, and I am not always able to express my thoughts clearly.)

Let us go back to my question--if you live in universe A (the universe where we have postulated no guiding intelligence), and perceive a phenomenon to have been designed, your perception is in error. However, just to make the initial consideration, you already had to conceive of a designer.

My problem is your attempt to define all function as telos. That is the very question we are considering--you cannot assert without evidence that telos exists, then point to something as designed, until the existence of telos is affirmed. Heck, teleology is supposed to be a posteriori.

Heck, I'm probably rambling. Let me know if the above is confusing.

Unless you want to reject the entire field of medicine as "attempting to dictate the universe".

I've already told you, medicine does not work on telos, it works on function. The two are not the same.

I can tell which universe I am in based on whether medicine makes sense.

In other words, you do so by conflating telos and function.

[GioD]

Speaking of terminology, I'm going to use the word "telos" for the more restrictive "purpose for design." It makes things easier, since the English words "design" or "purpose" are multivalent.

Teleos including design has problems from the start... I'll discuss this below.

You did not? Then I apologize for accusing you of doing so.

Thank you.

When you said that teleology was evident with "function." (Post 149) Functionality is not the indicator of teleology--purpose and design are the indicators of teleology. Function can be accidental or deliberate--it is not an automatic indication of telos.

Even Aristotle makes a distinction between function and telos--in his views, telos could help us understand function better, but he treats them as separate cases.

Yes, that was rushed and stupid of me. You are correct - not all functions are teleos (this was the basis for Natural Law ethics btw), only those that aim to fulfill something's ends.

Furthermore, Aristotle himself denied that telos indicated deity--remember his prime mover could neither perceive nor interact with the material world.

Yes - Aristotle believed they were built into nature. St. Thomas developed the argument that God grounded teleology, but he believed it was by grounding nature, not by "inserting" teleos as Plato did. This is another reason defining teleos to include design is problematic - at least from an Aristotelean or Thomistic perspective.

Again, "end" implies purpose.

I know. The purpose in mind simply isn't at the level of evolution changing creatures for a purpose.

This is the part you seem to be having problems with. If the existence and function of the heart is accidental, there is no "telos". There may be the appearance of telos, but such an appearance is a pareidolic phenomenon, and has no basis in reality.

See, this isn't what I get: How does the heart's origin being accidental imply it doesn't have a natural end?

Let us go back to my question--if you live in universe A (the universe where we have postulated no guiding intelligence), and perceive a phenomenon to have been designed, your perception is in error. However, just to make the initial consideration, you already had to conceive of a designer.

Right. But to conceive the "designer" (I don't like that term because it implies I'm arguing against evolution... just sayin') doesn't mean to say it exists before we have proven it, but to define its traits.

My problem is your attempt to define all function as telos. That is the very question we are considering--you cannot assert without evidence that telos exists, then point to something as designed, until the existence of telos is affirmed. Heck, teleology is supposed to be a posteriori.

I realize I wasn't clear that some function isn't teleos. Indeed, I probably should have phrased earlier definitions differently, because looking back I did say that. "Goal directed functions" is the ideal way of putting it IMO.

But the argument that things like the hearts or plants have teleos is the argument for teleos, because, so the argument goes, only with teleos do certain traits they have make sense. I'm not saying that it has teleos therefore it has teleos, but rather certain behaviors and effects of things can only be explained in terms of teleos, therefore it has teleos.

Heck, I'm probably rambling. Let me know if the above is confusing.

I may have misunderstood you, so let me know if I did.

I've already told you, medicine does not work on telos, it works on function. The two are not the same.

Teleos entails things are supposed to function for a purpose - the heart's purpose is to pump blood. Functions alone do not entail that. Medicine can only be explained if there is a way things are supposed to function, not just because they function.

[technomage]

Yes, that was rushed and stupid of me.

Heck, I can understand that--though I think I'm in a superior position to you in that I don't have to be rushed to get stupid.

How does the heart's origin being accidental imply it doesn't have a natural end?

There is part of the problem--how do you define "end." We need to take a close look at that concept.

In Aristotle's conception, of course, the "end" was the telos--a design, or a purpose, similar to that found within human creations. You of course remember his account of the four causes using the bronze statue as an example (IIRC, I think he actually used different examples for telos, and used the bronze castter only for the other three types of cause, but I'm going to go ahead and use the bronze caster all the way through).

* The material cause--what's it made of (in this case, the bronze)
* the formal cause--what form or shape is it made into (in this case, the shape of the statue)
* The efficient cause--the primary actor (in this case, either the bronze caster, or the art of casting bronze)
* The final cause--the end, the statue itself.

(I need to interject that "formal" cause is something else I reject, as I reject the existence of "forms," whether defined by Aristotle or Plato, but that is a topic for a separate discussion.)

Here I see another possible communication problem--this time, on my side. I was looking at "end" as "purpose," and ... the term is more complex than that. Yes, purpose is part of the concept, but not the entirety.

So ff we go to final cause. Aristotle's notion of final cause in nature depended upon the concept of characteristic regularity--I don't remember his specific argument, I fear, but he at least once made the comment "It takes a man to generate a man."

My first argument against this concept is that, through science, we have discovered that this "final cause" is noting more than the mechanisms of the material and efficient causes (I think this also dispenses with formal cause in nature, but as I said, that's a topic for a separate discussion). The characteristic regularity Aristotle cited is not caused by some metaphysical process: it is a natural outgrowth of evolutionary biology, and requires no driving intelligence to accomplish.

Secondly, it must be noted that Aristotle never proved that final causes exist in nature. Aristotle defended the concept by analogy, but to actually prove the case, he would have had to establish that nature demonstrates the existence of final causes as an independant argument, something he never does (and, if I remember correctly, explicitly acknowledges that he does not do this). His defense of final causes, however, gives his reason--if we do not examine a final cause, we leave unanswered an important question about the natural world. I contest that, rather than jump to the conclusion that a natural phenomena has a final cause, we need to realize that the question is only answerable through our preconceptions. If we believe that a designer existed, we will see design: if we believe that no designer exists, we will see accident--a fortuitous accident, to be sure, but an accident nonetheless.

Thirdly, it is trivial to describe and name a final cause for a human-constructed artifact: it is impossible to desscribe and name a final cause for a natural phenomenon. A case in point: yes, the heart pumps blood ... but this is not its only function. The heart also monitors the oxygen and pressure in the blood, keeps oxygenated blood separate from deoxygenated blood (in mammals, but not in all animals), sets the rate of firing, and set the sequence of firing (where the atria contract before the ventricles). Now, all of these are parts of the function of the heart, and it is easy to say that the "main function" of the heart is to pump blood, but that is a human reification--other organs have more complex functions. (Additionally, many hearts in "lower" animals do not pump "blood"--indeed, in most insects, the circulatory system has nothing to do with oxygenation.) Who is to say that "pumping blood" is the "final cause"? Perhaps the final cause is to deliver oxygenated blood to the rest of the body, or to collect deoxygented blood from the veins for delivery to the lung. No, the heart has so many functions that naming one specific function is reification. (I highly doubt that Aristotle would have approved of an argument for multiple final causes!)

I'm not thinking clearly enough to attempt a formal argument, so the above are informal (and most likely pretty flawed) arguments.

I'm not saying that it has teleos therefore it has teleos, but rather certain behaviors and effects of things can only be explained in terms of teleos, therefore it has teleos.

This is where we disagree. You may prefer an explanation that includes telos, but the existence of these phenomena can most certainly beexplained without them.

...things are supposed to function for a purpose

But that leaves open the question of whether or not the purpose was planned, or accidental. If a thing has an accidental purpose, this excludes the possibility that it was designed. If a thing has a deliberate purpose, this implies (actually, necessitates) a designer. How do you discern if a purpose was accidental or intentional?

There. I think that's clearer than my previous attempts.

[Soyeong]

Ever the fan of Edward Feser, I'd like to quote him on final causes to give some perspective:

But biological organs and processes are by no means the only sorts of natural phenomena that exhibit final casualty, and it is a mistake to assume (as is often done) that to speak of final causes is simply another way of speaking about functions. All functions are instances of final causality, but not all final causality involves the having of a function, if by "function" we mean the sort of role a bodily organ plays in the life of an animal or the role a mechanical part plays in the operation of a machine. For the Aristotelian, final causality or teleology (to use a more modern expression) is evident wherever some natural object or process has a tendency to produce some particular effect or range of effects. A match, for example, reliably generates flame and heat when struck, and never (say) frost and cold, or the smell of lilacs, or thunder. It inherently "points to" or is "directed towards" this range of effects specifically, and in that way manifest just the sort of end- or goal-directedness characteristic of final causality, even though the match does not (unlike a heart or carburetor) function as an organic part of a larger system. The same directedness towards a certain specific effect or range of effects is evident in all causes operative in the natural world. When Aristotelians say that final causality pervades the natural order, then, they are not making the implausible claim that everything has a function of the sort biological organs have, including piles of dirt, iron filings, and balls of lint. Rather, they are saying that goal-directedness exists wherever regular cause and effect patterns do.

[Griggsy]

Aristotle, whilst a naturalist, errs with teleology as Thales of Miletus before him and his student Strato of Lampsacus after him would agree with science that telology reflects superstion- reduced animism.
SatantheAlien and I have masterfully reduced teleology here to the pseudo-explanation that it is! My old thread the two category mistake presents the science behind the reasoning. And yet, it illuminates that backward, nonsensical causation.
We atheologians find Feser another quack,because he relies on such outdated philosophy instead of rising above the shoulders of those responsible for modern science.Oh, do please quote him at length so that I won't have to go to his blog!
His quote reflects his begged question of desired outcomes that Carneades' atelic argument notes.
No directed outcomes came forth for the flowering plants, the cooling-off period, the asteroid and the demise of dinosaurs and mutations that caused certain primates to have us as their progeny!
Leucippus rightly notes necessity as the law behind mechanism, and it includes randomness, which happens without concern for outcomes as noted!
We mechanists win as science is mechanistic! Fundamentalists rightly note that no way exists to harmonize science and God! They err in their nescience!
So what are other theistic arguments not already covered here should we discuss?

Yes, I delight in exposing sophistry!
http://morgansblog.com [url]
http://ignosticmorgansblog.wordpress.com[url]
http://thestratonician.wordpress.com[url]
Google ThalesToday.

[technomage]

Yes, I delight in exposing sophistry!

Try looking at some of your own posts.

[robertb]

I'm not talking about how our hearts developed, but rather why they have a specific function at all. It doesn't matter how it came to be.

Asking why, teleologically, is to imply intent so you beg the question. Evolution, per the ToE, is without intent by definition.

I think you don't know what teleology is. If teleology doesn't exist medicine is unjustifiable, as medicine presupposes that their is a rightly ordered way of our body parts to function.

Medicine would be an example of intent, the bullseye painted around the proverbial dart. What we are discussing is the dart. Therefore the analogy itself begs the question.

The argument is not about whether or not our body parts are designed or how they evolved but why our body parts have function at all. When I said there was an intent behind them I didn't mean an intent behind evolution that resulted in their creation but rather an intent sustaining nature's existence so that non-mental entities can have goal-directedness. Even if we evolved by chance, that doesn't refute teleology or the argument behind it.

I am not trying to refute teleology per se, we can have a specific discussion about that if you wish.

I am refuting your attempt to apply the concept of teleology to the theory of evolution, a contradiction by definition.

[robertb]

Ever the fan of Edward Feser, I'd like to quote him on final causes to give some perspective:

A match is manufactured for a purpose. A carburetor is manufactured for a purpose. A heart is not. The analogy fails exactly at the point it wishes to support, directedness (intent). It simply begs the question.

[GioD]

Evolution, per the ToE, is without intent by definition.

I'm granting this.

Medicine would be an example of intent, the bullseye painted around the proverbial dart. What we are discussing is the dart. Therefore the analogy itself begs the question.

How does this beg the question? Medicine presupposes there is a way our organs are supposed to function.

I am refuting your attempt to apply the concept of teleology to the theory of evolution, a contradiction by definition.

I'm not trying to apply it to evolution, I'm trying to say even with evolution teleology exists - not as a purpose of evolution, but in the form of our bodies' functioning being driven towards an end.

[GioD]

A match is manufactured for a purpose. A carburetor is manufactured for a purpose. A heart is not. The analogy fails exactly at the point it wishes to support, directedness (intent). It simply begs the question.

The exact point is that certain traits of the heart can't be explained if it doesn't have an end. Even if it weren't made for a purpose, that purpose would still exist (from an Aristotelean perspective).

[GioD]

I'm not thinking clearly enough to attempt a formal argument, so the above are informal (and most likely pretty flawed) arguments.

Thank you techo. Your post gave me a lot to think and read about. I'm not entirely sure A. (or at least his followers) would have rejected multiple final causes, and I remember reading some problems with excluding both them and formal causes - even granting atheism. Either way, I'll have to look into it some more before discussing this further.

But that leaves open the question of whether or not the purpose was planned, or accidental. If a thing has an accidental purpose, this excludes the possibility that it was designed. If a thing has a deliberate purpose, this implies (actually, necessitates) a designer. How do you discern if a purpose was accidental or intentional?

Are you saying here that both have ends but one simply came to be by accident and the other by design? Or does the accidental one not have ends in anything resembling the Aristotelean sense?