maybe morality is only partially objective

[phaedrus]

Nope. I'm still confused. All this talk of objective or subjective morality I find vague. Advocates of objective morality, is it right to think morality provides us with a basis to determine whether a particular action is good or bad? Are there objective moral facts which label some actions in all circumstances as always bad?

Could one of you please list an objective moral fact, an action which is always wrong in all circumstances ... but without using emotionally laden language that already presupposes said action's immorality.

For example. Don't tell me it's always wrong to murder. For all of us that will be a tautology because we would define murder as immoral. The action we are talking about is killing another human being. In some circumstances it is deemed moral, in some immoral. Don't tell me it's always wrong to torture. Same deal. The word 'torture' already presupposes immorality. If we say 'Is it always wrong to cause another human pain?' the answer is of course , no. So I'm looking for an example of an objective moral fact.

[psif]

Nope. I'm still confused. All this talk of objective or subjective morality I find vague. Advocates of objective morality, is it right to think morality provides us with a basis to determine whether a particular action is good or bad? Are there objective moral facts which label some actions in all circumstances as always bad?

Could one of you please list an objective moral fact, an action which is always wrong in all circumstances ... but without using emotionally laden language that already presupposes said action's immorality.

For example. Don't tell me it's always wrong to murder. For all of us that will be a tautology because we would define murder as immoral. The action we are talking about is killing another human being. In some circumstances it is deemed moral, in some immoral. Don't tell me it's always wrong to torture. Same deal. The word 'torture' already presupposes immorality. If we say 'Is it always wrong to cause another human pain?' the answer is of course , no. So I'm looking for an example of an objective moral fact.

How about it is always right to love and always wrong to fail to love other persons.

[phaedrus]

How about it is always right to love and always wrong to fail to love other persons.

I know what you're getting at by I'm trying to be empirical here. I'm trying to narrow it down to actions. After all, some actions claimed to be done in the name of love are judged by others to be immoral. Seems a little too subjective to me. My basic point is that I am not convinced that saying morality is objective is meaningful unless we can agree that there are moral facts and we can agree on them.

[seer]

Nope. I'm still confused. All this talk of objective or subjective morality I find vague. Advocates of objective morality, is it right to think morality provides us with a basis to determine whether a particular action is good or bad? Are there objective moral facts which label some actions in all circumstances as always bad?

Sure, it is always right to obey God and it is always wrong to disobey God. For particulars read your New Testament.

[Chrawnus]

Nope. I'm still confused. All this talk of objective or subjective morality I find vague. Advocates of objective morality, is it right to think morality provides us with a basis to determine whether a particular action is good or bad? Are there objective moral facts which label some actions in all circumstances as always bad?

Could one of you please list an objective moral fact, an action which is always wrong in all circumstances ... but without using emotionally laden language that already presupposes said action's immorality.

For example. Don't tell me it's always wrong to murder. For all of us that will be a tautology because we would define murder as immoral. The action we are talking about is killing another human being. In some circumstances it is deemed moral, in some immoral. Don't tell me it's always wrong to torture. Same deal. The word 'torture' already presupposes immorality. If we say 'Is it always wrong to cause another human pain?' the answer is of course , no. So I'm looking for an example of an objective moral fact.

I don't really know if objective morality requires there to be actions that are always good/bad, but rather that there exists certain moral values that are always the same. From a Christian perspective these moral values spring from God's nature and his purpose for the universe. These moral values gives a basis for when an action is good, or bad. Whenever an action goes against what God intended for the universe it is a bad/evil action and whenever an action works towards it it is a good action.

So no, I don't think there are that many actions that are always good, or evil. Instead I think that the circumstances decides. Worshipping God for example wouldn't be wrong, since we're supposed to do it, while worshipping false gods would be wrong, since that would go against the purpose of why God created us. There might be actions that are always good or bad regardless of circumstances, but I can't think of any right now.

[seer]

The question of the objectivity morality is whether there is (always? nearly always?, etc) an objective fact of the matter as to whether some behavior is immoral, or some person is good, etc.

That's a matter of language - meaning of moral terms depends on usage, and usage is the result (if there is an evolved moral sense) of that evolved moral sense, just as use of color words depends on usage, but usage is the result of our evolved color vision.

As long as moral statements describe moral facts (if not, there is no objective morality), then an evolved moral sense can result in objective moral statements just as an evolved color sense can result in objective color statements - e.g., there is a fact of the matter as to whether some object is blue.

Whether or not there is such species-wide mechanism, and it results in same usage of moral terms across cultures is an empirical matter, but the usual claim that evolution without theism results in no objective morality, and thus if objective morality exists, so does God, is not supported by good arguments or evidence.

But there are no moral facts in a godless universe that are not subject. Yes we may use subjective language to describe the color blue, but the color, or the object that contains the color, is objective. It exists independently of our subjective way of describing it. Not so with ethics.

[Seasanctuary]

At this point I'm pretty close to an Expressivist. People are typically expressing an allegiance to some standard and simultaneously judging whether a given action complies with it when they make moral claims. Furthermore, it's conceptually impossible to pick out a 'correct' standard without begging the question.

As far as I can tell, this view can explain moral language and practice quite well, though it might have the vice of being unfalsifiable. It certainly has the vice of not being what most people want to hear.

[seer]

At this point I'm pretty close to an Expressivist. People are typically expressing an allegiance to some standard and simultaneously judging whether a given action complies with it when they make moral claims. Furthermore, it's conceptually impossible to pick out a 'correct' standard without begging the question.

Expressivism in meta-ethics is a theory about the meaning of moral language. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms–for example, “It is wrong to torture an innocent human being”–are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as “wrong,” “good,” or “just” do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation.[1] Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions.[2] Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

Sea, what good to you or me or humanity is such a theory?

[Seasanctuary]

Sea, what good to you or me or humanity is such a theory?

If it is the descriptively correct account of what's going on when we make moral claims, then it's good in the same way any true theory is.

[Hamster]

Nope. I'm still confused. All this talk of objective or subjective morality I find vague. Advocates of objective morality, is it right to think morality provides us with a basis to determine whether a particular action is good or bad? Are there objective moral facts which label some actions in all circumstances as always bad?

Could one of you please list an objective moral fact, an action which is always wrong in all circumstances ... but without using emotionally laden language that already presupposes said action's immorality.

For example. Don't tell me it's always wrong to murder. For all of us that will be a tautology because we would define murder as immoral. The action we are talking about is killing another human being. In some circumstances it is deemed moral, in some immoral. Don't tell me it's always wrong to torture. Same deal. The word 'torture' already presupposes immorality. If we say 'Is it always wrong to cause another human pain?' the answer is of course , no. So I'm looking for an example of an objective moral fact.

Actions need a motive in order for them to have a moral dimension. If we did something unconsciously (with no motive) then it would be accidental and it wouldn't be either good or bad. You can even have good motives but do something bad, express one virtue at the expense of another

[seer]

If it is the descriptively correct account of what's going on when we make moral claims, then it's good in the same way any true theory is.

It seems to me that it reduces moral questions to utter meaninglessness.

expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences...

And how would one decide if expressivism is true by any objective standard? Isn't it merely a subjective opinion about moral thought?

[Seasanctuary]

I did say 'close' to Expressivism and explained what I meant, so not everything in that article is going to reflect my position.

Moral sentences typically do have truth value, but only in relation to the endorsed standard (or set of standards). You probably want to be complaining about morality having too many meanings under this theory, not no meaning.

At any rate, this theory would be true if it is what people are actually doing when they make moral claims. It might be hard to falsify since people are allowed to deny they're doing this, yet be doing it anyway.

[phaedrus]

Actions need a motive in order for them to have a moral dimension. If we did something unconsciously (with no motive) then it would be accidental and it wouldn't be either good or bad. You can even have good motives but do something bad, express one virtue at the expense of another

I don't know about you, but I confess the motivations for any of my actions are almost always mixed, conscious and unconscious. From this soup of motivations of varying strengths comes my actions in particular circumstances. Is Seer correct? Does objective morality boil down to doing whatever God says (leaving aside the obvious difficulty of determining that God has indeed said anything)? It seems to me this is entirely different from what most people mean when they say morality is objective. I'm not trying to be difficult, I just want to pin down what 'objective' morality means, and what it looks like.

[seer]

I did say 'close' to Expressivism and explained what I meant, so not everything in that article is going to reflect my position.

Moral sentences typically do have truth value, but only in relation to the endorsed standard (or set of standards). You probably want to be complaining about morality having too many meanings under this theory, not no meaning.

At any rate, this theory would be true if it is what people are actually doing when they make moral claims. It might be hard to falsify since people are allowed to deny they're doing this, yet be doing it anyway.

Sea, how is any of this, in the end, any different than good old fashion moral relativism?

[seer]

I'm not trying to be difficult, I just want to pin down what 'objective' morality means, and what it looks like.

Objective moral law would be a moral standard that existed independently of mankind. Not dependent on our subjective mores or whims.