Weak point in Plantinga's argument against naturalism

[seer]

My point was, just because someone does not believe what you believe does not mean that they are suppressing the truth.

Yes I know, but James, I am a Christian - I hold Revelation over opinion, even your opinion - sorry... But like I said Jim this does not make you particularly wicked. Just a run of the mill sinner, who needs forgiveness.

No, I am not suppressing anything, you are just being a little bit arrogant because you mistakingly confuse belief with knowledge.

Jim, do we really have to get into this whole belief and knowledge thing again? You really don't have a logical argument that supports your position - remember. Besides, I don't want to get into it - phaedrus is only going to get mad at me.

Sorry, I am not familiar with the term, what does "open creationist" mean?

It is somewhat vague. In my case I give no time line (i.e. six days of creation) for the account in Genesis. I do believe in a literal Adam and Eve as the two original parents of all humankind. Whether God used the evolutionary process to create them I know not. I wasn't there.

[MaxVel]

No, Plantinga's point was that Natrulsim was in contradiction with evolution, because evolution is indifferent to 'truth.' My argument is that Naturalism is compatable with evolution, because it is indifferent to 'truth.'

Shuny, what you've said above indicates to me that you don't grasp what Plantinga is arguing.

In Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, he argues that the truth of evolution is an epistemic defeater for naturalism (i.e. if evolution is true, it undermines naturalism). His basic argument is that if evolution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive faculties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value (maximizing one's success at the four F's: "feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing"), not necessarily to produce beliefs that are true. Thus, since human cognitive faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the naturalism-cum-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the veracity of the products of those same faculties, including naturalism and evolution themselves. On the other hand, if God created man "in his image" by way of an evolutionary process (or any other means), then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable.

{Emphasis mine}


Plantinga is saying that the combination of evolution and naturalism - if we hold both to be true - undercuts our reasons to believe that our cognitive faculties produce true beliefs, and thus undercut our reasons to believe in naturalism.


He's NOT saying 'If evolution is true, naturalism is false';

He is saying 'If both evolution and naturalism are true, then we have reasons to doubt our ability to reason to truth - and hence to doubt the truth of naturalism.'

[seer]

Shuny, what you've said above indicates to me that you don't grasp what Plantinga is arguing.




{Emphasis mine}


Plantinga is saying that the combination of evolution and naturalism - if we hold both to be true - undercuts our reasons to believe that our cognitive faculties produce true beliefs, and thus undercut our reasons to believe in naturalism.


He's NOT saying 'If evolution is true, naturalism is false';

He is saying 'If both evolution and naturalism are true, then we have reasons to doubt our ability to reason to truth - and hence to doubt the truth of naturalism.'

Amen!

[JimL]

Shuny, what you've said above indicates to me that you don't grasp what Plantinga is arguing.




{Emphasis mine}


Plantinga is saying that the combination of evolution and naturalism - if we hold both to be true - undercuts our reasons to believe that our cognitive faculties produce true beliefs, and thus undercut our reasons to believe in naturalism.


He's NOT saying 'If evolution is true, naturalism is false';

He is saying 'If both evolution and naturalism are true, then we have reasons to doubt our ability to reason to truth - and hence to doubt the truth of naturalism.'

Admittedly I still have not read his argument, but as you and seer define it the argument itself seems to be based on a flawed premise. He seems to be making the argument that only if God exists could our minds be in sinc with the natural world that they are a part of and therefore be able to make any sense of it. Why should beliefs that have survival value need be true or false in and of themselves. We hold both true and false beliefs, arriving at them both through the process of reason, so we have no more of a basis to doubt naturalism than we do to doubt God. His argument seems to me to be based on nothing but one belief and that is the belief in God which he asserts must be a true belief because if God didn't exist we could never even imagine him to exist. But we think in the abstract, we can imagine many false as well as true beliefs. So maybe I am missing something, but I don't get it, perhaps you could explain further since you have no reasons to doubt?

[shunyadragon]

Shuny, what you've said above indicates to me that you don't grasp what Plantinga is arguing.




{Emphasis mine}


Plantinga is saying that the combination of evolution and naturalism - if we hold both to be true - undercuts our reasons to believe that our cognitive faculties produce true beliefs, and thus undercut our reasons to believe in naturalism.


He's NOT saying 'If evolution is true, naturalism is false';

He is saying 'If both evolution and naturalism are true, then we have reasons to doubt our ability to reason to truth - and hence to doubt the truth of naturalism.'

As I said, I disagree with Plantinga's conclusions, if evolution is true we have reasons to doubt ALL belief systems. Theism is under the gun most, because of the necessary belief that our cognitive abilities must be reliable for a belief system to be reliably true. I believe the assumptions of naturalism are more accurate as to the nature of evolution, therefore Natrualism is more likely true because it is based on objective methods of science, and not subjective beliefs in God(s), but again naturalism justifies us doubt ALL belief systems in one way or another, because, yes, our cognitive abilities cannot be assumed to be reliable.

Naturalism has more checks and balances in the objective methods of science in understanding our existence, and not rely on subjective beliefs that depend only on assuming cognitive abilities are reliable. Naturalism is not dependent on this assumption.

I do understand Planting's argument. I just believe it is a poor attempt to justify theism.

[MaxVel]

Hi Jim -

Admittedly I still have not read his argument, but as you and seer define it the argument itself seems to be based on a flawed premise. He seems to be making the argument that only if God exists could our minds be in sinc with the natural world that they are a part of and therefore be able to make any sense of it.

If anything that's something akin to his conclusion, not a premise. So I'm not clear on what your 'flawed premise' is....

Why should beliefs that have survival value need be true or false in and of themselves.

Well, all beliefs are either true or false, right? Part of what Plantinga is saying is that evolution - which is the process that gave us our cognitive faculties, which we use to form our beliefs - is effectively blind to the issue of whether our beliefs are true or false. 'Evolution' only is concerned with whether our beliefs have survival value or not. A false belief may well have survival value (see upthread for examples from seer).

We hold both true and false beliefs, arriving at them both through the process of reason, so we have no more of a basis to doubt naturalism than we do to doubt God.

What do we use to form our beliefs? Our cognitive faculties. These have been formed by evolution, which doesn't care if they produce true beliefs or false ones, just if they produce beliefs which increase our chances of survival and reproduction.

So what is the probability of our cognitive faculties producing only true beliefs? If I understand his argument correctly, Plantinga is saying it's either low, or inscrutable - we don't know what the probability is. But these same faculties are what we use to form our belief that Naturalism is true. So we have reason to doubt if our belief in Naturalism is true, because we're using faculties that might not produce true beliefs to form that belief.


If evolution is 'guided' by God, however, then we're not quite in the same boat, because God could have guided evolution to produce (fairly) reliable cognitive faculties that (usually) do form true beliefs.


So, in summary:

It's NOT an argument against evolution.

It's NOT an argument that we 'know for sure' Naturalism is false.

It IS an argument to show that we have reason to doubt our ability to know the truth of (Evolution + Naturalism)

His argument seems to me to be based on nothing but one belief and that is the belief in God which he asserts must be a true belief because if God didn't exist we could never even imagine him to exist.

Uh, no, not in the EAAN argument.

But we think in the abstract, we can imagine many false as well as true beliefs. So maybe I am missing something, but I don't get it, perhaps you could explain further since you have no reasons to doubt?

I'm doing my best.

Here's a lecture outline of Plantinga's argument

[MaxVel]

As I said, I disagree with Plantinga's conclusions, if evolution is true we have reasons to doubt ALL belief systems.

Only for unguided, naturalistic, 'Godless' evolution. If God guides evolution, then we can have (mostly) reliable belief-forming faculties, because God could have steered things to form those reliable faculties.

Theism is under the gun most, because of the necessary belief that our cognitive abilities must be reliable for a belief system to be reliably true. I believe the assumptions of naturalism are more accurate as to the nature of evolution, therefore Natrualism is more likely true because it is based on objective methods of science, and not subjective beliefs in God(s), but again naturalism justifies us doubt ALL belief systems in one way or another, because, yes, our cognitive abilities cannot be assumed to be reliable.

{emphasis mine} - that's what Plantinga is saying: Naturalism (with evolution) undercuts itself. It undermines our confidence that our beliefs are true, which includes our belief in Naturalism.

Naturalism has more checks and balances in the objective methods of science in understanding our existence, and not rely on subjective beliefs that depend only on assuming cognitive abilities are reliable. Naturalism is not dependent on this assumption.

Uh, yes it is. How do we know that our belief that science gives us "objective methods in understanding our existence" is true, if, as you've said above, we have reasons to doubt ALL beliefs?

How do we know that our belief that this check or that balance, or this experiment or that observation that we believe in (we believe is true, we believe will confirm this or that belief) is true, if, as you've said above, we have reasons to doubt ALL beliefs?

I do understand Planting's argument. I just believe it is a poor attempt to justify theism.

I think you're getting there, not sure yet if you've really grasped it. You can't privilege Naturalism, or science, or any belief system if Plantinga's argument is true and you hold to Evolution + Naturalism.

[shunyadragon]

Only for unguided, naturalistic, 'Godless' evolution. If God guides evolution, then we can have (mostly) reliable belief-forming faculties, because God could have steered things to form those reliable faculties.

Evolution, by the scientific basis cannot assume it is guided. That is a Theistic Evolutionist assumption and not the basis for a convincing argument. The fact that God 'could have' done this or that is strictly a theistic assumption, and not anything to do with the scientific concept of evolution, which by its nature accepts Naturalist assumptions regardless of whether theistic assumptions are true or not.

The statement you made 'we can have (mostly) reliable belief-forming faculties.' is problematic, because it is too subjective to be of value in an argument. From a less biased view of the diversity of beliefs humans believe strongly in, there is no logical reason to assume that humans belief-forming facilities are necessarily reliable

{emphasis mine} - that's what Plantinga is saying: Naturalism (with evolution) undercuts itself. It undermines our confidence that our beliefs are true, which includes our belief in Naturalism.

I know fully well what Plantinga is saying, This does not represent a sound logical argument. It is simply an assertion based on faith. From the less biased view, ALL belief[forming are not necessarily reliable based solely on the evidence.

Uh, yes it is. How do we know that our belief that science gives us "objective methods in understanding our existence" is true, if, as you've said above, we have reasons to doubt ALL beliefs?

I have made it very clear in past posts, 'WE do not know' in any absolute sense.

How do we know that our belief that this check or that balance, or this experiment or that observation that we believe in (we believe is true, we believe will confirm this or that belief) is true, if, as you've said above, we have reasons to doubt ALL beliefs?

Yes, from the less biased perspective, without any world view assumptions ALL belief-forming rational thinking is in some way possibly unreliable based on the evidence.

I did not say that the scientific objective method based was necessarily true, but based on the evidence and the track record, the scientific objective methodology is more reliable and consistent and uniform than any subjective religious belief-forming system, which when considering the universal of all the diversity of belief systems, we have no reason to think our belief-forming rational facilities is likely reliable.

I think you're getting there, not sure yet if you've really grasped it. You can't privilege Naturalism, or science, or any belief system if Plantinga's argument is true and you hold to Evolution + Naturalism.

My problem with Plantinga's argument it is based on the assumption of privileges 'theism.' If you what the bottom line by the evidence, ALL world views are subject to question, and we cannot make any logical assumption of the reliable of our rational facilities regardless of whether theism or naturalism is true. The objective evidence still favors Naturalism.

[shunyadragon]

Well, all beliefs are either true or false, right? Part of what Plantinga is saying is that evolution - which is the process that gave us our cognitive faculties, which we use to form our beliefs - is effectively blind to the issue of whether our beliefs are true or false. 'Evolution' only is concerned with whether our beliefs have survival value or not. A false belief may well have survival value (see upthread for examples from seer).

True.

What do we use to form our beliefs? Our cognitive faculties. These have been formed by evolution, which doesn't care if they produce true beliefs or false ones, just if they produce beliefs which increase our chances of survival and reproduction.

First, they do not necessarily have survival vlaue. There effect may be neutral.

So what is the probability of our cognitive faculties producing only true beliefs?

Virtually nil regardless of whether theism is true or not. According to most religious beliefs, truth comes via revelation and would be indifferent to evolution.

If I understand his argument correctly, Plantinga is saying it's either low, or inscrutable - we don't know what the probability is. But these same faculties are what we use to form our belief that Naturalism is true. So we have reason to doubt if our belief in Naturalism is true, because we're using faculties that might not produce true beliefs to form that belief.

By the evidence our cognitive abilities are not necessarily reliable for any belief-forming process, but some belief-forming systems may be more relaible than others based on the evidence.

If evolution is 'guided' by God, however, then we're not quite in the same boat, because God could have guided evolution to produce (fairly) reliable cognitive faculties that (usually) do form true beliefs.

A thesitic assumption does not make a convincing basis for an argument.

So, in summary:

It's NOT an argument against evolution.

True.

It's NOT an argument that we 'know for sure' Naturalism is false.

True

It IS an argument to show that we have reason to doubt our ability to know the truth of (Evolution + Naturalism)

This is where the argument breaks down and fails and is based on a theistic assumption.

Arguments for 'truth' from a theist perspective should be based on 'Revelation' and not whether our cognative facilities are reliable from the evolution perspective. The question would whether our cognitive facilities are reliable enough to recognize and believe in the true belief over beliefs that are false. This becomes a difficult argument and brings up the problem of sincerity of deeply held beliefs and very human fallible choices in the reality of the diversity of human beliefs when the reality people believe the belief system they inherited by far most of the time.

[MaxVel]

Evolution, by the scientific basis cannot assume it is guided. That is a Theistic Evolutionist assumption and not the basis for a convincing argument. The fact that God 'could have' done this or that is strictly a theistic assumption, and not anything to do with the scientific concept of evolution, which by its nature accepts Naturalist assumptions regardless of whether theistic assumptions are true or not.

This sounds suspiciously like begging the question to me. You're a priori ruling out any claims that assume God exists. How exactly is it impossible for God to direct evolution?


You do realise that Plantinga's argument is NOT an argument for God's existence?

The statement you made 'we can have (mostly) reliable belief-forming faculties.' is problematic, because it is too subjective to be of value in an argument.

It was a hypothetical statement.

If X, then Y.

I don't see how that is subjective. It may or may not be true, that's the nature of hypothetical.

From a less biased view of the diversity of beliefs humans believe strongly in, there is no logical reason to assume that humans belief-forming facilities are necessarily reliable

Yes. I am biased.


OK. So your beliefs about the effectiveness of Plantinga's argument are not necessarily reliable, either. Or about the objectivity of naturalism and so on...

I know fully well what Plantinga is saying, This does not represent a sound logical argument. It is simply an assertion based on faith.

Rubbish.

Outline Plantinga's argument (the EEAN) and show me specifically where it is an assertion based on faith.

From the less biased view, ALL belief[forming are not necessarily reliable based solely on the evidence.


Yes, from the less biased perspective, without any world view assumptions ALL belief-forming rational thinking is in some way possibly unreliable based on the evidence.

That hypothetical really sticks out to you, huh?


What happens is we assume Naturalism as a world view - we plug it in to the 'equation' to see what might follow?

Plantinga argues that the result is that we have no real way of evaluating the reliability of our beliefs - he calls the probability 'inscrutable' - or that the probability is low.


What happens is we assume (Christian) theism as a world view - we plug it in to the 'equation' to see what might follow?

Plantinga argues that the result is that we have more reason to think that our cognitive faculties are reliable - since such a God would want us to know Him, and would have guided evolution to produce reliable belief-forming faculties.

I did not say that the scientific objective method based was necessarily true, but based on the evidence and the track record, the scientific objective methodology is more reliable and consistent and uniform than any subjective religious belief-forming system, which when considering the universal of all the diversity of belief systems, we have no reason to think our belief-forming rational facilities is likely reliable.

You're still assuming that things like 'evidence' and 'track record', 'being consistent' and 'being uniform' are helpful. The problem is, we believe in those things as being indicators of true beliefs.

But, since (as you've agreed) ALL our beliefs have been undercut (we don't know if any of them are reliable, or if some, and is so, which ones), our belief that there is such a thing as (say) 'consistency', and our belief that it shows us the truth of something, is itself unreliable.

If you agree that ALL our beliefs are unreliable, you can't also say 'except for these ones' and privilege the beliefs that you want to hold.

My problem with Plantinga's argument it is based on the assumption of privileges 'theism.'

No it doesn't. The point about theism is a corollary to the actual argument. A postscript.

Ignore theism completely and you still have the EAAN. The combination of evolution + naturalism undercuts our reasons for thinking that our beliefs are reliable, and thus undercuts naturalism.

That's a very trimmed down summary of the EAAN. No mention of theism at all, no use of it in the premises.



I think your problem is more that you don't like the conclusion - which is odd, since you're (apparently) a theist.

If you what the bottom line by the evidence, ALL world views are subject to question, and we cannot make any logical assumption of the reliable of our rational facilities regardless of whether theism or naturalism is true.

Uh, no. IF (Christian) Theism is true then it is possible that our rational faculties are reliable.


{This is a hypothetical statement - you can argue that this is not in reality the case, but to argue that it's not a correct hypothetical you'll need to address why exactly the Christian God couldn't possibly give us reliable rational faculties.}

The objective evidence still favors Naturalism.

Well it looks like Sparko is right - you're NOT a theist, at least by the definition that is used on TWeb. You should change your designation to something else.


And I think you're being inconsistent by holding both: -

"ALL belief-forming rational thinking is in some way possibly unreliable based on the evidence"

and

"The objective evidence still favors Naturalism."

The second statement is a lot stronger than the first statement allows.

[shunyadragon]

This sounds suspiciously like begging the question to me. You're a priori ruling out any claims that assume God exists. How exactly is it impossible for God to direct evolution?

No, I do not assume either in this argument. Assuming God exists (as Plantinga does) or assuming God does not exist would be begging the question in both cases.

You do realise that Plantinga's argument is NOT an argument for God's existence?

He is begging the question by assuming God exists. Actually he is indirectly arguing for the existence of God. The antithesis.of Naturalism is Theism of some sort or maybe omnipotent Aliensim.

It was a hypothetical statement.

If X, then Y.

I don't see how that is subjective. It may or may not be true, that's the nature of hypothetical.

The nature of the hypothetical is subjective, particularly in this case, because it is not based on objective evidence.




Yes. I am biased.

OK. So your beliefs about the effectiveness of Plantinga's argument are not necessarily reliable, either. Or about the objectivity of naturalism and so on...

Reliability comes in degrees and not absolutes.

Rubbish.

Not an adequate response.

Outline Plantinga's argument (the EEAN) and show me specifically where it is an assertion based on faith.

He assumes God exists as the premise and conclusion of his argument, as you clearly state below.

That hypothetical really sticks out to you, huh?

Yes, and the argument is based solely on the assumption God exists.


[/quote] What happens is we assume Naturalism as a world view - we plug it in to the 'equation' to see what might follow?

Plantinga argues that the result is that we have no real way of evaluating the reliability of our beliefs - he calls the probability 'inscrutable' - or that the probability is low. [/quote]

First, Plantinga has not presented an adequate way to determine probability in this case.

What happens is we assume (Christian) theism as a world view - we plug it in to the 'equation' to see what might follow?

Plantinga argues that the result is that we have more reason to think that our cognitive faculties are reliable - since such a God would want us to know Him, and would have guided evolution to produce reliable belief-forming faculties.

I approach the argument by not assuming either are true.

You're still assuming that things like 'evidence' and 'track record', 'being consistent' and 'being uniform' are helpful. The problem is, we believe in those things as being indicators of true beliefs.

No they are not necessarily an indicator of true beliefs. They are indicators of what is more reliable.

But, since (as you've agreed) ALL our beliefs have been undercut (we don't know if any of them are reliable, or if some, and is so, which ones), our belief that there is such a thing as (say) 'consistency', and our belief that it shows us the truth of something, is itself unreliable.

No, because reality is not a black and white issue as you have described. Based on all available evidence Naturalism is more reliable than theism.

If you agree that ALL our beliefs are unreliable, you can't also say 'except for these ones' and privilege the beliefs that you want to hold.

Based on the evidence I can present that Naturalism is more consistent, predictable, and reliable without assuming either is true.

Ignore theism completely and you still have the EAAN. The combination of evolution + naturalism undercuts our reasons for thinking that our beliefs are reliable, and thus undercuts naturalism.

That's a very trimmed down summary of the EAAN. No mention of theism at all, no use of it in the premises.

Actually there is no use for the argument at all.

I think your problem is more that you don't like the conclusion - which is odd, since you're (apparently) a theist.

Arguing against bad or good philosophical arguments is not a matter of what I believe or hold or not. I am just arguing against Plantinga's weak arguments. It is apparent you have little background in philosophical and logical arguments, because if you did you would be aware that what you argue for or against in these disaplines doe not necessarily reflect what one believes. I was educated to evaluate arguments on their merits, not beliefs.

Uh, no. IF (Christian) Theism is true then it is possible that our rational faculties are reliable.

{This is a hypothetical statement - you can argue that this is not in reality the case, but to argue that it's not a correct hypothetical you'll need to address why exactly the Christian God couldn't possibly give us reliable rational faculties.}

Possibilities and $2 will get you a cup of coffee at McDonald's

Well it looks like Sparko is right - you're NOT a theist, at least by the definition that is used on TWeb. You should change your designation to something else.

Arguing against bad or good philosophical arguments is not a matter of what I believe or hold or not. I am just arguing against Plantinga's weak arguments. It is apparent you have little background in philosophical and logical arguments, because if you did you would be aware that what you argue for or against in these disaplines doe not necessarily reflect what one believes. I was educated to evaluate arguments on their merits, not beliefs.

And I think you're being inconsistent by holding both: -

"ALL belief-forming rational thinking is in some way possibly unreliable based on the evidence"

and

"The objective evidence still favors Naturalism."

The second statement is a lot stronger than the first statement allows.

No, not inconsistent at all. The bottom line of the logical argument without assumptions of either Naturalism nor Theism is that human fallibility trumps beliefs in that our rational cognitive abilities are not necessarily reliable concerning any belief system, but reliability is not a black and white issue. By the evidence Naturalism is more reliable than theism.

Ever sense humans became human we have relied on the consistency, predictability, and reliability of objective methods of understanding the world we live in. Flint makes superior stone tools over quartz then, and it still does today. Naturalism is based on this sound foundation. Theism on the other hand has been inconsistent, unpredictable and unreliable in producing the same result from culture to culture and even individual to individual. The evidence speaks for itself.

I cannot rely on our physical evolution to provide reliable belief-forming cognitive functions to justify any belief system at the expense of another, I can only rely on the evidence.

I have said before and will repeat it, 'I rely on the belief in the universal compassion of God for all of humanity in Revelation for 'truth'(theistic . . .) concerning the spiritual nature of humanity, and not physical evolution.' I consider humanity to evolve spiritually parallel to our physical evolution ( +. . . evolution), therefore Theistic Evolution.

[MaxVel]

Briefly -

You're not actually interacting with what I'm saying, and/or giving non-responses to fairly simple and direct questions.

You're making assertions about particular failings that you see in Plantinga's argument, but not backing those up with specific citation of the argument and reasoning to show why this or that part fails.

An example of this is "...Plantinga has not presented an adequate way to determine probability in this case.". Why not? Does he talk about determining probability in his argument at all? Addressing some of those rather obvious questions would make this an interesting discussion.



Explaining things where you've misunderstood the argument, and asking you questions to draw out your understanding of it, or clarify your objections to aspects of it, only to be met with banal generalities is not an actual discussion.


For example I asked you: "How exactly is it impossible for God to direct evolution?". You gave no answer. Yet in the previous post you argued that saying God could guide evolution was 'a theistic assumption' and therefore not of use in forming an argument. You made this assertion, and when I asked a follow-up question to examine the basis for your assertion, you ignored it. In short, you're not meeting your side of the discussion, you're mostly asserting issues and raising objections, and not supporting them.


Last point: You said: "I cannot rely on our physical evolution to provide reliable belief-forming cognitive functions to justify any belief system at the expense of another, I can only rely on the evidence."


Again - this is not consistent with you accepting (which you have) that on Naturalism + Evolution, we have reasons to doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties. We don't know the degree to which our beliefs might be true or untrue.

Above you assume that your cognitive faculties are reliable in finding evidence, evaluating evidence, drawing the correct conclusion for evidence, and even that evidence --> conclusion is a valid way of reasoning.

If (as you have accepted) our cognitive faculties are to an undeterminable degree unreliable for forming true beliefs, than all of those are potentially fallible too.


You're saying something like this:

MaxVel: This argument shows that we can't know if we can count or do any mathematical operation correctly or not. In fact, our belief that maths 'works', that it reflects reality is could be wrong.

Shunyadragon: Well, I don't accept that argument, but I agree with the conclusion. We don't know if we can do maths or not. Nonetheless, I know that maths is true because I can count 4 and a separate group of 4 . I can add them to make 8

When I count all the Iget 8 , so maths works!


MaxVel: How do you know that you can count truly, or add truly, or even that maths addition is a true operation? You just agreed that all that is potentially wrong, and we don't know if it is wrong or not?


Shunyadragon: But maths works! See. I'm adding again! 4 +2 = 6.....


This will be my last response unless you actually get to grips with the specifics of Plantinga's argument, such as showing (with quotes) where he 'assumes God exists' in his premises. Such as showing that he doesn't 'present an adequate way to determine probability', and so on.

[seer]

Briefly -

You're not actually interacting with what I'm saying, and/or giving non-responses to fairly simple and direct questions.

You're making assertions about particular failings that you see in Plantinga's argument, but not backing those up with specific citation of the argument and reasoning to show why this or that part fails.

An example of this is "...Plantinga has not presented an adequate way to determine probability in this case.". Why not? Does he talk about determining probability in his argument at all? Addressing some of those rather obvious questions would make this an interesting discussion.



Explaining things where you've misunderstood the argument, and asking you questions to draw out your understanding of it, or clarify your objections to aspects of it, only to be met with banal generalities is not an actual discussion.


For example I asked you: "How exactly is it impossible for God to direct evolution?". You gave no answer. Yet in the previous post you argued that saying God could guide evolution was 'a theistic assumption' and therefore not of use in forming an argument. You made this assertion, and when I asked a follow-up question to examine the basis for your assertion, you ignored it. In short, you're not meeting your side of the discussion, you're mostly asserting issues and raising objections, and not supporting them.


Last point: You said: "I cannot rely on our physical evolution to provide reliable belief-forming cognitive functions to justify any belief system at the expense of another, I can only rely on the evidence."


Again - this is not consistent with you accepting (which you have) that on Naturalism + Evolution, we have reasons to doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties. We don't know the degree to which our beliefs might be true or untrue.

Above you assume that your cognitive faculties are reliable in finding evidence, evaluating evidence, drawing the correct conclusion for evidence, and even that evidence --> conclusion is a valid way of reasoning.

If (as you have accepted) our cognitive faculties are to an undeterminable degree unreliable for forming true beliefs, than all of those are potentially fallible too.


You're saying something like this:

MaxVel: This argument shows that we can't know if we can count or do any mathematical operation correctly or not. In fact, our belief that maths 'works', that it reflects reality is could be wrong.

Shunyadragon: Well, I don't accept that argument, but I agree with the conclusion. We don't know if we can do maths or not. Nonetheless, I know that maths is true because I can count 4 and a separate group of 4 . I can add them to make 8

When I count all the Iget 8 , so maths works!


MaxVel: How do you know that you can count truly, or add truly, or even that maths addition is a true operation? You just agreed that all that is potentially wrong, and we don't know if it is wrong or not?


Shunyadragon: But maths works! See. I'm adding again! 4 +2 = 6.....


This will be my last response unless you actually get to grips with the specifics of Plantinga's argument, such as showing (with quotes) where he 'assumes God exists' in his premises. Such as showing that he doesn't 'present an adequate way to determine probability', and so on.

Good points Max...

[shunyadragon]

MaxVel: This argument shows that we can't know if we can count or do any mathematical operation correctly or not. In fact, our belief that maths 'works', that it reflects reality is could be wrong.

No it does not. .

Shunyadragon: Well, I don't accept that argument, but I agree with the conclusion. We don't know if we can do maths or not. Nonetheless, I know that maths is true because I can count 4 and a separate group of 4 . I can add them to make 8

When I count all the Iget 8 , so maths works!


MaxVel: How do you know that you can count truly, or add truly, or even that maths addition is a true operation? You just agreed that all that is potentially wrong, and we don't know if it is wrong or not?

No I did not agree to that. I agreed that belief-systems may or may not be reliable based on our fallible nature. Nothing to do with above.

All you have demonstrated is that you made it out of elementary school, maybe.

Shunyadragon: But maths works! See. I'm adding again! 4 +2 = 6.....

Yes math works, but math, fortunately has nothing to do with subjective belief systems.

This will be my last response unless you actually get to grips with the specifics of Plantinga's argument, such as showing (with quotes) where he 'assumes God exists' in his premises. Such as showing that he doesn't 'present an adequate way to determine probability', and so on.

Good riddance to bad rubbish!!!

You will at least stop misrepresenting and misquoting me.

[JimL]

Hi Jim -

Hey Max

If anything that's something akin to his conclusion, not a premise. So I'm not clear on what your 'flawed premise' is....

Okay, so its a false conclusion. I must admit, I was not sure what the premise was.

Well, all beliefs are either true or false, right? Part of what Plantinga is saying is that evolution - which is the process that gave us our cognitive faculties, which we use to form our beliefs - is effectively blind to the issue of whether our beliefs are true or false. 'Evolution' only is concerned with whether our beliefs have survival value or not. A false belief may well have survival value (see upthread for examples from seer).

Evolution is not a thing, it is not concerned with anything, it is the mind that evolves and the mind not evolution that is concerned with surviving. But, if I understand Plantinga to be suggesting that our minds are effectively blind to the truth or falseness of our beliefs because the minds only purpose is survival, then I would suggest that that is a flawed
premise. Is he suggesting that everything that the human mind comes to believe has to do with survival. Sometimes the mind holds beliefs that only have to do with understanding the world and nothing to do with survival. So possibly I am still missing his point!

What do we use to form our beliefs? Our cognitive faculties. These have been formed by evolution, which doesn't care if they produce true beliefs or false ones, just if they produce beliefs which increase our chances of survival and reproduction.

Again, evolution is not a thing, it doesn't care about anything, only the mind cares, and it not only cares if it survives but it also cares whether or not its beliefs are true. Don't you care if if you survive and also care if your beliefs are true? But again, I would agree that we, our minds, are effectively blind as to the issue of whether our beliefs are true or false, but thats why we call them beliefs. Until we prove something to be true, we may believe it to be true, but we do not know it to be true.

So what is the probability of our cognitive faculties producing only true beliefs? If I understand his argument correctly, Plantinga is saying it's either low, or inscrutable - we don't know what the probability is. But these same faculties are what we use to form our belief that Naturalism is true. So we have reason to doubt if our belief in Naturalism is true, because we're using faculties that might not produce true beliefs to form that belief.

Naturalism is not a belief, it is self evident, the natural world is all around you, the "belief" is that there is more to it than that, i.e. that there is also a supernatural element to the world which is not evident. Could that be true? I suppose it could, but it remains a belief until you prove it to be true.

If evolution is 'guided' by God, however, then we're not quite in the same boat, because God could have guided evolution to produce (fairly) reliable cognitive faculties that (usually) do form true beliefs.

I see nothing in this argument that necessitates our minds to be in need of another mind to guide it to true beliefs. We have fairly reliable cognitive faculties because our minds are in tune, so to speak, with the world of which they are a part.

So, in summary:

It's NOT an argument against evolution.

It's NOT an argument that we 'know for sure' Naturalism is false.

It IS an argument to show that we have reason to doubt our ability to know the truth of (Evolution + Naturalism)

So, who would argue against that, of course we have degrees of doubt when it comes to our beliefs, if we had no doubts, if we were certain, then they wouldn't be beliefs.