Classical liberalism vs Modern liberalism

[joel]

I'm interested in any comments on the following thoughts on liberalism.

Classical liberals, such as John Locke, espoused the principles of individualism, liberty, justice, and equality. Modern liberals ostensibly endorse the same principles, using the same language, but attach a different meaning to these terms. Modern liberals tend to claim that any difference in meaning that they hold is addition to or augmentation of the meanings of the classical liberals, and thus is a progress or improvement upon the classical liberals' principles. However, when the differences in the meanings attached to these terms are carefully considered, one finds that, far from being an augmentation, the modern liberal definitions directly conflict with those of the classical liberals.

Consider liberty. Classical liberals understood liberty to be the absence of physical interference by others upon one's person and estate. John Locke wrote that liberty is “to follow my own will in all things, where the [natural law] rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature" (Second Treatise on Government, emphasis in original). John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, probably the most cited source on political ideas in the American colonies wrote,

"By liberty, I understand the power which every man has over his own actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art, and industry, as far as by it he hurts not the society, or any members of it, by taking from any member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself enjoys. The fruits of a man's honest industry are the just rewards of it, ascertained to him by natural and eternal equity, as is his title to use them in the manner which he thinks fit: And thus, with the above limitations, every man is sole lord and arbiter of his own private actions and property. A character of which no man living can divest him but by usurpation, or his own consent" (Cato's Letters, No. 62).

Modern liberals have referred to this definition of liberty pejoratively as merely “negative liberty,” and complained that “positive liberty” has been neglected. The classical liberal's “liberty” is said to be “negative” because it says only that others refrain from interfering with you. “Positive” liberty is said to consist of possessing the (positive) capacity and means to do what you will. Thus a wealthy person has more “positive” liberty.

The classical liberal, on the other hand, would say that “positive” liberty is no kind of liberty at all, because liberty is only a negative term—freedom is always freedom from something, not the possessing of means—and that the natural right to liberty into which everyone is born is a freedom from the rule of others. Modern liberals affirm an additional right to “positive” liberty. However, the modern liberal notion is not an augmentation but is opposition to the classical liberals. A right to “positive” liberty is a right to means—i.e., goods and services. If what is meant is only a right to one's own means, then this is just the classical “negative” liberty. Otherwise the only meaning of a right to “positive” liberty is to have a right to the person and/or goods of someone else—the right to be provided with means from someone else's person or estate (e.g., in the case of a “right” to be provided with food or health care). But that entails a direct infringement upon a man's right to natural liberty, according to the classical liberals. As Locke wrote, even a government "cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government," and “I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent.” Thus one person's “positive” liberty is necessarily the denial of another person's “negative” liberty. If B brandishes a gun and demands A's means, then do we stop B as aggressing against A's right to “negative” liberty, or do we defend B as exercising his right to “positive” liberty? There is no middle ground. A right to “positive” liberty is in direct opposition to the right to “negative” liberty. The classical and modern liberals use the same term “liberty” but in ways that are incompatible with each other. One cannot logically defend both.

The situation is similar in the case of justice. Classically, justice was always a form of Plato's “to render to each their due” (The Republic). Thus the classical liberals held justice to be the defense and respect of everyone's right to what is theirs (their person and estate). On the other hand, modern liberals seek to augment justice by the concept of “social justice.” But, the political manifestations of social justice are things like coerced “charity,” and thus contradict “regular” justice. Antony Flew in “Social Justice Isn't Any Kind of Justice,” shows that social justice dismisses “all possible grounds for any differences in deserts and entitlements,” thus eliminating any possibility of justice (http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn027.pdf ). From the perspective of the classical liberal, social justice amounts to supporting someone's claim to that which is someone else's, which would be considered an act of injustice. As in the case of liberty, social justice is not an addition to or augmentation of “regular” justice, but is a violation of it.

Another point of incompatibility is that justice has limits, while philanthropy is unlimited. Thus social justice, insofar as it is forced by law, is incompatible with the classical liberal principle of limited government, which is derived from “regular” justice. A 'philanthropic' government is one that possesses unlimited, absolute power.

Both of the modern liberal concepts of liberty and justice include the idea of equality, but again here it is opposed to the equality that was claimed by classical liberals. The latter affirmed that “all men by nature are equal,” but what was meant was that all men are born equally free and independent. Locke wrote,

“Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level...and yet all this consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another;...being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.”

When the classical liberals extolled this equality (of rights), they were arguing against the thesis that some men were born into slavery or subjection to other men—that other men had a natural jurisdiction over them. They certainly were not suggesting that we pursue other kinds of equality that would be in violation of justice. Modern liberals attempt to expand and pursue other kinds of equality—e.g., of wealth or income—or at least are in favor of eliminating “too much” inequality of income. This is, at root, a form of “from each according to his ability to each according to his need.” But this, insofar as it is enforced by law, is to establish those who need to be lowered as being naturally subject to those who need to be raised. The latter have a claim upon the former, and thus a kind of “jurisdiction or dominion” over the former. Another principle derived from classical equality is that of equality before the law, that “[legislators] are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough” (Locke). On the other hand modern liberals intentionally seek inequality before the law, as for example in the case of a progressive income tax. Thus the modern “equality” is not an addition to the classical “equality.” They are incompatible. Enforcement of the modern concept of equality is to infringe upon the classical equality of natural rights.

Finally, modern liberals often do not support the individualism of classical liberals. Instead appeals are often made to the common good (or “public good”, or “public welfare”) as opposed to the good of the individual. The common good is seen as a higher claim that overrides the individual's claim to his life, liberty, or estate. This language too, of “public good,” is borrowed from the classical liberals but with a different meaning. The classical liberals indeed held that all the acts of government are “to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people” (Locke), but “public good” was meant as opposed to the government acting in the government's good, and not as opposed to the individual. On the contrary, “public good” referred to the individual, “the good of every particular member of that society” in his natural rights, and thus “the sword is not given the magistrate for his own good alone.” The point was that the government may only protect the natural rights of the individual—to protect his life, liberty, and estate. To act on behalf of some collective good as a higher claim than that of the individual's is to act contrary to the “public good” of the classical liberals—contrary to natural law, because it violates the principle of equality before the law.

And so we find that although modern liberals use much of the same language as classical liberals when referring to fundamental principles, very different meanings are employed. We also find that if modern liberals affirm that their meanings are in addition to (or augmentation of) the classical meanings, they are mistaken. The modern and classical concepts are incompatible, and one cannot logically affirm both. This was recognized by the classical liberal Federic Bastiat when he wrote in 1850, “These two uses of the law are in direct contradiction to each other. We must choose between them. A citizen cannot at the same time be free and not free" (The Law).

[Faramir]

Bump.

Excellent post. I cringe when I here modern "progressives" describe themselves as liberal. (The term progressive isn't a much more accurate descriptor either)

[gharfish]

I'm interested in any comments on the following thoughts on liberalism.

Classical liberals, such as John Locke, espoused the principles of individualism, liberty, justice, and equality. Modern liberals ostensibly endorse the same principles, using the same language, but attach a different meaning to these terms. Modern liberals tend to claim that any difference in meaning that they hold is addition to or augmentation of the meanings of the classical liberals, and thus is a progress or improvement upon the classical liberals' principles. However, when the differences in the meanings attached to these terms are carefully considered, one finds that, far from being an augmentation, the modern liberal definitions directly conflict with those of the classical liberals.

Consider liberty. Classical liberals understood liberty to be the absence of physical interference by others upon one's person and estate. John Locke wrote that liberty is “to follow my own will in all things, where the [natural law] rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature" (Second Treatise on Government, emphasis in original). John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, probably the most cited source on political ideas in the American colonies wrote,

"By liberty, I understand the power which every man has over his own actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art, and industry, as far as by it he hurts not the society, or any members of it, by taking from any member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself enjoys. The fruits of a man's honest industry are the just rewards of it, ascertained to him by natural and eternal equity, as is his title to use them in the manner which he thinks fit: And thus, with the above limitations, every man is sole lord and arbiter of his own private actions and property. A character of which no man living can divest him but by usurpation, or his own consent" (Cato's Letters, No. 62).

Modern liberals have referred to this definition of liberty pejoratively as merely “negative liberty,” and complained that “positive liberty” has been neglected. The classical liberal's “liberty” is said to be “negative” because it says only that others refrain from interfering with you. “Positive” liberty is said to consist of possessing the (positive) capacity and means to do what you will. Thus a wealthy person has more “positive” liberty.

The classical liberal, on the other hand, would say that “positive” liberty is no kind of liberty at all, because liberty is only a negative term—freedom is always freedom from something, not the possessing of means—and that the natural right to liberty into which everyone is born is a freedom from the rule of others. Modern liberals affirm an additional right to “positive” liberty. However, the modern liberal notion is not an augmentation but is opposition to the classical liberals. A right to “positive” liberty is a right to means—i.e., goods and services. If what is meant is only a right to one's own means, then this is just the classical “negative” liberty. Otherwise the only meaning of a right to “positive” liberty is to have a right to the person and/or goods of someone else—the right to be provided with means from someone else's person or estate (e.g., in the case of a “right” to be provided with food or health care). But that entails a direct infringement upon a man's right to natural liberty, according to the classical liberals. As Locke wrote, even a government "cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government," and “I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent.” Thus one person's “positive” liberty is necessarily the denial of another person's “negative” liberty. If B brandishes a gun and demands A's means, then do we stop B as aggressing against A's right to “negative” liberty, or do we defend B as exercising his right to “positive” liberty? There is no middle ground. A right to “positive” liberty is in direct opposition to the right to “negative” liberty. The classical and modern liberals use the same term “liberty” but in ways that are incompatible with each other. One cannot logically defend both.

The situation is similar in the case of justice. Classically, justice was always a form of Plato's “to render to each their due” (The Republic). Thus the classical liberals held justice to be the defense and respect of everyone's right to what is theirs (their person and estate). On the other hand, modern liberals seek to augment justice by the concept of “social justice.” But, the political manifestations of social justice are things like coerced “charity,” and thus contradict “regular” justice. Antony Flew in “Social Justice Isn't Any Kind of Justice,” shows that social justice dismisses “all possible grounds for any differences in deserts and entitlements,” thus eliminating any possibility of justice (http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn027.pdf ). From the perspective of the classical liberal, social justice amounts to supporting someone's claim to that which is someone else's, which would be considered an act of injustice. As in the case of liberty, social justice is not an addition to or augmentation of “regular” justice, but is a violation of it.

Another point of incompatibility is that justice has limits, while philanthropy is unlimited. Thus social justice, insofar as it is forced by law, is incompatible with the classical liberal principle of limited government, which is derived from “regular” justice. A 'philanthropic' government is one that possesses unlimited, absolute power.

Both of the modern liberal concepts of liberty and justice include the idea of equality, but again here it is opposed to the equality that was claimed by classical liberals. The latter affirmed that “all men by nature are equal,” but what was meant was that all men are born equally free and independent. Locke wrote,

“Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level...and yet all this consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another;...being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.”

When the classical liberals extolled this equality (of rights), they were arguing against the thesis that some men were born into slavery or subjection to other men—that other men had a natural jurisdiction over them. They certainly were not suggesting that we pursue other kinds of equality that would be in violation of justice. Modern liberals attempt to expand and pursue other kinds of equality—e.g., of wealth or income—or at least are in favor of eliminating “too much” inequality of income. This is, at root, a form of “from each according to his ability to each according to his need.” But this, insofar as it is enforced by law, is to establish those who need to be lowered as being naturally subject to those who need to be raised. The latter have a claim upon the former, and thus a kind of “jurisdiction or dominion” over the former. Another principle derived from classical equality is that of equality before the law, that “[legislators] are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough” (Locke). On the other hand modern liberals intentionally seek inequality before the law, as for example in the case of a progressive income tax. Thus the modern “equality” is not an addition to the classical “equality.” They are incompatible. Enforcement of the modern concept of equality is to infringe upon the classical equality of natural rights.

Finally, modern liberals often do not support the individualism of classical liberals. Instead appeals are often made to the common good (or “public good”, or “public welfare”) as opposed to the good of the individual. The common good is seen as a higher claim that overrides the individual's claim to his life, liberty, or estate. This language too, of “public good,” is borrowed from the classical liberals but with a different meaning. The classical liberals indeed held that all the acts of government are “to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people” (Locke), but “public good” was meant as opposed to the government acting in the government's good, and not as opposed to the individual. On the contrary, “public good” referred to the individual, “the good of every particular member of that society” in his natural rights, and thus “the sword is not given the magistrate for his own good alone.” The point was that the government may only protect the natural rights of the individual—to protect his life, liberty, and estate. To act on behalf of some collective good as a higher claim than that of the individual's is to act contrary to the “public good” of the classical liberals—contrary to natural law, because it violates the principle of equality before the law.

And so we find that although modern liberals use much of the same language as classical liberals when referring to fundamental principles, very different meanings are employed. We also find that if modern liberals affirm that their meanings are in addition to (or augmentation of) the classical meanings, they are mistaken. The modern and classical concepts are incompatible, and one cannot logically affirm both. This was recognized by the classical liberal Federic Bastiat when he wrote in 1850, “These two uses of the law are in direct contradiction to each other. We must choose between them. A citizen cannot at the same time be free and not free" (The Law).

Who wrote this article / paper ?


>

[joel]

Who wrote this article / paper ?

I did.

[CodewordConduit]

"When the classical liberals extolled this equality (of rights), they were arguing against the thesis that some men were born into slavery or subjection to other men—that other men had a natural jurisdiction over them."

Didn't Locke have shares in the slave trade? IIRC he wrote some weasly stuff trying to tie just war theory to slavery.

Just a lil tangent.

[Darth Executor]

Didn't Locke have shares in the slave trade?

Wouldn't surprise me. Voltaire lived off rich friends while blasting the rich for stealing from the poor (or so my history teacher said, though she didn't quite put it that way). Not to be outdone, ancient philosophers had molesting boys as part of their curriculum. Like the old saying that I did not just make up goes, the army of bandits that sets out to plunder food reserves, rape maidens and burn villages to the ground will find that the army of philosophers has already been there, done that, and written a treatise on man's inhumanity to man inbetween Satanic orgies and acts of cannibalism. Did I mention I don't like philosophers?

[Darth Executor]

Modern liberals affirm an additional right to “positive” liberty. However, the modern liberal notion is not an augmentation but is opposition to the classical liberals.

Not really. A modern liberal would argue that one does not rightfully "own" his property if he has built it on the backs of the poor and he is thus obligated to repay those who put him in his unearned position of privilege. What constitutes unearned will undoubtedly differ between classical and modern liberals.

The reason why the two appear in conflict is because there are two relatively major political philosophies at work. Freedom is seen as a virtue and everyone wants a piece of it. In my opinion, they are both crooks. The classical libertarians are talented crooks who want as few restrictions as possible because their talent will bring them to the top. The modern liberals are charismatic crooks, without the talent to survive as independent figures, but with the talent to get masses of fools to do their business under the absurd pretext that it is for their own good.

Then again, I don't place a premium on freedom. It's not a virtue, it's a tool.

[joel]

Not really. A modern liberal would argue that one does not rightfully "own" his property if he has built it on the backs of the poor and he is thus obligated to repay those who put him in his unearned position of privilege. What constitutes unearned will undoubtedly differ between classical and modern liberals.

Certainly modern liberals have taken up this Marxist "exploitation" theory of what is earned. And insofar as one is still talking in terms of earning, then we may be still talking about liberty and justice and are just disputing the details of justice. (Though I would argue that the Marxists violate liberty here by placing additional limits on liberty of association and exchange.)

However, this is not what modern liberals mean by 'positive' liberty. (Or 'positive' universal rights.) Here they are talking about means. And thus one's natural right to 'positive' liberty would be a natural right to means--not just means you have earned, but a natural-born right to be provided with means, that you did not earn. Thus we hear them speak about a universal right to health care, to food, to housing, to education, to a particular standard of living, to a job. (Much of this can be found in the United Nation's "Universal Declaration of Human Rights", for example.) This is John Rawls' theory, for instance, that rejects such things as earning as being irrelevant. This is what led Flew in the quote I gave above to say that Rawls thus eliminates any possibility of justice--that 'social justice' therefore isn't any kind of justice.

Then again, I don't place a premium on freedom. It's not a virtue, it's a tool.

I don't think classical liberals said liberty is a virtue. On the contrary, a virtue is a positive term, while (as I said above) liberty is a negative one. Justice is the virtue (which includes not invading someone else's liberty).

However, liberty was said to be a good. A tool is a good. It is admittedly a means to an end: "To live securely, happily, and independently, is the end and effect of liberty."
And without liberty one cannot be virtuous, which requires free action of a moral agent.
Classical liberals did speak rapturously of liberty. E.g., in Cato's Letters:
"liberty is the divine source of all human happiness. To possess, in security, the effects of our industry, is the most powerful and reasonable incitement to be industrious: And to be able to provide for our children, and to leave them all that we have, is the best motive to beget them. But where property is precarious, labour will languish. The privileges of thinking, saying, and doing what we please, and of growing as rich as we can, without any other restriction, than that by all this we hurt not the publick, nor one another, are the glorious privileges of liberty; and its effects, to live in freedom, plenty, and safety."

and

"the inestimable blessing of liberty. Can we ever over-rate it, or be too jealous of a treasure which includes in it almost all human felicities? Or can we encourage too much those that contend for it, and those that promote it? It is the parent of virtue, pleasure, plenty, and security; and 'tis innocent, as well as lovely."

and

"civil happiness and prosperity is inseparable from liberty"

The classical libertarians are talented crooks who want as few restrictions as possible

This isn't true. Note that in these quotes liberty is not utter license, but is limited by justice. (e.g., liberty does not include murdering.)

Here again is the first quote from Locke in the OP, this time with the bit that precedes it:

What he means by Freedom "then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us,..a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws" but rather "...a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule [justice] prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature."

Thus they did not seek "as few restrictions as possible." Rather, it is a position affirming specific restrictions, no more and no less. Or in other words, force should be used for this use (restraint and reparation) and no others. Where the restriction of justice is being neglected or overstepped, the classical liberals advocate the use of force to put an end to it. They make the additional argument that the restrictions apply to everyone, including magistrates. When a magistrate oversteps the line, he becomes the enemy of man, just as "robbers or pirates". "The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. The title of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it."


What kind of peace is it for aggressors to be unresisted? "what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors." Then sarcastically suggests perhaps Odysseus should have urged peaceful submission to the Cyclops who intended to eat them.

[Darth Executor]

However, this is not what modern liberals mean by 'positive' liberty. (Or 'positive' universal rights.)

I never said it is. I was saying that's how it's justified.

I don't think classical liberals said liberty is a virtue.

I didn't say they said it. I'm saying they believe it. Practically worship it as your own quotes demonstrate. And so do you.

On the contrary, a virtue is a positive term, while (as I said above) liberty is a negative one. Justice is the virtue (which includes not invading someone else's liberty).

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/virtue

5. a good or admirable quality or property

However, liberty was said to be a good.

There you go. Between the dictionary and your own statement, the idea that liberty is a virtue can be grammatically correct, and furthermore you see it as such, regardless of whether you deny that it's a virtue.

A tool is a good.

No, a tool is neutral by definition. It can be used for both good and evil, but the tool itself is neither a moral agent nor a description of moral behavior. It's just something to use to further either end.

And without liberty one cannot be virtuous, which requires free action of a moral agent.

Without something bad to correct one cannot be virtuous either. Does that mean bad is good?

This isn't true. Note that in these quotes liberty is not utter license, but is limited by justice. (e.g., liberty does not include murdering.)

Liberty is limited by whatever the person exhorting its virtues doesn't like. That much I could have told you already. The general definition of liberty, however, is freedom from control. That could include the freedom to murder depending on the company you keep.

Thus they did not seek "as few restrictions as possible." Rather, it is a position affirming specific restrictions, no more and no less.

In other words, as few as possible. Note I said "as few as possible", not "none at all". With the definition of "as few as possible" being whatever Locke or whoever the person you're talking to doesn't want the freedom of.

[joel]

A tool is a good.

No, a tool is neutral by definition. It can be used for both good and evil, but the tool itself is neither a moral agent nor a description of moral behavior. It's just something to use to further either end.

We could end up arguing definitions.
I was thinking "a good" as in the economic sense, which is "a tool" or "a means".
And I would disagree that it is neutral by definition. Yes, a good can be used for both good and evil. In fact, every evil requires an already-existing good. Evil cannot create of its own. Evil does not have being on its own.

Without liberty, you can't do anything, whether good or evil. You aren't a moral agent. Thus liberty, like being, is not neutral but good.

Without something bad to correct one cannot be virtuous either. Does that mean bad is good?

I disagree with your premise here. Virtue is not a diminishing of evil. Virtue (as classically defined) is a perfection of being. (And a perfection of being can exist without an antecedent imperfection--as in the case of God.) Evil has no being of its own. Evil is a privation of good.

But here we are perhaps getting beyond just political matters.


Also, as I thought about it more after I wrote my post, I thought I should point out that even 'tool' or 'means' is only a metaphor and probably misleading. Again, liberty here refers not to positive means but an absence of injustice.

Liberty is limited by whatever the person exhorting its virtues doesn't like. That much I could have told you already.

Of course anyone can define a term however they like. Arguing definitions is pointless.
What is relevant is the concept being referred to. The classical liberals defined their term, and so when they speak of "liberty", they are referring to that particular idea. If someone defines the term differently (as do modern liberals) then they are referring to something different, and thus are not talking about the same thing that classical liberals are.
Which, in fact, is the main point of my OP.

(And I would argue that the limits in the classical conception are not arbitrary, and not due to emotionalism or personal preference, but arrived at for good reason--what is understood as justice.)

In other words, as few as possible. Note I said "as few as possible", not "none at all". With the definition of "as few as possible" being whatever Locke or whoever the person you're talking to doesn't want the freedom of.

Okay, then in the exact same sense they also want "as many as possible."

[Da Blonde]

...the army of bandits that sets out to plunder food reserves, rape maidens and burn villages to the ground will find that the army of philosophers has already been there, done that, and written a treatise on man's inhumanity to man inbetween Satanic orgies and acts of cannibalism.

That certainly explains the impulse to theocracy.

[NormATive]

The common denominator between "Classical Liberals" and "Modern Liberals" is a belief that human intellect and effort are the chief means of liberation from oppression, ignorance and the harsh, natural environment (cold, heat, starvation, etc.).

What separates them is merely time and context.

If you follow the history of the progressive movement in America just after the turn of the century, you will see striking differences between what had occurred in France and Russia previoulsy and concurrently. This is because circumstances were vastly different - hence; different outcomes.

American society is a very unique blend of progressivism (built on our founders' own embracing of neo-classical thought) and protestant millenialism (built on our history of oppossition to European Catholicism).

Your analysis, while lofty and well articulated, does not really fit what actually happened (and is happening) in America.

There are those, who; for whatever reason, wish it to be that simple.

NORM

[joel]

If you follow the history of the progressive movement in America just after the turn of the century, you will see striking differences between what had occurred in France and Russia previoulsy and concurrently. This is because circumstances were vastly different - hence; different outcomes.

American society is a very unique blend of progressivism (built on our founders' own embracing of neo-classical thought) and protestant millenialism (built on our history of oppossition to European Catholicism).

Your analysis, while lofty and well articulated, does not really fit what actually happened (and is happening) in America.

There are those, who; for whatever reason, wish it to be that simple.

Can you please explain further?

As best as I could tell what happened was that socialism and social democrats were gaining popularity in Europe, but wasn't palatable directly to Americans because it conflicted with their (liberal) tradition of liberty and justice. So they had to couch it in those liberal terms, thus co-opting the terms.

But I'm always happy to learn more (or differently).

[Da Blonde]

Can you please explain further?

As best as I could tell what happened was that socialism and social democrats were gaining popularity in Europe, but wasn't palatable directly to Americans because it conflicted with their (liberal) tradition of liberty and justice. So they had to couch it in those liberal terms, thus co-opting the terms.

But I'm always happy to learn more (or differently).

Fear is commonly used to trick people into voting against themselves and this is no exception.

Advocates of plutocracy are experts at striking fear.

Consider for example the Pledge of Allegiance: a simple document written in the late 1800s by a socialist Baptist minister, Francis Bellamy, which did not include the phrase "under God" until the early 1950s. It was inserted as a part of the McCarthy Era, because while the economic ideas of democratic socialists seemed palatable to working people, the atheism of the commonists did not, so this was emphasized. God was exploited mightily by advocates of plutocracy by that insertion.

[Alien]

However, this is not what modern liberals mean by 'positive' liberty. (Or 'positive' universal rights.) Here they are talking about means. And thus one's natural right to 'positive' liberty would be a natural right to means--not just means you have earned, but a natural-born right to be provided with means, that you did not earn. Thus we hear them speak about a universal right to health care, to food, to housing, to education, to a particular standard of living, to a job. (Much of this can be found in the United Nation's "Universal Declaration of Human Rights", for example.) This is John Rawls' theory, for instance, that rejects such things as earning as being irrelevant.

What you attribute to "Rawls" ( and no doubt others) fits very well with my own intuitive conclusions. My basic problem with "earning" as the criterion of "owning" is the difficulty of determining what (or more accurately how much) a person has "earned' by virtue of a given action or set of actions.

If a manual laborer works all day for, say, $100, it seems reasonable to say that he has earned it. If, however, a Trust Fund manager receives say 1% of the capital invested by making investment decisions on behalf of others, has he earned $10,000 by applying his intelligence, knowledge and experience to the investment of $1M? Let's say that he has. If he then invests another $1M on behalf of another client in the same way, based on the decision he made a few minutes ago, has he earned another $10,000? How about if someone then comes in with $1B to invest? Has he earned $10M? Has Bill Gates earned the $100B (or whatever it is these days) that he owns? It seems incredible that anyone, no matter how intelligent and hardworking could actually work hard enough to "earn" that amount.

And what about the children of very rich parents who are simply given huge sums of money? There is no possible argument, imo, that they have earned it. And if "earning" is the justification for "owning", then is it OK to take away all unearned money (and property).

I have no wish to debate individual cases, but the above seems to illustrate the difficulty of using "earning" as a basis of property rights.

I have also carefully avoided the use of "exploitation" or similar ideas, not because I don't think they ever apply, but because the argument works without them.

A possible answer is to say that everyone has certain rights to means (I'm using the word in the way I understand you to use it, I hope I have it right) based on no more than his/her membership of the community. What these rights entitle us to would be subject to debate of course and would depend on what was considered to be a person's basic "needs" and what means were available.

An analogy might be a family. No matter who earns the money in a family, needs are not satisfied in proportion to who earns what. One or both of the parents probably bring in the money. The children typically contribute little to nothing, even if the parents choose to make them do chores to prepare them for adult life. Nevertheless, typically everyone in the family gets what they need in terms of food, clothing, shelter, and so on. This is generally considered to be "good". Why does the perception of "good" change when it becomes a community larger than the family that is considered?