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I'm returning to my earlier project about my off the cuff reactions to The God Delusion, which I have found entertaining (in some good and some bad ways) and thought provoking. Chapter 4 is Dawkins's further attempts to dispense with arguments in favor of God.
I.
The first is the argument from probability--that is that the likelihood of life arising from purely naturalistic explanations is so improbable as to be nearly impossible--as improbable as a hurricane sweeping through a junk yard and assembling a 747. As this is an argument that is used most frequently by seven-day creationists, I'm not that interested in defending it. I agree that astoundingly improbably events happen daily--it is often cited that if you shuffle a deck of cards that it is probable that the combination you obtain is not likely to have been created before.
Where Dawkins and I diverge is that I do not see improbability as a reasonable argument against the existence of God. In fact, I think that to argue such is a non sequitur. I see this as similar to the premature atheist triumphalism over the closing 'God of the Gaps' theory--the idea that natural processes can explain the natural universe and therefore there is no need for God in the explanation so, somehow a miracle happens, and *poof* there is therefore no God.
My only serious objection in this section has to do with his argument that, "After Darwin, we all should feel, deep in our bones, suspicious of the very idea of design. The illusion of design is a trap that has caught us before, and Darwin should have immunized us by raising our consciousness. Would that he had succeeded with all of us." The idea of the "illusion of design" is another one of his unfalsifiable proclamations on which he is so reliant--the sort that will only appeal to his choir. In reality, it is difficult to determine if the apparent quality of "design" is a real hallmark of design or an illusion.
II.
The second section, "Natural Selection as a Consciousness-Raiser," doesn't seem to deal with an argument per se, but rather with his sermonette on understanding man's place in the universe. There is some attempt at wit here, and the awkward spectacle of Dawkins quoting Douglas Adams quoting Dawkins, but little, in my opinion of substance. For example, there is Dawkins disbelief at the reactions of theistic evolutionists--as if everyone who is presented with the same information must act the same way:
Of course, I'm not sure what sort of actual Christian would believe in such a hands-off type of deity. I believe, as presumably do many theistic evolutionists, that God using evolution or other natural processes in creation is simply an extension of his divine will--there's nothing lazy about it (as "lazy," a word relevant to human nature could be relevant to an entity so completely other that most of our language about "Him" is metaphor). We believe that the universe indicates the continuing creative will of God. Evolution, the birth of stars in stellar nurseries, or plate tectonics, are not hands off processes then, but the continuing, moment by moment expression and continuance of creation.
Again, this, like the previous section, deals with a theology that reached its peak in the nineteenth century. One gets the sense that Dawkins wishes his opponent were the typical Victorian parson with a completely anthropomorphic deity--the all or nothing sorts of God who must either create in seven days or not exist at all, as if there were no logical in between.
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At any rate, if you've read this far, I thank you for the indulgence. I will stop here to let people digest or comment on these parts, and I will post more in a couple of days, or tomorrow, if time and conversation permits.
Thanks,
Guacamole
I.
The first is the argument from probability--that is that the likelihood of life arising from purely naturalistic explanations is so improbable as to be nearly impossible--as improbable as a hurricane sweeping through a junk yard and assembling a 747. As this is an argument that is used most frequently by seven-day creationists, I'm not that interested in defending it. I agree that astoundingly improbably events happen daily--it is often cited that if you shuffle a deck of cards that it is probable that the combination you obtain is not likely to have been created before.
Where Dawkins and I diverge is that I do not see improbability as a reasonable argument against the existence of God. In fact, I think that to argue such is a non sequitur. I see this as similar to the premature atheist triumphalism over the closing 'God of the Gaps' theory--the idea that natural processes can explain the natural universe and therefore there is no need for God in the explanation so, somehow a miracle happens, and *poof* there is therefore no God.
My only serious objection in this section has to do with his argument that, "After Darwin, we all should feel, deep in our bones, suspicious of the very idea of design. The illusion of design is a trap that has caught us before, and Darwin should have immunized us by raising our consciousness. Would that he had succeeded with all of us." The idea of the "illusion of design" is another one of his unfalsifiable proclamations on which he is so reliant--the sort that will only appeal to his choir. In reality, it is difficult to determine if the apparent quality of "design" is a real hallmark of design or an illusion.
II.
The second section, "Natural Selection as a Consciousness-Raiser," doesn't seem to deal with an argument per se, but rather with his sermonette on understanding man's place in the universe. There is some attempt at wit here, and the awkward spectacle of Dawkins quoting Douglas Adams quoting Dawkins, but little, in my opinion of substance. For example, there is Dawkins disbelief at the reactions of theistic evolutionists--as if everyone who is presented with the same information must act the same way:
I am continually astonished by those theists who, far from having their consciousness raised in the way that I propose, seem to rejoice in natural selection as ‘God’s way of achieving his creation’. They note that evolution by natural selection would be a very easy and neat way to achieve a world full of life. God wouldn’t need to do anything at all! Peter Atkins, in the book just mentioned, takes this line of thought to a sensibly godless conclusion when he postulates a hypothetically lazy God who tries to get away with as little as possible in order to make a universe containing life. Atkins’s lazy God is even lazier than the deist God of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment: deus otiosus—literally God at leisure, unoccupied, unemployed, superfluous, useless. Step by step, Atkins succeeds in reducing the amount of work the lazy God has to do until he finally ends up doing nothing at all: he might as well not bother to exist.
Again, this, like the previous section, deals with a theology that reached its peak in the nineteenth century. One gets the sense that Dawkins wishes his opponent were the typical Victorian parson with a completely anthropomorphic deity--the all or nothing sorts of God who must either create in seven days or not exist at all, as if there were no logical in between.
-----
At any rate, if you've read this far, I thank you for the indulgence. I will stop here to let people digest or comment on these parts, and I will post more in a couple of days, or tomorrow, if time and conversation permits.
Thanks,
Guacamole
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