Beginning and the KCA

[Mattsterpiece]

Many people commentating may not care for the Kalam Cosmological Argument, but I figured I would get some input on a few objections I've seen in particular.

#1. We can't show that anything really begins.

I suppose this is to say that every object we see is merely the result of a transition of matter from one form to another. But certainly I could say that I, as a Homo sapien, began to exist, and that the cause for me, in as an entity in the form of a person, is my parents.

It seems pretty far-fetched to say that we can throw out the axiom of sufficient reason that things have a reason for existence, contingencies having external causes and necessary entities existing by their own nature. The former is more important.

#2. There's no support that things that begin are caused.

This one is more common. Frankly, I find better reasoning in finding a self-sustaining cosmological model than these sort of objections.

What do ye all think?

[nightbringer]

It seems pretty obvious to me that something can't come from nothing. But I wouldn't know how to actually argue for that. It just absolutely absurd to say otherwise.

I think a better way to attack KCA is by arguing for the possibility of an actual successive infinity.

[ENeGMA]

It seems pretty obvious to me that something can't come from nothing. But I wouldn't know how to actually argue for that. It just absolutely absurd to say otherwise.

No it isn't.

And if there isn't an argument you shouldn't just believe it.

I think a better way to attack KCA is by arguing for the possibility of an actual successive infinity.

I argue for both.

[nightbringer]

I don't know, must we have an argument for absolutely everything we believe? Do I need an argument to prove that I am actually seeing a laptop in front of me as I type? I'm not saying it's logically impossible for something to come from nothing - it's not contradictory. Just that I don't think it's metaphysically possible. I think about it and it just seems to violate all basic sense. I guess if you don't have that same intuition then I can't persuade you.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

That would depend on what is meant by nothing. Nothing can mean something different in physics and in metaphysics.

However, if you take what I take to mean nothing, absolute non-existence, then yes, it is absurd to say existence came from non-existence.

[ENeGMA]

That would depend on what is meant by nothing. Nothing can mean something different in physics and in metaphysics.

However, if you take what I take to mean nothing, absolute non-existence, then yes, it is absurd to say existence came from non-existence.

It's absurd to say something "came from" non-existence in the sense that nothing can't cause anything.

It's not absurd to imagine something which has no causal antecedent of any kind, but which begins to exist.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

It's not absurd to imagine something which has no causal antecedent of any kind, but which begins to exist.

Begins to exist from what?

[ENeGMA]

I don't know, must we have an argument for absolutely everything we believe?

No.

But you do need arguments for substantial philosophical theses on which important arguments (like the KCA) are supposed to rest.

A philosopher saying "It's obvious that..." or "Intuition tells us that..." is really just saying "I don't have an argument for this...".

Do I need an argument to prove that I am actually seeing a laptop in front of me as I type? I'm not saying it's logically impossible for something to come from nothing - it's not contradictory.

Indeed it isn't.

Just that I don't think it's metaphysically possible.

I don't see how you, or any other person, could possibly have any insight into facts like these, eg. what worlds metaphysically possible vs. logically possible.

How could you possibly know? What argument could you marshal?

I think about it and it just seems to violate all basic sense. I guess if you don't have that same intuition then I can't persuade you.

I'm just saying that there's no actual reason to just take this fact for granted.

That you and others accept it on "intuition" (intuition of what? You don't actually intuit metaphysical possibilities, after all.) is a fact about you, not a fact about metaphysics.

[ENeGMA]

Begins to exist from what?

Nothing.

Hence the "begins". In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, right?

Well, imagine that happening but with no God.

That's certainly a sensible statement, eg. you understood what what is meant by that possibility. It's not illogical or contradictory.

[Child_Of_Wisdom]

You love God you see God You hate God you miss God.

Show us the evidence is a front to justify themselves. All they need to do is be sceptical towards everything you say.

Expose their hypocrisy.

[nightbringer]

I don't see how you, or any other person, could possibly have any insight into facts like these, eg. what worlds metaphysically possible vs. logically possible.

How could you possibly know? What argument could you marshal?

I'm just saying that there's no actual reason to just take this fact for granted.

That you and others accept it on "intuition" (intuition of what? You don't actually intuit metaphysical possibilities, after all.) is a fact about you, not a fact about metaphysics.

Okay fair point well perhaps I'll try and muster up an argument and you can critique it as you see fit.

Would you agree that nothingness into the creation of the universe is a change? If so, then what can possibly cause this change if nothing exists to do it? Perhaps you deny that changes always require a cause. If so what justifies your belief that this is so? What reason do you have to think this? And if you believe that changes don't need a cause, is it only the kind of changes involved in bringing nothing into something or can other changes occur without cause?

[Mattsterpiece]

A philosopher saying "It's obvious that..." or "Intuition tells us that..." is really just saying "I don't have an argument for this...".

Wouldn't that be their way of stating that it's prima facie, in that any argument for it would be less obvious than the fact itself.

I don't think it's coincidence that people are just now throwing out ex nihilo nihil fit, while not even Hume took the negation of this seriously. It's really just ad hoc.

Don't things we observe all around us require a potentiality for their existence? In other words, when we say something is contingent, we mean that it's contingent. See what I mean by "prima facie"? Contingents are temporally finite. They may or may not exist. This very statement requires that there was potential for the existence or nonexistence of said object.

Now, can there be a potentiality in "nothing"? Is it not an obvious fact that in nothing there is nothing, not even potentiality? A potentiality has to exist in something for any contingent to begin.

So, it does indeed seem metaphysically impossible for a contingent to begin without a cause.

[ENeGMA]

Wouldn't that be their way of stating that it's prima facie, in that any argument for it would be less obvious than the fact itself.

If it were actually obvious, I wouldn't be in a position to doubt it, now would I?

I don't think it's coincidence that people are just now throwing out ex nihilo nihil fit, while not even Hume took the negation of this seriously. It's really just ad hoc.

Hume doubted ex nihilo nihil fit. In fact that seems to be part of his argument against induction.

So because everyone believes some particular metaphysical thesis, I have to believe it to just because everyone else does?

It's nice that you're coming out and just saying that you're letting a logical fallacy do the work that an argument is supposed to do.

Don't things we observe all around us require a potentiality for their existence?

I don't know.

I don't know what that means. This just seems like a way of saying "Everything that begins to exist must have a cause" which of course is not something I'm just going to agree to as a premise.

In other words, when we say something is contingent, we mean that it's contingent.

Contingent just means actual and not necessary.

It doesn't mean anything about "potentiality".

See what I mean by "prima facie"? Contingents are temporally finite.

It's possible for something to be eternal in one possible world and not exist in another possible world, I'd say.

They may or may not exist. This very statement requires that there was potential for the existence or nonexistence of said object.

Sure. But this is just a consequence of how possible worlds work.

Now, can there be a potentiality in "nothing"?

No.

Is it not an obvious fact that in nothing there is nothing, not even potentiality? A potentiality has to exist in something for any contingent to begin.

I don't think there are such things as "potentialities".

So, it does indeed seem metaphysically impossible for a contingent to begin without a cause.

Metaphysically impossible if you accept some view of metaphysics like yours, perhaps.

But I don't.

[ENeGMA]

Okay fair point well perhaps I'll try and muster up an argument and you can critique it as you see fit.

Would you agree that nothingness into the creation of the universe is a change?

No.

Changes are from one state to another. Nothingness isn't a state.

If so, then what can possibly cause this change if nothing exists to do it?

Nothing. It's uncased.

Perhaps you deny that changes always require a cause.

I wouldn't say I deny it.

I wouldn't say I believe it either.

If so what justifies your belief that this is so? What reason do you have to think this?

None.

I have absolutely no reason to think that changes "always" require a cause.

How could I know that? How could you?

And if you believe that changes don't need a cause, is it only the kind of changes involved in bringing nothing into something or can other changes occur without cause?

I'm a skeptic about causation too.

[Mattsterpiece]

If it were actually obvious, I wouldn't be in a position to doubt it, now would I?

Yeah, but that assumes that you're not completely nuts though.

Hume doubted ex nihilo nihil fit. In fact that seems to be part of his argument against induction.

So because everyone believes some particular metaphysical thesis, I have to believe it to just because everyone else does?

It's nice that you're coming out and just saying that you're letting a logical fallacy do the work that an argument is supposed to do.

One, you completely misrepresented me. I wasn't appealing to popularity of a thesis. I was saying that it's obvious.

Also, do your homework. Hume only said it's impossible to build a case for the causal principle, but he did go on to say that the negation of it is absurd.

I don't know what that means. This just seems like a way of saying "Everything that begins to exist must have a cause" which of course is not something I'm just going to agree to as a premise.

Newsflash, premises only have to be more plausibly true than their negation. The argument is obviously valid, but now you're suggesting that something can come from nothing.

The thing is, once you concede a beginning, you recognize the entity as a contingent, meaning it may or may not exist, but it just so happens to begin to exist. This means there was potential for both.

In saying that there was potential in nothing, aren't you affirming that there is something, instead of nothing?

Contingent just means actual and not necessary.

It doesn't mean anything about "potentiality".

Yeah, and saying that it is actual but not necessary affirms that it may not have existed or it may have, and it just so happens it does. That it what you call potentiality.

It's possible for something to be eternal in one possible world and not exist in another possible world, I'd say.

Since I don't feel like arguing a moot point, how about this:

Temporally-finite entities are contingent.

Sure. But this is just a consequence of how possible worlds work.

Yeah, and their being a potentiality as the basis for contingents is also a consequence.

Just a side note: Do we say that there is a potentiality for eternal entities to exist, or that they are beginningless and just exist.

I don't think there are such things as "potentialities".

You already conceded that there was a potential for the existence or nonexistence of any contingent. You had just conceded that.

Regardless of whether the number 3 "exists", when you had 2 you get 5.

Conceding that there is potential for contingents, you concede something, instead of nothing. You're being inconsistent.