Free will.

[shunyadragon]

No Shuny, he does not believe we can do otherwise, that is not the freedom that Dennett is speaking of. And again you are being dishonest, I did not use a selective quote, I linked the entire paper. You are wrong about Dennett, and I have proved you wrong with his own words. Stop misleading because everyone can see that you are prevaricating.

https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/...0010_0553_0565

As as we go here, everyone is only you in this thread,

[seer]

As as we go here, everyone is only you in this thread,

Shuny, Dennett in his own words says he does not believe that we can do otherwise, and according to him that is not necessary for free will. I mean what more do you need than his own words? Are you really this dishonest? I mean the title of the paper is "I CAN NOT DO OTHERWISE - SO WHAT?"

[shunyadragon]

Shuny, Dennett in his own words says he does not believe that we can do otherwise, and according to him that is not necessary for free will. I mean what more do you need than his own words? Are you really this dishonest? I mean the title of the paper is "I CAN NOT DO OTHERWISE - SO WHAT?"

The subject of the thread has passed you by in the dust of ancient agendas, and clinging to the incoherent libertarian free will, which you have not coherently defined. All you have asserted is there are different definitions. Oh! how meaningless of an argument.

[seer]

The subject of the thread has passed you by in the dust of ancient agendas, and clinging to the incoherent libertarian free will, which you have not coherently defined. All you have asserted is there are different definitions. Oh! how meaningless of an argument.

Doesn't matter, Dennett still does not agree with you that we can do other wise. Compatibilism asserts that free will and determinism are compatible - but that depends on how you define free will. If it is the ability to do otherwise then they are not compatible.

[shunyadragon]

Doesn't matter, Dennett still does not agree with you that we can do other wise. Compatibilism asserts that free will and determinism are compatible - but that depends on how you define free will. If it is the ability to do otherwise then they are not compatible.

I define ability to choose otherwise as human free will choice, and Dennett acknowledges that humans have choice, and the outcome of human choices is not inevitable, You tend to split frog hairs and selectively cite sources to justify your agenda, and will not acknowledge that philosophy of compatibilism indeed considers humans make free will choices with in the limits and context of determinism.

[seer]

I define ability to choose otherwise as human free will choice, and Dennett acknowledges that humans have choice, and the outcome of human choices is not inevitable, You tend to split frog hairs and selectively cite sources to justify your agenda, and will not acknowledge that philosophy of compatibilism indeed considers humans make free will choices with in the limits and context of determinism.

Well since Dennett does not agree with the ability to do otherwise - how then are we free? How can we be both free and determined? They can assert this all they want, but how is that possible?

[shunyadragon]

Well since Dennett does not agree with the ability to do otherwise - how then are we free? How can we be both free and determined? They can assert this all they want, but how is that possible?

Despite Tassman's repeated coherent explanations concerning compatibilism how Dennett describes, you persist in a combative approach concerning the nature of free will within and emergent from a deterministic framework.

Dennett is only one philosopher of many that advocates a form of compatibilism, and not the only explanation for the belief that a limited form of free will emerges from determinism within limited choice.

An interesting example is the choice of church or religious or non-religious belief system in our culture. In some other cultures the choice of an alternate belief system is punishable by death, or prison so people rarely make an alternate choice. In our culture the search is far more open, but nonetheless, but a limited number make the choice outside the accepted sense of community of the culture, and yes a limited number of people make choices'outside the box,' but yes they do so dominently seeking a 'sense of belonging' decision that leads most people to make a choice that is comfortable to them. Many people do indeed 'church shop' within this limited range of choices to pick one that they are comfortable with. They are not deterministic robots, but by far most indeed make limited free will choices within a limited number churches that meet the limited predetermined social and cultural framework. Of course, the majority make the choices of their parents, and grandparents, still within Dennett's 'elbow room.'

The problems with free will in this deterministic chain of events is the reason I describe it as 'potential free will.'

Within the deterministic causal chain of events within a cultural and social there are limited free will choices that people make. Dennett describes this as 'elbow room' within a deterministic frame work where people make choices.

[Tassman]

Yes, but the fact that our choices matter, and that they are one of the steps, or an integral part of the causal chain, does not in any sense explain how those choices free. Every event, and or choice made, in the causal stream matters, but mattering doesn't make them free. If I choose to murder someone, it matters, but if I only did so because that choice was an integral part of the causal stream, an action for which I could not do otherwise, then it wasn't what we would define as a free will action.

One of those “steps in the causal chain” may well have been the social acculturation process that results in your choice to not commit murder. Antecedent events matter a great deal, but within the deterministic causal chain we have a limited area of genuine free will according to the compatabilist argument. The alternative is hard determinism, wherein free-will is totally an illusion. Libertarian free-will is not a coherent option, despite the whining of seer.

[JimL]

One of those “steps in the causal chain” may well have been the social acculturation process that results in your choice to not commit murder. Antecedent events matter a great deal, but within the deterministic causal chain we have a limited area of genuine free will according to the compatabilist argument. The alternative is hard determinism, wherein free-will is totally an illusion. Libertarian free-will is not a coherent option, despite the whining of seer.

But wouldn't you say that the social acculturation process, being one of the steps in the causal chain, is also deterministic? You and shunya keep asserting limited free will, as opposed to hard determinism, but i'm just not seeing a coherent explanation as to just where free will enters the picture from the compatibilists perspective.

[seer]

One of those “steps in the causal chain” may well have been the social acculturation process that results in your choice to not commit murder. Antecedent events matter a great deal, but within the deterministic causal chain we have a limited area of genuine free will according to the compatabilist argument. The alternative is hard determinism, wherein free-will is totally an illusion. Libertarian free-will is not a coherent option, despite the whining of seer.

The ability to do otherwise Tass (which is how I define free will) is not an incoherent concept. And in case it escaped you, not all Libertarians agree on all points, one thing that is key though is that we have the ability to do otherwise. Without that ability there is no "genuine free will" - how could there be?

[shunyadragon]

[QUOTE=JimL;464060]But wouldn't you say that the social acculturation process, being one of the steps in the causal chain, is also deterministic? [quote]

No.

You and shunya keep asserting limited free will, as opposed to hard determinism, but i'm just not seeing a coherent explanation as to just where free will enters the picture from the compatibilists perspective.

It enters simply by the evidence I demonstrated by the history of people choosing their religious belief or non-belief by exercising their limited free will within deterministic factors that limit their choices, but yes for personal reasons of free will choice, some make choices 'outside the box' of causal chains of determinism, which than become part of the causal chains of determinism.

You are presently not responding to the previous posts that demonstrate the human ability to make choices outside the strict definition of determinism, therefore some version of compatibilism is the most logical, rational and scientific choice based on the evidence.

[JimL]

[QUOTE=shunyadragon;464354]

But wouldn't you say that the social acculturation process, being one of the steps in the causal chain, is also deterministic?

No.

Why not? Please explain?

It enters simply by the evidence I demonstrated by the history of people choosing their religious belief or non-belief by exercising their limited free will within deterministic factors that limit their choices, but yes for personal reasons of free will choice, some make choices 'outside the box' of causal chains of determinism, which than become part of the causal chains of determinism.

Sorry shunya, but again that is incoherent. All you are saying above is that free will emerges when people make their free will choices within an otherwise deterministic world. You are not explaining how, or in what sense their choices are freely made rather than determined like everything else in the deterministic world.

You are presently not responding to the previous posts that demonstrate the human ability to make choices outside the strict definition of determinism, therefore some version of compatibilism is the most logical, rational and scientific choice based on the evidence.

And again, you've presented no such previous posts demonstating in what sense the choices we make are freely made. You suggest that they are in some sense free, you assert that they are in some sense free, but you don't explain by what evidence you have come to the conclusion that they are in some sense free.

[Tassman]

But wouldn't you say that the social acculturation process, being one of the steps in the causal chain, is also deterministic? You and shunya keep asserting limited free will, as opposed to hard determinism, but i'm just not seeing a coherent explanation as to just where free will enters the picture from the compatibilists perspective.

You appear to be defining free-will in the LFW sense, which is logically incoherent. And you’re not distinguishing determinism from pre-determinism, i.e. the idea that the entire past (as well as the future) was determined at the origin of the universe.

There is actually no strict determinism at any "level" of the physical world thanks to quantum indeterminacy. What we have is a form of ‘adequate determinism’ whereby compatabilists can argue for a causal connection between motives, feelings and reason and make choices from freely generated possibilities or chance events. In short, limited free-will!

[JimL]

You appear to be defining free-will in the LFW sense, which is logically incoherent. And you’re not distinguishing determinism from pre-determinism, i.e. the idea that the entire past (as well as the future) was determined at the origin of the universe.

There is actually no strict determinism at any "level" of the physical world thanks to quantum indeterminacy. What we have is a form of ‘adequate determinism’ whereby compatabilists can argue for a causal connection between motives, feelings and reason and make choices from freely generated possibilities or chance events. In short, limited free-will!

Still not getting exactly what you mean by limited Tass. Limited by what exactly? When we are faced with a choice, lets say there are 15 different flavors of ice cream to choose from, how exactly is the choice I opt for limited? Am I free to choose any flavor amonst the 15, or is my choice limited to just a few out of the fifteen, or just one? And if so, what is it exactly that limits, or free's my choices to one, two, three, or ten of the 15 choices available? My understanding of determinism is that the choices "I" make would be the effects of antecedent causes, not of a free will. So, if I am free to choose any of the 15 flavors available, then I obviously have free will, but if I am limited to choose only one particular flavor out of the fifteen then I'm determined. So what does compatibilism say, that I can choose otherwise, but there are only a limited number amongst the 15 that are available for me to choose? If so, why? Why a limited number of choices, rather than just one?

[Tassman]

Still not getting exactly what you mean by limited Tass. Limited by what exactly? When we are faced with a choice, lets say there are 15 different flavors of ice cream to choose from, how exactly is the choice I opt for limited? Am I free to choose any flavor amonst the 15, or is my choice limited to just a few out of the fifteen, or just one? And if so, what is it exactly that limits, or free's my choices to one, two, three, or ten of the 15 choices available? My understanding of determinism is that the choices "I" make would be the effects of antecedent causes, not of a free will. So, if I am free to choose any of the 15 flavors available, then I obviously have free will, but if I am limited to choose only one particular flavor out of the fifteen then I'm determined. So what does compatibilism say, that I can choose otherwise, but there are only a limited number amongst the 15 that are available for me to choose? If so, why? Why a limited number of choices, rather than just one?

Your choices would be limited to your antecedent ice-cream experiences and you would probably choose the flavour you have always considered the nicest in the past. However there could be a chance element, e.g. a brand new flavour being available or your new girlfriend suggesting you try something different or your mate daring you to choose by tossing a coin. Any of these chance elements may result in you overriding your previous experiences and choosing the new ice-cream.

In such an event you are exercising limited free will due to a chance occurrence. This is Adequate (or Statistical) Determinism, as understood by Combatabilists, as opposed to ‘pre-determinism’ (or Hard Determinism), whereby the entire past (as well as the future) was determined at the origin of the universe and is utterly rigid.