An Analysis of Free Will

[nightbringer]

Not throwing anything - but you really think that is just? We humans would not consider it just - is God's sense of justice so different than ours?

I need to spend some time thinking about how I can explain what I intuitively see in this view which doesn't entail the sort of injustice which I think you're seeing, and which - I think you're right - doesn't accord with God's character.

I'm enjoying this thread though, it's definitely helped me refine my thinking.

[nightbringer]

Why don't I go on the offensive for a moment? To those defending radically libetarian free will - how do you tackle the argument I presented in the OP? Here it is in more systematic form:

1. Sally chooses X.
2. (1) is an event.
3. All events are either caused or uncaused.
4. If (1) is uncaused Sally didn't cause (1).
5. If Sally didn't cause (1), Sally is not responsible for (1).
6. From (4) and (5), if (1) is uncaused Sally is not responsible for (1).

7. If (1) is caused, then (1) is part of a causal chain.
8. All causal chains are either infinite, finite, or circular.
9. From (7) and (8), if (1) is caused, (1) is preceded by an infinite, finite, or circular causal chain.

10. If (1)'s preceding causal chain was infinite, then it either occurred entirely within Sally's agency or extends outside it.
11. It is impossible for there to be an infinite causal chain within Sally's agency.
12. If (1)'s causal chain extends infinitely outside Sally's agency then (1) was causally determined by factors outside Sally's agency.
13. If (1) was causally determined by factors outside Sally's agency, Sally is not responsible for (1).
14. From (10),(11), (12) and (13), if (1)'s causal chain is infinite, Sally is not responsible for (1).

15. If (1)'s causal chain was circular then (1) was part of the cause of (1).
16. It is impossible for a contingent event to be the cause of it self.
17. From (15) and (16), (1)'s preceding causal chain cannot be circular.

18. If (1)'s preceding causal chain is finite it had a first cause.
19. The first cause in (1)'s preceding causal chain cannot be itself caused.
20. If the first cause in (1)'s preceding causal chain is not caused then Sally did not cause it.
21. If Sally did not cause the first cause in (1)'s preceding causal chain then Sally did not ultimately cause (1) either.
22. If Sally did not ultimately cause (1) then Sally is not responsible for (1).
23. From (18), (19), (20), (21) and (22), if (1)'s preceding causal chain if finite, Sally is not responsible for (1).

23. From (3), (6), (9), (14), (17) and (23), it is impossible for Sally to be responsible for (1).

I deny (19).

On reflection I think that actually it is (20) that I deny, not (19). Same reason as themuzicman, because Sally is the first cause. Though as I'm arguing I think that only works if Sally necessarily causes X. As such the above argument alone is not any cause for concern for the LFW-er.

[seer]

I need to spend some time thinking about how I can explain what I intuitively see in this view which doesn't entail the sort of injustice which I think you're seeing, and which - I think you're right - doesn't accord with God's character.

I'm enjoying this thread though, it's definitely helped me refine my thinking.

Ok... Are you a Calvinist BTW...

[nightbringer]

Ok... Are you a Calvinist BTW...

Nope. Always been passionately adverse to Calvinism. If I become convinced that this view of free will presents the same theological problems as compatiblism, I shall drop it.

I'm down as a Molinist on my profile.

[seer]

Nope. Always been passionately adverse to Calvinism. If I become convinced that this view of free will presents the same theological problems as compatiblism, I shall drop it.

I'm down as a Molinist on my profile.

Ok, I lean towards Molinism myself. Don't Molinists like Bill Craig believe we have the ability to do otherwise?

[shunyadragon]

yes, a logical argument can be valid and false.

[shunyadragon]

Ok...





Not throwing anything - but you really think that is just? We humans would not consider it just - is God's sense of justice so different than ours?

Yes. Human sense of Justice is egocentric.

[nightbringer]

Ok, I lean towards Molinism myself. Don't Molinists like Bill Craig believe we have the ability to do otherwise?

Well from what I remember from Craig's views as put forward in Four Views on Divine Foreknowledge if he does believe that principle he doesn't believe "logical prevention" is the kind of inability that the principle is getting at. I hope I haven't misunderstood him though. I'd re-read his arguments but I don't have the book to hand any more. Guess he probably has a lot of similar material on his website though.

[nightbringer]

yes, a logical argument can be valid and false.

Of course, an argument can be valid while containing false premises. What I was shocked at was your claim that human beings can do logically impossible things. Seeing as I don't even grant that "ability" to God.

[nightbringer]

Here is a reworking of both the argument in the OP and the contingency argument into one.

1. X is any instance of an agent (A) being animated that is morally relevant.*
2. X is either caused or uncaused.
3. If X is uncaused then A didn’t cause X.
4. If A didn’t cause X then A is not responsible for X.
5. If A is not responsible for X then A is not morally accountable for X.
6. From (3), (4) and (5), if X is uncaused then A is not morally accountable for X.

7. If X is caused then X is preceded by a causal chain.**
8. All causal chains are either infinite, finite, or circular.
9. From (7) and (8), if X is caused then X is preceded by either an infinite, finite, or circular causal chain.

10. If X was preceded by an infinite causal chain then the causal chain either occurred entirely within A’s agency, or extends outside of it.
11. It is impossible for there to be an infinite causal chain within A’s agency.
12. From (10) and (11), if X was preceded by an infinite causal chain then it extends outside A’s agency.
13. If X was ultimately caused by things outside of A’s agency then A is not ultimately responsible for X.
14. If A is not ultimately responsible for X then A is not morally accountable for X.
15. From (12), (13) and (14), if X was preceded by an infinite causal chain, then A is not morally accountable for X.

16. If X was preceded by a circular causal chain then X is ultimately the cause of itself.
17. It is impossible for X to be the cause of itself.
18. From (16) and (17), it is impossible for X to be preceded by a circular causal chain.

19. If X is preceded by a finite causal chain then the causal chain had a beginning.
20. All causal chains that have a beginning have a first cause.
21. From (19) and (20), if X’s preceding causal chain is finite it has a first cause.
22. If X’s preceding causal chain has a first cause, that cause is either A or not A.
23. If the first cause in X’s preceding causal chain is not A then A is not ultimately responsible for X.
24. From (14) and (23), if A is not the first cause of X then A is not morally accountable for X.
25. From (2), (6), (9), (15), (18), (21) and (24), if A is not the first cause in a causal chain preceding X, then A cannot be morally accountable for X.

26. Necessarily, the first cause in a causal chain cannot itself have a cause.
27. All contingent causes are themselves caused.
28. From (26) and (27), if A contingently causes X then A is not the first cause in the causal chain preceding X.
29. From (25) and (28), if A is not necessarily the first cause in a causal chain preceding X then A cannot be morally accountable for X.

*The language of being “animated” in “morally relevant” ways is used to refer to an agent’s action without using language that already presupposes that the agent is the responsible party. Look at the difference in language, say, between “an agent moving his hand” and “an agent’s hand moving”. The first implies that the agent is responsible, the latter leaves that open. In the same way being animated in morally relevant ways refers to an occurrence that is morally significant (say murder, or rape), without suggesting an a priori commitment to what the responsible party is, i.e. it could be an alien tapping into the agent’s brain, or indeed the agent herself.

**To some people “causal chain” might suggest that there is definitely more than one preceding cause. I don’t take that phrase to have any quantitative input in this argument (there could just be one preceding cause – it would still quality as a causal chain here).

[themuzicman]

I'm not sure you understand what I'm getting at. I'm essentially making some sort of contingency argument with similar reasoning as with those made for God's existence. I think that there is a cause for anything that is contingent. I think when you claim that a "causal explanation" is not the cause, you are begging the question against my argument.

This is what I'm getting at: if Sally contingently chooses X then something (in the broadest possible sense) caused her to choose X. If that cause was itself contingent then something caused that cause. If that was cause was itself contingent then something caused that cause. If that cause... etc. Either this goes on infinitely or it stops at a cause that necessarily happens. Otherwise you are committed to the claim that contingent things just happen. This doesn't sound any less absurd to me than the claim that the universe just happened to come into being without cause.

I don't think it is absurd at all to say that a being with a moral free will caused a decision to come into being, with its onoly cause being the will itself. The will may have an explanation for why it chose, but that explanation isn't a cause. So, we might call the fee will an uncaused, but intentional causer. If we're operating in a strictly physical world that operates 100% by the laws of nature, then you'd have a point, but we don't, and one element of the nature of the will is to resolve a contingency without itself being caused.

And I don't see a proof that says that all contingencies must be the result of a necessity or previous contingency.

[themuzicman]

Here is a reworking of both the argument in the OP and the contingency argument into one.

1. X is any instance of an agent (A) being animated that is morally relevant.*
2. X is either caused or uncaused.
3. If X is uncaused then A didn’t cause X.
4. If A didn’t cause X then A is not responsible for X.
5. If A is not responsible for X then A is not morally accountable for X.
6. From (3), (4) and (5), if X is uncaused then A is not morally accountable for X.

7. If X is caused then X is preceded by a causal chain.**
8. All causal chains are either infinite, finite, or circular.
9. From (7) and (8), if X is caused then X is preceded by either an infinite, finite, or circular causal chain.

10. If X was preceded by an infinite causal chain then the causal chain either occurred entirely within A’s agency, or extends outside of it.
11. It is impossible for there to be an infinite causal chain within A’s agency.
12. From (10) and (11), if X was preceded by an infinite causal chain then it extends outside A’s agency.
13. If X was ultimately caused by things outside of A’s agency then A is not ultimately responsible for X.
14. If A is not ultimately responsible for X then A is not morally accountable for X.
15. From (12), (13) and (14), if X was preceded by an infinite causal chain, then A is not morally accountable for X.

16. If X was preceded by a circular causal chain then X is ultimately the cause of itself.
17. It is impossible for X to be the cause of itself.
18. From (16) and (17), it is impossible for X to be preceded by a circular causal chain.

19. If X is preceded by a finite causal chain then the causal chain had a beginning.
20. All causal chains that have a beginning have a first cause.
21. From (19) and (20), if X’s preceding causal chain is finite it has a first cause.
22. If X’s preceding causal chain has a first cause, that cause is either A or not A.
23. If the first cause in X’s preceding causal chain is not A then A is not ultimately responsible for X.
24. From (14) and (23), if A is not the first cause of X then A is not morally accountable for X.
25. From (2), (6), (9), (15), (18), (21) and (24), if A is not the first cause in a causal chain preceding X, then A cannot be morally accountable for X.

26. Necessarily, the first cause in a causal chain cannot itself have a cause.
27. All contingent causes are themselves caused.
28. From (26) and (27), if A contingently causes X then A is not the first cause in the causal chain preceding X.
29. From (25) and (28), if A is not necessarily the first cause in a causal chain preceding X then A cannot be morally accountable for X.

*The language of being “animated” in “morally relevant” ways is used to refer to an agent’s action without using language that already presupposes that the agent is the responsible party. Look at the difference in language, say, between “an agent moving his hand” and “an agent’s hand moving”. The first implies that the agent is responsible, the latter leaves that open. In the same way being animated in morally relevant ways refers to an occurrence that is morally significant (say murder, or rape), without suggesting an a priori commitment to what the responsible party is, i.e. it could be an alien tapping into the agent’s brain, or indeed the agent herself.

**To some people “causal chain” might suggest that there is definitely more than one preceding cause. I don’t take that phrase to have any quantitative input in this argument (there could just be one preceding cause – it would still quality as a causal chain here).

I don't understand the purpose of "necessarily" in 26 or 29. Other than that, it's fine.

[nightbringer]

I don't think it is absurd at all to say that a being with a moral free will caused a decision to come into being, with its onoly cause being the will itself. The will may have an explanation for why it chose, but that explanation isn't a cause. So, we might call the fee will an uncaused, but intentional causer. If we're operating in a strictly physical world that operates 100% by the laws of nature, then you'd have a point, but we don't, and one element of the nature of the will is to resolve a contingency without itself being caused.

And I don't see a proof that says that all contingencies must be the result of a necessity or previous contingency.

I don't think natural laws have anything to do with it. I think what you're suggesting is metaphysically impossible, not physically impossible.

It seems clear to me that things that don't have to happen don't just happen. Sure an agent may have a reason for causing X, but either that agent's nature means the reason necessary will persuade A, or it only might persuade A. If it only might persuade A, then there is a reason why this reason persuades A. And then it's the same for that reason, it is either necessarily persuades A or there is a further reason why it does. It goes on forever until A is necessarily persuaded to do X.

You can say that contingent things "just happen" if you want but I'll need to see why this is any less absurd than the claims of some atheists that the universe "just did" come into being, without cause. I don't see any difference here.

[nightbringer]

I don't understand the purpose of "necessarily" in 26 or 29. Other than that, it's fine.

I think you're right that those could be clearer.

[themuzicman]

I don't think natural laws have anything to do with it. I think what you're suggesting is metaphysically impossible, not physically impossible.

It seems clear to me that things that don't have to happen don't just happen. Sure an agent may have a reason for causing X, but either that agent's nature means the reason necessary will persuade A, or it only might persuade A. If it only might persuade A, then there is a reason why this reason persuades A. And then it's the same for that reason, it is either necessarily persuades A or there is a further reason why it does. It goes on forever until A is necessarily persuaded to do X.

Does this apply to God?

You can say that contingent things "just happen" if you want but I'll need to see why this is any less absurd than the claims of some atheists that the universe "just did" come into being, without cause. I don't see any difference here.

I think we need to consider that the nature of the human will is that it is intentional and uncaused... in at least that sense made in the image of God.