There is no evidence for a biblical jesus

[Rational Gaze]

they come to realize that it is difficult to know whether Moses existed or what Jesus actually said and did

Except it isn't difficult to know what Jesus said or did at all. Then again, this is Ehrman. He thinks that unless we know what Jesus said verbatim, then we can't know anything about what Jesus said at all... which is a view completely out of touch with reality.

they find that there are other books that were at one time considered canonical but that ultimately did not become part of Scripture (for example, other Gospels and Apocalypses),

Oh dear, Barty, I had no idea you were THIS full of crap. If he's referring to books like the Gospel of Thomas, then it is widely recognised that it is a 2nd century work. I mean, it's almost as if he's deliberately ignoring key facts related to the origins of early Christianity... oh, right, that's because he is.

they come to recognize that a good number of the books of the Bible are pseudonymous (for example, written in the name of an apostle by someone else),

Wrong again, Barty. We have good evidence they were written by who they say are they written by. My respect for Ehrman has now gone down quite considerably... although I should have expected outright lies such as these given his publication of a book named Forged.

that in fact we don't have the original copies of any of the biblical books but only copies made centuries later, all of which have been altered.

Wow. This is the only thing that is actually correct, although, as per Ehrman's usual style of deliberately leaving out key information, the earliest manuscripts are dateable to the 2nd century, and only 1% of variants are meaningful and viable, yet affect no major theology (despite Barty's whining).

[Rational Gaze]

As a side note, it is hilarious how Tassman keeps demanding evidence for widely accepted facts, yet offers none whatsoever in favour of ludicrous fairy tale stories.

[Rational Gaze]

There are approximately 5,700 Greek manuscripts, 10,000 Latin manuscripts and roughly 1,000,000 quotations of the New Testament in the works of the Early Church Fathers.
" Besides the Greek manuscripts, there are Latin, Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, Gothic, Georgian, Arabic, and many other versions of the New Testament. The Latin manuscripts number over ten thousand. All told, the New Testament is represented one thousands times as many manuscripts as the average classical author’s writings. Even the well-known authors–such as Homer or Herodotus–simply can’t compare to the quantity of copies that the New Testament enjoys. Homer is in fact a distant second in terms of manuscripts, yet there are fewer than twenty-five hundred copies of homer extant today." - J Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel (2006), p71, 79-81
The earliest papyrus manuscript fragments date to around 125-175AD, with the earliest codices dating to the fourth century AD. The Gospel of Mark was thought to have been written around 60AD, the Gospels of Matthew and Luke were thought to have been written around 70AD and the Gospel of John was thought to have been written around 90AD.

As compared to:
· Celsus’ de Medicina authored in the 1st century AD has twenty 15th century manuscripts based on a lost manuscript that was first discovered in 1426, and has two 9th century and one 10th century manuscript.
· Ovid’s Metamorphoses authored in the 1st century AD has three fragments dating to the 9th century, and twenty-five manuscripts from the 13th century.
· Pliny’s Natural History authored in the 1st century AD has five early fragments from the 5th century and larger manuscripts date to the ninth century.
· Quintilian’s Institutio Oratio authored in the 1st century AD has two manuscripts that date to the 9th century and one that dates to the 10th century.
· Tacitus’ Annals authored in the 2nd century has a manuscript of books 1-6 from the 9th century and a manuscript of books 11-16 from the 11th century as its earliest manuscripts.

We thus see that the textual evidence for the New Testament is the greatest in ancient history. The New Testament has the nearest competitors beat by an order of sizeable magnitude. Yet, classical scholars don’t run around like headless chickens complaining about a “lack of certainty."

1. The largest number of textual variants (well over half) involve spelling differences and nonsense readings that are easily detectable. These affect nothing of significance in the text.
2. Next in number are those variants that do not affect translation or, if they do, involve synonyms. Variants such as “Christ Jesus” versus “Jesus Christ” may entail a slightly different emphasis, nut nothing of great consequence is involved.
3. Other, more meaningful variants are not viable. They simply have no plausibility when it comes to reflecting the wording of the original because the manuscripts in which they are found have a poor pedigree. The issue involves careful historical investigation and requires the scholar to take the transmission of the text seriously. We saw that Robert Price’s attempt to excise Luke 1:34 from the Bible belonged to the category of “meaningful but not viable.” In his case, there was absolutely no manuscript evidence on his side, only wishful thinking.
4. The smallest category, about 1 percent of all textual problems, involves those variants that are both meaningful and viable. Most New Testament scholars would say that there are far fewer textual problems in this category than even 1 percent of the total. But even assuming the more generous amount (by expanding the scope of both “meaningful” and “viable”), not much of a theological nature is affected.

Of course, despite the plethora of evidence in favour of the textual reliability of the New Testament, there are those who think that key elements of New Testament were corrupted. Are there really meaningful variants that New Testament scholars aren’t telling us about? Let us take a look at the evidence. There are two such examples that critics frequently point to. The first is 1 John 5:7, which they claim the Trinity rests or falls on. Of course, the doctrine of the Trinity is based on a large number of verses such as John 1, Colossians 1:15-18, and Proverbs 8. The second example is Timothy 3:15-16, which they believe the doctrine of divine inspiration is solely based on. Again, the doctrine of divine inspiration is drawn on a number of passages such as 1 Peter 1:20, John 14:26, and 1 Corinthians 2:6-13.

In fact, when one looks at the evidence, one finds this category of textual problems comprised entirely of things that don’t affect theology. For example, in Romans 5:1, there are two possibilities. Paul either says “we have peace” or “let us have peace.” The difference in Greek is a single letter, and whatever option is true, it does not affect any theology whatsoever. A similar example occurs in 1 Thessalonians 2:7, where Paul describes himself and his associates as “gentle” or “little children.” Once again, the difference in Greek is a single letter, and, once again, no New Testament theology is affected whatsoever. As Komoszewski, et al. note:
“One of the most common variants involves the use of the first person plural pronoun and the second person plural pronoun. There is only one letter difference between the two in Greek.” - J Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel (2006), p61

Do these problems mean affect New Testament theology? Do they provide an insurmountable hurdle for the reliability of the New Testament documents? The answer is no, so it makes me wonder why critics and sceptics think that such examples actually mean anything. Even if they could somehow show that that the New Testament is textually corrupt, then so what? As William Lane Craig has noted:
“Even documents which are generally unreliable may contain valuable historical nuggets, and it will be the historian’s task to mine these documents in order to discover them.” - William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition, Crossway Books (2008), p11

As it stands, there is a firm bedrock of evidence that demonstrates the overwhelming reliability of the New Testament, so it makes me wonder why critics and sceptics continue their fruitless campaign against it.

The primary source of those who argue against the textual reliability of the New Testament tends to be one Bart Ehrman, an agnostic textual critic who has published sensationalist books, such as Misquoting Jesus, which are quoted by critics and sceptics as if it were holy writ. However, whilst books such as Misquoting Jesus are oft read and quoted, the lay public largely ignores Ehrman’s scholarly works, such as The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture. Rather irresponsibly, Ehrman leaves out a lot of information in his popular works that he includes in his scholarly works. In The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, he maintains that the scribes did not misunderstand and pervert the text, but engaged in an interpretative process whereby they tried to preserve what they perceived to be a more accurate meaning of the text against heretical misinterpretations. Ehrman is quite clear:
“The scribes of our surviving manuscripts more commonly preserved theological variations than created them, and none of these appears to have made a concerted effort to create an anti-adoptionistic recension of the New Testament. Indeed, the Christians of the proto-orthodox camp did not, on one level, need to change the texts; they believed that the texts, in whatever form they came, already attested their christological views.” - Bart Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, Oxford University Pres, (2005), p98

However, in Misquoting Jesus, Ehrman seemingly departs from such scholarly care and leaves out a lot of critical information, as we shall soon see (although does mention the good intentions of the scribes at least once.)

One example that Ehrman raises is Mark 1:40-41, where a man with a skin disease kneels down before Jesus and ask Him to heal him. Ehrman notes that the original reading was that Jesus was angry towards the man and that this had been changed in some manuscripts so that Jesus heals the man out of compassion, not anger. Ehrman’s argument in Misquoting Jesus is that the scribes were puzzled by Jesus’ anger and so changed it to compassion. It is true that the original reading did have Jesus being angry with the man, but is this such a problem? The answer is no. Ehrman believes this is problematic, because Jesus is treating this man “unfairly.” However, if that is so, why did the scribes not do away with the Old Testament, or stop associating Jesus with YHWH as the Marcionites did? There are other places in the New Testament, as Ehrman admits, where Jesus is angry, such as Mark 10:14.
In Ehrman’s scholarly work, Ehrman argues that Jesus’ anger here fits in with Mark’s overall portrayal of Jesus, but in Misquoting Jesus, Ehrman presents this as if it counts as an insurmountable hurdle.

There are actually several good reasons to think why Jesus’ anger is appropriate in such a scenario. First of all, his skin condition clearly wasn’t that bad if he was able to waltz through town right up to Jesus. Since people with skin diseases were required stay away from others and openly declare themselves as being unclean. If he had had full-blown leprosy or something similar, then someone would have spotted him way before he got close to Jesus. Secondly, the healing occurred in public, rather than discreetly. Thirdly, touching the man’s head to heal the man also made Jesus ritually unclean, meaning that He would have had to have left the city and stay in the desert until he was ritually clean again. So, in other words, this meant that this man interrupted Jesus’ teachings ministry, and it also meant other people who sought Jesus’ healing would have to have followed Jesus to the desert. Thus, the scribal change was not made out of embarrassment at all. What Ehrman also fails to point out is that the only reason he is aware of the change is because of manuscript evidence. In other words, there is evidence in the manuscripts where changes have occurred, and the kicker is, scholars know this! This is why we have more accurate Bible translation, with good quality Bibles including footnotes noting variant readings when and where they occur.

Another example that Ehrman raises is that of Matthew 24:36, which says:
“But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.”
Ehrman notes that many important manuscripts lack the phrase “nor the Son” but argues in Misquoting Jesus that scribes changed this because they were embarrassed by Jesus’ not knowing something. However, he neglects to point out a similar passage Mark, 13:32, where there is no such disparity, which Ehrman admits in The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture. Another example is a passage that isn’t even in the Bible, as it has been universally recognised as a late 16th century addition for quite some time. Ehrman doesn’t even bring this passage up at all in The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture.

In Misquoting Jesus Ehrman states that his faith collapsed when he realised, as a textual scholar, that there was doubt over the exact words that Jesus spoke. He goes as far as to say that the only way to truly understand an author is to what all his words actually were. This is a typical fundamentalist mindset that is simply not open to the nuances of New Testament tradition:
“…to apply the concept of original and copy to ancient documents is anachronistic… we must abandon the modern concept of authenticity and the modern requirement of exact verbatim correspondence down to the very punctuation.” - Rosalind Thomas, Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens, Cambridge University Press, (1989), p47-48

From this we can see that Ehrman is unable to accept answers outside what he sees in the text, and that he retains an unhealthy focus on individual words rather than the broader ideas. This is actually a common mistake present among both Christians and sceptics alike. All too often, you will hear people who insist that Jesus’ exact words must be known otherwise Christianity is somehow false. This is simply fundamentalist black-and-white all-or-nothing thinking that just has no place in critical analysis of the New Testament.

In addition to the above, I felt that it would be prudent to review some more alleged ‘interpolations’ this time from critic and sceptic Richard Carrier. He claims that 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16 and 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 are both interpolations we don’t have manuscript evidence for.

Let us first take a look at the 1 Thessalonians passage:
“14 For you, brothers and sisters, became imitators of God’s churches in Judea, which are in Christ Jesus: You suffered from your own people the same things those churches suffered from the Jews 15 who killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets and also drove us out. They displease God and are hostile to everyone 16 in their effort to keep us from speaking to the Gentiles so that they may be saved. In this way they always heap up their sins to the limit. The wrath of God has come upon them at last.”

Carrier claims:
· Paul never blames the Jews for the death of Jesus elsewhere.
· Paul never talks about God’s wrath as having come, but only at the future judgement (see: Romans 2:5, 3:5-6, 4:15.)
· Paul teaches the Jews will be saved, not destroyed (see: Romans 11:25-28.)
· Paul was dead by the time the “wrath had come upon them to the uttermost” (the destruction of Jewish nation and temple in 70AD.
Carrier likewise claims that arguments against interpolation “make no sense” and requires us to “believe too many improbable things.” He also argues that Paul never talks of the Jews as if he were not one of them.

Let us take a look at the evidence. First, is there any reason to suggest that this verse refers to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70AD? Carrier just dismisses other proposed events with a hand wave, yet this does not make a valid argument. Maybe if Carrier had spent more time interacting with the scholarship on this issue, then he would know that some have suggested that the event referred to was the expulsion of the Jews from Rome by Claudius in 48AD. This was not exactly an event of little consequence but had far reaching implications. Indeed, roughly 20-30,000 Jews were massacred and there was a subsequent famine in Judea. How can this not be interpreted as divine punishment? If Carrier wants to argue against such a position then he needs to provide some interesting reasons to accept his claim that the passage exclusively refers to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70AD.

Secondly, does this condemnation of the Jews stand in contrast with what Paul had previously said about the Jews? One wonders, what is problematic or contradictory here? Is one to suppose that Paul never got angry with his fellow Jews? As Williams notes:
“A frank recognition of guilt does not preclude love for the guilty.” - David J. Williams, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Peabody: Hendrickson, (1992), p47

There is also the fact that Romans was written 7-10 years after 1 Thessalonians. Are we to suppose that Paul could not have changed his mind? The simplest explanation, however, that this is simply an example of hyperbolic polemic and ancient rhetoric. Lastly, is there any reason to suggest that Paul means all Jews? It seems clear that such an identification is mistaken, Indeed, when one reads the passage, we note that Paul makes the distinction that he is only referring to Jews who persecuted the Church. How can it be inferred he is talking about all Jews, when the Christians of the Judean churches were themselves Jews? This argument thus makes no sense whatsoever. Thus I agree with Jewett:
“…only those desiring a sanitised picture of Paul and the early Church are likely to find Pearson [another critic who makes use of such arguments] convincing on this point.” - Robert Jewett, The Thessalonian Correspondence: Pauline Rhetoric and Millenarian Piety, Fortress Press, (1986), p39

Thus Carrier’s bold bare assertions are woefully inadequate and do not encapsulate scholarly consensus on the matter whatsoever.

What then of the passage from 1 Corinthians? Let us take a look:
“34 Women should remain silent in the churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the law says. 35 If they want to inquire about something, they should ask their own husbands at home; for it is disgraceful for a woman to speak in the church.”

Carrier is this time aware of the argument in favour of Pauline authorship, by noting the explanation that Paul is quoting his opponents. Does Carrier offer any substantive argument against this argument though? The answer is no, and we are again met with bare assertions that have no place in scholarly discussion of nuances issues such as these. We actually have several good reasons for thinking Paul is quoting his opponents here. We have a number of examples were Paul DOES use this literary device throughout his epistles, such as 1 Corinthians 6, where Paul quotes opponents in verses 12 and 13 and then offers a refutation.

A second fact is that of a tiny particle in the Greek text that is left out of a number of translations, immediately following this passage. Carrier notes this and quotes the passage in its wider context:
“29 And let the prophets speak by two or three, and let the others discern. 30 But if a revelation be made to another sitting by, let the first keep silence. 31 For ye all can prophesy one by one, that all may learn, and all may be exhorted; 32 and the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets; 33 for God is not a God of confusion, but of peace. As in all the churches of the saints, 34 let the women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but let them be in subjection, as also saith the law. 35 And if they would learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home: for it is shameful for a woman to speak in the church. 36 What? was it from you that the word of God went forth? or came it unto you alone? 37 If any man thinketh himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him take knowledge of the things which I write unto you, that they are the commandment of the Lord. 38 But if any man is ignorant, let him be ignorant. 39 Wherefore, my brethren, desire earnestly to prophesy, and forbid not to speak with tongues. 40 But let all things be done decently and in order.“

Carrier claims the “What?” does not appear in the Greek text and is the invention of a “modern commentator.” I think many Biblical scholars would be surprised to hear that. Presumably, he means the translation of the particle to mean “What?” as it can also be translated as “or.” Otherwise, one can conclude that Carrier is simply making things up. One fact that Carrier leaves out is that this particle occurs elsewhere in Paul’s writings, in both meanings “or” and “what.”

For example, in Romans 2:3-4:
“3 So when you, a mere human being, pass judgment on them and yet do the same things, do you think you will escape God’s judgment? 4 Or do you show contempt for the riches of his kindness, forbearance and patience, not realizing that God’s kindness is intended to lead you to repentance?”
This is from the NIV, where the particle is untranslated in the 1 Corinthians passage. Two similar passages, one where the particle also remains untranslated in the NIV, are Romans 9:20-21 and 1 Corinthians 6:8-9:
“20 But who are you, a human being, to talk back to God? “Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’” 21 [Particle is here] Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for special purposes and some for common use?”

“8 Instead, you yourselves cheat and do wrong, and you do this to your brothers and sisters. 9 Or do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor men who have sex with men.”
In all these examples, it means the same thing. It’s kind of like modern “NOT!” jokes in that regard. In other words, it marks violent disagreement.

What is even odder, though, is how Carrier claims that this “what?” is the only evidence of Paul’s disagreement with the statement in the preceding two verses. I have to ask, is Carrier blind? Even without the particle, it is still clear that Paul is disaffirming the preceding two verses. The flow of the argument alone indicates that Paul is rebuking the position espoused in verses 24-35:
· Paul uses a gentle, instructional, nurturing tone in verses 26-33.
· Paul switches to a legalistic rabbinical style disgrace-oriented passage in verses 34-35.
· Paul then switches to a rebuking, ironic tone in verses 36-38 to demolish a false teaching in the immediate context.
· Paul finishes by switching back to the gentle, instructional, and nurturing tone in verses 39-40.
Lastly, the nature of the rebuke indicates that verses 34-35 are a position that the Corinthians held, and not Paul. In verses 26-32, Paul offers his solutions for orderly worship with universal speaking allowed. In verse 33, Paul concludes that God seeks order and seeks it this way in all churches. In verses 34-35, Paul quotes somebody else’s solution for orderly worship, which mandated that women shut-up. Verses 36-38 are Paul’s argument against this position. He admonishes them by asking why they think themselves so much more spiritual than other churches to the extent that they believe they can propose a different solution to the problem of orderly worship.

[Xru]

Nice AAG - I tried the "Promote to Article" button but am not sure what if anything I accomplished by promoting it, ha ha. Anyway, nice summary of the evidence! Well done.

[MaxVel]

Tassman -

the problem is not that you reject inerrancy, but that you reject - on that 'basis' - all kinds of work and research by qualified and professional scholars out of hand and without even examining their actual arguments. I seem to recall you rejecting arguments that aren't even based on the biblical texts because they were made by an 'inerrantist'. And you do this without even examining the actual 'problem' - inerrancy either, and lumping all kinds of people in under the one simplistic pigeonhole. Glen Miller's 'inerrancy' is very different from Norman Geisler's.

If -as you claim - they are starting from a false premise, and therefore their conclusions are false, that should be something you can demonstrate by addressing their actual arguments. Yet you regularly avoid doing this.


We all have our presuppositions - for (many) Christians 'inerrancy' is one. That you reject that presupposition is no surprise. One of your presuppositions is naturalism. Christians reject this - but here is the crucial difference. Christian posters (and scholars) actually engage with the arguments and positions of the people you cite in support of your arguments, even when those people have a false presupposition (naturalism).


Of course, from your point of view, naturalism isn't a false presupposition, and inerrancy is. From the Christian's point of view it's the other way round. By your refusal to engage with the actual positions of well-respected Christian scholars you are not fairly participating in the dialogue, and are acting like a troll. If a Christian poster was simply to brush off people like Ehrmann, Carrier, Price et al when you site them to support your arguments, I think you'd find that poster not really worth engaging. They'd be acting unfairly, insisting you accept their presuppositions ('inerrancy' and 'not-naturalism') without argument, and at the same time insisting without argument that your presuppositions (biblical 'errancy' and naturalism) are false, and invalidate all the conclusions anyone holding them might come to. This, with the presuppositions reversed, is what you do, and it is one major reason why many posters here have dismissed you as not worth the effort.

You refuse to actually put your presuppositions equally under the microscope, and insist on dismissing others a priori. Despite your many fine words to the contrary, this behaviour shows you don't actually respect others (Christians) as people, even though you may disagree with them on many points.

[Rational Gaze]

Nice AAG - I tried the "Promote to Article" button but am not sure what if anything I accomplished by promoting it, ha ha. Anyway, nice summary of the evidence! Well done.

I forgot to include some references, as I was cut and pasting from my work-in-progress book. The groupings of variants was quoted from Reinventing Jesus, which I forgot to italicising and source, although if people want the reference its J Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, (2006), p104-105.

The relevant section is:

1. The largest number of textual variants (well over half) involve spelling differences and nonsense readings that are easily detectable. These affect nothing of significance in the text. 2. Next in number are those variants that do not affect translation or, if they do, involve synonyms. Variants such as “Christ Jesus” versus “Jesus Christ” may entail a slightly different emphasis, nut nothing of great consequence is involved. 3. Other, more meaningful variants are not viable. They simply have no plausibility when it comes to reflecting the wording of the original because the manuscripts in which they are found have a poor pedigree. The issue involves careful historical investigation and requires the scholar to take the transmission of the text seriously. We saw that Robert Price’s attempt to excise Luke 1:34 from the Bible belonged to the category of “meaningful but not viable.” In his case, there was absolutely no manuscript evidence on his side, only wishful thinking. 4. The smallest category, about 1 percent of all textual problems, involves those variants that are both meaningful and viable. Most New Testament scholars would say that there are far fewer textual problems in this category than even 1 percent of the total. But even assuming the more generous amount (by expanding the scope of both “meaningful” and “viable”), not much of a theological nature is affected.

[Rational Gaze]

If -as you claim - they are starting from a false premise, and therefore their conclusions are false, that should be something you can demonstrate by addressing their actual arguments. Yet you regularly avoid doing this.

More to the point, Tassman is singularly incapable of providing a single example of any of these named scholars rejecting or fudging data because it disagrees with their beliefs, whereas I have already shown examples of the Jesus Seminar and Bart Ehrman fudging and obfuscating the data to fit in with their beliefs.

[Rational Gaze]

Of course, from your point of view, naturalism isn't a false presupposition, and inerrancy is.

As a side note, Tassman is completely incapable of even arguing for the truth of naturalism. I provided several arguments against naturalism, none of which were actually addressed, but all of which were ignored. Tassman instead chose to harp on about the utility of science validating naturalism, which is probably the most logically egregious "argument" I have ever seen him advance. However, if Tassman is actually willing to rise to the challenge for once (instead of question dodging and side-stepping around the argument) maybe he can deal with these?

Argument 1: In acts of introspection, one is aware of 1) one’s self as an unextended centre of consciousness; 2) various capacities of thought, sensation, belief, desire, and volition that one exercises and that are essential, internal aspects of the kind of thing one is; and 3) one’s sensations as being such that there is no possible world in that they could exist and not be one’s own. This can be represented in the following two ways.

One:
(1) I am an unextended centre of consciousness (justified by introspection.)
(2) No physical object is an unextended centre of consciousness.
(3) Therefore, I am not a physical object.
(4) Either I am a physical object or an immaterial substance.
(5) Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.

Two:
(1) My sensations (and other states of consciousness) are either externally or internally related to me.
(2) If I am a physical object, then my sensations are externally related to me such that there is a possible world in that those sensations exist and are not so related to me.
(3) There is no possible world in where my sensations exist without being mine (justified by introspection.)
(4) Therefore, I am not a physical object and my sensations are internally related to me.
(5) If a sensation is internally related to me, then it is a mode of my self.
(6) If an entity x is a mode of some entity y, then x is an inseparable entity dependant for its existence on y such that (a) x is modally distinct from and internally related to y and (b) x provides information about the nature of the thing y of which is it a mode.
(7) Therefore, I am thing whose nature is to have sensations (and other states of consciousness.)

Argument Two: The indexicality of thought provides evidence for the truth of substance dualism. A complete, third person physical description of the world will fail to capture the fact expressed by “I am An Astute Gentleman.” No amount of information non-indexically expressed captures the content conveyed by this assertion. The first person indexical “I” is irreducible and ineliminable, and this feature of “I” is not innocuous, but rather, is explained by claiming that “I” refers to a nonphysical entity – the substantial self with at least the power of self-awareness. Moreover, if mental predicates are added to the third person descriptive language, this still fails to capture the state of affairs expressed by statements like “I am thinking that P.” Finally, the system of indexical references (i.e., “I,” “here,” “there,” “this,” “that”) must have a unifying centre that underlies it. This unifying centre is the same entity referred to by “I” in expressions like “I am thinking that P,” namely, the conscious substantial subject taken as a self-conscious, self-referring particular. This argument can be represented as follows:

(1) Statements using the first person indexical “I” express facts about persons that cannot be expressed without the first person indexical.
(2) If I am a physical object, then all facts about me can be expressed in statements without the first person indexical.
(3) Therefore, I am not a physical object.
(4) I am either a physical object or an immaterial substance.
(5) Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.

Argument Three: Substance dualism can also be argued on the grounds that libertarian freedom is true, which probably explains why some atheists deny the reality of Free Will. This argument can be formulated as follows:
(1) Human beings exercise libertarian agency.
(2) No material object (one which is such that all of its properties, parts, and capacities, are at least and only physical) can exercise libertarian agency.
(3) Therefore, human beings are not material objects.
(4) Human beings are either material objects or immaterial substances.
(5) Therefore, they are immaterial substances.

Argument Four: Naturalism can be refuted by the fact that is internally incoherent and self-contradictory. This can be formed as:

(1) States of mind have a relation to the world we call intentionality, or aboutness. The intentionality referred to here is propositional in nature. Our possessing this kind of intentionality means that we are capable of having, entertaining, believing, and desiring certain states of affairs propositionally described.
(2) Thoughts and beliefs can either be true or false.
(3) Human beings can be in the condition of accepting, rejecting, or suspending belief about propositions.
(4) Logical laws exist.
(5) Human beings are capable of apprehending logical laws.
(6) The state of accepting the truth of a proposition plays a crucial causal role in the production of other beliefs, and the propositional states is relevant to the playing of this causal role.
(7) The apprehension of logical laws plays a causal role in the acceptance of the argument as true.
(8) The same individual entertains thoughts of the premises and then draws the conclusion.
(9) Our processes of reasoning provide us with a systematically reliable way of understanding the world around us.
(10) Unless statements (1)-(9) are true, then it is incoherent to argue that one should accept naturalism based on evidence of any kind.
(11) Unless statements (1)-(9) are true, then there are no scientists, and nobody is using the scientific method.
(12) Therefore, naturalism is incoherent, cannot be rationally justified, and is most definitely false.

Argument Five: If science is true, then we as human beings are in states with determinate propositional content, but if naturalism is true, we should never be in such propositional states.

(1) Some mental states have determinate content. In particular, the states involved in adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing, in squaring numbers and taking their square roots, are determinate with respect to their intentional content.
(2) Physical states are indeterminate with respect to international content. Any physical state is logically compatible with the existence of a multiplicity of propositionally defined, intentional states, or even with the absence of propositionally defined mental states entirely.
(3) Therefore, the mental states involved in mathematical operations are not and cannot be identical to physical states.

Argument Six: Materialism is incompatible with meaning. This can be represented simply as:

(1) If materialism is true, then meaning is indeterminate.
(2) Meaning is determinate (a presupposition of science and reason.)
(3) Therefore, materialism is false.

Argument Seven: Another argument is that the supervenience relation employed by non-reductive materialists cannot be admitted into supervenient materialist’s ontology. This can be represented as:

(1) For physicalists, all facts must be materialistically acceptable. That is, they are facts about physical things, or about things that are ontologically distinct from the physical, but strongly supervene on the physical.
(2) There must be some fact – the explanation – in virtue of which B-properties supervene on A-properties; called the S-facts. There are two options for materialistically respectable facts:
(a) They themselves could supervene on A-properties. But then there is an infinite regress problem, for now we have to explain this new supervenience relation, which in turn needs to be explain, and so on ad infinitum, so this is no good.
(b) Or, the S-facts could not just be further A-properties, that is, facts about the physical entity. But then these facts do no bridge the explanatory gap between the B-facts and the a-facts.

Argument Eight: Argument from qualia. Qualia are the subjective conscious experiences we have when we ‘feel’ something. There are many variations of this argument, with the best-known example being the Mary’s room argument, which gives the example of a colour scientist, named Mary, who knows every physical fact about colour and even every physical fact about the experience of colour in other people. However, she has been confined to a room that is black and white since birth, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she leaves the room and sees colour for the first time, and in doing so learns what it is like to see that colour. This can be represented as:
(1) Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical information about colour experience of other people.
(2) After he release, Mary learns something the colour experiences of other people.
(3) Therefore, before her release, Mary was not in possession of all the information about other people’s colour experiences, even though she was in possession of all the physical information.
(4) Therefore, there are truths about other people’s colour experience that are not physical.
(5) Therefore, physicalism is false.

Argument Nine: the Chinese Room argument. Suppose that artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that any Chinese speaker would be convinced that he or she is talking to another Chinese-speaking human being. Does the machine literally "understand" Chinese? Or is it merely simulating the ability to understand Chinese? Suppose that I am in a closed room and have a book with an English version of the computer program, along with sufficient paper, pencils, erasers, and filing cabinets. I could receive Chinese characters through a slot in the door, process them according to the program's instructions, and produce Chinese characters as output. As the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it is fair to deduce that I would be able to do so as well, simply by running the program manually. There is no essential difference between the role the computer plays in the first case and the role I play in the latter. Each is simply following a program, step-by-step, which simulates intelligent behaviour. And yet I don't speak a word of Chinese. Since I do not understand Chinese we must infer that the computer does not understand Chinese either. Without "understanding" or “intentionality” we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking". Because it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word, therefore Strong AI is mistaken. This can be formulated as follows:

(1) If Strong AI is true, then there is a program for Chinese such that any computer system that runs that program, that system thereby comes to understand Chinese.
(2) I could run a program for Chinese without thereby coming to understand Chinese.
(3) Therefore, Strong AI is false.

Argument ten: the incompatibility of naturalism and evolution. This argument states that if both naturalism and evolution are true at the same time, then we have no rational basis for accepting the validity of our reasoning processes, thus making naturalism self-defeating.

(1) The human brain is an organ that arose via evolution.
(2) Evolution results in the preservation of traits that enhance survivability.
(3) If naturalism is true, then mind and brain are equivalent.
(4) The mind, being identical to the brain, is therefore geared towards our survival, not in the production of true beliefs.
(5) Therefore, if naturalism and evolution are true at the same time, we have no way of knowing which of our beliefs are actually true. Thus, we have no grounds for accepting the validity of our reasoning processes.
(6) Evolution is true, and our reasoning processes are valid.
(7) Therefore, naturalism is false.

Argument eleven: the quantum-theoretic argument against naturalism.

(1) Naturalism is the view that the sum and substance of everything that exists is exhausted by physical objects and processes and whatever is causally dependent upon them.
(2) The explanatory resources of naturalism are therefore restricted to material objects, causes, events and processes.
(3) Neither nonlocal quantum correlations nor (in the light of nonlocalisability) the nature of the fundamental constituents of material reality can be explained or understood if the explanatory constraints of naturalism are preserved.
(4) These quantum phenomena require an explanation.
(5) Therefore, naturalism (materialism, physicalism) is irremediably deficient as a world-view and consequently should be rejected not just as inadequate, but fundamentally false.

Argument twelve: the incompatibility of naturalism and scientific realism.

(1) Scientific realism, representational naturalism and essential reliability entail that scientific methods are reliable sources of truth about the world.
(2) From the preference of simplicity, it follows that simplicity is a reliable indicator of the truth about natural laws.
(3) Mere correlation between the simplicity and the laws of nature is not good enough: reliability requires that there be some causal mechanism connecting simplicity and the actual laws of nature.
(4) Since the laws of nature pervade space and time, any such causal mechanism must exist outside spacetime.
(5) Consequently, ontological naturalism is false.

Argument thirteen: the incompatibility of naturalism and objective morality, i.e. the axiological argument for God.

One:
(1) If naturalism is true, then there are no objective moral values and duties.
(2) Objective moral values and duties exist.
(3) Therefore, naturalism is false.

Two:
(1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
(4) Objective moral values and duties exist.
(2) Therefore, God exists (and naturalism is false.)

[Challenger Grim]

As a side note, Tassman is completely incapable of even arguing for the truth of naturalism. I provided several arguments against naturalism, none of which were actually addressed, but all of which were ignored. Tassman instead chose to harp on about the utility of science validating naturalism, which is probably the most logically egregious "argument" I have ever seen him advance. However, if Tassman is actually willing to rise to the challenge for once (instead of question dodging and side-stepping around the argument) maybe he can deal with these?

Argument 1: In acts of introspection, one is aware of 1) one’s self as an unextended centre of consciousness; 2) various capacities of thought, sensation, belief, desire, and volition that one exercises and that are essential, internal aspects of the kind of thing one is; and 3) one’s sensations as being such that there is no possible world in that they could exist and not be one’s own. This can be represented in the following two ways.

One:
(1) I am an unextended centre of consciousness (justified by introspection.)
(2) No physical object is an unextended centre of consciousness.
(3) Therefore, I am not a physical object.
(4) Either I am a physical object or an immaterial substance.
(5) Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.

Two:
(1) My sensations (and other states of consciousness) are either externally or internally related to me.
(2) If I am a physical object, then my sensations are externally related to me such that there is a possible world in that those sensations exist and are not so related to me.
(3) There is no possible world in where my sensations exist without being mine (justified by introspection.)
(4) Therefore, I am not a physical object and my sensations are internally related to me.
(5) If a sensation is internally related to me, then it is a mode of my self.
(6) If an entity x is a mode of some entity y, then x is an inseparable entity dependant for its existence on y such that (a) x is modally distinct from and internally related to y and (b) x provides information about the nature of the thing y of which is it a mode.
(7) Therefore, I am thing whose nature is to have sensations (and other states of consciousness.)

Argument Two: The indexicality of thought provides evidence for the truth of substance dualism. A complete, third person physical description of the world will fail to capture the fact expressed by “I am An Astute Gentleman.” No amount of information non-indexically expressed captures the content conveyed by this assertion. The first person indexical “I” is irreducible and ineliminable, and this feature of “I” is not innocuous, but rather, is explained by claiming that “I” refers to a nonphysical entity – the substantial self with at least the power of self-awareness. Moreover, if mental predicates are added to the third person descriptive language, this still fails to capture the state of affairs expressed by statements like “I am thinking that P.” Finally, the system of indexical references (i.e., “I,” “here,” “there,” “this,” “that”) must have a unifying centre that underlies it. This unifying centre is the same entity referred to by “I” in expressions like “I am thinking that P,” namely, the conscious substantial subject taken as a self-conscious, self-referring particular. This argument can be represented as follows:

(1) Statements using the first person indexical “I” express facts about persons that cannot be expressed without the first person indexical.
(2) If I am a physical object, then all facts about me can be expressed in statements without the first person indexical.
(3) Therefore, I am not a physical object.
(4) I am either a physical object or an immaterial substance.
(5) Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.

Argument Three: Substance dualism can also be argued on the grounds that libertarian freedom is true, which probably explains why some atheists deny the reality of Free Will. This argument can be formulated as follows:
(1) Human beings exercise libertarian agency.
(2) No material object (one which is such that all of its properties, parts, and capacities, are at least and only physical) can exercise libertarian agency.
(3) Therefore, human beings are not material objects.
(4) Human beings are either material objects or immaterial substances.
(5) Therefore, they are immaterial substances.

Argument Four: Naturalism can be refuted by the fact that is internally incoherent and self-contradictory. This can be formed as:

(1) States of mind have a relation to the world we call intentionality, or aboutness. The intentionality referred to here is propositional in nature. Our possessing this kind of intentionality means that we are capable of having, entertaining, believing, and desiring certain states of affairs propositionally described.
(2) Thoughts and beliefs can either be true or false.
(3) Human beings can be in the condition of accepting, rejecting, or suspending belief about propositions.
(4) Logical laws exist.
(5) Human beings are capable of apprehending logical laws.
(6) The state of accepting the truth of a proposition plays a crucial causal role in the production of other beliefs, and the propositional states is relevant to the playing of this causal role.
(7) The apprehension of logical laws plays a causal role in the acceptance of the argument as true.
(8) The same individual entertains thoughts of the premises and then draws the conclusion.
(9) Our processes of reasoning provide us with a systematically reliable way of understanding the world around us.
(10) Unless statements (1)-(9) are true, then it is incoherent to argue that one should accept naturalism based on evidence of any kind.
(11) Unless statements (1)-(9) are true, then there are no scientists, and nobody is using the scientific method.
(12) Therefore, naturalism is incoherent, cannot be rationally justified, and is most definitely false.

Argument Five: If science is true, then we as human beings are in states with determinate propositional content, but if naturalism is true, we should never be in such propositional states.

(1) Some mental states have determinate content. In particular, the states involved in adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing, in squaring numbers and taking their square roots, are determinate with respect to their intentional content.
(2) Physical states are indeterminate with respect to international content. Any physical state is logically compatible with the existence of a multiplicity of propositionally defined, intentional states, or even with the absence of propositionally defined mental states entirely.
(3) Therefore, the mental states involved in mathematical operations are not and cannot be identical to physical states.

Argument Six: Materialism is incompatible with meaning. This can be represented simply as:

(1) If materialism is true, then meaning is indeterminate.
(2) Meaning is determinate (a presupposition of science and reason.)
(3) Therefore, materialism is false.

Argument Seven: Another argument is that the supervenience relation employed by non-reductive materialists cannot be admitted into supervenient materialist’s ontology. This can be represented as:

(1) For physicalists, all facts must be materialistically acceptable. That is, they are facts about physical things, or about things that are ontologically distinct from the physical, but strongly supervene on the physical.
(2) There must be some fact – the explanation – in virtue of which B-properties supervene on A-properties; called the S-facts. There are two options for materialistically respectable facts:
(a) They themselves could supervene on A-properties. But then there is an infinite regress problem, for now we have to explain this new supervenience relation, which in turn needs to be explain, and so on ad infinitum, so this is no good.
(b) Or, the S-facts could not just be further A-properties, that is, facts about the physical entity. But then these facts do no bridge the explanatory gap between the B-facts and the a-facts.

Argument Eight: Argument from qualia. Qualia are the subjective conscious experiences we have when we ‘feel’ something. There are many variations of this argument, with the best-known example being the Mary’s room argument, which gives the example of a colour scientist, named Mary, who knows every physical fact about colour and even every physical fact about the experience of colour in other people. However, she has been confined to a room that is black and white since birth, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she leaves the room and sees colour for the first time, and in doing so learns what it is like to see that colour. This can be represented as:
(1) Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical information about colour experience of other people.
(2) After he release, Mary learns something the colour experiences of other people.
(3) Therefore, before her release, Mary was not in possession of all the information about other people’s colour experiences, even though she was in possession of all the physical information.
(4) Therefore, there are truths about other people’s colour experience that are not physical.
(5) Therefore, physicalism is false.

Argument Nine: the Chinese Room argument. Suppose that artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that any Chinese speaker would be convinced that he or she is talking to another Chinese-speaking human being. Does the machine literally "understand" Chinese? Or is it merely simulating the ability to understand Chinese? Suppose that I am in a closed room and have a book with an English version of the computer program, along with sufficient paper, pencils, erasers, and filing cabinets. I could receive Chinese characters through a slot in the door, process them according to the program's instructions, and produce Chinese characters as output. As the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it is fair to deduce that I would be able to do so as well, simply by running the program manually. There is no essential difference between the role the computer plays in the first case and the role I play in the latter. Each is simply following a program, step-by-step, which simulates intelligent behaviour. And yet I don't speak a word of Chinese. Since I do not understand Chinese we must infer that the computer does not understand Chinese either. Without "understanding" or “intentionality” we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking". Because it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word, therefore Strong AI is mistaken. This can be formulated as follows:

(1) If Strong AI is true, then there is a program for Chinese such that any computer system that runs that program, that system thereby comes to understand Chinese.
(2) I could run a program for Chinese without thereby coming to understand Chinese.
(3) Therefore, Strong AI is false.

Argument ten: the incompatibility of naturalism and evolution. This argument states that if both naturalism and evolution are true at the same time, then we have no rational basis for accepting the validity of our reasoning processes, thus making naturalism self-defeating.

(1) The human brain is an organ that arose via evolution.
(2) Evolution results in the preservation of traits that enhance survivability.
(3) If naturalism is true, then mind and brain are equivalent.
(4) The mind, being identical to the brain, is therefore geared towards our survival, not in the production of true beliefs.
(5) Therefore, if naturalism and evolution are true at the same time, we have no way of knowing which of our beliefs are actually true. Thus, we have no grounds for accepting the validity of our reasoning processes.
(6) Evolution is true, and our reasoning processes are valid.
(7) Therefore, naturalism is false.

Argument eleven: the quantum-theoretic argument against naturalism.

(1) Naturalism is the view that the sum and substance of everything that exists is exhausted by physical objects and processes and whatever is causally dependent upon them.
(2) The explanatory resources of naturalism are therefore restricted to material objects, causes, events and processes.
(3) Neither nonlocal quantum correlations nor (in the light of nonlocalisability) the nature of the fundamental constituents of material reality can be explained or understood if the explanatory constraints of naturalism are preserved.
(4) These quantum phenomena require an explanation.
(5) Therefore, naturalism (materialism, physicalism) is irremediably deficient as a world-view and consequently should be rejected not just as inadequate, but fundamentally false.

Argument twelve: the incompatibility of naturalism and scientific realism.

(1) Scientific realism, representational naturalism and essential reliability entail that scientific methods are reliable sources of truth about the world.
(2) From the preference of simplicity, it follows that simplicity is a reliable indicator of the truth about natural laws.
(3) Mere correlation between the simplicity and the laws of nature is not good enough: reliability requires that there be some causal mechanism connecting simplicity and the actual laws of nature.
(4) Since the laws of nature pervade space and time, any such causal mechanism must exist outside spacetime.
(5) Consequently, ontological naturalism is false.

Argument thirteen: the incompatibility of naturalism and objective morality, i.e. the axiological argument for God.

One:
(1) If naturalism is true, then there are no objective moral values and duties.
(2) Objective moral values and duties exist.
(3) Therefore, naturalism is false.

Two:
(1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
(4) Objective moral values and duties exist.
(2) Therefore, God exists (and naturalism is false.)

tl;dr*












*Tassman Loses; Damn Right

[Rational Gaze]

Tassman Loses; Damn Right

To be honest, I doubt that Tassman would be even able to understand a single argument. I hope Leonhard starts a thread on the subject, because he is a sceptic with whom it is actually worth conversing with.

[Tassman]

There are approximately 5,700 Greek manuscripts, 10,000 Latin manuscripts and roughly 1,000,000 quotations of the New Testament in the works of the Early Church Fathers.
" Besides the Greek manuscripts, there are Latin, Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, Gothic, Georgian, Arabic, and many other versions of the New Testament. The Latin manuscripts number over ten thousand. All told, the New Testament is represented one thousands times as many manuscripts as the average classical author’s writings. Even the well-known authors–such as Homer or Herodotus–simply can’t compare to the quantity of copies that the New Testament enjoys. Homer is in fact a distant second in terms of manuscripts, yet there are fewer than twenty-five hundred copies of homer extant today." - J Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel (2006), p71, 79-81
The earliest papyrus manuscript fragments date to around 125-175AD, with the earliest codices dating to the fourth century AD. The Gospel of Mark was thought to have been written around 60AD, the Gospels of Matthew and Luke were thought to have been written around 70AD and the Gospel of John was thought to have been written around 90AD.

As compared to:
· Celsus’ de Medicina authored in the 1st century AD has twenty 15th century manuscripts based on a lost manuscript that was first discovered in 1426, and has two 9th century and one 10th century manuscript.
· Ovid’s Metamorphoses authored in the 1st century AD has three fragments dating to the 9th century, and twenty-five manuscripts from the 13th century.
· Pliny’s Natural History authored in the 1st century AD has five early fragments from the 5th century and larger manuscripts date to the ninth century.
· Quintilian’s Institutio Oratio authored in the 1st century AD has two manuscripts that date to the 9th century and one that dates to the 10th century.
· Tacitus’ Annals authored in the 2nd century has a manuscript of books 1-6 from the 9th century and a manuscript of books 11-16 from the 11th century as its earliest manuscripts.

We thus see that the textual evidence for the New Testament is the greatest in ancient history. The New Testament has the nearest competitors beat by an order of sizeable magnitude. Yet, classical scholars don’t run around like headless chickens complaining about a “lack of certainty."

1. The largest number of textual variants (well over half) involve spelling differences and nonsense readings that are easily detectable. These affect nothing of significance in the text.
2. Next in number are those variants that do not affect translation or, if they do, involve synonyms. Variants such as “Christ Jesus” versus “Jesus Christ” may entail a slightly different emphasis, nut nothing of great consequence is involved.
3. Other, more meaningful variants are not viable. They simply have no plausibility when it comes to reflecting the wording of the original because the manuscripts in which they are found have a poor pedigree. The issue involves careful historical investigation and requires the scholar to take the transmission of the text seriously. We saw that Robert Price’s attempt to excise Luke 1:34 from the Bible belonged to the category of “meaningful but not viable.” In his case, there was absolutely no manuscript evidence on his side, only wishful thinking.
4. The smallest category, about 1 percent of all textual problems, involves those variants that are both meaningful and viable. Most New Testament scholars would say that there are far fewer textual problems in this category than even 1 percent of the total. But even assuming the more generous amount (by expanding the scope of both “meaningful” and “viable”), not much of a theological nature is affected.

Of course, despite the plethora of evidence in favour of the textual reliability of the New Testament, there are those who think that key elements of New Testament were corrupted. Are there really meaningful variants that New Testament scholars aren’t telling us about? Let us take a look at the evidence. There are two such examples that critics frequently point to. The first is 1 John 5:7, which they claim the Trinity rests or falls on. Of course, the doctrine of the Trinity is based on a large number of verses such as John 1, Colossians 1:15-18, and Proverbs 8. The second example is Timothy 3:15-16, which they believe the doctrine of divine inspiration is solely based on. Again, the doctrine of divine inspiration is drawn on a number of passages such as 1 Peter 1:20, John 14:26, and 1 Corinthians 2:6-13.

In fact, when one looks at the evidence, one finds this category of textual problems comprised entirely of things that don’t affect theology. For example, in Romans 5:1, there are two possibilities. Paul either says “we have peace” or “let us have peace.” The difference in Greek is a single letter, and whatever option is true, it does not affect any theology whatsoever. A similar example occurs in 1 Thessalonians 2:7, where Paul describes himself and his associates as “gentle” or “little children.” Once again, the difference in Greek is a single letter, and, once again, no New Testament theology is affected whatsoever. As Komoszewski, et al. note:
“One of the most common variants involves the use of the first person plural pronoun and the second person plural pronoun. There is only one letter difference between the two in Greek.” - J Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel (2006), p61

Do these problems mean affect New Testament theology? Do they provide an insurmountable hurdle for the reliability of the New Testament documents? The answer is no, so it makes me wonder why critics and sceptics think that such examples actually mean anything. Even if they could somehow show that that the New Testament is textually corrupt, then so what? As William Lane Craig has noted:
“Even documents which are generally unreliable may contain valuable historical nuggets, and it will be the historian’s task to mine these documents in order to discover them.” - William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition, Crossway Books (2008), p11

As it stands, there is a firm bedrock of evidence that demonstrates the overwhelming reliability of the New Testament, so it makes me wonder why critics and sceptics continue their fruitless campaign against it.

The primary source of those who argue against the textual reliability of the New Testament tends to be one Bart Ehrman, an agnostic textual critic who has published sensationalist books, such as Misquoting Jesus, which are quoted by critics and sceptics as if it were holy writ. However, whilst books such as Misquoting Jesus are oft read and quoted, the lay public largely ignores Ehrman’s scholarly works, such as The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture. Rather irresponsibly, Ehrman leaves out a lot of information in his popular works that he includes in his scholarly works. In The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, he maintains that the scribes did not misunderstand and pervert the text, but engaged in an interpretative process whereby they tried to preserve what they perceived to be a more accurate meaning of the text against heretical misinterpretations. Ehrman is quite clear:
“The scribes of our surviving manuscripts more commonly preserved theological variations than created them, and none of these appears to have made a concerted effort to create an anti-adoptionistic recension of the New Testament. Indeed, the Christians of the proto-orthodox camp did not, on one level, need to change the texts; they believed that the texts, in whatever form they came, already attested their christological views.” - Bart Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, Oxford University Pres, (2005), p98

However, in Misquoting Jesus, Ehrman seemingly departs from such scholarly care and leaves out a lot of critical information, as we shall soon see (although does mention the good intentions of the scribes at least once.)

One example that Ehrman raises is Mark 1:40-41, where a man with a skin disease kneels down before Jesus and ask Him to heal him. Ehrman notes that the original reading was that Jesus was angry towards the man and that this had been changed in some manuscripts so that Jesus heals the man out of compassion, not anger. Ehrman’s argument in Misquoting Jesus is that the scribes were puzzled by Jesus’ anger and so changed it to compassion. It is true that the original reading did have Jesus being angry with the man, but is this such a problem? The answer is no. Ehrman believes this is problematic, because Jesus is treating this man “unfairly.” However, if that is so, why did the scribes not do away with the Old Testament, or stop associating Jesus with YHWH as the Marcionites did? There are other places in the New Testament, as Ehrman admits, where Jesus is angry, such as Mark 10:14.
In Ehrman’s scholarly work, Ehrman argues that Jesus’ anger here fits in with Mark’s overall portrayal of Jesus, but in Misquoting Jesus, Ehrman presents this as if it counts as an insurmountable hurdle.

There are actually several good reasons to think why Jesus’ anger is appropriate in such a scenario. First of all, his skin condition clearly wasn’t that bad if he was able to waltz through town right up to Jesus. Since people with skin diseases were required stay away from others and openly declare themselves as being unclean. If he had had full-blown leprosy or something similar, then someone would have spotted him way before he got close to Jesus. Secondly, the healing occurred in public, rather than discreetly. Thirdly, touching the man’s head to heal the man also made Jesus ritually unclean, meaning that He would have had to have left the city and stay in the desert until he was ritually clean again. So, in other words, this meant that this man interrupted Jesus’ teachings ministry, and it also meant other people who sought Jesus’ healing would have to have followed Jesus to the desert. Thus, the scribal change was not made out of embarrassment at all. What Ehrman also fails to point out is that the only reason he is aware of the change is because of manuscript evidence. In other words, there is evidence in the manuscripts where changes have occurred, and the kicker is, scholars know this! This is why we have more accurate Bible translation, with good quality Bibles including footnotes noting variant readings when and where they occur.

Another example that Ehrman raises is that of Matthew 24:36, which says:
“But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.”
Ehrman notes that many important manuscripts lack the phrase “nor the Son” but argues in Misquoting Jesus that scribes changed this because they were embarrassed by Jesus’ not knowing something. However, he neglects to point out a similar passage Mark, 13:32, where there is no such disparity, which Ehrman admits in The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture. Another example is a passage that isn’t even in the Bible, as it has been universally recognised as a late 16th century addition for quite some time. Ehrman doesn’t even bring this passage up at all in The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture.

In Misquoting Jesus Ehrman states that his faith collapsed when he realised, as a textual scholar, that there was doubt over the exact words that Jesus spoke. He goes as far as to say that the only way to truly understand an author is to what all his words actually were. This is a typical fundamentalist mindset that is simply not open to the nuances of New Testament tradition:
“…to apply the concept of original and copy to ancient documents is anachronistic… we must abandon the modern concept of authenticity and the modern requirement of exact verbatim correspondence down to the very punctuation.” - Rosalind Thomas, Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens, Cambridge University Press, (1989), p47-48

From this we can see that Ehrman is unable to accept answers outside what he sees in the text, and that he retains an unhealthy focus on individual words rather than the broader ideas. This is actually a common mistake present among both Christians and sceptics alike. All too often, you will hear people who insist that Jesus’ exact words must be known otherwise Christianity is somehow false. This is simply fundamentalist black-and-white all-or-nothing thinking that just has no place in critical analysis of the New Testament.

In addition to the above, I felt that it would be prudent to review some more alleged ‘interpolations’ this time from critic and sceptic Richard Carrier. He claims that 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16 and 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 are both interpolations we don’t have manuscript evidence for.

Let us first take a look at the 1 Thessalonians passage:
“14 For you, brothers and sisters, became imitators of God’s churches in Judea, which are in Christ Jesus: You suffered from your own people the same things those churches suffered from the Jews 15 who killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets and also drove us out. They displease God and are hostile to everyone 16 in their effort to keep us from speaking to the Gentiles so that they may be saved. In this way they always heap up their sins to the limit. The wrath of God has come upon them at last.”

Carrier claims:
· Paul never blames the Jews for the death of Jesus elsewhere.
· Paul never talks about God’s wrath as having come, but only at the future judgement (see: Romans 2:5, 3:5-6, 4:15.)
· Paul teaches the Jews will be saved, not destroyed (see: Romans 11:25-28.)
· Paul was dead by the time the “wrath had come upon them to the uttermost” (the destruction of Jewish nation and temple in 70AD.
Carrier likewise claims that arguments against interpolation “make no sense” and requires us to “believe too many improbable things.” He also argues that Paul never talks of the Jews as if he were not one of them.

Let us take a look at the evidence. First, is there any reason to suggest that this verse refers to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70AD? Carrier just dismisses other proposed events with a hand wave, yet this does not make a valid argument. Maybe if Carrier had spent more time interacting with the scholarship on this issue, then he would know that some have suggested that the event referred to was the expulsion of the Jews from Rome by Claudius in 48AD. This was not exactly an event of little consequence but had far reaching implications. Indeed, roughly 20-30,000 Jews were massacred and there was a subsequent famine in Judea. How can this not be interpreted as divine punishment? If Carrier wants to argue against such a position then he needs to provide some interesting reasons to accept his claim that the passage exclusively refers to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70AD.

Secondly, does this condemnation of the Jews stand in contrast with what Paul had previously said about the Jews? One wonders, what is problematic or contradictory here? Is one to suppose that Paul never got angry with his fellow Jews? As Williams notes:
“A frank recognition of guilt does not preclude love for the guilty.” - David J. Williams, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Peabody: Hendrickson, (1992), p47

There is also the fact that Romans was written 7-10 years after 1 Thessalonians. Are we to suppose that Paul could not have changed his mind? The simplest explanation, however, that this is simply an example of hyperbolic polemic and ancient rhetoric. Lastly, is there any reason to suggest that Paul means all Jews? It seems clear that such an identification is mistaken, Indeed, when one reads the passage, we note that Paul makes the distinction that he is only referring to Jews who persecuted the Church. How can it be inferred he is talking about all Jews, when the Christians of the Judean churches were themselves Jews? This argument thus makes no sense whatsoever. Thus I agree with Jewett:
“…only those desiring a sanitised picture of Paul and the early Church are likely to find Pearson [another critic who makes use of such arguments] convincing on this point.” - Robert Jewett, The Thessalonian Correspondence: Pauline Rhetoric and Millenarian Piety, Fortress Press, (1986), p39

Thus Carrier’s bold bare assertions are woefully inadequate and do not encapsulate scholarly consensus on the matter whatsoever.

What then of the passage from 1 Corinthians? Let us take a look:
“34 Women should remain silent in the churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the law says. 35 If they want to inquire about something, they should ask their own husbands at home; for it is disgraceful for a woman to speak in the church.”

Carrier is this time aware of the argument in favour of Pauline authorship, by noting the explanation that Paul is quoting his opponents. Does Carrier offer any substantive argument against this argument though? The answer is no, and we are again met with bare assertions that have no place in scholarly discussion of nuances issues such as these. We actually have several good reasons for thinking Paul is quoting his opponents here. We have a number of examples were Paul DOES use this literary device throughout his epistles, such as 1 Corinthians 6, where Paul quotes opponents in verses 12 and 13 and then offers a refutation.

A second fact is that of a tiny particle in the Greek text that is left out of a number of translations, immediately following this passage. Carrier notes this and quotes the passage in its wider context:
“29 And let the prophets speak by two or three, and let the others discern. 30 But if a revelation be made to another sitting by, let the first keep silence. 31 For ye all can prophesy one by one, that all may learn, and all may be exhorted; 32 and the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets; 33 for God is not a God of confusion, but of peace. As in all the churches of the saints, 34 let the women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but let them be in subjection, as also saith the law. 35 And if they would learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home: for it is shameful for a woman to speak in the church. 36 What? was it from you that the word of God went forth? or came it unto you alone? 37 If any man thinketh himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him take knowledge of the things which I write unto you, that they are the commandment of the Lord. 38 But if any man is ignorant, let him be ignorant. 39 Wherefore, my brethren, desire earnestly to prophesy, and forbid not to speak with tongues. 40 But let all things be done decently and in order.“

Carrier claims the “What?” does not appear in the Greek text and is the invention of a “modern commentator.” I think many Biblical scholars would be surprised to hear that. Presumably, he means the translation of the particle to mean “What?” as it can also be translated as “or.” Otherwise, one can conclude that Carrier is simply making things up. One fact that Carrier leaves out is that this particle occurs elsewhere in Paul’s writings, in both meanings “or” and “what.”

For example, in Romans 2:3-4:
“3 So when you, a mere human being, pass judgment on them and yet do the same things, do you think you will escape God’s judgment? 4 Or do you show contempt for the riches of his kindness, forbearance and patience, not realizing that God’s kindness is intended to lead you to repentance?”
This is from the NIV, where the particle is untranslated in the 1 Corinthians passage. Two similar passages, one where the particle also remains untranslated in the NIV, are Romans 9:20-21 and 1 Corinthians 6:8-9:
“20 But who are you, a human being, to talk back to God? “Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’” 21 [Particle is here] Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for special purposes and some for common use?”

“8 Instead, you yourselves cheat and do wrong, and you do this to your brothers and sisters. 9 Or do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor men who have sex with men.”
In all these examples, it means the same thing. It’s kind of like modern “NOT!” jokes in that regard. In other words, it marks violent disagreement.

What is even odder, though, is how Carrier claims that this “what?” is the only evidence of Paul’s disagreement with the statement in the preceding two verses. I have to ask, is Carrier blind? Even without the particle, it is still clear that Paul is disaffirming the preceding two verses. The flow of the argument alone indicates that Paul is rebuking the position espoused in verses 24-35:
· Paul uses a gentle, instructional, nurturing tone in verses 26-33.
· Paul switches to a legalistic rabbinical style disgrace-oriented passage in verses 34-35.
· Paul then switches to a rebuking, ironic tone in verses 36-38 to demolish a false teaching in the immediate context.
· Paul finishes by switching back to the gentle, instructional, and nurturing tone in verses 39-40.
Lastly, the nature of the rebuke indicates that verses 34-35 are a position that the Corinthians held, and not Paul. In verses 26-32, Paul offers his solutions for orderly worship with universal speaking allowed. In verse 33, Paul concludes that God seeks order and seeks it this way in all churches. In verses 34-35, Paul quotes somebody else’s solution for orderly worship, which mandated that women shut-up. Verses 36-38 are Paul’s argument against this position. He admonishes them by asking why they think themselves so much more spiritual than other churches to the extent that they believe they can propose a different solution to the problem of orderly worship.

You must feel you are on a losing streak again - as well you might - given that we are blessed with another of your interminable monologues. I doubt many read them. I certainly don’t, but presumably one is not intended to. The idea presumably is to bludgeon one into submission, not promote discussion.

You surely do not expect anyone to go through this stuff this point-by-point, i.e. track down quotes, check their accuracy and context and provide a reasoned response? Of course not - this would be the last thing you want. This is what you are avoiding by this little game of yours. And we all know it. .

If you have some points you wish to discuss then please give them and support them otherwise this exercise in futility will go the way of all your other indigestible snow-jobs.

[Tassman]

You mean like Craig Evans, who worked under Burton Mack and James Robinson, whom I have quoted twice already? You should really take the blinders off. Who knows, you might actually see something?

Quit bluffing!

Craig Evans is a conservative scholar who holds views contrary to majority scholarship – e.g. dating of the gospels. He is still publishing, e.g. ‘The World of Jesus and the Early Church’ has just been released. He is tenured at Acadia College which is “……covenanted to work under the authority of the Bible which is the all-sufficient ground of faith and practice.”

So, what is the basis of your empty assertion that the apologist scholars: “did their work prior to working at inerrancist institutes”?

Answer: There is no basis whatsoever. Just AAG big-talk!

No, what matters are the argument. Your incessant whining about "doctrinal statements" is nothing more than a genetic fallacy, but don't worry, I understand. You have no actual arguments, or facts supporting your position, so this is all you've got.

Your “incessant whining about” genetic fallacy is wrong. Any scholarly presuppositions about the subject matter must be taken into account when assessing their conclusions - especially when presuppositions of an inerrant bible are sworn to be upheld by those comfortably tenured in such institutions.

The Historical/Critical method does not allow for any presuppositions like an inerrant bible. One is expected to follow the facts where they lead regardless of the conclusions – including the overturning of biblical ‘truth statements’ when the facts warrant it.

Because it happens to be true.

It is not true. Only believers and apologist scholars believe it is the case that Christianity began as a single, orthodox form of Christianity dating from Jesus and his disciples in a continuous, unbroken line until today. The facts simply do not support this notion.

Unlike the baseless assumption and suppositions of those such as, say, the Jesus Seminar, who have been widely discredited.

“Widely discredited”!

This is an outrageous unsupported assertion, but typical of AAG. The Jesus Seminar has been mocked and smeared by apologists for obvious reasons - no one else I’m aware of.

Wrong. There is zero evidence of any kind whatsoever for this fairy tale belief. There is, however, considerable evidence that Jesus was believed to have been divine since the origin of Christianity.

Majority scholarship does NOT accept the apologist argument that “Jesus was believed to have been divine since the origin of Christianity”.

It has considerable evidence that there was great diversity within Christianity during its first few decades. The Jewish Christians settled in Jerusalem under Jesus' brother James, but others spread across the known world preaching a very different Christianity using quite different gospels and had quite different views of who Jesus was and what he did."

Scholars using correct critical historical criteria come to very different conclusions.

Indeed they do! Those practicing Historical/Critical methodology cannot simultaneously hold to the notion of an inerrant bible, because this rules out the possibility of some biblical truth claims being wrong. And this would be contrary to the concept of inerrancy.

I guess that is why hardly anybody still believes in such an antiquated notion. Such beliefs were fashionable and in vogue during the 19th and early 20th centuries, but have long such been discredited. It would help if you kept up to date to with current scholarship.

Re the bolded:

Nonsense. I guess you are unaware of the recent work of:

Charles Freeman, "A new history of early Christianity," Yale University Press, (2009).

Gregory J. Riley, "One Jesus, many Christs," Harper SanFrancisco, (1997),

Barrie Wilson, "How Jesus became Christian," St. Martin's Press, (2008)

Bart D. Ehrman, "Lost Christianities: The battle for Scripture and the faiths we never knew," Oxford University Press, (2003)

To name a few! This is what is being taught in the mainline seminaries as the Jaecp quote made clear. The problem is that it doesn't filter down to the laity OR make a dent in the doctrinally cast-iron conservative seminaries for which biblical research equates with preserving the notion of inerrancy, NOT uncovering truth.

[Chrawnus]

You must feel you are on a losing streak again - as well you might - given that we are blessed with another of your interminable monologues. I doubt many read them. I certainly don’t, but presumably one is not intended to. The idea presumably is to bludgeon one into submission, not promote discussion.

You surely do not expect anyone to go through this stuff this point-by-point, i.e. track down quotes, check their accuracy and context and provide a reasoned response? Of course not - this would be the last thing you want. This is what you are avoiding by this little game of yours. And we all know it. .

If you have some points you wish to discuss then please give them and support them otherwise this exercise in futility will go the way of all your other indigestible snow-jobs.

I read them. But unlike you I can keep my concentration on one thing for more than a few minutes.

It's nice to see you admit that you have no intention of doing any serious research at all and instead whine about how tiresome it is to actually do some actual work for a change. Instead you insinuate, if not directly assert, that AAG might be dishonest in his quotations either by distorting them or taking them out of context.

But we all know that you prefer soundbites instead of actual content.

[Tassman]

Tassman -

the problem is not that you reject inerrancy, but that you reject - on that 'basis' - all kinds of work and research by qualified and professional scholars out of hand and without even examining their actual arguments. I seem to recall you rejecting arguments that aren't even based on the biblical texts because they were made by an 'inerrantist'. And you do this without even examining the actual 'problem' - inerrancy either, and lumping all kinds of people in under the one simplistic pigeonhole. Glen Miller's 'inerrancy' is very different from Norman Geisler's.

The bottom line re inerrancy is that the “work and research” by scholars, no matter how “qualified and professional”, is undermined by the overriding presupposition of the bible being the ‘word of god’. Therefore any conflicts which research uncovers will inevitably be resolved in such a way as to harmonize with the scriptural account. Either that or the notion of inerrancy will necessitate abandoning altogether – as was the case with Bart Ehrman or the despised (around these parts) John Loftus.

RE the bolded: Such alleged quotes as “I seem to recall…” are not acceptable in discussion. They demean me without my being able to defend them.

If -as you claim - they are starting from a false premise, and therefore their conclusions are false, that should be something you can demonstrate by addressing their actual arguments. Yet you regularly avoid doing this.

More accurately: They are starting from a premise unsupported by creditable evidence.

In general terms the arguments of the inerrantists tend to be similar and very often contrast with the scholars practicing Historical/Critical methodology. An example can be found with the history of early Christianity.

The latter argue, with considerable evidence, that early Christianity was a chaos of conflicting Christology’s, whereas the apologists seek evidence to argue for the unified notion of the Jesus tradition as found in scripture – e.g. attempting to date the gospels early in order to reinforce their presuppositions.

We all have our presuppositions - for (many) Christians 'inerrancy' is one. That you reject that presupposition is no surprise. One of your presuppositions is naturalism. Christians reject this - but here is the crucial difference. Christian posters (and scholars) actually engage with the arguments and positions of the people you cite in support of your arguments, even when those people have a false presupposition (naturalism).

Rejecting ‘naturalism’ is absurd.

The only alternative is to argue that all the constants and laws so far discovered in nature, such as the speed of light, are capricious and inscrutable and that we cannot even reason about the principle of uniformity, i.e. that the future will resemble the past. It is this which has enabled us to understand about gravity, mechanics, electricity, and the structure of the solar system etc, etc, etc.

Do you REALLY reject this?

Of course, from your point of view, naturalism isn't a false presupposition, and inerrancy is. From the Christian's point of view it's the other way round. By your refusal to engage with the actual positions of well-respected Christian scholars you are not fairly participating in the dialogue, and are acting like a troll. If a Christian poster was simply to brush off people like Ehrmann, Carrier, Price et al when you site them to support your arguments, I think you'd find that poster not really worth engaging. They'd be acting unfairly, insisting you accept their presuppositions ('inerrancy' and 'not-naturalism') without argument, and at the same time insisting without argument that your presuppositions (biblical 'errancy' and naturalism) are false, and invalidate all the conclusions anyone holding them might come to. This, with the presuppositions reversed, is what you do, and it is one major reason why many posters here have dismissed you as not worth the effort.

Your argument is specious.

Yes, religions are based in “supernaturalism” and people are free to believe in whatever religion they choose. It is their choice. But by refusing to accept such beliefs myself does not make me a troll. However, it does discredit theists who denigrate and mock those who disagree with them. Something I never do - well, hardly ever.

As for Ehrmann, Carrier, and Price – they are more than “brushed off” by theists. Price was driven away by a barrage of totally offensive mockery when he was gracious enough to answer TWeb questions on line. And where have I seen “Barty” (i.e. Dr Bart Ehrman) referred to recently. O yes. In this thread #1651: “Barty, I had no idea you were THIS full of crap”, and his “usual style of deliberately leaving out key information”. This is not to “simply to brush off” such non-apologetic scholars in your view, I take it. “People who live in glass houses…….”

You refuse to actually put your presuppositions equally under the microscope, and insist on dismissing others a priori. Despite your many fine words to the contrary, this behaviour shows you don't actually respect others (Christians) as people, even though you may disagree with them on many points.

My alleged “presuppositions” consist of nothing more than a refusal to accept claims without sufficient supporting evidence. If others choose to then that is their business, but they do so as a matter of faith, not belief grounded in creditable evidence. There is no verified evidence for the existence of a supernatural world and therefore its existence is improbable – although it is hypothetically possible. This is my presupposition – microscope not needed. But, I suspect your real objection is that I do not find the arguments of apologists in the least convincing.

[Rational Gaze]

I certainly don’t, but presumably one is not intended to. The idea presumably is to bludgeon one into submission, not promote discussion.

In other words, you have no arguments. Argumentum ad hominem in lieu of rebuttal is your modus operandi after all, and seems to be the sine qua non of your worldview.

You surely do not expect anyone to go through this stuff this point-by-point, i.e. track down quotes, check their accuracy and context and provide a reasoned response?

Of course I do. That's how debate and scholarly discussion takes place. Your statement here is simply indicative of your own laziness. If you are unwilling to debate like rationally and maturely, then so much the worse for you.