On the Freedom of the Will

[Carrikature]

Alright, so per Seasanctuary's recommendation, I purchased Essay on the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. I finished it a few days ago, and now I haves some questions and thoughts on it.


The basis for his stance is essentially that there are two main components involved in the decision-making process: the character and the motive(s). He further states that the character has three main attributes. First, that each person has their own unique, individual character. Second, that the character is both inborn and unchangeable. Finally, the character is empirical.

The first and third attributes I can readily agree to. It is the second where my initial problem lies. Is it knowable that our character is unchangeable? Schopenhauer seems to claim that our perception of our character can be altered through increased knowledge and maturity (though I expect the two go hand-in-hand), but that the true nature of the character has not actually changed. I can accept this answer, though begrudgingly.

It also occurs to me to wonder about the impact character has on our motive(s). As humans, we experience motivation through various sensual stimuli. We also can experience a more abstract motivation through the thought-process. I expect our character drives our thoughts, but does it remain that way throughout the life of an individual? A child may not have the ability to view themselves introspectively and assess their own motives, but an adult certainly can. Does the adult then possess the ability to create or modify motives through introspection, or are these alterations merely the result of the existing character?

Finally, I have to say that Schopenhauer's treatment of moral responsibility is nonsensical at best. Throughout his essay, he clearly lays out the framework for actions that are necessitated and therefore fully determined. While this would point to moral inculpability for most, he insists that this simply isn't the case. Instead, he maintains that humankind's natural instinct to place the blame for actions on a person's character, coupled with the transcendental existence of alternative actions still places the moral responsibility squarely on the individual. I take this to be utterly ludicrous. If a person can be nothing but what they are (as determined by their character), then no true moral choice is afforded them. Further, it seems to me that Schopenhauer's treatment of the subject is more a concession to those who would question or dismiss his arguments from a purely theological standpoint.

Thoughts?

[Xru]

Haven't read the author.

You'd have to give a summary of what his points are for me to make any comment.

[Carrikature]

Haven't read the author.

You'd have to give a summary of what his points are for me to make any comment.

Of what points? I think I've laid out a brief summary in order to establish the context already, but I don't think it's necessary to have read the book to discuss my thoughts.

[themuzicman]

Well, this is the problem with a naturalist look at the human person: He is bound by laws of nature, specifically cause and effect. With every effect having a cause, it is impossible to get out of the determinist chain, and that's what he's found.

The work sounds very much in line with Luthers "The Bondage of the Will."

[seer]

Alright, so per Seasanctuary's recommendation, I purchased Essay on the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. I finished it a few days ago, and now I haves some questions and thoughts on it.


The basis for his stance is essentially that there are two main components involved in the decision-making process: the character and the motive(s). He further states that the character has three main attributes. First, that each person has their own unique, individual character. Second, that the character is both inborn and unchangeable. Finally, the character is empirical.

The first and third attributes I can readily agree to. It is the second where my initial problem lies. Is it knowable that our character is unchangeable? Schopenhauer seems to claim that our perception of our character can be altered through increased knowledge and maturity (though I expect the two go hand-in-hand), but that the true nature of the character has not actually changed. I can accept this answer, though begrudgingly.

It also occurs to me to wonder about the impact character has on our motive(s). As humans, we experience motivation through various sensual stimuli. We also can experience a more abstract motivation through the thought-process. I expect our character drives our thoughts, but does it remain that way throughout the life of an individual? A child may not have the ability to view themselves introspectively and assess their own motives, but an adult certainly can. Does the adult then possess the ability to create or modify motives through introspection, or are these alterations merely the result of the existing character?

Finally, I have to say that Schopenhauer's treatment of moral responsibility is nonsensical at best. Throughout his essay, he clearly lays out the framework for actions that are necessitated and therefore fully determined. While this would point to moral inculpability for most, he insists that this simply isn't the case. Instead, he maintains that humankind's natural instinct to place the blame for actions on a person's character, coupled with the transcendental existence of alternative actions still places the moral responsibility squarely on the individual. I take this to be utterly ludicrous. If a person can be nothing but what they are (as determined by their character), then no true moral choice is afforded them. Further, it seems to me that Schopenhauer's treatment of the subject is more a concession to those who would question or dismiss his arguments from a purely theological standpoint.

Thoughts?

This sounds a lot like Dennett's compatibilism - they want to have their cake and eat it to. It just doesn't work - without the ability to do "otherwise" in a given situation I don't see how moral culpability is possible.

[Carrikature]

Well, this is the problem with a naturalist look at the human person: He is bound by laws of nature, specifically cause and effect. With every effect having a cause, it is impossible to get out of the determinist chain, and that's what he's found.

The work sounds very much in line with Luthers "The Bondage of the Will."

What third option, beyond cause and effect, do you suggest exists?

This sounds a lot like Dennett's compatibilism - they want to have their cake and eat it to. It just doesn't work - without the ability to do "otherwise" in a given situation I don't see how moral culpability is possible.

Agreed. I don't necessarily disagree with Schopenhauer's conclusion as regards free will, but I do disagree that it is as compatible with moral culpability as he would like to pretend. It's understandable that he would wish to meld the two, though. I've pretty much decided that determinism is either entirely or largely true, but I admit to some reluctance as to what that means from a theological standpoint.

[RBerman]

If a person can be nothing but what they are (as determined by their character), then no true moral choice is afforded them.

That depends entirely on how you define "true moral choice."

On another note, does he allow for the modulatory effects of environment upon the person? You might imagine that a particular person with the same original character might make different choices if he were raised in situation A vs situation B.

[seer]

I've pretty much decided that determinism is either entirely or largely true, but I admit to some reluctance as to what that means from a theological standpoint.

Have you ever read Vincent Cheung?

http://www.vincentcheung.com/other/sovselfcomp.pdf

A sovereign God contradicts the idea that man exercises free will when it comes to any matter, including salvation. The sovereignty of God and the freedom of man are mutually exclusive. To affirm one is to deny the other....

....Indeed, the absolute sovereignty of God and the moral responsibility of man are compatible. Perhaps this is what the theologians are so worried about. But man is morally responsible only because God has decided to hold him accountable. This has no necessarily connection with choice or freedom. Even coercion does not eliminate responsibility. What does one have to do with another? The moral responsibility of man depends on the absolute sovereignty of God, and nothing else.

He doesn't pull any punches on this subject.

[Carrikature]

That depends entirely on how you define "true moral choice."

On another note, does he allow for the modulatory effects of environment upon the person? You might imagine that a particular person with the same original character might make different choices if he were raised in situation A vs situation B.

I define moral choice as having the ability to make a decision. From a deterministic standpoint, there is no choice as all decisions are inevitable given motive(s) and a set character. It is not enough to say that other options do exist were your character otherwise, as Schopenhauer seems to claim, but rather that your character allows for those options itself. How would you define true moral choice?

In answer to your second question, yes and no. Schopenhauer says that the motives reveal the character through actions. Situation A would involve different motives than Situation B, so the action will be different even given the same character. We could then use the differing actions to comprehend the true nature of the character, if that makes sense. In other words, if it is my character to be greedy, but not to unduly harm others, then I could conceivably steal from another that I perceive to be rich (Situation A) but not from someone I perceive as poor (Situation B). So to summarize, a character could be revealed in differing manners based on environment, but he does not allow that the character itself is altered by environment.

Have you ever read Vincent Cheung?

http://www.vincentcheung.com/other/sovselfcomp.pdf

A sovereign God contradicts the idea that man exercises free will when it comes to any matter, including salvation. The sovereignty of God and the freedom of man are mutually exclusive. To affirm one is to deny the other....

....Indeed, the absolute sovereignty of God and the moral responsibility of man are compatible. Perhaps this is what the theologians are so worried about. But man is morally responsible only because God has decided to hold him accountable. This has no necessarily connection with choice or freedom. Even coercion does not eliminate responsibility. What does one have to do with another? The moral responsibility of man depends on the absolute sovereignty of God, and nothing else.

He doesn't pull any punches on this subject.

If such is true, which I admit only as plausible, then it removes the necessity of Christ's death. This is admittedly more theological than philosophical, but it seems to be relevant at the moment.

[RBerman]

I define moral choice as having the ability to make a decision. From a deterministic standpoint, there is no choice as all decisions are inevitable given motive(s) and a set character. It is not enough to say that other options do exist were your character otherwise, as Schopenhauer seems to claim, but rather that your character allows for those options itself. How would you define true moral choice?

"True" is redundant in that phrase. A moral choice is a choice on a moral issue. A choice is when you have competing motivations, and act according to the strongest one. It needn't and indeed can't imply that you would make different choices if the scenario could be replayed repeatedly, since that would mean that your strongest desire was not really strongest.

In answer to your second question, yes and no. Schopenhauer says that the motives reveal the character through actions. Situation A would involve different motives than Situation B, so the action will be different even given the same character. We could then use the differing actions to comprehend the true nature of the character, if that makes sense. In other words, if it is my character to be greedy, but not to unduly harm others, then I could conceivably steal from another that I perceive to be rich (Situation A) but not from someone I perceive as poor (Situation B). So to summarize, a character could be revealed in differing manners based on environment, but he does not allow that the character itself is altered by environment.

I was thinking of situations A and B as referring to different upbringings, so that the same person might or might not steal in situation X, based on whether they had upbringing A or upbringing B.

[seer]

If such is true, which I admit only as plausible, then it removes the necessity of Christ's death. This is admittedly more theological than philosophical, but it seems to be relevant at the moment.

How so?

[Carrikature]

"True" is redundant in that phrase. A moral choice is a choice on a moral issue. A choice is when you have competing motivations, and act according to the strongest one. It needn't and indeed can't imply that you would make different choices if the scenario could be replayed repeatedly, since that would mean that your strongest desire was not really strongest.

I somewhat disagree. Simply having competing motivations isn't enough, unless we have the ability to dictate the relative strength of a given motivation. This is why I use true when referring to moral choice. It is easy for something to have the illusion of choice simply because multiple possibilities conceivably exist.

I was thinking of situations A and B as referring to different upbringings, so that the same person might or might not steal in situation X, based on whether they had upbringing A or upbringing B.

Oh I understand that. From what I've read, Schopenhauer doesn't allow the environment to affect the character. However, the environment would affect which motives come into play, as well as their relative strength. For myself, I'm unsure. Our upbringing certainly provides a filter through which we view events. I don't think it has the ability to change who we are inside, though. Rather, I would expect our environment helps dictate how certain personality traits are exhibited.

[Carrikature]

How so?

Victor Cheung himself, in the link you provided, states, "But man is morally responsible only because God has decided to hold him accountable." If God has decided to hold man accountable, it follows that God could have decided not to hold man accountable. The difference from a human perspective is negligible. On the one hand, God holds man accountable, but also allows them a method to evade the consequences through Christ's death. However, let us not forget that Cheung further says that, "If God is absolutely sovereign, then he also decides and causes human choice and desire." His opening statement, even, is "A sovereign God contradicts the idea that man exercises free will when it comes to any matter, including salvation."

Our first scenario, then, is the one Cheung suggests, wherein we have a God who has decided to hold man accountable, provided a loophole, then chooses who will actually utilize the loophole. A similar scenario would be that God allows everyone to utilize the loophole. A third scenario could entail God choosing not to hold man accountable, removing the need for Christ's death, and thereby allowing everyone to live 'happily ever after'. A final scenario is God holding no one accountable, but choosing to discard certain persons based on whatever method seems appropriate. In the end, from a human perspective, God has either chosen to accept someone or has not, and there's not a thing that person can do about it. Further, it would be equally possible for God to have dispensed with the whole charade in the first place and simply opted for one of the latter two scenarios. The question, then, would be "Why didn't He just do that in the first place?"

I could almost hope Cheung is right, since if he is, I can live my life free of guilt from here on out. All I need do is repeat the mantra, "It is God who has done my choosing for me."

[seer]

Victor Cheung himself, in the link you provided, states, "But man is morally responsible only because God has decided to hold him accountable." If God has decided to hold man accountable, it follows that God could have decided not to hold man accountable. The difference from a human perspective is negligible. On the one hand, God holds man accountable, but also allows them a method to evade the consequences through Christ's death. However, let us not forget that Cheung further says that, "If God is absolutely sovereign, then he also decides and causes human choice and desire." His opening statement, even, is "A sovereign God contradicts the idea that man exercises free will when it comes to any matter, including salvation."

Our first scenario, then, is the one Cheung suggests, wherein we have a God who has decided to hold man accountable, provided a loophole, then chooses who will actually utilize the loophole. A similar scenario would be that God allows everyone to utilize the loophole. A third scenario could entail God choosing not to hold man accountable, removing the need for Christ's death, and thereby allowing everyone to live 'happily ever after'. A final scenario is God holding no one accountable, but choosing to discard certain persons based on whatever method seems appropriate. In the end, from a human perspective, God has either chosen to accept someone or has not, and there's not a thing that person can do about it. Further, it would be equally possible for God to have dispensed with the whole charade in the first place and simply opted for one of the latter two scenarios. The question, then, would be "Why didn't He just do that in the first place?"

I could almost hope Cheung is right, since if he is, I can live my life free of guilt from here on out. All I need do is repeat the mantra, "It is God who has done my choosing for me."

Hehe, except God will make you feel guilty! I don't disagree with much of what you say, but if you lean towards determinism how do you reconcile that with moral responsibility and the necessary atonement that follows?

[RBerman]

I somewhat disagree. Simply having competing motivations isn't enough, unless we have the ability to dictate the relative strength of a given motivation. This is why I use true when referring to moral choice. It is easy for something to have the illusion of choice simply because multiple possibilities conceivably exist.

I don't see how we ever dictate our motivations. We act according to them, but we don't dictate them.

Oh I understand that. From what I've read, Schopenhauer doesn't allow the environment to affect the character. However, the environment would affect which motives come into play, as well as their relative strength. For myself, I'm unsure. Our upbringing certainly provides a filter through which we view events. I don't think it has the ability to change who we are inside, though. Rather, I would expect our environment helps dictate how certain personality traits are exhibited.

"Nature vs nurture" is an evergreen debate.