Do you mean the ability to ALWAYS do otherwise, without exception? If you say yes, then you are being logically incoherent because you are ignoring the impact the antecedent events that formed your subconscious mind. And if you acknowledge the impact of your subconscious upon your decision-making processes, you have entered the realm of Compatabilism.
Did I say always? No! And earlier on I made it clear that there are some things that impact choice, like addiction, brain injury, upbringing, etc... But that generally we have the ability to do otherwise. That is the foundation of any LFW theory (of which there are a number) and that concept is not incoherent. And if you believe that we have the ability to do otherwise, even if only rarely, then you too agree the concept is not incoherent.
Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...
Than you agree with the definition I previously provided, which you previously hedged.
Where did I agree with this definition? The fact is Shuny I have made clear that I do believe there are constraints, some stronger than others. Some easier to over come than others. The discussion of free will is not black and white.
Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...
The level to which humans have influence over their future is itself largely dependent on present and past. The degree to which our decision-making processes affect reality is unknown and much debated between 'hard determinists' and 'compatabilists'. What is not debatable is the incoherent notion of Libertarian Free-Will, whereby an agent can disregard the antecedent events that form the subconscious mind. If an agent takes this into account, then we're no longer talking about LFW but combatabilism.
Right, that is why the courts often take a defendants past exerience into consideration when sentencing and so forth, but that doesn't effect the nature of the will itself, or our ability to do otherwise. The world we live in may be determined and those external factors can influence our choices, but we are still free to overide those external factors an choose to do otherwise. Thats all I'm trying to say about the will, that it itself is not determined, and I think you may agree.
I think the point that the combatibilists are admitting to is that they agree that we do indeed have free will, that it is influenced or constrained by the construct it operates within is really besides the point, that would be the case no matter what.
It should be noted I am not a compatibalist. While I think explaining what free will is, is a hard task, I think compatibalism however respectable it can be is even more problematic than a more traditional approach to this old question. The original incentive for compatibalist was the sixteenth century notion that our universe was a clock work of only deterministic efficient causes, while trying to avoid the conclusion that humans can't really be held accountable. That justice, intent and choice were mere illusions of the human condition. And do this in a world with no final cause, no telos, no directionality, but just things that happen as dictated by merciless physical laws; Justice in a game of infinite billiards of the atoms.
The idea that our universe a mechanical clockwork has long since died, and while deterministic interpretations of physics are perfectly possible, there's not really any particular reason to have them. So if I have to guess I'd take our universe exhibits non-mechanical behavior, though I reject the idea that there is such a thing as an event without a cause.
Its not really that difficult considering that we make reference even to whether an atom will, or will not decay. Implying by language already that a cause of the radioactive decay resides with the particle itself. One that we can't know of, since we can't see the essence of that particle. We just know it by the physical effects it produces, and our physical theories accurately produces the odds that it'll decay in a particular way.
Reminds me that I need to read Real Essentialism by Oderberg.
Right, that is why the courts often take a defendants past exerience into consideration when sentencing and so forth, but that doesn't effect the nature of the will itself, or our ability to do otherwise. The world we live in may be determined and those external factors can influence our choices, but we are still free to overide those external factors an choose to do otherwise. Thats all I'm trying to say about the will, that it itself is not determined, and I think you may agree.
Yes I agree with the proviso that the degree to which our decision-making processes affect reality is unknown and much debated between 'hard determinists' and 'compatabilists'...as I said previously.
“He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.
Where did I agree with this definition? The fact is Shuny I have made clear that I do believe there are constraints, some stronger than others. Some easier to over come than others. The discussion of free will is not black and white.
Hence you are a compatabilist, because what you're acknowledging is not libertarian free-will..
“He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.
I think the point that the combatibilists are admitting to is that they agree that we do indeed have free will, that it is influenced or constrained by the construct it operates within is really besides the point, that would be the case no matter what.
I believe this an unwarranted extreme interpretation of compatabilism by Dennett only one view of the nature of the philosophy of compatibilism.
Actually, as the only alternative I could go with is a flexible determinism that allows only a partial ability to make decisions within a limited decision choice that is predetermined. That is what you describe.
The problem with the libertarian free will perspective is that there is evidence of decisions making process outside the belief in contrary choice within a limited number of possibilities.
Fortunately by the evidence, I believe there are several objectively observed properties of our decision making process that fail to describe a strict determinist perspective.
There is most definitely a chain cause and effect decisions that are to degree influenced by the sequence of cause and effect relationships. The problem is the individual making the decision cannot know the degree of free will involved in each decision. Therefore it is possible that all the decisions of the cause and effects could be predetermined by the collective cause of and effect nature of predetermined events. Therefore it is possible that determinism rules.
I believe there is evidence that 'potential free will' exists, but that is another story.
Last edited by shunyadragon; 08-13-2017 at 06:01 PM.
Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:
Originally Posted by Tassman
seer amen'd this post.
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