An Analysis of Free Will

[nightbringer]

I'm not at all familiar with the literature on free will. But the topic has been on my mind for a little while and I've got an idea of the sort of account of it that I find attractive, at least in this provisionary stage in my thinking about the topic. Thought I'd spell it out and get some critical feedback.

First of all, I'd better state two presumptions that I'm going in with on this topic. I'm open to discussing these assumptions in the thread, but they aren't the focus and I'm not going to argue for them in this space. Here they are:

1) Compatibilism is false. That is, I believe that if an agent's actions are causally determined by events outside of her agency, then she does not have free will in any sense that would allow for moral culpability.

2) Human agents do in fact have free will.

With these two presumptions in mind, here's the problem for understanding free will as I understand it...

Sally has just chosen to eat strawberry icecream over chocolate icecream. Her choosing strawberry icecream is an event that is either caused or uncaused. If it was uncaused then Sally didn't cause it. If Sally didn't cause it, then the decision was not within Sally's agency and thus it was not a free decision.

If the event of her choosing to eat strawberry icecream over chocolate was caused then the causal chain that produced this event is either finite, infinite, or circular. But it surely wasn't infinite because then either Sally's mind would have to have dealt with an infinite number of things, which seems impossible, or the causal chain extends infinitely outside of her agency (meaning it wouldn't have been her free decision). It also can't be circular as Sally's decision to choose the strawberry flavour would've been part of the causal chain that caused that very decision! That's highly counter-intuitive.

So the causal chain must be finite. But if it's finite that means at some stage it begun. But now we're back where we started at the prospect of an uncaused cause. The first event in the causal chain must be uncaused, right?

Well, I don't think so. I think it is false that the first event in a causal sequence necessarily must be itself uncaused. That is because I think events can be caused not just by other events, but by things with certain natures. I think that agents are essentially causers. Agents don't just cause contingently, but out of the necessity of their being. Unlike a rock, which is only involved in causation when it is put into motion amongst over things in an event, an agent causes just by being. If an agent ceased to cause the agent would cease to be.

But an agent doesn't just cause any old how or any old thing. An agent only causes that which is in its nature to cause. I'm not too interested in exploring all that this nature might be, but we can imagine that it includes such things as rational thought-causing.

Note then that I don't consider the ability to "have done otherwise" to be a necessary feature of free will. I think that is simply mistakenly thought to be the only alternative to compatibilism. (I am happy to comment further on this upon request.)

As such I think this view accords with the intuitions that seem to drive both compatibilism and LFW. Causal determinism is avoided, but the orderly nature of the mind remains intact.

There's plenty more to say and a plethora of potential objections to field but rather than write any more I'd rather have at it in discussion. Thoughts?

[Vivian]

Hi nightbringer!

I have a bit of a different perspective on free will, meaning while it seems obvious to me, it might not be what is generally thought among the Christians at Tweb.

I believe that God designed us with free will, however I believe that we do not have nor exercise free will presently. Because we are on in bondage, just as the Bible says.

This bondage is slavery and when we are in bondage we are not exercising our free will. Thus why all the imagery of setting the captives free - which is Jesus' proclaimed purpose for being here.

Our bondage is evidenced by our drive and compelling to do what we ought to do or should do - even thinking that this is what we will to do, instead of what we truly desire or will. [Gosh, we want to do what is right, but we don't have faith enough to believe that God has written what is right and good on our heart, that our true desire is right and good, so we search with our mind for worldly evidence of what is right and good.]

We can see our bondage when we analyze and try to figure out what we should do, based on this evidence and that evidence, or when our heart is so encumbered with pain, what we want is distorted, and will bring pain and harm to ourselves and others.

God has designed us in his image, so that our true will is his will, but we cannot often even see what that will is due all our fears and should dos, and so instead we focus on what the world or others are telling us to do, or what we think they are telling us what to do. Or in the most wounded scenarios, what we think we want is what brings harm to others.

Take your ice cream scenario. If the girl ordering ice cream is functioning out of bondage, her choice of flavor will most likely come from a place of fear - this is the flavor I am suppose to pick, or last time I picked what I really wanted, my friends made fun of me, or if I get that chocolate, I might spill it on my shirt and my mom will get mad, etc etc. So a myriad of thoughts pass through her mind, and she searches them to see what she wants instead of just looking at the ice cream with an unwounded heart and purely picking from pure desire, or a pure heart. (Our pure desire is always what is best for all.)

A pure desire may one say ooh I want the double chocolate fudge, and another time say, ooh I want the mint choc chip (because she knows that is her sisters favorite and she is going to take it home to her).

This is why we come to Lord Jesus, to be healed, to be set free, so that God's true will can manifest through us. This is why the Bible talks about crucifying our desires and circumcizing our heart, these are healing and purification terms, so that God's will can manifest through us - which is really what all of us want in our heart of hearts, which is really our true will. We just may not know it yet!

I believe that this is why we know free will is true, yet we cannot reconcile it with our life experiencing - we just cannot see free will being exercised for few among us are able to exercise their true will. And yes, what I am saying is that all would come fully to Christ, if they were not wounded and in bondage. Our woundedness keeps us stuck with our selves, or creating a lesser image of Christ, one that cannot heal the captives and set them free, right here and now, as Jesus promised. And so we may think we have come to Christ, but remain in bondage, because we have not fully done so.

Jesus did not come into this world to condemn it, but to heal it and set it free!

Shalom!

Viv

[nightbringer]

Hey Vivian.

I don't think we're talking about free will from the same angle. I'm not trying to tackle any particular theological problem here. I think the problem I identify in understanding free will (and my proposed solution) apply no matter when you think humans have possessed free will.

[Seasanctuary]

I think that agents are essentially causers. Agents don't just cause contingently, but out of the necessity of their being. [...]
But an agent doesn't just cause any old how or any old thing. An agent only causes that which is in its nature to cause.

Are agents responsible for their nature?

[nightbringer]

Are agents responsible for their nature?

Agents are not responsible for their nature qua agent, no. The same would be true on any account of free will. Whatever is essential to a agent's nature could not have been brought about by that very agent. What is supposed to be the problem here? (I know the intuitive problem you're getting at, but if you laid it out I think I'd be more able to make a response ... or concede that my idea is terrible!)

[Seasanctuary]

Something like this, I suppose:

1. Either agents necessarily make choices according to their nature, or don't necessarily make choices according to their nature.
2. It's conceptually impossible for an agent to make choices against its nature.
3. From (1) and (2), agents necessarily make choices according to their nature.
4. A choice made necessary by X is a choice determined by X.
5. From (3) and (4), the choices of agents are determined by their nature.

6. Either agents can make choices which modify their nature, or agents cannot make choices which modify their nature.
7. If agents can make choices which modify their nature, then — by (5) — such choices are determined by (an earlier state of) their nature.
8. Human agents have natures with an initial state, as opposed to an infinite regress.
9. From (7) and (8), if agents can make choices which modify their nature, then — for humans — such choices are eventually determined by an initial state of the agent's nature.
10. If agents cannot make choices which modify their nature, then — by (8) — the choices of human agents are directly determined by an initial state of the agent's nature.
11. From (9) (10) and (6), the choices of human agents are either directly determined or eventually determined by an initial state of the agent's nature.
12. Direct and eventual determination both count as simple determination.
13. From (11) and (12), the choices of human agents are determined by an initial state of the agent's nature.

14. Human agents are not responsible for the initial state of their nature.
15. If an agent's choices are determined by something the agent is not responsible for, the agent is not responsible for their choices.
16. From (13) and (14), the choices of human agents are determined by something human agents are not responsible for.
17. From (15) and (16), human agents are not responsible for their choices.

[nightbringer]

Hah now that's what I'm talkin' 'bout.

I think I deny (15). But it might be quite hard to explain why I do. I'll have a stab at it. It comes down to how I think culpability is related to distinctions between causal events and causal things.

To start with the obvious, an agent is responsible for whatever chain of events has its causal origin with the agent. If an agent A causes event E1 and E1 is a sufficient cause of event E2, A is responsible for E2, not only E1. Okay. But under the view I'm playing with here where agents are essentially causers with particular natures, E1 was caused by A just by virtue of what A is. Are E1 and E2 thus ultimately the responsibility not of A, but of whomever/whatever made A? I don't think so.

Let us say that A came to be via the processes of naturalistic evolution. Some long chain of events came to produce A including such events as mutations in particular genes, and the survival of particular creatures. We could lay out this causal chain of events sequentially counting back from its beginning (it's easier to assume it wasn't infinite) as E-20, E-19, E-18... E0 (this last event designating the event of A's coming to be). Let's add E1 and E2 to our causal sequence so we have this:

E-20, E-10, E-18... E0, A, E1, E2

Doesn't this causal sequence show that A isn't ultimately responsible for E1+2? Well, note that this isn't actually a chain consisting solely of events. There is a thing in this sequence, namely, A. Why is this important? Well clearly the mere event of A's coming to be (E0) didn't cause E1. A had to come to be in order for E1 to happen, but A's merely coming to be didn't cause E1. E1 was caused by A (a thing), not by A's coming to be (an event). The two are separate, and I think, importantly so. E0 is the end of a causal chain of events. E1 and E2 are a wholly new chain.

So I think it is possible for A to be caused by something other than A (in this example, E0), yet for A to be responsible for the events A causes. You might say at this point that even though A is causally responsible for E1+2, A could never be morally culpable for them. But I guess I'd ask, why not? I think one would have to object on the grounds of A "not being able to do otherwise." But this is a different objection to the one you've raised and one I think can be tackled.

But before even thinking about going there, I'll let you get back to me. To be honest I don't expect the above has been very persuasive. I'm torn between thinking it's either very clever, or sophistry.

[Seasanctuary]

Or let's drop the first causal chain altogether. Agents start with different natures without any preceding story. It seems you might still have trouble assigning a robust kind of moral praise and blame for making choices the way they necessarily will, given their natures and understanding of the situation.

In such a situation, I still think many of our practices of blame and praise make sense. If I buy a new car and it turns out to be a lemon, I'm going to take a negative attitude toward that car and stop trusting it. But I'm not going to assign it the robust kind of responsibility and blame we often think moral badness calls for. More like the 'this person is not operating in a society-friendly way' view that modern psychologists are known for taking. Or in theological terms, more like how (I understand that) Calvinists view the 'depraved.'

[nightbringer]

It seems you might still have trouble assigning a robust kind of moral praise and blame for making choices the way they necessarily will, given their natures and understanding of the situation.

Now might be the time to bring up why I don't think an agent lacks culpability-enabling free will even if their choices are necessary. The following is a rough recollection of an illustration used in a book on divine foreknowledge:

Imagine that Sally really wants to kill Fred. She's voiced her loathing toward him and she's told you about the plan she has to kill him tomorrow. You don't much like Fred either so you want her to go through with it. However, you doubt her resolve and wonder whether she has the bottle to do it. To ensure that she does, while she is sleeping you implant a particularly advanced computer chip in her brain. This chip will monitor her thinking and if Sally were to change her mind, the chip would activate and cause her to choose to kill Fred anyway. The next day comes and Sally kills Fred without any hesitation. The chip never activates. Is Sally morally culpable for her actions? Surely, yes. Even though she couldn't have chosen otherwise.

Why do we not assign moral blame for a poorly performing car? I'd say because we know its poor performance is just an event in a causal sequence the car didn't initiate. The car is not causally responsible. The same is not true with agents. Agents initiate causal sequences and are culpable for them even though the causal sequences they generate couldn't have been otherwise.

[seer]

Agents initiate causal sequences and are culpable for them even though the causal sequences they generate couldn't have been otherwise.

I don't see how that is possible. It seems to me that culpability is directly linked to the ability to refrain or to do otherwise.

[nightbringer]

I don't see how that is possible. It seems to me that culpability is directly linked to the ability to refrain or to do otherwise.

Well what do you make of the illustration I posted above?

"Imagine that Sally really wants to kill Fred. She's voiced her loathing toward him and she's told you about the plan she has to kill him tomorrow. You don't much like Fred either so you want her to go through with it. However, you doubt her resolve and wonder whether she has the bottle to do it. To ensure that she does, while she is sleeping you implant a particularly advanced computer chip in her brain. This chip will monitor her thinking and if Sally were to change her mind, the chip would activate and cause her to choose to kill Fred anyway. The next day comes and Sally kills Fred without any hesitation. The chip never activates. Is Sally morally culpable for her actions? Surely, yes. Even though she couldn't have chosen otherwise."

Bear in mind the folk I got this illustration from defend plain ol' libertarian free will!

[magellan004]

Well what do you make of the illustration I posted above?

"Imagine that Sally really wants to kill Fred. ...
This chip will monitor her thinking and (1) if Sally were to change her mind, the chip would activate
Even though she (2) couldn't have chosen otherwise."

'If Sally were to change her mind' = choice.

Free will is about only one thing - the choice to do good.
If a person doesn't think they can do good/bad then they have no choice.
If a person thinks they can do good/bad then they have free will.

Eve thought that by eating the apple she could do wrong.
Cain thought he could do wrong to Able.


Magellan

[JimL]

'If Sally were to change her mind' = choice.

Free will is about only one thing - the choice to do good.
If a person doesn't think they can do good/bad then they have no choice.
If a person thinks they can do good/bad then they have free will.

Eve thought that by eating the apple she could do wrong.
Cain thought he could do wrong to Able.


Magellan

So, according to you Magellan, so long as we think that we have free will, then we do?

[seer]

Well what do you make of the illustration I posted above?

"Imagine that Sally really wants to kill Fred. She's voiced her loathing toward him and she's told you about the plan she has to kill him tomorrow. You don't much like Fred either so you want her to go through with it. However, you doubt her resolve and wonder whether she has the bottle to do it. To ensure that she does, while she is sleeping you implant a particularly advanced computer chip in her brain. This chip will monitor her thinking and if Sally were to change her mind, the chip would activate and cause her to choose to kill Fred anyway. The next day comes and Sally kills Fred without any hesitation. The chip never activates. Is Sally morally culpable for her actions? Surely, yes. Even though she couldn't have chosen otherwise."

Bear in mind the folk I got this illustration from defend plain ol' libertarian free will!

Well no night, she had the choice to go through with it or not. The chip really did not prevent her from changing her mind. She could have changed her mind - which would have activated the chip - at that point she would not have been responsible. But since she did not choose to change her mind she is culpable.

[themuzicman]

I'm not at all familiar with the literature on free will. But the topic has been on my mind for a little while and I've got an idea of the sort of account of it that I find attractive, at least in this provisionary stage in my thinking about the topic. Thought I'd spell it out and get some critical feedback.

First of all, I'd better state two presumptions that I'm going in with on this topic. I'm open to discussing these assumptions in the thread, but they aren't the focus and I'm not going to argue for them in this space. Here they are:

1) Compatibilism is false. That is, I believe that if an agent's actions are causally determined by events outside of her agency, then she does not have free will in any sense that would allow for moral culpability.

2) Human agents do in fact have free will.

With these two presumptions in mind, here's the problem for understanding free will as I understand it...

Sally has just chosen to eat strawberry icecream over chocolate icecream. Her choosing strawberry icecream is an event that is either caused or uncaused. If it was uncaused then Sally didn't cause it. If Sally didn't cause it, then the decision was not within Sally's agency and thus it was not a free decision.

If the event of her choosing to eat strawberry icecream over chocolate was caused then the causal chain that produced this event is either finite, infinite, or circular. But it surely wasn't infinite because then either Sally's mind would have to have dealt with an infinite number of things, which seems impossible, or the causal chain extends infinitely outside of her agency (meaning it wouldn't have been her free decision). It also can't be circular as Sally's decision to choose the strawberry flavour would've been part of the causal chain that caused that very decision! That's highly counter-intuitive.

So the causal chain must be finite. But if it's finite that means at some stage it begun. But now we're back where we started at the prospect of an uncaused cause. The first event in the causal chain must be uncaused, right?

Well, I don't think so. I think it is false that the first event in a causal sequence necessarily must be itself uncaused. That is because I think events can be caused not just by other events, but by things with certain natures. I think that agents are essentially causers. Agents don't just cause contingently, but out of the necessity of their being. Unlike a rock, which is only involved in causation when it is put into motion amongst over things in an event, an agent causes just by being. If an agent ceased to cause the agent would cease to be.

But an agent doesn't just cause any old how or any old thing. An agent only causes that which is in its nature to cause. I'm not too interested in exploring all that this nature might be, but we can imagine that it includes such things as rational thought-causing.

Note then that I don't consider the ability to "have done otherwise" to be a necessary feature of free will. I think that is simply mistakenly thought to be the only alternative to compatibilism. (I am happy to comment further on this upon request.)

As such I think this view accords with the intuitions that seem to drive both compatibilism and LFW. Causal determinism is avoided, but the orderly nature of the mind remains intact.

There's plenty more to say and a plethora of potential objections to field but rather than write any more I'd rather have at it in discussion. Thoughts?

You've just reduced a person to being a robot animated by the programming of their nature, and lost free will altogether.