Gym Debate: Is it rational to believe in the exsistence of the Christian God? (Rayado vs. Anon)

[Kelp]

Gym Debate Notice:

This debate thread is open to debate the following issue:

It is rational to believe that the Christian God exists.
Anon will be defending the negative and Rayado will be defending the affirmative. This debate will begin as soon as Anon makes his first post. The debate will last 5 rounds.


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[Kelp]

Moderated By: Kelp

My mistake. It will be Ray going first.

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[Rayado]

First off, I would like to thank my debate partner, Anon, for agreeing to this debate. This is my first Wrestling Ring debate; any mistakes I make are my own.

That being said, the Resolved for this debate is "It is rational to believe that the Christian God exists." I picked this one, as opposed to the slightly different "The Christian God exists," for a few different reasons that should become apparent through the course of this debate.

What does it mean to say that it is rational to believe that the Christian God exists? There are a number of different things we can unpack from this one statement. First, that we can know that God exists from observing reality, that we can know things about reality and about metaphysics, and that what we can know about God via reason and philosophy can lead us to the Christian God.

Several spectators have suggested that a direct appeal to the evidences of the Christian faith be presented and defended for such a debate; I think that this is putting the cart before the horse, as I shall explain later on.

I plan to take several lines of thought and bring them all together to show that belief in the Christian God is rational.

The hurdle that we've got to jump first is the question of truth: does truth exist? What makes something true? How can we test for truth? Without answering these questions, we cannot possibly hope to make sense of anything else we discuss.

We can know what truth is, and we can know whether or not things are true, for a number of different reasons. First, of the three methods of finding truth, only one makes sense. The first is a coherence theory of truth, which says that truth is what coheres to itself. The Pragmatic theory of truth, the one most popular today, is that truth is whatever works for you.
These two theories of truth both make the same mistake: they mistake a test for truth for the truth itself. Coherence theory boils down to subjectivism and cannot account for the possibility of two totally contradictory 'truths' that, while cohering to themselves, totally contradict each other. Thus they cannot both be true. The pragmatic theory breaks down because what is even meant by the term 'works' is ambiguous; also, things may work that we know are not true. It turns truth into the means to another end; thus under such a scheme there's no difference in saying "It is raining" and "It is useful to believe that it is raining," when in reality we know there's a huge difference between them.

This leaves us with the third theory, the Correspondence theory, which states that truth is what corresponds to reality. The simplest definition for truth that I've ever heard is "Truth is telling it like it is." Aristotle put it best: “To say of what is, that it is not, or of what is not, that it is, is false; while to say of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not, is true.” Even the competing theories of truth have to depend on the correspondence theory to make their claims!

So from this, we can say that truth is that which corresponds to reality.

But can we know reality? It's a question that is both basic and complex. The simple answer is "Yes, we can know reality." It's consistent with our sensory perception of a world around us that was here before we were. To say that we cannot know reality is self-defeating, because it tells us several things about reality: first, that we can know at least one thing about reality, that talk about reality is not meaningless, and that such a statement should be accepted as true. So to say that we cannot know reality is to say something meaningful that corresponds to reality--two things that such a denial of the knowability of reality contradicts!

We also have to have the right worldview. A worldview, of course, is the framework through which we view reality. And it is for this reason that I did not start with the usual evidence for miracles, because how we interpret them is affected by our worldviews. An atheist can say that the Resurrection happened, but that it was merely an anomaly; an agnostic can say that it happened, just that we don't (or can't) know how or why; a polytheist such as a Hindu can say that it happened because Jesus is obviously another guru or god in the pantheon. So miracles alone do not prove that God exists; but they are evidence that is best evaluated through the right worldview and with the right method (more on that later).

So what can reality tell us about God? This is where things really start to get interesting. When we look at reality, we see that it is constantly changing. If we were to walk to a park, and sit down in front of a tree, we would come to some conclusions about that tree: it exists, it is affected by nature and the world around it; and if we were to sit there for a long time, we would conclude that the tree is changing. It is growing, its leaves are either there or not, depending on the time of year, and if we sat there long enough, that tree would stop existing. We can look at little trees and come to the conclusion that our tree was caused by something else outside of itself. We can look at dead trees and come to the conclusion that our tree will not be around forever. And to become one with the tree really hurts.

We can take what we observed about the tree and apply it to the entire world: it is changing. Always. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus summed his worldview up by saying "Everything flows;" the world is always in motion. We ask: was it always so? Our tree came into being because of other events; our world came into being because of a cause of other events. If our tree came into being, it obviously cannot be said to be without a cause. Something caused it. We look at reality, and what do we see? It is changing. Like the tree that is a part of it, it must have been caused by something. Did it cause itself? Or did something else cause it? How long has this chain of events gone on?

Right about here is where Parmenides stepped up to the plate and suggested that all reality has the same being, because there were only two options: one was being, the other was not being. He said that being was what all things had in common; his view eventually came to be called monism. Plato, the Greek Atomists, and a few other groups tried to answer by saying it was differences in non-being that made the difference, but they ultimately failed to answer him. It was not until Thomas Aquinas came onto the scene that Parmenides was finally refuted: it was a difference in being that made all the difference. Aquinas said that there were two kinds of being: actual, and potential. To have actuality was to have existence; to be able to change was potency. In order to change at all, something must have potency, and it can only change in accord with whatever potency it has. Parmenides had fudged the two; he had not taken into account the different kinds of being. Thus he blew the doors wide open on the possibility of distinction between beings that are contingent (that is, relying upon another for its being), and beings that are necessary (beings that are not reliant upon another for being).

Thus we see that nature is a contingent being. What is it contingent upon? Itself? That is an impossibility--things cannot bring themselves into existence. Nor can it have just existed forever; that is an infinite regression of events and is physically impossible. Is it uncaused? That, too, is impossible; it has potency, and while act cannot become potency, potency can become actualized. So this leaves us with the only alternative: that it was caused by another--and that being can only be purely actual. Such a being cannot be material, for to be made up of material is to have potentiality. That being, then, would have to be both uncaused and immaterial. 'Pure Act' was the term Aquinas used to describe this being, and it's accurate. The interesting thing is that this means that I am arguing for an immaterial God; immaterial proofs are the order of the day. To ask for material proofs for an immaterial God is irrational.

So what does being Pure Act mean? We've ruled out the possibility of being material; but it also means that it has no limitations on its essence and being. Existence itself is an attribute of such a being. In fact, having no potentiality means that it cannot be limited in any of its attributes and essence: whatever it is, it is perfectly and eternally. Whereas things that have potency have being, a being that is pure act is being. And a being that has being itself as an attribute, it can be said to be a Necessary being: if being is there all along, it cannot not be. We cannot be because we have the potential not to be. Not so to anything that is Pure Act.

It also means that there cannot be more than one being who is Pure Act; to be able to differentiate between beings, we have to be able to say that there is a difference, and such a difference would indicate that one being lacks something that the other does not. And if something can be said to lack, it must be a potential being; and thus cannot be said to be Pure Act.

And we got all that from looking at a tree!

When it comes to the question of God, there are basically only six different worldviews: theism, deism, finite godism, pantheism, panentheism, or atheism. These six views appear in different forms in all world religions, and atheism itself can look a lot like pantheism depending on how it's defined.

But why does theism stand out among them as being the only true worldview? Theism corresponds to reality, whereas the other five do not. Deism, for example, asserts that a very great miracle--creation--while denying all the rest. This is little more than begging the question! Why insist that only one miracle is possible? Finite godism is refuted by the conclusion that God is pure act--to introduce limitations to his attributes contradicts what we can know, through reason, about God. So that's out. What about pantheism, the belief that all is God? It went into the garbage bin with monism. Not only that, to say that all is God ultimately breaks down into total relativism and chaos--for to say that everything is God, is to say that I am God, you are God, my computer is God (despite all evidences to the contrary, it acts more like the devil), and nothing is God--yet all of the above are true. So that boils down to self-contradiction. How about panentheism, the view that God is in the universe in the way that a soul is in a body? That's saying that God is both finite and infinite, which is incoherent. And atheism? It's possible to talk meaningfully about God, and his existence can be demonstrated through argumentation.

So with that information in mind, theism best fits the bill of what we know about reality. There is one being, that is Pure Act, who is beyond nature and yet who brings it into being. We aren't that being. Nature isn't that being. But such a being exists by necessity while all else exists by contingency.

To sum up so far:

Something undeniably exists.
Nothing cannot cause something.
Something eternally exists.
We are not eternal and unchanging.
Whatever is not eternal and unchanging needs a cause.
Therefore there is a necessary cause of my existence (that, by definition, is eternal).

So that puts us on the doorstep of theism, and someone could rightly say, "But this doesn't lead us to the Christian God!" And they'd be right--if I stopped there.

But we are personal; there is more to us than mere flesh and bone. We are different in kind than all other living beings in kind and degree: in kind because we are a different species, and in degree, because we can abstract ideas whereas everything else runs on instinct. So what is
the source of this intellect that we have? Nature can't give what it doesn't have; intelligence had to come from something other than nature. This is also where Descartes made his famous blunder: he started with man's ability to think. He literally put the cart before the horse; by starting in the mind, he sawed off the branch he sat on and paved the way for Kant to come along and make some equally bad conclusions about the arguments for God. Whereas Augustine, Aquinas, and modern thinkers like Craig or Geisler start with objectivity of truth as their starting point, Descartes started with subjective thought--and the effect was disastrous. He meant well; he wanted to assert beyond doubt God's existence, but he started in the wrong place. Kant came along after him, and concluded that all the arguments necessarily hinge on the Ontological argument, but this is far from the truth. Rather, the Ontological argument serves to contribute to the definition of God that is used in other arguments, but they are by no means based on them. And because Kant followed Descartes and started with the mind, he came to the conclusion that our minds could not cross the gap between the mind and reality; he said that reality was ultimately unknowable, and nearly destroyed the field of metaphysics in the process (I mean, really; when was the last time you took a metaphysics class at high school or college?).

But as philosopher Etienne Gilson aptly said, "If you start in the mind, you will never get out of the mind;" and that is exactly what Descartes and Kant did. Descartes started with a subjective approach that ultimately becomes relativism; and Kant, in saying that reality is incomprehensible, said something about reality that was both comprehensible and supposedly true.

So we have minds and we can think; neither minds nor thought can come from non-minds and non-thought, because those things do not have anything to give towards mind and thought. We are more than just material; our thoughts do not exist materially, the things we think about do not exist materially, although they affect the material of our being. Humans are moral beings; this also is curious. Morality is not something we get from that which is non-moral or even non-living; it makes sense that we get our morality in the same way we get our personality and intelligence. Nature cannot provide for these attributes that we have; no effect can be greater than its cause, and nature certainly doesn't have a cause great enough to cause something from nothing. However a being that is Pure Act does have the ability to effect morality, intelligence, and personhood in us because it has those attributes necessarily.

With the ability to apprehend things with our intellect is our ability to abstract universals from particular things in nature. This also sets us above creatures that act on instinct. Being able to apprehend universal truths allows us to make sense of the things we can say about God and reality. If we cannot apprehend universals, then it is meaningless to talk about anything absolutely. Plato said that universals had a real existence in themselves; Kant said they existed as categories in the mind; Ockham said they didn't exist at all, and all we have are particulars.
Universals can be said to be the essential attribute that makes a being so, and it applies to the whole category of whatever being has that attribute. They are immaterial; only particular things can be material, and it is not material that is essential to that being. For instance, I am not less of a human if I were to lose a hand or foot tomorrow; I would not be less of a human if I lost my hair, and I would not be less of a human if I was not able to apprehend reality (and thus, the nature of human nature has huge implications for things like abortion). It is the catness that a cat has, and the dogginess that a dog has--we can meaningfully say, "How much for that doggie in the window, " but we cannot meaningfully say "How much for that dogginess in the window?" The universal is the form that comes to exist in the mind from experiencing the particular examples of that essence, and the form of that thing comes to exist in the human mind. We can abstract the universal from a particular form, and it is that form that allows us to differentiate between different essences.

So to sum up again:

Something undeniably exists.
Nothing cannot cause something.
Something eternally exists.
We are not eternal and unchanging.
Whatever is not eternal and unchanging needs a cause.
Therefore there is a necessary cause of my existence (that, by definition, is eternal).
But we are personal, intellectual, and moral creatures.
Only that which has personality, intellect, and morality can create personal, intellectual, and moral creatures.
Therefore, a necessary being who is personal, intellectual, and moral caused personal, intellectual, and moral beings.

What can we know from this argument? We can know that we can know reality, that something necessarily exists, and that thing is eternal, unchanging, infinite, personal, intellectual, and moral that has the power to bring us into being.

Amazing what trees can teach us if we sit there long enough.

That description of fits what we call God. That description also happens to perfectly match what God reveals about himself in the Bible.

Moses had the temerity to ask God what his name was in Exodus 3, and in reply he was told "I AM WHO I AM"--'Yahweh,' whose very name was Being. We also find that God is personal (Genesis 1:26), all-knowing (Psalm 147:5, Romans 11:33), eternal (Psalm 90:2), unchanging (Malachi 3:6, Hebrews 6:18), and omnipresent (1 Kings 8:27, Colossians 1:17).
So there we have it. It is reasonable to conclude, from observing reality and drawing conclusions (that do not contradict and that conform to reality), that the God of the Bible exists, and that we can know that He exists, that it we can speak comprehensibly of Him, and that we can know Him personally (after all, we are personal). Only then, with this out of the way, can we appreciate the value of the miracles without mistakenly categorizing them. To say that it is unreasonable to believe that the Christian God exists, one would have to challenge the knowability of reality, the meaningfulness of God-talk, or demonstrate that the arguments I've used are irrational and/or contradictory, etc. There are also other arguments that we may cover later in the course of the debate.

To be sure, this is not all we can know about God through just looking at reality. We can know some things about God through reason, but not everything. Nor does it rule out the possibility of God revealing things about himself to us by way of special revelation.

It is entirely possible that I could fail in my objective and completely bomb every single possible argument and reasoning that God exists. However, this does not mean that God does not exist; it means that I have done an otherwise terrible job of saying why. My mind is subjective; but the objective forms and universals that we can all appeal to do not change because I've done a horrible job explaining them.

[Anon]

I. Introduction.

Like Rayado, this is my own first debate here in the Wrestling Ring, and, as such, all mistakes made are my own.

I would first like to begin my statement for thanking Rayado in kind for participating in this debate. As I read his case, the smile on my face grew wider and wider; although we may differ on this point at this moment, we are more together philosophically than one might first guess would exist between a theist and a nontheist.

Next, I should make it clear the position I hold. I am a Nontheistic, but open Agnostic, meaning that I hold that the question "Does God Exist?" is neither true nor false in my epistemic range of knowledge, but in reality, definitely has an answer (although the answer epistemologically may end up being provably unknowable, i.e. Strong Agnosticism).

A similarity can be drawn to the famous "NP Completeness" problem, of which the nerds here will automatically be nodding in recognition; for those who had better luck in high school with the opposite sex rather than mathematics, this is a very important postulation that currently has no proof. It may be true, and it may be not true - there is no question that it *is* true or not, but as far as human knowledge goes, no valid proof has yet been provided, and therefore nobody can make a definitive statement. This is not unlike how I feel about God in my own context of knowledge of reality.

Since I consider the question of God perhaps the most important question man can ask, I have started a voracious search for the truth (or falsity?) of His existence. As previously atheist, I held that God did not exist because no proof worked, and I was pretty fundie on this position. I've recognized now, however, that I have not adequately reflected on the proofs that are out there, and, furthermore, that I could not have actually been an atheist, because stating that no proofs exist does not mean that a God cannot exist.

However, since I mean to settle the question, I can, like the people who are fairly sure through other evidences that P does not equal NP in my nerdy universe, at least find whether God "probably" does not or does exist (by which I mean other evidences that are not logically conclusive but which follow from the assumption or denial of the case lead to the way the facts are) and then act accordingly in this assertive agnostic mode. Rayado goes further in strength with his case, though, as I shall explain.

II. Rayado's Case

Rayado's case claims that belief in the Christian God is rational. I think Rayado might be underestimating the power of his case here. Indeed, it proves the case rationally, i.e. no "most likely, but I dunno for sure" here! It is knowing, and not belief, which Rayado posits. That is powerful indeed.

Although the Biblical verses he cited include Old Testament for each case (showing perhaps only the Jewish God definitively), he's shown omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience, showing that if I'd indeed stacked the deck, I didn't stack it entirely well.

As it would not be fair to include a complete critique of Rayado's case, since he has not seen mine and since I am to have the last word, I will only include comments in my own case which deal with Rayado's opening statement, but which are the critiques I find most important for Rayado to consider so he may have some form of answer to work with when he makes his next statement. After my opening statement and Rayado's next post, I will focus on Rayado's case (and subsequent additional statement) with the fullness it deserves. I will, though, highlight many important similarities I share with Rayado's general philosophy.

III. My Case.

I will present my philosophy in brief here, and demonstrate why it leads to my current agnosticism about God's existence. In short, given the context of my knowledge, I cannot conclude the truth or falsity of God's existence, just as those in theoretical computing can't yet conclude the truth or falsity of the P=NP theorem given the context of knowledge in that subject. But, this does not mean Rayado cannot convert me to this notion; after all, Fermat's Last Theorem was left unproven (and undisproven) for quite a while before Andrew Wiles emerged from his closet not long ago with a definitive proof. And, as I have stated, I have not adequately seen all proofs. Rayado's proof is one of them!

I would ask Rayado to consider my philosophy and my subsequent objections in his further replies. Rayado will need to either demonstrate how I am overlooking God's existence by mistake given my philosophy, point out some things in my philosophy that are incorrect and offer corrections entailing God's existence, or add to my knowledge some things which lead to God.

A. Metaphysics and Epistemology - I agree with Rayado in many points here. Indeed, the cathedral of Aristotelean thought is the most beautiful in all of philosophy; it provides many answers to difficult questions, answers which subsequent philosophers attempted to destroy. Kant and Hume, in their wreckage of all that man can know, founded many of the worldviews that cause so much trouble today - including the worldview of many sects within Christianity (of which Raynado is not one!).

The following presupposes the axiomatic validity of the evidence senses of a healthy human, which means: one must use the evidence of the senses to deny them. Rayado may challenge me here if he wishes, but I don't think he will

I, too, ascribe to the correspondence theory of truth, but here is my central counterargument to what Raynado has presented so well in his first case - I will show his notion of contingency may not apply. For, what does it mean to correspond to reality? It means that what we know is how reality behaves, whether in relation to metaphysical objects or in relation to the nature of causation. But this presupposes that metaphysical reality - to which truth corresponds, and thus which ultimately dictates the nature of all truth - is the logically precedent foundation of logic and epistemology.

What does it mean to exist? Raynado uses the example of a tree - it is alive; it has a trunk, leaves, branches, and roots. Note, we are talking about one tree here, not "treeness" as such - imagine simply looking at the object in question, pretending we are some human who has never seen a tree before and perceiving these qualities without even knowing their names in any language. We see here, by example, the fundamental nature of what it means to exist: to exist, very loosely, is to possess qualities. Even if this set of qualities is unitary and self-evident, as with, say, a fermion, we still have: to be is to be something.

A is A, or, a particular has exactly its set of qualities. And it follows that A cannot be non-A; our savage from a desert island here recognizes that a tree does not walk around and speak, for example.

We cannot change this with our minds. And since such is the precedent foundation for the primary epistemological generalization of all existents - that A is A logically speaking (i.e. T = not(F)) - and since such recognition is tenseless (i.e. not time-dependent), then it is trivially necessary applied to metaphysics. A cannot be non A in epistemology; likewise in the metaphysics on which it necessarily depends, that which is given to our senses (given a healthy brain) is what it is necessarily. It cannot be any other way. Thus I cannot see how Rayado's definition of contingency is equivalent to the standard philosophical definition (i.e. that the negation would provide a logical contradiction).

What about beginning to exist, then? Well, this rests on causation, or the action of the identities of existents upon one another to generate, directly from the nature of the acting constituents, an arrangement thereof. Since such causation itself involves a set derivative from previous necessary identities, the effect is necessary, and "beginning to exist" means exactly a rearrangement into a current conceptual notion the preexisting material from previous particulars of a different conceptual nature. Things change - but the ultimate "stuff" does not come into nor pass out of existence. This seems to give trouble to Rayado's otherwise very powerful argument, as an aside.

As a result of causation witnessed in reality, our minds have a basis on which to perform logic. Our evaluations depend upon our inborn abilities, and upon man's ability to freely choose to focus on reasoning the evidence of our senses, where by "freely choose" I roughly mean the ability to select between two sets of rational lines (note: necessary causation does not wipe this notion out, since the free choice itself is the precedent and is necessarily caused).

Epistemological conceptualization has been unchallenged thus far, but a brief outline, should Rayado wish to analyze it, is that man takes reality and draws conclusions from similarities. Our savage may enter a forest after pondering his first tree - he sees other trees which have trunks, leaves, and so on. The size and shape of these are different, but fundamentally, these are not essential to "treeness." The similarities of the sets of the particulars is much greater than the differences. "Treeness" is gained, and may be now named, by our savage. This is how men gather the nature of reality, and eventually think about it conceptually and draw conclusions which enable him the power to rearrange the metaphysical for the benefit of his survival. Humanity, to invert Descartes, works on the principle: "I am, therefore, I think."

Thus, "treeness" is not solely in trees, apart from man; nor is it in some Platonic vat that has nothing to do with trees at all fundamentally. It is also not solely due to man's opinion, or a random, baseless "agreement of men," although differences in language may highlight presupposed differences in the importance of particulars. It is both a product of man's subjective consideration and reality's intrinsic nature. It is, in effect, both!

B. Man and Morality.

As Rayado states, man is more than mere flesh and bone. Indeed, the common objection that without God, man is nothing more than atoms clashing together, is a definition by non-essentials. Man, like all other given constituents of reality, has a nature, and although it includes his flesh and bone, the essential properties of man are also: his life, i.e. his ability to sustain his conscious existence, and his rationality and free will, i.e. his main method of doing such maintenance of his life (as opposed to his now-unreliable remnants of instinct).

Due to each particular man's limited ability, it is exceedingly likely - and, at birth, necessary - for a man to need a society in which to sustain his life. But since this society is exactly a set of men with the same essential and conceptual identity, our individual must behave accordingly - because of what man is, tells what we ought to do.

Why move from or seek shelter in the path of a tornado? The identity of the tornado - what it is - provides an immediate mode of action for what we ought to do. It presupposes our nature - that we are alive, and that we use rationality and choice to remain alive.

Likewise, in a society of men, we deal in kind with those who are of an identity like us. Since they are at all times of potential value whether individually or as a part of a body which allows means for our survival, their value is inherent, as all concepts in general, both within those outside of us and within us. That old canard "to love others, you must first love yourself" is actually a valuable statement of the human morality. In the proper context, all moral value-judgments - from the horrific nature of the Holocaust down to "harmless" little lies - can be derived from this.

Many will note the similarity with Ayn Rand here (I once quipped that I am so similar to Rand that she would consider me one of her worst enemies). However, Rand based her morality ultimately on one's particular self, making the crucial error when failing to recognize that such is derived and precedented, most importantly, by the nature of man as a whole, i.e. the nature of each and every "self." One's self must obviously be the source of this action, but it's hand-in-hand with others, providing a basis in altruism - so it is based not in the sacrifice of the self, as is commonly vomited out today in remnant echo of Kant, but rather in the love for one's life and recognition of the values of others both to yourself and within themselves.

The Lord Jesus Christ said (Luke 10-27, paraphrased), "as ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also to them likewise." That's about as good as it gets when describing what I meant in the above paragraph.

None of this entire philosophy, in my context of knowledge, neither accepts nor rejects the question of God. But since the question of God is especially important, as Christ also states that (in the Christian Theist sense) we are bound to also love Him, it is incumbent on me to not hold this question of agnosticism for long.

III. Of God.

There are many difficulties I have with the atheist position (both strong-atheist and agnostic-atheist). These difficulties will be presented in my next debate with my new friend CodewordConduit, and will be presented then; they are not pertinent for the context of this particular debate. So I will move to my difficulties with theism.

A. Creation Out of Nothing.

The problem of creation out of nothing is that, as Dr. Craig states, "out of nothing, nothing comes." This means: if there exists no properties to arrange, causation cannot happen. This makes Creation out of Nothing logically impossible, meaning even an omnipotent Being cannot do it, just as He cannot make a square circle or married bachelor. Perhaps I am mistaken with this notion, but I find it difficult to shake!

But what of the beginning of the Universe? An account for the cause of the Universe may be given to Rayado upon request, but I will await his request for this presentation should he wish for me to give an account.

B. The Conditional Problem of Evil

Although more shaky on the grounds of God's possible in-time existence, Rayado's notion of God seems to preclude One who is, at this moment (i.e. not sans Creation), timeless at all times (to put it in a seemingly awkward way). This means that all evil action exists as timelessly true and valid for God, meaning that evil is truly never defeated.

Furthermore, Rayado's presentation of God assigns His the necessary functioning of all things - including every evil act! Therefore, God cannot be omnibenevolent if He is outside time. This seems troubling.

C. The Nature of God the Father

How can a Being who is not spacial in nature be anywhere, more or less everywhere? How can an unchanging Being walk in the morning in the Garden, and speak to Moses (I am Who Am seems to me to preclude that it is God the Son speaking here)?

What of His Word in the Bible, and how we must treat it? Is it inerrant? I can suppose God's deliverance of the Scripture to their authors can be inerrant at that point, but the recordings (even the first) can suffer from human error. If the age of the Universe, the process of Creation, and evolution (which does not necessarily preclude even Christianity IMO, since it may have been the only logically possible way for God to bring us about!) are true as science indicates, then at least poor Moses, in Genesis 1, did the best he could - even now, people like Dr. Craig struggle with deep questions even given advanced science, so I could imagine poor Moses attempting to interpret the Vision he received from God with his own context of knowledge, and in a way that must be taught to the early, lost Jews to make them not simply say "wha...?" But is this a valid way to regard God's Word?

Part (C) is merely a barrier for me, not as much of a difficulty per se, but a barrier is a barrier!

IV. Conclusion.

Although I have not directly addressed all concerns yet out of fairness to Rayado regarding the debate order, I have presented a few necessary objections to his case, and presented my own case for my agnostic account for reality. As I search for God, I would like to reiterate that I am not attempting to defeat Christianity - although I have much trouble with the politics (those who know me know they may discuss religion all they want with me, but to STAY AWAY from the political arena!), of course being a Christian doesn't seem anymore to me to believe in the Republican Party for salvation . My respect for Christian beliefs has grown in my search, but my questions still remain.

I am looking forward, hungrily, to Rayado's next reply. I have a feeling that however my reflection of his case turns out, he and I will make great friends :thumbsup:

*NOTE* Rayado - I do not possess a word program at this time; my main computer just got busted up, and this one has a limited space which precludes such a program. Thus, if this goes significantly over what you expect from me, you may choose to make your next post as long as you wish, and to take a couple extra days to finish it up.

I hope I have respected the honor due to your position here, and have not stepped out of lines in disrespect. This is the important question that men explore, and your answer is a challenging one, and I can't wait to be challenged further!

[Rayado]

My first response will actually be in a reverse order of the things that my opponent presented them in; and I would like to start with Part III of his opening post, and work my way back from there, for a few different reasons. First, I think the objections to theism that were presented deserve to be dealt with first; second, I'm much more familiar with them than some of the other material presented; and third, when it comes to the things I'm not familiar with, such as sections of Part I, I would like to see more explanation so that I don't misjudge the arguments. Rather than start with things that we differ on, it would just make more sense to begin where we agree and work our way from there into things we may not agree on.
So without further ado, let's take a look at the barriers that have been presented.

Creation Out of Nothing.

The problem of creation out of nothing is that, as Dr. Craig states, "out of nothing, nothing comes." This means: if there exists no properties to arrange, causation cannot happen. This makes Creation out of Nothing logically impossible, meaning even an omnipotent Being cannot do it, just as He cannot make a square circle or married bachelor. Perhaps I am mistaken with this notion, but I find it difficult to shake!

The thing is, Dr. Craig is right. You can't give what you don't have, and that holds for the origin of the universe. Looking a few other options before we get to theism and creation ex nihilo:

If we were to say that the universe always existed, that leaves us with the problem of a being (nature), which is composed of both act and potency, by virtue of being material and having time as an attribute. Anything that has potency can change, and is contingent on some other being for its existence, be it another cause that either has a cause or is itself uncaused.

If we go the route of an infinite series of causes, we immediately run into two big problems: eventually, one of the causes must both be caused and self-caused, which is a blatant contradiction in terms. The other is the problem of an infinite series of moments of time: If an infinite number of moments have occurred before this one, why has not the universe died a cold death? Is not all matter 'winding down?' If an infinite series of moments occurred before this one, we could not have ever reached this one. But here we are. Infinite numbers of things work on paper, but not in reality. Potential infinite numbers are possible; actual infinite numbers are not.

If we look at a cause which is uncaused, we have to ask out of what was the universe created.

If we say the universe was created out of God, we've gone the route of pantheism or panentheism--and taken up the philosophical absurdities that those views are based upon. So the only good answer is that God created the world out of something other than Himself--that is to say, nothing. But what an omnipotent Being, who is Pure Act, can cause is being--and that is exactly what happened with Creation. There is no middle ground between nonbeing and being. Our being is analogous to His, because ours was given by Him. More than that, it is possible for him to effect being in something other than Himself.

The Bible clearly says that it is God who created and sustains the universe by His Word (Genesis 1:1, obviously, and verses like John 1:1-3, Colossians 1:15-17, and Hebrews 1:3). We are dealing with a being of Pure Act, who can do everything possible; this is no mere Zeus-wannabe. Remember, too, that God is transcendent over creation and apart from it; time is not one of his attributes. Everything He is, he is infinitely and eternally. Everything He is, He is perfectly. This alone alleviates many of the proposed problems.

But what of the beginning of the Universe? An account for the cause of the Universe may be given to Rayado upon request, but I will await his request for this presentation should he wish for me to give an account.

You may provide an account, but it obviously cannot resolve into self-contradiction by way of an infinite regress or ex deus.

But there is one other thing to be said about the nature of being that will have a direct impact on another issue: evil. More on that below.

The Conditional Problem of Evil

Although more shaky on the grounds of God's possible in-time existence, Rayado's notion of God seems to preclude One who is, at this moment (i.e. not sans Creation), timeless at all times (to put it in a seemingly awkward way). This means that all evil action exists as timelessly true and valid for God, meaning that evil is truly never defeated.

Furthermore, Rayado's presentation of God assigns His the necessary functioning of all things - including every evil act! Therefore, God cannot be omnibenevolent if He is outside time. This seems troubling.

I want to make a few things really, really clear before I proceed here: evil is a real problem for anybody who has ever lived. It's serious, and it deserves a serious answer that is neither glib nor dismissive.

That being said, there was one thing missing that is the most important part of the problem of evil: What is evil? In order to explain why evil is supposed to be a problem, would it not be wise to define it before you proceed? I want to understand what you mean by the term evil, and I want to be able to more precisely answer your objection--and I'm confident that the answer will either satisfy you, or leave you more appreciative of the theistic, Christian answer to the issue of evil. But there's a little more legwork that has to be done before we can really meet eye-to-eye on it yet.

The Nature of God the Father

Admittedly, this one is by far the most interesting to me. And for good reason!

How can a Being who is not spacial in nature be anywhere, more or less everywhere?

It goes back to His being Pure Act: a Being who is infinite exists, by definition, everywhere; it also follows from God being immaterial, Simple (that is, not composed of parts--eat that, Richard Dawkins), and without limit--it just makes sense when we think about the attributes and put them together.

How can an unchanging Being walk in the morning in the Garden, and speak to Moses (I am Who Am seems to me to preclude that it is God the Son speaking here)?

A very good question! The OT theophanies are veeeeeery interesting, for a number of reasons--not the least of which is that with only a few exceptions, the "Angel of the LORD" passages all indicate the divinity of said 'angel' (it's technically a mistranslation based off of two transliterations that didn't need to happen; the term almost always means 'messenger' instead of 'angel-as-in-the-class-of-beings that we call angels that appear from time to time in Scripture. Even a cursory introduction to the OT shows that an awful lot of people seemed to think they were seeing YHWH.

This also throws the doors wide open to the possibility of the one God being multi-personal. If we are to take John 1:18 and John 4:24 as true, then it was the Son they saw, yet the Son was correctly identified as Yahweh--and at the same time, correctly not identified as only the Father.

Oh, and to throw another wrench into the gears, let's take a look at Genesis 19:24:

Genesis 19:24

Then the LORD rained down burning sulfur on Sodom and Gomorrah—from the LORD out of the heavens.

The word in English that is translated LORD is the word Yahweh.

Two distinct Yahwehs, both acting in coordination; one on earth, the other in the heavens.

Now the obvious question is how can an infinite Being take upon himself the limitations of a physical presence within space and time? It's a fair question, with an equally fair answer: such a manifestation is not part of the eternal nature of God. God makes it abundantly clear that he is not a man, but that does not mean that he cannot take the form of man--because he is not essentially man.

Romans 1:20 makes it very clear, along with the John verses, that the Father is invisible, and yet known by his effects upon nature. The same goes for Hebrews 1:3: whatever the Father is invisibly, the Son is visibly. (And let's face it, that's a pretty elegant way of describing their Being.)

What of His Word in the Bible, and how we must treat it? Is it inerrant?

That's an interesting question; I think that when we look at the nature of God, within the right worldview and with the right method of determining truth, we can arrive at inerrancy.

I can suppose God's deliverance of the Scripture to their authors can be inerrant at that point, but the recordings (even the first) can suffer from human error.

Inerrancy admits that. It states that the copies of the originals are authoritative, but not inerrant. Inerrancy only applies to the originals.

If the age of the Universe, the process of Creation, and evolution (which does not necessarily preclude even Christianity IMO, since it may have been the only logically possible way for God to bring us about!) are true as science indicates, then at least poor Moses, in Genesis 1, did the best he could - even now, people like Dr. Craig struggle with deep questions even given advanced science, so I could imagine poor Moses attempting to interpret the Vision he received from God with his own context of knowledge, and in a way that must be taught to the early, lost Jews to make them not simply say "wha...?" But is this a valid way to regard God's Word?

Let's ask that question. If we're gonna go that route, we have to ask the question of how we deal with phenomenological language--that is, how the authors of the Bible described the miraculous. But the one thing we don't see with the writings is nervousness, or even shiftiness on the parts of the authors: the accounts are sober. Even casual--take the 'God walking in the garden' passage, for example. The events were sometimes terrifying, even in the description, but we don't see that terror reflected in the actual writing; it's too straightforward.

Part (C) is merely a barrier for me, not as much of a difficulty per se, but a barrier is a barrier!

Let's bring in the demolition crew, shall we?

Moving backwards, on to the case presented by Anon. I'll respond to some things, but not all, because there's a fair amount that we agree on. If I don't get to something, and you would like a response, just let me know.

I, too, ascribe to the correspondence theory of truth, but here is my central counterargument to what Raynado has presented so well in his first case - I will show his notion of contingency may not apply. For, what does it mean to correspond to reality? It means that what we know is how reality behaves, whether in relation to metaphysical objects or in relation to the nature of causation. But this presupposes that metaphysical reality - to which truth corresponds, and thus which ultimately dictates the nature of all truth - is the logically precedent foundation of logic and epistemology.

Actually, this is not a presupposition. This is why I started with objective reality by way of a tree. My conclusions were arrived at after observing the tree; they are a posteriori rather than a priori. You do not have to presuppose a necessary being to arrive at the existence of said necessary being.

Although the Biblical verses he cited include Old Testament for each case (showing perhaps only the Jewish God definitively), he's shown omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience, showing that if I'd indeed stacked the deck, I didn't stack it entirely well.

This is why I didn't bat an eye at M's caution, and why I didn't start with the usual appeals to the Resurrection.

What about beginning to exist, then? Well, this rests on causation, or the action of the identities of existents upon one another to generate, directly from the nature of the acting constituents, an arrangement thereof. Since such causation itself involves a set derivative from previous necessary identities, the effect is necessary, and "beginning to exist" means exactly a rearrangement into a current conceptual notion the preexisting material from previous particulars of a different conceptual nature. Things change - but the ultimate "stuff" does not come into nor pass out of existence. This seems to give trouble to Rayado's otherwise very powerful argument, as an aside.

Actually, that's not a fair description of how the law of thermodynamics works. While the Law states that matter can neither be created nor destroyed, it raises a problem: it's a Law. Laws come in two flavors, prescriptive and descriptive. This one happens to be a descriptive law with a hint of minty freshness. It describes things, and that makes all the difference--it describes nature ceteris paribus, all other things being equal. It works great when matter and motion are in place; but if you're going to try to use it for a cause of the universe, you're stuck with trying to explain how motion can be eternal--and you may find yourself trying to argue for a self-caused cause--and good science must have good philosophy as a foundation. So don't say I didn't warn you.

I specifically left the Moral Argument out of my Opening statement, but I am glad that Anon has brought it up, because it has much to do with the nature of being. It raises the question of how we should be. I'd like to revisit this argument more, once we've hammered out a definition for good and evil.

And lastly, Part I:

Next, I should make it clear the position I hold. I am a Nontheistic, but open Agnostic, meaning that I hold that the question "Does God Exist?" is neither true nor false in my epistemic range of knowledge, but in reality, definitely has an answer (although the answer epistemologically may end up being provably unknowable, i.e. Strong Agnosticism).

It seems to me, based on your previous appeal to the First Law of Thermodynamics, that your position on the existence of God differs (from atheism) not in being, but in non-being. We will see, however, whether or not that's the case.

A similarity can be drawn to the famous "NP Completeness" problem, of which the nerds here will automatically be nodding in recognition; for those who had better luck in high school with the opposite sex rather than mathematics, this is a very important postulation that currently has no proof. It may be true, and it may be not true - there is no question that it *is* true or not, but as far as human knowledge goes, no valid proof has yet been provided, and therefore nobody can make a definitive statement. This is not unlike how I feel about God in my own context of knowledge of reality.

To be honest, this was a little too technical for me--it's from a different field, so I'm not used to the problem. However, I suspect something from it, but I'm going to ask you to explain it further, so I don't misjudge you or the position you take. Enough strawmen have been burned by theists and nontheists; one more is not something I want to contribute to this discussion. This is your opportunity to explain your case more fully.

Let's enjoy ourselves in this debate, not rush things, and really take the time to understand one another, both for our sakes and for those observing our discussion. We can all benefit from it then.

[Anon]

I would first like to thank Rayado for allowing me a few extra days for a response, due to my losing my main computer. I have had some time to ponder some of the excellent points he has raised, and I hope to meet that challenge with a few questions and challenges of my own.

Since I am writing this on a utility where I won't accidentally lose the text of my post to any random crash, you'll have to forgive my lack of quoting ability; I'll try my best.

In the first part of your response, you wrote that

If we go the route of an infinite series of causes, we immediately run into two big problems: eventually, one of the causes must both be caused and self-caused, which is a blatant contradiction in terms. The other is the problem of an infinite series of moments of time: If an infinite number of moments have occurred before this one, why has not the universe died a cold death? Is not all matter 'winding down?' If an infinite series of moments occurred before this one, we could not have ever reached this one. But here we are. Infinite numbers of things work on paper, but not in reality. Potential infinite numbers are possible; actual infinite numbers are not.

If we look at a cause which is uncaused, we have to ask out of what was the universe created.

If we say the universe was created out of God, we've gone the route of pantheism or panentheism--and taken up the philosophical absurdities that those views are based upon. So the only good answer is that God created the world out of something other than Himself--that is to say, nothing. But what an omnipotent Being, who is Pure Act, can cause is being--and that is exactly what happened with Creation. There is no middle ground between nonbeing and being. Our being is analogous to His, because ours was given by Him. More than that, it is possible for him to effect being in something other than Himself.

The Bible clearly says that it is God who created and sustains the universe by His Word (Genesis 1:1, obviously, and verses like John 1:1-3, Colossians 1:15-17, and Hebrews 1:3). We are dealing with a being of Pure Act, who can do everything possible; this is no mere Zeus-wannabe. Remember, too, that God is transcendent over creation and apart from it; time is not one of his attributes. Everything He is, he is infinitely and eternally. Everything He is, He is perfectly. This alone alleviates many of the proposed problems.

From what I gather, you justify here that creation ex nihilo is possible by the impossibility of the contrary - i.e. that it is impossible for a first mover of pure Act not to exist. Nonetheless, to preclude any potential arguments with a naturalistic account, how do you define potency, act, and contingency here (forgive my lapse on Aristotle here; it's been a decade!)? I am not entirely sure how a being of pure act may bring about existence - an account of the process is given (beautifully!) by the Holy Bible, but an account of the methodology is not. How can this being be outside of time other than sans creation, if He had to make the free decision to create, as Dr. Craig puts it? I assume that you may mean God the Father is timeless and Christ, through Whom it is made, is now in time (obviously, given the New Testament ) but maybe some exact clarification is needed about the Father, who after all must have "pushed the button" to enable this, so to speak.

Here are two accounts I can give for the Universe. For reasons of philosophical appeal, I lean toward the latter argument; the former argument may still be the case, however.

I. An Infinite Chain of Causes

Furthermore, I cannot see what is wrong with an infinite series of causes. Now, note carefully that I do not believe in an absolute time, since time *must* be tied to some metaphysical notion, such as the Earth's rotation around the Sun, or, to use a very precise definition, light's motion across a specified distance in a vacuum. Even so, these motions have antecedent causes; thus, time is logically preceded by metaphysical cause and effect.

So, we see that a notion of "metaphysical time" can be linked to a chain of causal events, where (roughly!) "a happens before b" (a and b standing for events in our chain) means that b cannot be actual without the actuality of a, where "actuality" means "the set of all metaphysically true states," or the word "now," if you please For instance, if a is "a 998 mb surface low pressure system arrives in Colorado" and b is "Darrin sees his first real tornado near the city of Wakeeney, Kansas," then from elementary meteorology it is clear that a precedes b by my definition here.

What does this have to do with the infinite chain of causes? Well, it is certain, given our definition of time (exactly "second," or that weird period of some kind of cesium atom decay) that under this constantly held time unit, the available entropy of the universe entails that if we string too many "seconds" together, we haven't a universe at all in the past. But what about causation? Entropy, when taken closer and closer to the Big Blammo, decreases; coupled with the Special Theory of Relativity, we have a system of, metaphysically speaking, a lot of causes happening over a "second" way back then, relative to the mundane, nearly-constant number of causes that happen over the span of a second nowadays.

Back then, there were no cesium atoms to decay; metaphysics didn't properly contain a physics with *any* atoms, when you look at it. In short, holding this standard of causation to "back then" doesn't have any proper referents.

Instead, let's simply hold to metaphysics and dispense of relating time to one particular cause, and redefine it to examining a chain of causes. Hop on a chain of causation and flip the switch backwards - we go slow for a long span, then we start hopping to precedent causes REALLY "quickly" *relative to how our ride was before.* In other words, for immediately subsequent actions a1 and b1 "nearer" to the Big Blammo, and immediately subsequent actions a and b "nearer" to us, it would take on average, say, ten million repetitions of a1 to b1 to cover the space between a being true and b being true.

To model it properly, grab your nearest scientific calculator and graph sin (1/x). Look at the crests of the waves and imagine the points at the crests being metaphysical actions, and examine how they increase relative to one another at almost a hyper rate as we approach the origin down the x-axis. There is, in fact, an infinite number of such crests between any such point and x=0. There's a model that doesn't ruin physics, as it respects entropy and actually draws from notions implicit in a smaller, hotter universe.

What of the problems of actual infinites? Well, the present is the set of all metaphysically true states; these events are no longer metaphysically true, and so do not fall into the actual infinite problem, just as the set of future events will not.

What of the problem of traversing this infinite? The word "traversing" means, in all the usage I've seen, to form the set of past events by "successive addition." One does not "form" the set, however - to "form" means to begin with the empty set and then build by adding ordered elements. To state that such a set needs to be formed is to presuppose a beginning, and in this hypothesis, we have presupposed no beginning, and I have found no contradiction: the set is the metaphysically given.

II. The Big Wad

However, it may be that physics entails that (I) is not actually the case, i.e. that at some state a1, the precedent state (by some hypothetical physical theory) must be a first state b1. This is what Einstein proposed. This is also the way of things which I find more consistent, which means: I concede the Kalam Cosmological Argument (which would also follow directly from your argument!).

To avoid the problems with creation ex nihilo, and to account for the way the universe is, we again start with the metaphysically given, and some (now finite) causal chain. In fact, we take the union of all causal chains, which, since things do not begin to exist without a cause, must all lead back to this first moment.

What we then have is a sort of blob of all constituents that will make up all future states. I don't know what these are speaking in the realm of physics; for all I care, before Plank time, that these are miniature slices of pepperoni pizza pirouetting about quite quickly and bashing into each other to form newer, fresher toppings. It doesn't matter; let's reduce ourselves to the Singularity and get on with it. (Note here: if Quantum Gravity wipes the Singularity, the reasoning would be similar, as I would still assert that even under QM it still must be so that causation is ordered - the "distance" need not be "dimension zero" for this).

The set of all that exists must, as Einstein showed, come together at a single point, but taking a relational view of distance doesn't necessitate that (I view distance to be as epistemologically dependent as I do time); metaphysically speaking, what is entailed is a state A in which the set of all reality constituents {a1, ... , an) are all acting equally upon one another. In other words, a1 acts on a2, a3, a4, ... , an, and each other element does so likewise. If you were to make a graph, each element would be connected to each other element with a double-sided arrow, and you'd have a massive ball of yarn for sure!

So we have a glob of the basis constituents (whatever they may be, or whatever they USED to be at this first state) for all matter and energy, smashed together so as that all elements act on all other elements. This has the property of being (a) timeless (and thus Uncreated), as all possible causation at this state is "true" and no ordering is thus entailed here; (b) spaceless, as distance would not apply to such a superimposed state, as it would have no referent; (c) cleared of the problems of creation ex nihilo (atheistic or theistic); (d) sufficient to bring time and space into being, since such a "massive cause" entails a change, i.e. entails that the next state must involve separate (distance), ordered strings of causation (time), since otherwise the set of all these simultaneous actions in the "big wad" would give no effect, contradicting the fact that they are acting at all.

We thus have two cases accounting for the Universe - the latter which even concedes Kalam.

III. Other Considerations.

I will now address other points you raised briefly:

As for the problem of evil, I do realize its seriousness; if you wish to hold off on it, you may feel free to take that option, and I will not fault you in the least. This is a serious match in the gasoline no matter where your theistic beliefs fall. But should you wish to continue, I will define evil very broadly: "that which is not conducive to man's life." Now, we can have various types of evil: natural calamity, the initiation of physical force (murder, rape), and the initiation of nonphysical force (deceit, trust-breaking, theft), and the non-socially-related actions of self-harm (covetousness, self-deceit, wreckless behavior, suicide).

If God does "hold the Universe together at all times," so to speak (as is not necessitated by the verses you quoted, since He may have Created the universe through Christ to hold together by virtue of the inherent identities of what He made), then God must hold all evil acts actively; this seems to be quite a harsh charge, and troubles me greatly. It almost implies that dreaded specter that led me away from Christianity a dozen years ago in the span of a single night - theological determinism.

On the Simplicity of God - what do you mean here? I am not quite sure; God must contain all knowledge of the Universe, and that is not simple. However, if you mean metaphysically, then God is *at least* Triune, unless you do not hold such views of the trinity. Even in three, He may be simple, but he is not *unitarily* simple, unless you mean to consider that all three "members" are of the same *essential substance* (Act) in the Beginning.

Good point on Laws (in physics). I hope I've challenged some of those other notions above - by the way, we've gotta team up and teach all those "physics wipes out metaphysics" people some sound principles. That physics must have a sound philosophy behind it is so true and is missing entirely from science nowadays. It's depressing!

Good job with your case so far, Rayado. I will listen to your answers to my arguments, but will only respond tersely; we ought to continue that going, as it is obviously a very crucial question, but in my next statement, I will switch the *main* focus more toward the Scriptures, Jesus Christ, inerrancy, and all that entails, if that's all right with you - unless it's all right to extend this discussion a few rounds (it's fine with me)!

Best wishes and looking forward to your next post with great anticipation -

-Darrin

(NOTE: I'm a bit tired after all this typing; I'm going to submit this particular post unedited, so apologies in advance for bad writing and typos)

[Rayado]

I would first like to thank Rayado for allowing me a few extra days for a response, due to my losing my main computer. I have had some time to ponder some of the excellent points he has raised, and I hope to meet that challenge with a few questions and challenges of my own.

Let's see what this new round brings, shall we?

Since I am writing this on a utility where I won't accidentally lose the text of my post to any random crash, you'll have to forgive my lack of quoting ability; I'll try my best.

Not a problem.

From what I gather, you justify here that creation ex nihilo is possible by the impossibility of the contrary - i.e. that it is impossible for a first mover of pure Act not to exist.

Not quite--the impossibility of other alternatives does not contribute to the possibility of my claim. We simply have to dismiss that which is logically contradictory, such as denying reality, a cause that is both caused by something else and itself at the same time, etc. I am simply eliminating alternatives; the fact that they may not be good enough is, by itself, not enough to show creation ex nihilo correct, but it certainly will prevent unnecessary trips down rabbit holes.

Nonetheless, to preclude any potential arguments with a naturalistic account, how do you define potency, act, and contingency here (forgive my lapse on Aristotle here; it's been a decade!)?

No problem. It was actually Aquinas, not Aristotle, who defined and distinguished them. Act is that which is; potentiality is that which can be. Contingency is that which is caused (think the term contingent that is used nowadays; it means plans in case of certain scenarios, etc.) That, in turn, is distinguished from the term 'necessary,' which simply means that such a being is, for lack of a better term, necessary (I know, we theists are so creative). It's possible for something to be both necessary and contingent; an example of this would be parents. They are necessary for their children, yet themselves are contingent upon their own parents. All contingent beings derive their existence from something else by virtue of having potentiality--the ability to change, however that change might come about.

I used the example of a tree to talk about what a contingent being is. Our tree is contingent upon many different things in nature; nature, as we see it today, is itself contingent upon something else. We know this because it changes. We observe it changing. It cannot be said to be unchanging. A being that is unchanging cannot be said to be contingent, for to say that it is contingent is to say that its being relies upon something else. That being, by definition, would only be necessary; it has no change to be accounted for in its being.

I am not entirely sure how a being of pure act may bring about existence - an account of the process is given (beautifully!) by the Holy Bible, but an account of the methodology is not. How can this being be outside of time other than sans creation, if He had to make the free decision to create, as Dr. Craig puts it?

I actually don't like the language of God 'deciding' to create, because it's not quite accurate. I say this because to say that God decided anything would be to put God into time, into the possibility of change (on the language that the Bible uses about repenting, etc, I might get to that later). In fact, the question of what God was doing before creation is a meaningless question, because time is not in God's nature. To put God in time is to limit His nature; to be in time is to be able to change.

You want my honest answer about how God brought time and space into being? I don't know. My mind is finite; I can know that He did without knowing how. The ability to create the universe from nothing, instantly, boggles my mind. Yet I know that it makes sense philosophically to speak of it in the way that I have.

I assume that you may mean God the Father is timeless and Christ, through Whom it is made, is now in time (obviously, given the New Testament ) but maybe some exact clarification is needed about the Father, who after all must have "pushed the button" to enable this, so to speak.

We may be getting waaay ahead of ourselves here, but the historic Christian statement has been that Jesus has two natures, one human, and one divine. In Jesus' divine nature, he shares all the attributes of deity with the Father and the Spirit--eternality, uncausality, the omni-attributes, etc. To add humanity to his deity was not a confusion of the divine and human natures. They did not mix, but were joined in His person in the Incarnation.

One thing I need to stress is that while God is outside of time, He views all of time at once, and in that sense He is acting in time at all times.

Here are two accounts I can give for the Universe. For reasons of philosophical appeal, I lean toward the latter argument; the former argument may still be the case, however.

I. An Infinite Chain of Causes

Furthermore, I cannot see what is wrong with an infinite series of causes. Now, note carefully that I do not believe in an absolute time, since time *must* be tied to some metaphysical notion, such as the Earth's rotation around the Sun, or, to use a very precise definition, light's motion across a specified distance in a vacuum. Even so, these motions have antecedent causes; thus, time is logically preceded by metaphysical cause and effect.

I would agree that that is how we measure time, but time itself is not dependent upon what yardstick we use to measure it.

So, we see that a notion of "metaphysical time" can be linked to a chain of causal events, where (roughly!) "a happens before b" (a and b standing for events in our chain) means that b cannot be actual without the actuality of a, where "actuality" means "the set of all metaphysically true states," or the word "now," if you please For instance, if a is "a 998 mb surface low pressure system arrives in Colorado" and b is "Darrin sees his first real tornado near the city of Wakeeney, Kansas," then from elementary meteorology it is clear that a precedes b by my definition here.

I would agree so far that your seeing your first tornado is contingent upon the conditions being right to produce said tornado. But I would define act as 'that which is,' because there's more to act than a set of statements. Act is being. (Make a mental note of this definition, it will show up later.)

What does this have to do with the infinite chain of causes? Well, it is certain, given our definition of time (exactly "second," or that weird period of some kind of cesium atom decay) that under this constantly held time unit, the available entropy of the universe entails that if we string too many "seconds" together, we haven't a universe at all in the past. But what about causation? Entropy, when taken closer and closer to the Big Blammo, decreases; coupled with the Special Theory of Relativity, we have a system of, metaphysically speaking, a lot of causes happening over a "second" way back then, relative to the mundane, nearly-constant number of causes that happen over the span of a second nowadays.

Back then, there were no cesium atoms to decay; metaphysics didn't properly contain a physics with *any* atoms, when you look at it. In short, holding this standard of causation to "back then" doesn't have any proper referents.

Are you saying that time is contingent (pardon the use) upon our ability to measure it? I contend that time is a property that all contingent beings have, regardless of how it is measured, by virtue of contingency. Change implies that something exists in two different states, but not simultaneously in those states. Time is what we say such a change takes place in; this allows us to measure such change, be it nearly instant or over millions of years. Time allows us to measure before and after; those terms are meaningless to any being that is eternal, since there isn't a before or after to measure it by.

Instead, let's simply hold to metaphysics and dispense of relating time to one particular cause, and redefine it to examining a chain of causes. Hop on a chain of causation and flip the switch backwards - we go slow for a long span, then we start hopping to precedent causes REALLY "quickly" *relative to how our ride was before.* In other words, for immediately subsequent actions a1 and b1 "nearer" to the Big Blammo, and immediately subsequent actions a and b "nearer" to us, it would take on average, say, ten million repetitions of a1 to b1 to cover the space between a being true and b being true.

Are you saying that the nearer we get (backwards) to the Big Bang, the more 'repetitions' are required to measure time?

To model it properly, grab your nearest scientific calculator and graph sin (1/x). Look at the crests of the waves and imagine the points at the crests being metaphysical actions, and examine how they increase relative to one another at almost a hyper rate as we approach the origin down the x-axis. There is, in fact, an infinite number of such crests between any such point and x=0. There's a model that doesn't ruin physics, as it respects entropy and actually draws from notions implicit in a smaller, hotter universe.

Infinity behaves nicely when on paper, I'll grant you that. We can do math with it. What we can't do is have an actually infinite number of real things.

What of the problems of actual infinites? Well, the present is the set of all metaphysically true states; these events are no longer metaphysically true, and so do not fall into the actual infinite problem, just as the set of future events will not.

We must be careful; at which point does something that was once true become false, and how?

What of the problem of traversing this infinite? The word "traversing" means, in all the usage I've seen, to form the set of past events by "successive addition." One does not "form" the set, however - to "form" means to begin with the empty set and then build by adding ordered elements. To state that such a set needs to be formed is to presuppose a beginning, and in this hypothesis, we have presupposed no beginning, and I have found no contradiction: the set is the metaphysically given.

I would say that the problem with trying to traverse an infinite is that it's trying to amass an infinite number of finite things. I'm a cat person, and I'm fine with a finite number (small, mind you) of cats. It would be patently impossible to amass an infinite number of cats, for a number of reasons: first, the number of cats that exist and that have ever existed is finite; even if, in some bizarre alternate reality, if you could amass an infinite number of cats, such a reality would be infinitely cats. But I also contend that the idea of an infinite number of finite things is a self-contradiction. I also think we agree, more or less, so far.

II. The Big Wad

However, it may be that physics entails that (I) is not actually the case, i.e. that at some state a1, the precedent state (by some hypothetical physical theory) must be a first state b1. This is what Einstein proposed. This is also the way of things which I find more consistent, which means: I concede the Kalam Cosmological Argument (which would also follow directly from your argument!).

Well, that's just good logic. It dumps us off at the door of garden-variety theism, and not at the destination I'm looking for, that a more detailed Cosmological argument shoots for.

To avoid the problems with creation ex nihilo, and to account for the way the universe is, we again start with the metaphysically given, and some (now finite) causal chain. In fact, we take the union of all causal chains, which, since things do not begin to exist without a cause, must all lead back to this first moment.

What we then have is a sort of blob of all constituents that will make up all future states. I don't know what these are speaking in the realm of physics; for all I care, before Plank time, that these are miniature slices of pepperoni pizza pirouetting about quite quickly and bashing into each other to form newer, fresher toppings. It doesn't matter; let's reduce ourselves to the Singularity and get on with it. (Note here: if Quantum Gravity wipes the Singularity, the reasoning would be similar, as I would still assert that even under QM it still must be so that causation is ordered - the "distance" need not be "dimension zero" for this).

The set of all that exists must, as Einstein showed, come together at a single point, but taking a relational view of distance doesn't necessitate that (I view distance to be as epistemologically dependent as I do time); metaphysically speaking, what is entailed is a state A in which the set of all reality constituents {a1, ... , an) are all acting equally upon one another. In other words, a1 acts on a2, a3, a4, ... , an, and each other element does so likewise. If you were to make a graph, each element would be connected to each other element with a double-sided arrow, and you'd have a massive ball of yarn for sure!

So we have a glob of the basis constituents (whatever they may be, or whatever they USED to be at this first state) for all matter and energy, smashed together so as that all elements act on all other elements. This has the property of being (a) timeless (and thus Uncreated), as all possible causation at this state is "true" and no ordering is thus entailed here; (b) spaceless, as distance would not apply to such a superimposed state, as it would have no referent; (c) cleared of the problems of creation ex nihilo (atheistic or theistic); (d) sufficient to bring time and space into being, since such a "massive cause" entails a change, i.e. entails that the next state must involve separate (distance), ordered strings of causation (time), since otherwise the set of all these simultaneous actions in the "big wad" would give no effect, contradicting the fact that they are acting at all.

I have a question at this point: by elements, do you mean to say that this Singluarity is composed of parts, or not? If you speak of it as a 'wad,' does that not imply that it is made of parts? How can you describe it both as being in a state of flux, and yet timeless? And if it has parts, how can you say that it is uncaused? Inquiring minds want to know. :3

I would contend that such a singlarity--yeah, that one, the one that the universe once was--has potentiality, the ability to change. That alone throws out the possibility of it being unchanged, because that which is eternally unchanged is also eternally unchangeable.

We thus have two cases accounting for the Universe - the latter which even concedes Kalam.

Even though the Kalam form is quick and to the point, I prefer the longer Cosmological arguments--and with your description of the 'big wad,' we may have stepped into the realm of the Design argument--which I think can serve a different purpose than what most people use it for. We may yet get to discuss that.

III. Other Considerations.

I will now address other points you raised briefly:

As for the problem of evil, I do realize its seriousness; if you wish to hold off on it, you may feel free to take that option, and I will not fault you in the least.

That would be very disappointing, to myself and pretty much everyone watching this debate. There is much that we can learn about it from our previous discussion about being.

This is a serious match in the gasoline no matter where your theistic beliefs fall. But should you wish to continue, I will define evil very broadly: "that which is not conducive to man's life." Now, we can have various types of evil: natural calamity, the initiation of physical force (murder, rape), and the initiation of nonphysical force (deceit, trust-breaking, theft), and the non-socially-related actions of self-harm (covetousness, self-deceit, wreckless behavior, suicide).

I would like to take a brief step back for a moment to propose two definitions. I could start with evil, but that would still leave me without a definition of what good is. Therefore, allow me to define good so that we may better understand evil: That which is good is as it should be.

As a Christian, I do not affirm the above definition of evil, because there are some things that are very much conducive to one man's life that are not conducive to another's; yet all the things you mentioned have one other thing in common: a privation--a lack--of good that should be there. Evil is the absence of good in something. They take away being that should be there; moreso in human evil than in natural evil, but disaster is the destruction or marring of being.

Thus we can say that in the things you mentioned--rape, murder, deceit, trust-breaking, theft, covetousness, etc. etc.--that which should be is not. Evil has no real nature in itself; it is in the corruption of the good that evil is found. And because evil is a lack of being, no being can be said to be pure evil in itself, not even Satan--because even he is a fallen creature, created good, who fell.

If God does "hold the Universe together at all times," so to speak (as is not necessitated by the verses you quoted, since He may have Created the universe through Christ to hold together by virtue of the inherent identities of what He made), then God must hold all evil acts actively; this seems to be quite a harsh charge, and troubles me greatly. It almost implies that dreaded specter that led me away from Christianity a dozen years ago in the span of a single night - theological determinism.

It does not need to lead necessarily to that conclusion. That he allows evil to happen is not His fault; it certainly does not come from his being or essence. But God is pure act; and acting at once throughout history, and keeping in mind the omnipresence and omnipotence of God that can be arrived at from his pure being, it would be quite proper to say that God can use evil, even evil that He allows, for a far greater good. I would even say that He uses all evil to bring about greater good; in fact, the greatest evil possible--the death of the Son of God himself--was used to bring about the greatest good possible, and through it, the greatest evil of all was overcome. Our God is a Judo master, so to speak.

On the Simplicity of God - what do you mean here? I am not quite sure; God must contain all knowledge of the Universe, and that is not simple. However, if you mean metaphysically, then God is *at least* Triune, unless you do not hold such views of the trinity. Even in three, He may be simple, but he is not *unitarily* simple, unless you mean to consider that all three "members" are of the same *essential substance* (Act) in the Beginning.

I kind of wish I had started my response with this paragraph, because the simplicity of God informs an awful lot of what I've said so far. In fact, I would recommend that you go over some of my responses again in light of what Divine Simplicity entails below, because it may shed light on stuff that may have been unclear.

What I mean by saying that God is simple in being is that he is not composed of parts, and that he is one in essence. He is Spirit; spirit, being immaterial, is not composed of parts. Divine simplicity does not refer to His knowledge; it refers to God being one in essence.

As a Trinitarian, I think that the Trinity follows from Divine Simplicity: there are three persons in one God. The Father, Son, and Spirit are consubstantial (that is, they share the same essence--what makes the Father, God, makes the Son and Spirit God as well) and that they are consubstantially eternal, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc. As for being immaterial, human nature was added to the Son's divine nature, but not because He was lacking anything. As I've said before, it would be a contradiction for him to be eternally physical, as that would imply an infinite finite. It would be a contradiction to say that there was some part of his Divine nature that was lost when it was joined to His human nature at the Incarnation; no small number of heresies have resulted from fudging the distinctions of His dual natures. But this is not a debate about church history or the battle between orthodoxy and heresy.

Good point on Laws (in physics). I hope I've challenged some of those other notions above - by the way, we've gotta team up and teach all those "physics wipes out metaphysics" people some sound principles. That physics must have a sound philosophy behind it is so true and is missing entirely from science nowadays. It's depressing!

Good job with your case so far, Rayado. I will listen to your answers to my arguments, but will only respond tersely; we ought to continue that going, as it is obviously a very crucial question, but in my next statement, I will switch the *main* focus more toward the Scriptures, Jesus Christ, inerrancy, and all that entails, if that's all right with you - unless it's all right to extend this discussion a few rounds (it's fine with me)!

You may do as you wish; you have two more rebuttal posts, and then you may sum up your case in the closing argument (note that no new arguments may be made in your closing argument, and that goes for me too). We've got plenty of debate time yet to bring various things up.

Best wishes and looking forward to your next post with great anticipation -

-Darrin

(NOTE: I'm a bit tired after all this typing; I'm going to submit this particular post unedited, so apologies in advance for bad writing and typos)

Not a problem. It's been a real pleasure so far, and I don't think that'll change (pun intended).

[Anon]

(NOTE AFTER I JUST FINISHED: I am kind of out of it [but strangely not tired enough to snooze] so this will likewise be unedited; I apologize for any bad grammar, and all errors are my responsibility).

Again, Rayado has made a powerful post for me to consider deeply. At the end of his whole mess of a search I'm doing with God in general and Christianity in specific, I will always hold that people like Rayado are reasonable and well-argued believers, even if I ultimately conclude that belief itself is not rational (i.e. that it does not correspond to reality). Here at halftime, I gladly concede that Rayado is in the lead by using what I *think* is called the Vertical Cosmological Argument nowadays, an argument which, by virtue of this thread alone, I know now that I have not considered properly. I've even bought Dr. Edward Feser's book on the subject, which, as per my word, I will read after the debate has concluded.

Now that I recognize I'm down by a touchdown or two, let's see if I can't catch up a bit.

Recall that my position is currently "searching agnosticism" - meaning that I have decided that my last ten years as a staunch atheist were both based on an invalid philosophical premise AND were caused by an emotional reaction to a reading of the Bible for which I was not prepared. Thus, I am considering the arguments with a cool, rational approach for the first time in my life (even as a believer), and am, in this thread, presenting reasons why I hold that many important concepts generally tied to Christian theism - namely, Creation, design, morality, and so on - are in fact notions that do not either entail nor deny the existence of the Christian God. For Ray to succeed, he must either convince me that this view is invalid, that God actually does exist despite this view of mine, or at least open avenues which allow me to consider evidences which I have not yet examined.

Ray has succeed at the latter thus far, and I will give the due critical response, but I would like to see more arguments which lead one to link Ray's (and Aristotle/Aquinas') Unmoved Mover with the God of Christianity. Recall that we are arguing for Christian theism, so even if Ray gets my foot in the "God door" with this debate, we may, like Habermas with his friend Tony Flew, not have moved any closer to the veracity of the *Christian* Deity. So I will now compact the section about God in general, briefly giving a response to Rayado's rejoinder and offering a few new ideas and clarification of old ideas, and follow it up with an opening about the truth of the Bible and the Deity of Christ with greater focus.

Of course, I will not at all be angry about a continuance of this (and other) argument(s) for the Existence of God; in fact, Rayado, I would ask you continue to counter my counters, as it were, while promising I will be intellectually honest for the part regarding Christ and the Bible and presuppose FSOA that God exists (or at least "may" exist) in the "general" sense only while discussing that particular context, so that I do not engage in presuppositional denial before even beginning an examination for the evidence.

All contingent beings derive their existence from something else by virtue of having potentiality--the ability to change, however that change might come about.

The argument doesn't seem to follow here, now that I (think) I understand what you mean.

Let's go back to our tree. It is caused; metaphysically speaking, however, this causation is a result of rearrangements of present metaphysical constituents. It's like those old alphabet letters you had on the fridge as a kid - you could rearrange them into whatever words you like, but the constituents - the alphabet letters - would be the same. Likewise, in metaphysics qua metaphysics, we have only the Play-Doh which is kicked around causally; epistemologically, however, we gather sense perception of this current arrangement of the metaphysical Play-Doh and (thank goodness for memory!) separate and compare the identities of the nature of this arrangement with similar arrangements with measurements of those qualities omitted in those particulars, resulting in our structure of concepts and knowledge, with the most specific ("this is an Elm") being narrower comparisons of measurement and more general ("this is a plant") representing wider allowances and inclusion of measurement and omission of nonessential properties according to the hierarchy of the concept relative to the basic, perceptual level. That is all I should say for now, though, as I stray too deep in epistemology and too far away from God, but a few last comments follow.


Yes, perhaps (think E=m*c^2) those individual constituents would themselves change, but again, like the tree, that's due to a rearrangement of other metaphysical constituents by virtue of the identity of the parts of our "atomic tree," say, and by virtue of the identity of the situation present during that rearrangement - the conductor of that event, in analogy.

But as I argued, perhaps the parts of metaphysical make-up have always existed in the sense that they could be (1) the perpetrators of my "Infinite Causal History" argument, or (2) once part of a timeless, spaceless state of ultimate and mathematically network-complete simultaneous causation. In both situations, no metaphysical "shoelace-tier" would be implied, since in (1) it is ***presupposed*** that a necessary firestarter does not exist, unless you would like to argue that an *explanatory* chain must be finite even in an eternal-causal universe (I think I've seen this somewhere long ago, but have forgotten it), and in my finite-history-presupposed case (2) the Universe is - in a much better sense than Dennett et. al.'s goofy and invalid "bootstrap" illustrations - simply there by brute fact, and is the First Cause of all causation. IT is the "unmoved mover" AT ONLY time t=0.

If you were to state for (2) that the Universe would still be contingent, as it of course still changed, then I would counter that the Universe in that First State would still not *need* (although it could still *have*) an explanation, since we presuppose that it's all-for-one-and-one-for-all in that hypothetical superposition, so that it follows, metaphysically, that nothing could have "changed" to that state (by the Second Law, this ultimate beginning is implied even if you could counter with Cyclic Models).

I know we discussed something similar to this earlier, but it is worth reiterating with greater clarity in light of your counterargument here.

I actually don't like the language of God 'deciding' to create,... To put God in time is to limit His nature; to be in time is to be able to change.

Change presupposes a causation; without causes, A is A (with causes, "A is A" anyway, since a cause has identity dependent on the identity of the constituents involved in the causation). To state that A "will always remain" A is invalid; there is no time to refer. A is just plain old A for some hypothetical reality-constituent in a hypothetical "timeless" universe. It is "permanently" timeless, not just timeless "sans" the Universe, is it is in its network-causal state in my case (2) above. So, it seems here, to put it shortly, that you agree that time is preceded by causation, since causation precedes change! Without change, no time.

You want my honest answer about how God brought time and space into being? I don't know. My mind is finite; I can know that He did without knowing how. The ability to create the universe from nothing, instantly, boggles my mind. Yet I know that it makes sense philosophically to speak of it in the way that I have.

I think this is a very honest answer, Rayado. But I concede you perhaps unwittingly answered your statement here:

We may be getting waaay ahead of ourselves here, but the historic Christian statement has been that Jesus has two natures, one human, and one divine. In Jesus' divine nature, he shares all the attributes of deity with the Father and the Spirit--eternality, uncausality, the omni-attributes, etc. To add humanity to his deity was not a confusion of the divine and human natures. They did not mix, but were joined in His person in the Incarnation.

One thing I need to stress is that while God is outside of time, He views all of time at once, and in that sense He is acting in time at all times.

... particularly the emboldened portion. God is "always creating" in a sense, and "always making the New Heaven and New Earth" in a sense, and so on.

However, let me first reiterate the specific problem from evil here, because I think it's crucial and I don't know if it's been answered *from the perspective of God* yet - this state of God, i.e. not simply timeless just sans the universe a la Craig, makes God the Father not only always witnessing evil - and thus by very definition He will not exist in any state in which evil is given the justice that Christ entails and will be a "thing of the past," since such notions do not apply to Him even with the Universe in your view. Also, the "Contingency" issue still stands to me, and seems to charge God with being the necessitator of ALL evil actions. This not only charges God with timelessly experiencing and "sustaining" all evil, but due to the necessity on and only on the part of God, also seems to wipe off free will from the map, which may give you trouble if you're Non-Calvinist.

I would agree that that is how we measure time, but time itself is not dependent upon what yardstick we use to measure it.

If you note time with its ulitmate precedent - ordered causal chains by "now" (metaphysical truth), "past" (metaphysical "now"-false states which logically lead to "now" i.e. intuitively but incorrectly stated, "they once were true"), and "future" (metaphysical "now-false" states which are logically induced by "now" and "then") not are just a yardstick of time, since a yardstick implies measure, but it is the very *definition* of time in the sense of the logically precedent. As earlier - no change, no time.

Act is being. (Make a mental note of this definition, it will show up later.)

Careful! Things have to exist to act, too. To say act is being is pure Heraclitus if I understand the definition of act correctly!

Are you saying that the nearer we get (backwards) to the Big Bang, the more 'repetitions' are required to measure time?

Infinity behaves nicely when on paper, I'll grant you that. We can do math with it. What we can't do is have an actually infinite number of real things.

We must be careful; at which point does something that was once true become false, and how?

In regards to your first question, *almost.* What I mean is this: more actions are required closer to the Big Bang if we want to string them together causally and measure the "time between" the average action close to now. Imagine two metal balls banging together and going out further distances each bang, before returning to one another, and suppose that's all the universe is and this follows my infinite causal history under any constantly held time-unit model. As we back up the footage, our sporatic gunfire of steel ball whackings "close to now" will sound eventually like the world's quickest machine gun according to our generally reliable "close to now" clacks as a time standard, and the distance would be a lot shorter and the motion a lot faster in comparison to the analogue averages "near today" in this basic model. But a different being living at the time of the "world's quickest machine gun" era is used to the average motion at this point, and looks at his time frame as "normal" (he'd live no longer than the blink of an eye to us) while seeing the past "clackings" as the same narrowing distance and increasingly machine-gun time and motion *relative to himself* as we do now with this ancient being, *relative to ourselves*.

What I am saying in my argument is that, relative to *any* time unit measured from the average causal length from *any* era (ancient guy "early in the universe" or us or whatever) the Universe will be seen always as finite with respect to this constantly held time unit referent, which will, as we drift further back our presupposed infinite causal chain, "cover" so many "earlier" events in relation that it becomes useless as a measurement, and, in fact, leads to an apparent *beginning.* But the universe *itself* is infinite in metaphysics qua metaphysics despite this fact in this little hypothesis of mine, since change, and the causes which precede them, are presupposed infinite in history.

If you're familiar with Calculus, I can give you a mathematical model how this will work: let "1" be a unit representing a cause (a second, say, which depends on the cause induced by an atomic decay), let "n" represent the nth event before the "current event" in our presupposed infinite chain, and let "t(n)" represent the inverse of the number of times historical cause "n" must successively occur to "wait for" 1 to "finish" occurring if compared side by side (i.e. if a constant firing of a handgun is 1, our machine-gun analogy would be perhaps represented by the fraction "1/20" since 20 bullets, say, would spray in the time it takes for one difference of the constant firing to happen). For a finite (but long) number of events as we back up, the "second" would be a pretty good descriptor of the relational nature of the causal chain. Then stuff would start machine-gunning after k seconds as the Universe shrinks toward Plank time and starts speeding up, indicating a small universe with huge speeds and more work-energy as we rewind, and all the extra causation that entails. The epistemological time then *could* be modeled as T = k + sum (i = 1 to infinity) [1/i^2] < infinity. In summary: this shows a finite time under a constant time unit with referent could still exist in an infinite-causal universe, meaning such criticism does not entail a logical contradiction and invalidate the metaphysical-logical coherence when such a chain is presupposed.

As far as an actually infinite number of things, again, if you're A-time theorist, the past is, to put it as a pun ... history. It's metaphysically just as false as the future. So there is no actual infinite at any state to turn into Hilbert's Hotel residents. It's as potentially infinite as the future is, since all we have, by presupposition, is an epistemological consideration of "formation" with the only starting point metaphysically possible - a "now." Even if you were to claim the past exists now in an actual infinite state due to the result carried over from the infinite causal chain which was "once" true, this would not be valid, as causation entails rearrangement, not an addition of the number of metaphysical constituents. In other words, if Tristram "Slim" Shandy were arranging indestructable and unremovable alphabet letters on God's refridge for eternity, the set of alphabet letters would not change in cardinality.

A metaphysical truth is an epistemological relation to reality qua reality, i.e. existence, i.e. identity. So a metaphysical truth would "remain true" if other causal events which do not affect it occur. It would become false when a causal event causes it to change its identity. Epistemologically, this will relate to my description of measurement-consideration; of course we are changing like mad - our atoms replace themselves, what, every seven years? - but specific atomic construction gives way to similar atomic construction, and over seven years (or seventy) it won't entail the fact that we are still a man, that identity over time is present (being constructed by new particles in the old memory-and consciousness-preserving arrangement), and so on. It's all about the essentials, baby!

I would say that the problem with trying to traverse an infinite is that it's trying to amass an infinite number of finite things ... I also think we agree, more or less, so far.

Careful. "Amass" means to begin with an empty set and build from there. By mathematics you cannot "amass" an infinite set, but if an infinite set is presupposed, then yours and Dr. Craig's strict "amassing" sense of "traverse," being tied necessarily with finite set construction in if and only if fashion, is right out as a possibility for logical refutation. It's like trying to argue that "Sun God" and "Son of God" lend evidence to Christ's connection to mythology, since English didn't exist back then to give anyone a chance at making that kind of mistake.

I have a question at this point: by elements, do you mean to say that this Singluarity is composed of parts, ...Inquiring minds want to know. :3

The singularity is composed of "parts" in that the singularity is composed of different identities which are "superimposed" in respects to distance, i.e. that there exists no separateness between any metaphysical element and any other. The event is timeless because in the entire (alltogether) Universe no event is occurring causally between two or more elements while other elements exist at that state not experiencing an event; to be timeless means no causation is occurring or all constituents of reality are network-causing all other constituents of reality in a state of simultaneous action, as both cases have no independent causal referent.

The effect of the First Cause is necessarily separateness and motion, as if it were not, it would not have been a Cause, i.e. a cause/effect action entailing change, since the only logically possible change from a "singularity" (meaning: no separateness or isolated relational causation existed as referents, not that "radius is zero" since "radius" is an invalid relational distance concept at this state) necessarily means no more superimposition. The fact of constituents which possessed different identities and the fact of the presence of causation entailed by this identity-entanglement at the Singularity is the metaphysically given, and as metaphysics is my starting point, it on its face could not have been any other way.

I answered the latter question earlier.

I would contend that such a singlarity--yeah, that one, the one that the universe once was--has potentiality, the ability to change. That alone throws out the possibility of it being unchanged, because that which is eternally unchanged is also eternally unchangeable.

Even though the Kalam form is quick and to the point, I prefer the longer Cosmological arguments--and with your description of the 'big wad,' we may have stepped into the realm of the Design argument--which I think can serve a different purpose than what most people use it for. We may yet get to discuss that.

That would be very disappointing, to myself and pretty much everyone watching this debate. There is much that we can learn about it from our previous discussion about being.

I would like ... That which is good is as it should be.

Unfortunately, "is as it should be" seems ambiguous to me. How should it be? One might site perfection as the standard, but one's individual, particular, personally-chosen identity could necessitate objectively a different standard than another. I think a massive tornado outbreak over the Southern Plains where nobody gets hurt is awesome, but most others don't think so. This is due to the identity of our choices. So should it be Springtime-tornadic every day I have a break, or should tornadoes never happen again? We're bordering on relativism, it seems, if we hold as a *universal standard for the concept of man* the values entailed by the *identity of the choices of particular men.* This is of course outside what must be universal to all as mandated by the identity of man as a concept, such as the fact that, conceptually, man has a right to choose his own means to live, thus entailing a universal value to trade agreed upon values, and not to steal. But tornadoes, and tons of other examples, are representative of things which are not chosen in value-systems of another and (as I defined it) are not relevant to their shared identity as a conceptual man - only their chosen identity as a particular, unique man or woman.

I hope the theft illustration helps with your issues with this:

As a Christian, I do not affirm the above definition of evil,... the destruction or marring of being.

The emboldened is a contradiction in terms - it denies an identity for evil and proceeds to grant evil an identity! Perhaps you mean that corruption of the good is a "negative action," in the sense that good logically precedes evil. But if the good is perfection, we are placing logical precedence on a value-judgment of the metaphysically given (the imperfect), which is ... well, all we are given. It is to, in a sense, place epistemology in a throne above reality.

Consequently, is this from Nicomachean (sp?) Ethics or similar to it? I seem to remember writing a similar criticism to the above paragraph a LONG LONG time ago in a galaxy FAR FAR away, when I was a 19 year old college sophomore spring chicken taking and falling for Aristotle for the first time.

It does not need to lead necessarily to that conclusion...the death of the Son of God himself--was used to bring about the greatest good possible, and through it, the greatest evil of all was overcome. Our God is a Judo master, so to speak.

Whoops, I missed this! This takes care of the "God sustains evil necessarily" problem, but it still leaves open my previous question as to how God would ever experience the defeat of evil via punishment as an omnibenevolent Being; to Him, all evil acts are just as true in Heaven, where temporal peeps will be in eternal bliss away from evil, as they were when the calamities were occurring in-time. God, for instance, will "always" perceive His son's suffering and taking on of sin as "metaphysically true."

Your explanation for Divine Simplicity is conceded, with one last question: why is the Trinity, as three *persons* of the same *essence* (to use that horrible Greek notion) simple? Why not one person of one essence?

Ah, it is growing late - I know I stated I would like to start about Christ- and Bible-specific arguments, but thinking about it, I (a) do not know what you specifically hold in your particular Christian worldview, and thus what you will propose as argument; (b) do not wish to "jump a round" on you since you're "playing white and moving first" and since I will ultimately get the Last Word ™ on all of it, and finally since I (c) wanted to give my final, definitive thoughts on this current subject in response to yours, before we contract the length of this particular subject to include Christ and the Bible, should you wish to head there (it is your choice, my friend).

Good to talk with a reasonable Christian, a smart challenging man, and someone who at any rate can join with me to get some logic, reason, and philosophy back on the foundation of science, which too many people are adopting in blind faith!

[Rayado]

At long last, my third and final rebuttal. And dadgummit, my first attempt was 5.5k characters too long. Time to breakout the Chainsaw of Ellipses™. I really hate to do this, too.

I gladly concede that Rayado is in the lead by using what I *think* is called the Vertical Cosmological Argument nowadays, an argument which, by virtue of this thread alone, I know now that I have not considered properly. I've even bought Dr. Edward Feser's book on the subject, which, as per my word, I will read after the debate has concluded.

It is indeed a vertical form of the Cosmological argument; but it's not Kalam. Kalam is horizontal. I custom-tailored it to my purposes for this debate, so it's not as long as it could be.

Now that I recognize I'm down by a touchdown or two, let's see if I can't catch up a bit.

Recall that my position is currently "searching agnosticism" - meaning that I have decided that my last ten years as a staunch atheist were both based on an invalid philosophical premise AND were caused by an emotional reaction to a reading of the Bible for which I was not prepared.

Rather than jettisoning everything, would it not make sense to study the particular issue in-depth, to prevent or minimize the possibility of overreaction?

Thus, I am considering the arguments with a cool, rational approach for the first time in my life (even as a believer), and am, in this thread, presenting reasons why I hold that many important concepts generally tied to Christian theism - namely, Creation, design, morality, and so on - are in fact notions that do not either entail nor deny the existence of the Christian God. For Ray to succeed, he must either convince me that this view is invalid, that God actually does exist despite this view of mine, or at least open avenues which allow me to consider evidences which I have not yet examined.

A quick aside: my success in this debate isn't necessarily tied to you changing your mind. I will have succeeded if I present and defend what is true.
Failure would come at the cost of me flipping out or not making my case. I wouldn't consider it a failure if you didn't accept it; it'd be nice, but it's not what I'm really banking on.

Ray has succeed at the latter thus far, [...] So I will now compact the section about God in general, briefly giving a response to Rayado's rejoinder and offering a few new ideas and clarification of old ideas, and follow it up with an opening about the truth of the Bible and the Deity of Christ with greater focus.

This is where it gets interesting: if you'll note the similarities between the God of the Bible and the God I arrived at via my form of the Cosmological argument, they're the same. It would be incumbent upon us to then examine whatever else God revealed about Himself through the Bible, would it not? If it gets it right philosophically, why not use that as a foundation and see what it'll support? Because that's really what my opening statement is--a foundation for something greater.

Of course, I will not at all be angry about a continuance of this (and other) argument(s) for the Existence of God;[...]

We might could start a Basketball Court thread after this is over, just to chat in a more informal setting without the format that we've chosen here. Or Tektonics. Or whatever suits your fancy.

The argument doesn't seem to follow here, now that I (think) I understand what you mean.

[...]That is all I should say for now, though, as I stray too deep in epistemology and too far away from God, but a few last comments follow.

I think it does apply to our discussion of contingency and the ability to change. It's not the God doesn't change; it's that he can't change by His very nature.

Yes, perhaps (think E=m*c^2) those individual constituents would themselves change, but again, like the tree, that's due to a rearrangement of other metaphysical constituents by virtue of the identity of the parts of our "atomic tree," say, and by virtue of the identity of the situation present during that rearrangement - the conductor of that event, in analogy.

That's getting very close to a design argument, don't you think?

But as I argued, perhaps the parts of metaphysical make-up have always existed in the sense that they could be (1) the perpetrators of my "Infinite Causal History" argument, or (2) once part of a timeless, spaceless state of ultimate and mathematically network-complete simultaneous causation. In both situations, no metaphysical "shoelace-tier" would be implied, since in (1) it is ***presupposed*** that a necessary firestarter does not exist, unless you would like to argue that an *explanatory* chain must be finite even in an eternal-causal universe (I think I've seen this somewhere long ago, but have forgotten it), and in my finite-history-presupposed case (2) the Universe is - in a much better sense than Dennett et. al.'s goofy and invalid "bootstrap" illustrations - simply there by brute fact, and is the First Cause of all causation. IT is the "unmoved mover" AT ONLY time t=0.

Unfortunately, I haven't had time to read Dennett (you'll have to decide if that's ultimately a bad thing or not); but I've got a few questions about this paragraph.

What do you mean when you say "parts of metaphysical makeup?" And how would such a setup avoid Dawkins' 747 argument?

The problem I have with an infinite causal history is twofold: first, if there were an actually infinite number of moments before this one, there is no reason to suspect that we even should have arrived at this one; second, the universe is going to die, one way or another--shouldn't this have happened if it had an infinite amount of time in which to achieve this end? If an infinite amount of time has passed without the universe ending, why should I believe that any more time will actually draw us closer to a dead universe?

If you were to state for (2) that the Universe would still be contingent, as it of course still changed, then I would counter that the Universe in that First State would still not *need* (although it could still *have*) an explanation, since we presuppose that it's all-for-one-and-one-for-all in that hypothetical superposition, so that it follows, metaphysically, that nothing could have "changed" to that state (by the Second Law, this ultimate beginning is implied even if you could counter with Cyclic Models).

Except that it did change. That much is evident. As Dr. Geisler is fond of saying, "That's what happens when a theory meets a brutal gang of facts in a dark alley." But how are you connecting metaphysics to it? I'm not sure we're on the same wavelength there.

I know we discussed something similar to this earlier, but it is worth reiterating with greater clarity in light of your counterargument here.

Change presupposes a causation;[...] to put it shortly, that you agree that time is preceded by causation, since causation precedes change! Without change, no time.

More or less; if I had more time, I might try to restate and/or clarify some of my case, but right now (and on this particular topic, I think) I may not have to. I'm in this to learn, too.

I think this is a very honest answer, Rayado. But I concede you perhaps unwittingly answered your statement here:

... particularly the emboldened portion. God is "always creating" in a sense, and "always making the New Heaven and New Earth" in a sense, and so on.

Uh, I don't actually say that--in fact, there's a particularly vocal faction that says that, but they're very much heretical in doing so, because they say that all Biblical prophecy has already been fulfilled! I do say that God sustains the world and it would cease to exist if He withdrew his sustenance--but that much isn't really the issue.

However, let me first reiterate the specific problem from evil here, [...]This not only charges God with timelessly experiencing and "sustaining" all evil, but due to the necessity on and only on the part of God, also seems to wipe off free will from the map, which may give you trouble if you're Non-Calvinist.

Two things: first, it's just nonsensical to speak of God experiencing evil unless you clarify what you mean. How does God experience evil? In His being? Then He is neither Pure Act nor perfect. What about Jesus? He experienced evil, to be sure, but it was from without, not within.

The Bible is overwhelmingly clear about the goodness of God and His relation to evil:

Deuteronomy 32:4

He is the Rock, his works are perfect,
and all his ways are just.
A faithful God who does no wrong,
upright and just is he.

Psalm 18:30

As for God, his way is perfect;
the word of the LORD is flawless.
He is a shield
for all who take refuge in him.

Habakkuk 1:13

Your eyes are too pure to look on evil;
you cannot tolerate wrong.
Why then do you tolerate the treacherous?
Why are you silent while the wicked
swallow up those more righteous than themselves?

Matthew 5:48

Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

The question, then, isn't can God will evil to exist, but why; but God isn't silent on that, either:

Genesis 50:20

“But as for you, you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, in order to bring it about as it is this day, to save many people alive”

Romans 5:3-4

“And not only that, but we also glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation produces perseverance; and perseverance, character; and character, hope”

If you note time with its ulitmate precedent - ordered causal chains by "now" [...] but it is the very *definition* of time in the sense of the logically precedent. As earlier - no change, no time.

I don't agree with your definitions of the past and future. In fact, it is easily reduced to the absurd, because more than just allowing for the possibility of an actual contradiction, it practically necessitates contradiction within reality. The past is true; time alone cannot change that, for time alone changes no truth. It is not less true today that JFK was shot than it was yesterday. It is additional information that changes the truth of something in the past. The same goes for the future.

Careful! Things have to exist to act, too. To say act is being is pure Heraclitus if I understand the definition of act correctly!

Not quite. A being can act without changing itself. That would be Heraclitus.

In regards to your first question, *almost.* [...]

Do Newton's Cradles have a habit of always moving in your universe?

What I am saying in my argument is that, relative to *any* time unit measured from the average causal length from *any* era [...]

But can your theory withstand the objections I've raised about the end of the universe, how we reached this moment, etc.?

If you're familiar with Calculus,

I'm not; I was an English major.

As far as an actually infinite number of things, [...] In other words, if Tristram "Slim" Shandy were arranging indestructable and unremovable alphabet letters on God's refridge for eternity, the set of alphabet letters would not change in cardinality.

Again, I'll ask: is this descriptive of the cause of the universe, or prescriptive? Would this have anything to do with the Law of Thermodynamics that states that matter and energy can neither be created nor destroyed?

A metaphysical truth is an epistemological relation to reality qua reality, i.e. existence, i.e. identity. So a metaphysical truth would "remain true" if other causal events which do not affect it occur. It would become false when a causal event causes it to change its identity. Epistemologically, this will relate to my description of measurement-consideration; of course we are changing like mad - our atoms replace themselves, what, every seven years? - but specific atomic construction gives way to similar atomic construction, and over seven years (or seventy) it won't entail the fact that we are still a man, that identity over time is present (being constructed by new particles in the old memory-and consciousness-preserving arrangement), and so on. It's all about the essentials, baby!

Dawkins' 747 is coming in for a landing...

Careful. "Amass" means to begin with an empty set and build from there. By mathematics you cannot "amass" an infinite set, but if an infinite set is presupposed, then yours and Dr. Craig's strict "amassing" sense of "traverse," being tied necessarily with finite set construction in if and only if fashion, is right out as a possibility for logical refutation. It's like trying to argue that "Sun God" and "Son of God" lend evidence to Christ's connection to mythology, since English didn't exist back then to give anyone a chance at making that kind of mistake.

I mean 'amass' in the literary sense.

I mean that you simply can't proceed through an actually infinite number of things. It's self-refuting, like trying to number a countless number of cats. That which is infinite is, in fact, without finitude, wouldn't you say?

The singularity is composed of "parts" in that the singularity is composed of different identities which are "superimposed" in respects to distance, i.e. that there exists no separateness between any metaphysical element and any other. The event is timeless because in the entire (alltogether) Universe no event is occurring causally between two or more elements while other elements exist at that state not experiencing an event; to be timeless means no causation is occurring or all constituents of reality are network-causing all other constituents of reality in a state of simultaneous action, as both cases have no independent causal referent.

I would rather say that to be timeless is to be unable to be affected by cause, not wholly independent from cause and effect period. I don't really think that the singularity can be said to be timeless, because it simply cannot be denied that one second occurred that changed it--followed by a helluva lot of seconds. Change can be measured by the most minute of measurements, but eventually it starts to look an awful lot like Zeno's paradox.

Unfortunately, "is as it should be" seems ambiguous to me. How should it be? One might site perfection as the standard, but one's individual, particular, personally-chosen identity could necessitate objectively a different standard than another.

Then it would cease to be objective and be subjective.

I think a massive tornado outbreak over the Southern Plains where nobody gets hurt is awesome, but most others don't think so. This is due to the identity of our choices. So should it be Springtime-tornadic every day I have a break, or should tornadoes never happen again? We're bordering on relativism, it seems, if we hold as a *universal standard for the concept of man* the values entailed by the *identity of the choices of particular men.* This is of course outside what must be universal to all as mandated by the identity of man as a concept, such as the fact that, conceptually, man has a right to choose his own means to live, thus entailing a universal value to trade agreed upon values, and not to steal. But tornadoes, and tons of other examples, are representative of things which are not chosen in value-systems of another and (as I defined it) are not relevant to their shared identity as a conceptual man - only their chosen identity as a particular, unique man or woman.

But should a preference be treated this way? Who in their right mind would prefer to live in the path of a disaster they know will obliterate everything they have, and very possibly themselves? No one, unless they're taking the expressway out of here.

I hope the theft illustration helps with your issues with this:

Theft itself is a definite privation of good--namely, a privation of one person's goods by another!

The emboldened is a contradiction in terms - it denies an identity for evil and proceeds to grant evil an identity!

Interesting observation, but it doesn't fly, and here's why. Evil can be named, it can be identified, but that does not mean that it has a substance. It cannot be said to be substantial--we cannot point to a little blob of stuff and say "hey, that there is evil." Evil has an identity, but it is metaphysical, not substantial, and that makes all the difference. I am not denying that evil can be identified; I deny that it can be identified as its own substance. Things can be identified that don't have a material substance

The alternative is to deny that evil has an identity; in short, this means that you cannot identify evil. In anything. You don't even have the ability to do so.

Perhaps you mean that corruption of the good is a "negative action," in the sense that good logically precedes evil. But if the good is perfection, we are placing logical precedence on a value-judgment of the metaphysically given (the imperfect), which is ... well, all we are given. It is to, in a sense, place epistemology in a throne above reality.

What's the problem with that? To be unable to differentiate between good and evil is the logical outcome of not being able to identify one or both of them. But something that is good isn't necessarily perfect; perfection means that it's totally good, without flaw or error, within time or without.

Consequently, is this from Nicomachean (sp?) Ethics or similar to it? I seem to remember writing a similar criticism to the above paragraph a LONG LONG time ago in a galaxy FAR FAR away, when I was a 19 year old college sophomore spring chicken taking and falling for Aristotle for the first time.

It's pretty close to Aristotle; I think he did say that goodness was being.

Whoops, I missed this! This takes care of the "God sustains evil necessarily" problem, but it still leaves open my previous question as to how God would ever experience the defeat of evil via punishment as an omnibenevolent Being; to Him, all evil acts are just as true in Heaven, where temporal peeps will be in eternal bliss away from evil, as they were when the calamities were occurring in-time. God, for instance, will "always" perceive His son's suffering and taking on of sin as "metaphysically true."

I think this is a confusion of how God relates to evil. Nor do I think that God's exhaustive divine foreknowledge destroys our free choices (I'm a Molinist, if anything, and not a Calvinist).

Your explanation for Divine Simplicity is conceded, with one last question: why is the Trinity, as three *persons* of the same *essence* (to use that horrible Greek notion) simple? Why not one person of one essence?

Heh heh....horrible, you say? It was the perfect way to describe their relation and being. To say that they are of one essence is to say that all three posses that which makes God God. Essentially, all three are equal. One person, of one essence, actually poses a problem--one that Islam cannot answer: if God is love, who could He be said to love before there was anyone existing to love? Himself? That 'love' is meaningless, because love is by definition the singular reaching out into the relational. A Oneness God cannot be said to be love if he is not always with someone to love. This isn't a problem with the Trinity. Also, you run back into the problem of monism with a one-essence-one-person scenario, and it's one that Islam hasn't managed to avoid.

Ah, it is growing late - I know I stated I would like to start about Christ- and Bible-specific arguments, but thinking about it, I (a) do not know what you specifically hold in your particular Christian worldview, and thus what you will propose as argument; (b) do not wish to "jump a round" on you since you're "playing white and moving first" and since I will ultimately get the Last Word ™ on all of it, and finally since I (c) wanted to give my final, definitive thoughts on this current subject in response to yours, before we contract the length of this particular subject to include Christ and the Bible, should you wish to head there (it is your choice, my friend).

We can cover that in a Basketball Court thread, or in Tektonics, if you want. I would like to discuss this with you.

Good to talk with a reasonable Christian, a smart challenging man, and someone who at any rate can join with me to get some logic, reason, and philosophy back on the foundation of science, which too many people are adopting in blind faith!

It's certainly been interesting (and rewarding) so far.

As it stands, you have one rebuttal left; I will begin working on my closing statement. Remember, in our closing statements we can sum up our cases, but we cannot make any new arguments.

[Anon]

At long last, my third and final rebuttal. And dadgummit, my first attempt was 5.5k characters too long. Time to breakout the Chainsaw of Ellipses™. I really hate to do this, too.

At long last, my third and final rebuttal! I should have posted much earlier, but of course Spring Break and the included debate between Carrier and Craig intervened.

I will proceed with my final rebuttal. I will promise to make my closing statement much quicker in response, especially considering that you have the majority of yours composed, as you state later. And to help with the "chainsaw problem," I think I should proceed with this statement sans any other quotes - that should help not exceed the Tweb limit.

I will also relegate any questions about morality and the Resurrection (and other topics) to my thread in JP's forum - "Anon Queries Thread," and will address the question at hand only in this rebuttal. Thus I will accept your replies and calls for further extra-debate discussion outright, and not potentially exceed the word-limit by going off-topic; I apologize for doing so in the first place, and admit freely that I did not at first recognize that such replies were not what you wish to address. In my further debates at Tweb, I will be sure to utilize this lesson learned.

However, I am interested in them still, and in your replies about them in specific!! Feel free to join me and what remains of the friendly skeptics there after we're finished up here! Looking forward to it, my friend.

I'll take Dr. Craig's "reexamine and reply" style here, so we can eliminate the heavy taxes of the words internal to quoting.

======================

In my opening statement and in my rebuttal, I offered several criticisms of Rayado's arguments and also proposed two alternate explanations for the existence of the universe. I will examine Rayado's final rebuttal by bringing their efficacy against my own arguments under the microscope, and by considering their own internal consistency. I will hope to maintain both the respect I hope I've shown Rayado in my previous posts and the reverence these arguments deserve, while still applying the fullest application of my reasoning power to cut straight to the heart of the nature of truth.

Rayado wondered what I meant by metaphysical make-up - I think my penchant for using horrible descriptions for easy concepts has reared its ugly head once again. By "metaphysical make-up," I mean simply the constituents of reality. I too often use bloated language in my description, and Rayado has done a good job teasing what I mean from what I say during this debate, but sometimes I just blurt too much fluff.

Now, Rayado wonders whether my arguments for a naturalistic origin of the universe imply the Dawkins "Ultimate 747" counterargument to design. It may not surprise my fellow Aristotelean opponent that I actually hold that argument to be fallacious, since if the First Cause is logically necessary, it would not matter how complex its (or His) design is! I cannot see how my argument posits ol' Dorkins' bad counterargument, unless Rayado means that I consider a metaphysical causal state at the Beginning posited by my second argument a simpler cause than God - but, to me, such complexity is nonessential, and should remain that way lest both cases be epistemically equal in all other ways. It's the same, to me, as beauty in a relationship - I would only choose a girl "based on looks" if they are otherwise contextually and personally identical in personality, intelligence, and values, something that is unlikely - if not epistemically impossible - to occur.

He offers a much stronger counterargument with his question regarding infinities in his challenge to my first presentation of a possible account for the Universe. To recap this first explanation of mine, I argued:

(1) The Infinite Causal Chain Explanation Hypothesis.
(P1) If there exists an infinite causal chain, then the Universe did not begin to exist.
(P2) There exists an infinite causal chain.
(P3) Therefore, the Universe did not begin to exist.

(P2) is assumed for sake of argument.

In this hypothesis, (P2) must be intelligible, i.e. it must withstand the arguments against an actual infinite, and (P1) must furthermore comply with the observed facts of reality, i.e. I must posit a rational resolution of an infinite causal history of the Universe to the fact that existence entails a Big Bang and therefore a beginning under any constantly held time-unit. For the latter, I put forth a harmonization based both on the increasing relational causal nature of existence in the past compared to the present and on the possibility for an "appearance" that the Universe began to exist (even if a causal chain is infinite) by use of Calculus summation. However, the physical plausibility of (P1) is not challenged here; Rayado instead has challenged whether (P2) is intelligible by virtue of arguments against an actual infinite, so I will in turn address his points on this matter and leave (P1) up to further possible discussion outside the scope of this debate.

Let's look at Rayado's criticisms from the position of his own main argument. I believe this methodology will serve to both address his objections and to reiterate some of my own objections to his argument in a clearer manner. If God is not in time, then this entails a B-theory of time, meaning that ultimately (in God's perception) the Universe is causally complete, i.e. all actions that are related by the concept "before" and "after" are equally known as valid to God, as He is not in time. Interestingly enough, William Lane Craig and even Thomas Aquinas conceded that an infinite causal history is possible if God exists in this case, because all the argument entails is that a necessary sustainer of the Universe exists; whether or not He created the Universe or the Universe is coeternal with Him, He remains the necessary cause (see Craig and Copan, "Creation out of Nothing," pp. 161-162). That is why the argument Rayado posits is, I presume, known as the "vertical" Cosmological Argument.

But there are many problems with this theory. One is the moral case given God exists; as Rayado suggested, this ought to be considered elsewhere. But there are metaphysical problems with this theory. For, if there exists a state of the Universe in which all past events, future events, and current events are simply "just there," so to speak (scientifically, they are "extended in time" in the same sense as they are "extended in space"), then the Universe simply is, whether finite to us historically or not, and it is this ultimate nontemporal state in and of itself that may be taken as a brute fact - i.e. as the necessary end of the chain as the parent of its internal causally related states, or the "sustainer," to use Rayado's term. Whether or not God exists, then, is not addressed, and this would lead back to my position - agnosticism. As Craig concludes: "even conservation itself requires an A-theory of time." (Ibid. 165).

As interesting as it may seem, my counter actually pushes Rayado's great point back into the limelight, as I am an A-time theorist! So even if Rayado disagrees with me on the ultimate nature of time in the Universe, he would be in all rights to press me to address his charge about the difficulties of an actual infinite.

Rayado's objection is answered, however, by the cathedral of Aristotle itself - to quote a fellow Ancient Greek thinker of his, what is, is. In other words, we start with the identity of the context of what is; thinking of what could be is a neat thought experiment, but it does not deny what IS, lest we place the epistemological above the metaphysically given.

How, then, can Rayado's difficult and challenging objection be resolved for my first case? The answer is that Rayado's charge in fact drops the relational context of what we are presuming to be infinite. We must recall what we are labeling as infinite in my argument - the set of causal chains. "Now," i.e. the metaphysically given, is state a1, say. Thus, what we mean by history, assuming my first case, is not at its base, "the historical chain of causation is infinite," but that "the historical chain of causation is the set {a2, a3, a4, ...} in which a2, a3, a4, ..., are causally precedent states to the metaphysically given state (within the causal chain of consideration) a1. So even though the size of this set is equivalent to the size of any history for any metaphysical causal-state a(k), k an integer, or even the length of the whole chain presuming a future-infinite history, we must not give precedence to the set size when looking at the set itself, since it implies the sets themselves are equal, and not just size-equivalent. An easier illustration is to consider the set of primes, which is the same set-size ("countably infinite") but not the same set as, the set of all rational numbers.

Rayado challenges that such a theory of time would be absurd, because it renders the past false - denying identity, i.e. that since JFK was shot in the past, and that since under my assertion the past is metaphysically false, this entails a direct absurdity since it would entail that JFK's assassination is therefore false. But Rayado may be confusing what I mean here by "metaphysically false." What I mean here is a tensed statement, i.e. I do claim that

"On November 22, 1963, John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas"

is a true claim, the metaphysical statement

"John F. Kennedy is being assassinated in Dallas"

is false in a metaphysical, temporal context of current events. I apologize for any confusion on the matter here Rayado; I was unclear in my presentation, as you correctly pointed out.

Rayado also returns to his challenge on proceeding through an infinite past to the current moment. Unfortunately, I think this still presumes a beginning to the "proceeding," as his example of counting an infinite set of cats illustrates: counting presumes a beginning to the counting, and thus the argument commits a fallacy: it assumes that one may begin counting such a set (in the usual sense) when we are assuming no beginning to the set of causal history.

Furthermore, his example of an infinite set of cats is not ordered; causal history is ordered by a "before" and "after" relation, and to assess the set one must consider the elements and the ordering in question. We may "jump in the stream" of beginning to count an infinite set of cats by starting with my neighbor's cat, so to speak, but where do we begin in a presupposed set of ordered causal history? We can't start with the first past event and then go backwards, as that would be against the ordering; likewise, we can't start at any place and begin counting. This should illustrate further what I mean by a causal history, and bring to the surface the problems with assigning a state-state "proceeding formation" of such a chain in any potential refutation.

Rayado furthermore asks whether the Second Law is prescriptive or descriptive. I am not sure I know enough to answer this properly, but since Rayado sees justifiable importance in this answer, I will posit that the Second Law is descriptive and absolute.

Therefore, even though Rayado's challenges are thoughtful and perhaps even in need of further exploration on my part, as presented I cannot see how his challenges to the intelligibility of my first argument would stand.

Now my second hypothesis, which instead presumes a finite causal history of the Universe, may be stated as follows:

(2) The Big Wad hypothesis.
(P1) If a nonpersonal metaphysical state of the Universe caused space and time to begin to exist, then the Universe is uncreated.
(P2) A nonpersonal metaphysical state of the Universe caused space and time to begin to exist.
(P3) Therefore, the Universe is uncreated.

(P2) is assumed for sake of argument.

(P1)'s justification in my earlier arguments amounted to arguing for such a state's effectual causation of the beginning of spacetime, and by recognizing that this causal state itself is timeless by definition, as it causes spacetime to begin to exist.

The beginning-state would be, to borrow a little from Quentin Smith's illustration (see Craig vs. Smith, "Does God Exist?" 2003, available at reasonablefaith.org) seen as this, illustrated with three elements of universal existents for sake of ease (it may be extended to the much larger - but still finite - number of basic constituents now making up the Universe by the same concept implied):

t0 ("Timeless Causal State")

a1<---->a2<---->a3
^ ^
| ----------------------|

... so that, basically, every primary element of existence is, in this Singularity State, acting upon every other element of existence simultaneously, i.e. without any referent internal causal progression, i.e. this Singularity State is timeless and spaceless (space and time presuppose separate, progressional chains of causation).

The effect of this causal state is spacetime's beginning to exist, as the effect of this simultaneous timeless causal state must be the bringing of spacetime into being, i.e. the separation of the metaphysical constituents from which the notions of space and time are derived. It is the necessary result and the only possible result, since separation is the only logical effect of such a simultaneous causal action.

Rayado challenges this first by stating the following: "Except that it did change. That much is evident. As Dr. Geisler is fond of saying, "That's what happens when a theory meets a brutal gang of facts in a dark alley." But how are you connecting metaphysics to it? I'm not sure we're on the same wavelength there." Hopefully, this gets us on the same wavelength - I actually agree that it did change. It must change, or else we wipe cause and effect off the map, and I don't think we want to do that!

Rayado further challenges that it is undeniable that some time must pass to change it. But as I addressed, this state is simultaneous; hence, there is no progressive time-referent at this state. Applying any time length here cannot be done, since this state caused spacetime to begin to exist in the first place under my hypothesis.

Zeno's Paradox crops up in Rayado's argument shortly afterward, but this is still speaking of the effect (spacetime beginning to exist), and not the cause (the timeless, nonpersonal, nonseparate state sans spacetime).

Rayado's strongest objection, posited earlier, is that which is eternally unchanged is eternally unchangeable. I do not believe I have addressed this properly, and I will do so now while I have my final time on the debating floor. Now, why can't an eternally unchanged entity not be unchangeable? I think there may be a mixing of terms here - "eternally unchanged" means that there exists no "prior" point in which entity with Identity A "was" Identity A'. Suppose, though, that a vase has existed "unchanged from eternity," so to speak - here, there's still nothing stopping me from getting a hammer and breaking it!

But perhaps the thrust is, "how could it change internally?" Well, if it also existed in a simultaneous-action state whose effect is to bring spacetime into being, then it logically follows that it IS in fact a timeless entity sans spacetime that changes by definition of the necessary result of its simultaneous state of causation!

Also notice that this argument (2) does not really even depend upon an "A-theory" or "B-theory" of time. In fact, assuming a "B-theory" of time, we have a nonpersonal "sustainer" of the causally ordered Universe - namely, the Singularity State itself! And since the Singularity State is by definition an atemporal state, it has no prior change upon it, making it the necessary beginning fitting the Vertical Cosmological Argument. Thus (2), if it stands, could potentially answer all of the crucial questions the Vertical Argument raises about necessity and contingency, and in a naturalistic way that preserves the material for the universe rather than facing the theological struggle of the mystery of Creatio Ex Nihilo.

I hope I have exhibited my arguments more clearly in this statement. I look forward to Rayado's conclusions, and hope he has learned something of my difficulties regarding the theistic question and also recognized my respect for the strength of his arguments as well as my own need to investigate his objections more thoroughly than a limited debate can offer. Rayado's great counters to my questions about the nature of the Biblical God, of Christ, of Morality, and of the Bible will be addressed, as mentioned before, in Tektonics and elsewhere, and I look forward to expanding this difficult question of Christian theism with a very capable philosopher long after our closing statements have been submitted.

[Kelp]

Moderated By: Kelp

Debate over. Thread closed.

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[Rayado]

I think not. (Kelp's getting a pay cut for that one. )

So here we are, at the end of our little journey through time, space, and the space between our ears. As both the participants and the observers know, the Resolved for the debate was, "It is rational to believe that the Christian God exists." I defended the positive, to the best of my ability, and my opponent defended the negative, to the best of his ability.

To sum up, I chose to use a customized version of the vertical Cosmological argument for God's existence and the rationality of the Christian worldview. I am quite pleased that I had the opportunity to show that the objections that Anon raised, specifically with Christian theism, not only could be answered, but had good answers that were also far more satisfying than all others. I would really like to start a Basketball Court thread where we could informally discuss objections like that, because I love that kind of discussion much more than, say, presenting a long-winded argument.

My question to those reading this debate is: who has accomplished what they set out to do in this debate? Have I successfully defended the proposition that it is reasonable to believe that the Christian God exists? If I have, it is because the Christian God exists. If I have not, I need to find a better argument. Have I shown that it is unreasonable not to believe that the Christian God exists? I would certainly like to think so--because the choice can change your life.

This was a good opportunity for me to learn about some of the more nuanced objections to the arguments for God's existence, and worth much more attention than the old "Can God make a rock" arguments. It's really nice discussing these things with someone who shows both intelligence and respect. I think it can be safely said that we both can walk away with a list of things to investigate and examine--and that's a good thing, because that was one of my goals for this debate.

There's simply no way I can get into the minutiae of Anon's last rebuttal, but there is one last thing I would like to ask:

Is your objection to my description of time enough to show that it is unreasonable to believe that the Christian God exists?

But, there's time and opportunity to discuss this, at our leisure, elsewhere here on Theologyweb. And that is something worth looking forward to. I would once again like to thank Anon for his willingness and thoughtfulness to and through this debate. Thank you.

[Anon]

As Rayado stated above, this debate has been long, thoughtful, challenging and (especially from my arguments ) quite winded, in the sense that this debate prevents a lack of interaction that normal posting grants. However, the debate was by no means unproductive; Rayado both presented a challenging case that I will be pondering for a long time, and also aided me in analyzing the difficulties within my own position.

I look back on this debate with a sense of positive accomplishment and with the joy of gaining a new, intelligent friend, no matter how much our theological worldviews differ. The debate may rage on as I iron out what exactly I ought to believe, but above all else, I hope this debate stands as an example of how two people from different worldviews can put their minds together in challenge without bringing in personal character, motive, or unwarranted disrespect for the views of the opposition.

So, in conclusion, I am happy to have fenced with Rayado and will come away with a greater appreciation of what was once a poorly-known argument on my part. Just one more tough case to ponder on my road to find the truth ...

As a stinger, I noticed Rayado is a fan of the Final Fantasy series - perhaps our next debate ought to be over which installment of that game is the best, unless he agrees with the immutable fact that Final Fantasy 6 is tops.

Thanks to Rayado, to Tweb for hosting, and to all of you for reading

[Kelp]

Moderated By: Kelp

Ok. Now it's done.

Good work, guys!

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Contact the forum moderator or an administrator in Private Message or email instead. If you feel you must publically complain or whine, please take it to the Psychotherapy Room unless told otherwise.