Plantinga's Dangerous Idea

[mattbballman]

Oh yea, and Shunyadragon, you’re not invited, so please leave me alone. You’re gobbledygook is not welcome. Thank you.

I want to talk about the main objection to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). From the way I see it, the objection boils down to this. Aren’t true beliefs more adaptive than false ones? Thus, if evolution is true, natural selection would select the genetic mutations that produce true belief rather than false belief. Again, this is - as I see it - the main objection against EAAN.

Since everyone has discussed EAAN a trillion times, I won’t rehash all its complexities unless necessary. I’ll give the sparknotes in a couple sentences. EAAN basically says P (R/E&N) is low or inscrutable. Or in plain English, the probability of the reliability of our cognitive faculties (to produce true beliefs) given Evolution and Naturalism is low or inscrutable. Thus, Naturalists aren’t rational in believing their cognitive faculties are reliable. Therefore, given Evolution, Naturalists can’t rationally hold to any belief, including their belief in Naturalism.

Again, the only objection I keep seeing come up over and over again is what I said above: wouldn’t evolution have natural selection favor those genetic mutations that lead to reliable cognitive faculties that produced mostly true beliefs? Because we’ve survived for so long, isn’t it more probable that evolution selected cognitive faculties that produced true, rather than false, beliefs?

The short answer is no. Consider, says Plantinga, the prolonged survival of just any species, leaving aside humans for a sec. Isn’t it possible to have reliable cognitive faculties without having any beliefs at all, let alone true beliefs? In these creatures, their cognitive faculties are indeed reliable, but they have no beliefs, let alone true beliefs. In this case, these creatures survive, not because their cognitive faculties produce mostly true beliefs, but because their cognitive faculties properly relate them to the relevant parts of the environment needed for survival. Plantinga calls these indicators. The frog, for example, probably doesn’t have any belief about the fly it catches: it has indicators. The insect doesn’t have any belief about the blood it’s about to suck: it has these indicators.

Now, consider humans who have cognitive faculties that do produce beliefs. Does OUR survival, given evolution, probably mean that our cognitive faculties reliably produce true beliefs? I mean, wouldn’t false beliefs lead to maladaptive behavior? That is the question. The answer is both ‘not necessarily’ and ‘it is ultimately inscrutable’. Not necessarily, because we COULD have cognitive faculties that have the right INDICATORS, and yet false beliefs. Just as the frog and the insect have the right indicators that lead to adaptive behavior, so could humans, even if their cognitive faculties produced false beliefs, or even if they have no beliefs. In other words, there’s no necessary connection between ‘indicators’ enabling your survival and cognitive faculties producing true beliefs: the indicators can be equally effective even if cognitive faculties produced false beliefs. So, that takes care of the necessity part. Now, what about the probability part?

Well, given Evolution, since true beliefs don’t necessarily matter for survival, then there seems to be a ‘probability stalemate’. It is equally probable, given Evolution, that true belief is connected to behavior necessary for survival than it is for false belief. But this means it is not MORE probable that, given Evolution, we have cognitive faculties that produce true beliefs.

Therefore, assuming Evolution, there’s no reason to think true beliefs are more adaptive than false ones, or that evolution would choose cognitive faculties that produce true beliefs.

I’m summarizing for the sake of a TWeb thread.

[seer]

Oh yea, and Shunyadragon, you’re not invited, so please leave me alone. You’re gobbledygook is not welcome. Thank you.

I want to talk about the main objection to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). From the way I see it, the objection boils down to this. Aren’t true beliefs more adaptive than false ones? Thus, if evolution is true, natural selection would select the genetic mutations that produce true belief rather than false belief. Again, this is - as I see it - the main objection against EAAN.

Since everyone has discussed EAAN a trillion times, I won’t rehash all its complexities unless necessary. I’ll give the sparknotes in a couple sentences. EAAN basically says P (R/E&N) is low or inscrutable. Or in plain English, the probability of the reliability of our cognitive faculties (to produce true beliefs) given Evolution and Naturalism is low or inscrutable. Thus, Naturalists aren’t rational in believing their cognitive faculties are reliable. Therefore, given Evolution, Naturalists can’t rationally hold to any belief, including their belief in Naturalism.

Again, the only objection I keep seeing come up over and over again is what I said above: wouldn’t evolution have natural selection favor those genetic mutations that lead to reliable cognitive faculties that produced mostly true beliefs? Because we’ve survived for so long, isn’t it more probable that evolution selected cognitive faculties that produced true, rather than false, beliefs?

The short answer is no. Consider, says Plantinga, the prolonged survival of just any species, leaving aside humans for a sec. Isn’t it possible to have reliable cognitive faculties without having any beliefs at all, let alone true beliefs? In these creatures, their cognitive faculties are indeed reliable, but they have no beliefs, let alone true beliefs. In this case, these creatures survive, not because their cognitive faculties produce mostly true beliefs, but because their cognitive faculties properly relate them to the relevant parts of the environment needed for survival. Plantinga calls these indicators. The frog, for example, probably doesn’t have any belief about the fly it catches: it has indicators. The insect doesn’t have any belief about the blood it’s about to suck: it has these indicators.

Now, consider humans who have cognitive faculties that do produce beliefs. Does OUR survival, given evolution, probably mean that our cognitive faculties reliably produce true beliefs? I mean, wouldn’t false beliefs lead to maladaptive behavior? That is the question. The answer is both ‘not necessarily’ and ‘it is ultimately inscrutable’. Not necessarily, because we COULD have cognitive faculties that have the right INDICATORS, and yet false beliefs. Just as the frog and the insect have the right indicators that lead to adaptive behavior, so could humans, even if their cognitive faculties produced false beliefs, or even if they have no beliefs. In other words, there’s no necessary connection between ‘indicators’ enabling your survival and cognitive faculties producing true beliefs: the indicators can be equally effective even if cognitive faculties produced false beliefs. So, that takes care of the necessity part. Now, what about the probability part?

Well, given Evolution, since true beliefs don’t necessarily matter for survival, then there seems to be a ‘probability stalemate’. It is equally probable, given Evolution, that true belief is connected to behavior necessary for survival than it is for false belief. But this means it is not MORE probable that, given Evolution, we have cognitive faculties that produce true beliefs.

Therefore, assuming Evolution, there’s no reason to think true beliefs are more adaptive than false ones, or that evolution would choose cognitive faculties that produce true beliefs.

I’m summarizing for the sake of a TWeb thread.

Very good and to the point!

[Seasanctuary]

Or in plain English, the probability of the reliability of our cognitive faculties (to produce true beliefs) given Evolution and Naturalism is low or inscrutable. Thus, Naturalists aren’t rational in believing their cognitive faculties are reliable. Therefore, given Evolution, Naturalists can’t rationally hold to any belief, including their belief in Naturalism.

First, I'd like to point out that even if the basic argument were successful, all this would do is set up another skeptical scenario along the lines of not being able to show that an external world exists, that other minds exist, etc.

I suppose you could say that a certain kind of Theism would let us avoid dealing with radical skepticism in the area of belief reliability, but then we might as well become Berkeley-style idealists to avoid dealing with radical skepticism about external objects.

In other words, there’s no necessary connection between ‘indicators’ enabling your survival and cognitive faculties producing true beliefs: the indicators can be equally effective even if cognitive faculties produced false beliefs.

What makes a belief a belief and an indicator an indicator?

It sounds a bit like indicators involve information the mind takes in which is unavailable to voluntary action. Or maybe that beliefs only count as beliefs if they're available for introspection. But these are two quite different criteria so possibilities are left out.

I feel like Plantinga is making up a fuzzy distinction to avoid counter-examples, but am quite willing to hear a clarification.

[themuzicman]

Actually, if you think about it, mankind might be the only creature on earth that engages in its own "natural selection", in that we have all out wars that (in the past) have wiped out an entire city or nation (or taken them into slavery) solely for the purpose of owning that area, and the winners of these wars tend to be the ones that have developed the "best truth" in terms of development of technology and warmaking philosophy. For a given political region, "survival of the fittest" has been a reality since mankind organized into city-states, and we can even see this up to and including our own time, with the USA vs. the USSR in the cold war arms race.

Granted that this isn't "natural selection" in the genetic sense, but it is uniquely human, and is directly tied to who can discover and utilize scientific and philosophical truths in the best possible manner, whether they be warmaking, economic or political in nature. So, the process of discovering true beliefs (philosopohy) and true facts (science) is directly related to the survival of the fittest of mankind's cultures.

(Granted that this natural selection doesn't necessarily favor what we would consider to be good, but then that's human nature for you...)

[mattbballman]

First, I'd like to point out that even if the basic argument were successful, all this would do is set up another skeptical scenario along the lines of not being able to show that an external world exists, that other minds exist, etc.

I suppose you could say that a certain kind of Theism would let us avoid dealing with radical skepticism in the area of belief reliability, but then we might as well become Berkeley-style idealists to avoid dealing with radical skepticism about external objects.

It's interesting you take this route. But I wouldn't narrow it to having true beliefs about the external world only. It's that you'd have an undercutting defeater for any belief at all. Even this belief: "I believe that EAAN sets up a skeptical scenario along the lines of not being able to show that an external world exists."

You're right in saying I invoke Theism at this point to save me from such skepticism. But I don't think this entails Berkley's Idealism. Invoking Theism basically means you're cognitive equipment hooks you up with mostly true beliefs, whether the world ends up being a collection of ideas or matter.

What makes a belief a belief and an indicator an indicator?

Here I'll quote Plantinga and we can go from there.

Take the frog example Plantinga uses. "What the frog clearly does have are "indicators," neural structures that receive input from the frog's sense organs, are correlated with the path of the insect as it flies past, and are connected with the frogs muscles in such a way that it is able to flick out its tongue and capture that unfortunate fly."

1. They're neural structures.
2. These structures get input from sense organs.
3. These structures are connected to muscles.
4. And the muscles are connected to behavior related to the environment.

Next quote: "Fleeing predators, finding food and mates--these things require cognitive devices that in some way track crucial features of the environment, and are appropriately connected with muscles; but they do not require true belief, or even belief at all. The long term survival of organisms of a certain species certainly makes it likely that its members enjoy cognitive devices that are successful in tracking those features of the environment--indicators, as I've been calling them."

This reiterates 2 properties noted above.

1. Again, they track features in the environment.
2. Connected with muscles.

Examples of indicators: "In the human body there are indicators for blood pressure, saline content, temperature, insulin level, and much else; in these cases neither the blood, nor its owner, nor anyone else in the neighborhood ordinarily holds beliefs on the topic."

Thus, the frog flicking its tongue at the fly is like my body regulating blood pressure. Just as I don't have to hold any beliefs about blood pressure while my body regulates it, so the frog probably doesn't hold a belief while it flicks its tongue.

Thus, perhaps, given Evolution, our survival is possible because of these indicators, which are serenely indifferent to true beliefs.

What about beliefs? Assuming Naturalism, what is a belief?

1. It is also a neural structure.
2. It has neurophysiological properties (NP).
3. It also has content properties (CP).
4. CP is the part of the belief we can call true/false.

A content property has a proposition for its content. For example, my belief THAT there is a tree over there has this CP: the proposition THAT there is a tree over there. According to some scenarios, CP are causally related to NP properties, like smoke to fire. NPs determine what kind of CP you'll end up with.

The point, though, is this: NP is what's related to the sense organs, which get the muscles moving, which get the creature to do stuff to survive, NOT the CPs. If you want I can find you the quote where T.H. Huxley agrees with this: he basically says, since beliefs are just an epiphenomena of NP, beliefs (I think he called it consciousness) have no more to do with survival than the steam has anything to do with the functioning of a train's engine.

Thus, natural selection goes for the NP (the indicators) that get the creature to survive, and is serenely indifferent to CP.

Take dreams, says Plantinga: NP will cause a certain CP (that you're REALLY rock-climbing). NP itself might have survival value, even though CP is irrelevant and false.

Tell me what you think!

[mattbballman]

Actually, if you think about it, mankind might be the only creature on earth that engages in its own "natural selection", in that we have all out wars that (in the past) have wiped out an entire city or nation (or taken them into slavery) solely for the purpose of owning that area, and the winners of these wars tend to be the ones that have developed the "best truth" in terms of development of technology and warmaking philosophy. For a given political region, "survival of the fittest" has been a reality since mankind organized into city-states, and we can even see this up to and including our own time, with the USA vs. the USSR in the cold war arms race.

Granted that this isn't "natural selection" in the genetic sense, but it is uniquely human, and is directly tied to who can discover and utilize scientific and philosophical truths in the best possible manner, whether they be warmaking, economic or political in nature. So, the process of discovering true beliefs (philosopohy) and true facts (science) is directly related to the survival of the fittest of mankind's cultures.

(Granted that this natural selection doesn't necessarily favor what we would consider to be good, but then that's human nature for you...)

I don't see this as uniquely human. Ants wage war. Animal, reptile, fish and fowl prey on their own game. It's on a smaller scale, but it is a scale. Because our brains are so much more sophisticated we "have produced racks, whips, prisons, slavery, guns, bayonets, and bombs" (Lewis, The Problem of Pain). But I don't think it follows that because of the sophistication, natural selection doesn't play out in every species to some extent.

[themuzicman]

I don't see this as uniquely human. Ants wage war. Animal, reptile, fish and fowl prey on their own game. It's on a smaller scale, but it is a scale. Because our brains are so much more sophisticated we "have produced racks, whips, prisons, slavery, guns, bayonets, and bombs" (Lewis, The Problem of Pain). But I don't think it follows that because of the sophistication, natural selection doesn't play out in every species to some extent.

The uniquely human part is that we intentionally raise the bar for survival by develping technology and philosophies that allow us to dominate other people groups. Animals don't do this.

[mattbballman]

The uniquely human part is that we intentionally raise the bar for survival by develping technology and philosophies that allow us to dominate other people groups. Animals don't do this.

This is off topic, but this is an interesting point you bring up. Technology has made us more creative than ever at sinning, hasn't it?

[Seasanctuary]

1. They're neural structures.
2. These structures get input from sense organs.
3. These structures are connected to muscles.
4. And the muscles are connected to behavior related to the environment.

The impression I get from this is that of specialized structure which both receives particular kinds of input and then directly fire a response. Something along the line of reflex reactions.

By contrast, I would consider a belief to be a mental pattern that typically represents a part of the world and may impact voluntary choices.

Next quote: "Fleeing predators, finding food and mates--these things require cognitive devices that in some way track crucial features of the environment, and are appropriately connected with muscles; but they do not require true belief, or even belief at all.

I find it hard to believe that these activities in, say, mammals can be wholly attributed to a series of specialized reflex reactions.

Thus, perhaps, given Evolution, our survival is possible because of these indicators, which are serenely indifferent to true beliefs.

Our mental representations of the world could conceivably be wildly incorrect, but then how do we successfully 'track' things in our environment? I could only see Plantinga's scenario working out if our voluntary choices don't matter to survival, because reflex reactions are keeping us going.

What about beliefs? Assuming Naturalism, what is a belief?

1. It is also a neural structure.
2. It has neurophysiological properties (NP).
3. It also has content properties (CP).
4. CP is the part of the belief we can call true/false.

A content property has a proposition for its content. For example, my belief THAT there is a tree over there has this CP: the proposition THAT there is a tree over there.

I would say a belief is a neural pattern which represents a proposition (a way the world might be) to the person holding it.

The point, though, is this: NP is what's related to the sense organs, which get the muscles moving, which get the creature to do stuff to survive, NOT the CPs.

You could use the analogy that the pattern of magnetized areas on a hard disk is what a computer's input/output hardware deals with, not the files such patterns represent.

If you want I can find you the quote where T.H. Huxley agrees with this: he basically says, since beliefs are just an epiphenomena of NP, beliefs (I think he called it consciousness) have no more to do with survival than the steam has anything to do with the functioning of a train's engine.

...which would be a handy analogy because it explains how it can seem like the significance of hard disk patterns are irrelevant to the operation of a computer, while showing how different files correspond to different patterns and therefore content does (indirectly) affect how operations play out.

Thus, natural selection goes for the NP (the indicators) that get the creature to survive, and is serenely indifferent to CP.

Unless the CPs and NPs have a correspondence relationship.

Take dreams, says Plantinga: NP will cause a certain CP (that you're REALLY rock-climbing). NP itself might have survival value, even though CP is irrelevant and false.

If sleep didn't remove normal voluntary control of muscles, our dream beliefs would probably be quite detrimental to survival!

[themuzicman]

This is off topic, but this is an interesting point you bring up. Technology has made us more creative than ever at sinning, hasn't it?

Technology is a tool. It doesn't make us more or less creative at anything. It just allows us to be more efficient in whatever we do, good or bad.

[nightbringer]

Again, the only objection I keep seeing come up over and over again is what I said above: wouldn’t evolution have natural selection favor those genetic mutations that lead to reliable cognitive faculties that produced mostly true beliefs? Because we’ve survived for so long, isn’t it more probable that evolution selected cognitive faculties that produced true, rather than false, beliefs?

Even if it is true that reliable cognitive faculties are probably more adaptive than non-reliable cognitive faculties, I think it is still possible to argue that P(R/E&N) is inscrutable. After all even if a certain trait would be more adaptive, there is no guarantee that such a trait will actually come about. For instance, perhaps it would be more advantageous for a particular bird to have four wings rather than two (perhaps the added wings would increase its speed and power while incurring no non-negligible drawbacks). Should this four-winged trait come about then, probably, birds who have that trait will reproduce more successfully than those who don't. That is, natural selection would most probably favour the four-winged trait over the two-winged trait. But of course, even that being so, there is absolutely no guarantee that the four-winged trait will ever actually come about.

So perhaps truth-producing cognitive faculties are more evolutionarily advantageous than largely mistake-prone cognitive faculties. Why think, given N and E, that truth-producing cognitive faculties ever actually emerged or will emerge? You see we have to assign a probability not only to a trait's adaptive qualities but also to its potential emergence. And I can't see how that latter probability could be anything other than inscrutable. So P(R/E&N) is inscrutable even granting that truth-producing cognitive faculties are more evolutionarily favourable.

I suppose as a counter the naturalistic evolutionist could claim that the probability is not inscrutable all things considered because they know that their cognitive faculties are reliable. How? Presumably in the same way we know we aren't brains in vats. This strikes me as a fair response.

[mattbballman]

Technology is a tool. It doesn't make us more or less creative at anything. It just allows us to be more efficient in whatever we do, good or bad.

So an atom bomb isn't a more creative way to kill lots of people instead of a machine gun? Sure, efficiency is a factor. But the tool being more creative can be a factor in the increased efficiency.

[mattbballman]

Even if it is true that reliable cognitive faculties are probably more adaptive than non-reliable cognitive faculties, I think it is still possible to argue that P(R/E&N) is inscrutable. After all even if a certain trait would be more adaptive, there is no guarantee that such a trait will actually come about. For instance, perhaps it would be more advantageous for a particular bird to have four wings rather than two (perhaps the added wings would increase its speed and power while incurring no non-negligible drawbacks). Should this four-winged trait come about then, probably, birds who have that trait will reproduce more successfully than those who don't. That is, natural selection would most probably favour the four-winged trait over the two-winged trait. But of course, even that being so, there is absolutely no guarantee that the four-winged trait will ever actually come about.

Plantinga's stronger point, though, is that even if the bird got four wings instead of two, this had nothing to do with the bird's beliefs. And even if the bird had false beliefs, natural selection would only work on the level of neurophysiological properties, not the content properties, anyway.

So perhaps truth-producing cognitive faculties are more evolutionarily advantageous than largely mistake-prone cognitive faculties. Why think, given N and E, that truth-producing cognitive faculties ever actually emerged or will emerge? You see we have to assign a probability not only to a trait's adaptive qualities but also to its potential emergence. And I can't see how that latter probability could be anything other than inscrutable. So P(R/E&N) is inscrutable even granting that truth-producing cognitive faculties are more evolutionarily favourable.

You'd have to adjust the probability calculus a bit. It wouldn't be P(R/E&N) anymore: it'd be P(AQ/E&N)*P(R/E&N), where AQ is the emergence of the adaptive qualities.

I suppose as a counter the naturalistic evolutionist could claim that the probability is not inscrutable all things considered because they know that their cognitive faculties are reliable. How? Presumably in the same way we know we aren't brains in vats. This strikes me as a fair response.

It's not fair because they're assuming as innocent what's already on trial. The brain in a vat scenario isn't questioning cognitive faculties themselves; it's questioning the reliability of belief based on sense perception. If I 'know' I'm not a brain in a vat, I have a true belief that I'm not a brain in a vat, and this true belief, given Evolution, is what is now called into question, since the reliability of our cognitive faculties are now on trial. Darwin's doubt is more fundamental than the brain in a vat.

[mattbballman]

The impression I get from this is that of specialized structure which both receives particular kinds of input and then directly fire a response. Something along the line of reflex reactions.

Yes. Pure non-rational cause and effect.

By contrast, I would consider a belief to be a mental pattern that typically represents a part of the world and may impact voluntary choices.

Deep down, though, given Naturalism, a belief can be boiled down to the two-part structure I gave: NP and CP. This would then go for the mental pattern too. The part of the mental pattern doing the representing would be the CP. But as I argued, NP determines CP, and natural selection goes for altering NP only, because NP determines the right behavior for survival. But if CP is nothing but the steam from the engine of NP, we don't have any reason to think we have true beliefs produced by reliable cognitive faculties. Thus, P(R/E&N) is low/inscrutable.

I find it hard to believe that these activities in, say, mammals can be wholly attributed to a series of specialized reflex reactions.

I think given Evolution, it's probable.

Our mental representations of the world could conceivably be wildly incorrect, but then how do we successfully 'track' things in our environment? I could only see Plantinga's scenario working out if our voluntary choices don't matter to survival, because reflex reactions are keeping us going.

Given Evolution, though, it LOOKS LIKE you track things in the environment, but Plantinga's point is that Evolution doesn't give you adequate GROUNDING for the belief that you do. If you're so sure you track things correctly, perhaps there's more to the picture than Evolution, so we can get the reliability back to our cognitive faculties. You can't respond to Berkley's Idealism the way Dr. Johnson did: by kicking a rock.

I would say a belief is a neural pattern which represents a proposition (a way the world might be) to the person holding it.

That's more or less what was said. But the neural pattern can't represent anything. Neural patterns are non-rational phenomena. What does the representing is the epiphenomena of the neural patterns: the CP. The neural patterns determine CP; but it isn't a two-way street. The engine determines the steam, but the steam has nothing to do with the engine functioning.

You could use the analogy that the pattern of magnetized areas on a hard disk is what a computer's input/output hardware deals with, not the files such patterns represent.

Ah. So you're equating the hard disk with NP and the files with CP. This could work, because NP determines CP, and not the other way around. And there can be multiple hard disks with identical magnetized areas having either different files or no files at all! There would be a link, but the areas on the disk would therefore get along fine without taking into consideration the files. Or maybe you could have varying hard disks with identical files! This isn't a perfect analogy because the NP of a mammal adjusts because of survival value, while the magnetized areas on a hard disk adjust for our purposes in pulling up certain files. Undoubtedly, the disk is made a certain way for our purposes, and a mammal is made a certain way for Nature's purposes. So, this analogy breaks down a little in the end.

...which would be a handy analogy because it explains how it can seem like the significance of hard disk patterns are irrelevant to the operation of a computer, while showing how different files correspond to different patterns and therefore content does (indirectly) affect how operations play out.

But the pattern determines the content; the content doesn't determine the pattern. The content may affect how operations play out, but the content just as probably might involve false belief as true belief.

If sleep didn't remove normal voluntary control of muscles, our dream beliefs would probably be quite detrimental to survival!

Right, but that wasn't the point. The NP leading to dreaming creatures (entailing false beliefs about things) might be the same NP that leads to a creature's survival.

[Seasanctuary]

Deep down, though, given Naturalism, a belief can be boiled down to the two-part structure I gave: NP and CP.

I regard properties as philosopher-speak rather than any sort of real structure, which is to say I regard any substantive arguments based on properties with a great deal of suspicion.

This would then go for the mental pattern too. The part of the mental pattern doing the representing would be the CP. But as I argued, NP determines CP, and natural selection goes for altering NP only, because NP determines the right behavior for survival.

This seems to assume beliefs are determined by natural selection (because natural selection determines the neurological correlates of belief). Instead, I would say natural selection has provided some species with the capacity to form and act on beliefs; natural selection would not have the effect of promoting or suppressing specific beliefs.

I suppose you could grant this and say natural selection still only 'cares' about the general capacity to form helpful neurological patterns, not the accuracy of whatever those patterns represent. But the thing that strikes everyone but Plantinga & company as obvious is that accuracy of representation is what usually makes the neurological patterns helpful.

But if CP is nothing but the steam from the engine of NP, we don't have any reason to think we have true beliefs produced by reliable cognitive faculties. Thus, P(R/E&N) is low/inscrutable.

Imagine two sets of DNA which allow for belief-formation. Together with their individuals' experience, 100 beliefs have been formed for each.

DNA 1
-------
50 helpful NPs
50 detrimental NPs

DNA 2
-------
90 helpful NPs
10 detrimental NPs

As I understand Plantinga's argument, there is no higher probability that the individual with DNA 2 holds a greater number of accurate CPs than does the individual with DNA 1.

In other words, there is not even a probable connection between more helpful beliefs and more accurate beliefs.

If you're so sure you track things correctly, perhaps there's more to the picture than Evolution, so we can get the reliability back to our cognitive faculties.

Our cognitive faculties are reliable if they are reliable, not if we can show that they are without assuming it.

The neural patterns determine CP; but it isn't a two-way street. The engine determines the steam, but the steam has nothing to do with the engine functioning.

Then we need an analogy where engines tend to break down if the steam isn't right. Beliefs tend to be unhelpful when they're wrong.

But the pattern determines the content; the content doesn't determine the pattern. The content may affect how operations play out, but the content just as probably might involve false belief as true belief.

The content may not determine the pattern, but it does have bearing on the helpfulness of the pattern...and therefore bearing on the helpfulness of various belief-forming processes.