On the Freedom of the Will

[Carrikature]

Hehe, except God will make you feel guilty! I don't disagree with much of what you say, but if you lean towards determinism how do you reconcile that with moral responsibility and the necessary atonement that follows?

As far as I can tell, you can't. To be sure, if I fully embraced determinism, it would mean I consequently embraced a deist theology.

[Carrikature]

I don't see how we ever dictate our motivations. We act according to them, but we don't dictate them.

Then what do we dictate?

"Nature vs nurture" is an evergreen debate.

I'm afraid I don't get what you mean by evergreen debate. I understand the 'nature vs nurture' concept, but I'm not sure either answer makes any difference in the long run. The degree to which we are influenced by our environment does not diminish the role of determinism. At most, it would add another dimension to the equation, but the outcome is still inevitable.

[seer]

As far as I can tell, you can't. To be sure, if I fully embraced determinism, it would mean I consequently embraced a deist theology.

At that point why not throw it all out and embrace materialism? I personally would not find any reason to keep the God door open.

[RBerman]

Then what do we dictate?

I'm not sure what "dictate" means to you. We choose, which means that we do what we want most to do.

[Carrikature]

At that point why not throw it all out and embrace materialism? I personally would not find any reason to keep the God door open.

I prefer not to eliminate possibilities, and there is very little impetus to make that jump in my opinion.

I'm not sure what "dictate" means to you. We choose, which means that we do what we want most to do.

Ok, what are we choosing? We have a character, which is given. We exist in an environment which, at least early on, is not of our choosing. We act upon the strongest motivation, yet the strength (and very existence) of the motivation is not under our control.

Arguably, we may have the potential to set or alter motivational strength, but that in turn is dependent on character/environment. In fact, the existence of this potential is one of the things I questioned in my OP. As I mentioned, Schopenhauer claims that we still have moral responsibility because other actions could have been performed were we someone else. For him, this seems to be enough, but I simply can't follow the logic of it.

[seer]

Ok, what are we choosing? We have a character, which is given. We exist in an environment which, at least early on, is not of our choosing. We act upon the strongest motivation, yet the strength (and very existence) of the motivation is not under our control.

This is where I disagree. Let's say I have two options - a piece of chocolate cake, which I really desire to eat, and the desire to watch my health. Two desires - but there is a "I" that is a final "decider." At this point what makes one desire /motivation stronger than the other if it is not me? If I decide to eat the cake does that mean that I never had the ability to choose otherwise? I don't see how it does.

[RBerman]

Ok, what are we choosing? We have a character, which is given. We exist in an environment which, at least early on, is not of our choosing. We act upon the strongest motivation, yet the strength (and very existence) of the motivation is not under our control. Arguably, we may have the potential to set or alter motivational strength, but that in turn is dependent on character/environment. In fact, the existence of this potential is one of the things I questioned in my OP. As I mentioned, Schopenhauer claims that we still have moral responsibility because other actions could have been performed were we someone else. For him, this seems to be enough, but I simply can't follow the logic of it.

I understand "choosing" to be the process whereby our conflicting motivations (inputs) results in a single output. For instance, we want chocolate cake, but we want to lose weight. This might result in a smaller slice of cake than if we did not want to lose weight.

[Carrikature]

Let me start by apologizing for the delayed response. I was out for the weekend, and I put in my notice at work yesterday morning, so things were a bit...odd.

This is where I disagree. Let's say I have two options - a piece of chocolate cake, which I really desire to eat, and the desire to watch my health. Two desires - but there is a "I" that is a final "decider." At this point what makes one desire /motivation stronger than the other if it is not me? If I decide to eat the cake does that mean that I never had the ability to choose otherwise? I don't see how it does.

I understand "choosing" to be the process whereby our conflicting motivations (inputs) results in a single output. For instance, we want chocolate cake, but we want to lose weight. This might result in a smaller slice of cake than if we did not want to lose weight.

Both of your points are sufficiently similar that I feel I can adequately address both of them together. We'll see how that goes.


Before we do anything, we must lay out the decision process. Essentially, we have a given set of motives that act upon a given person. This person's character determines how that person will react to those motives, which also includes assigning relative strengths to each motive. The deliberation process, then, is the act of the character assessing those strengths allowing the final outcome to be the strongest motivation.

Seer, here is where your answer lies. Your use of the 'I' as a final decider is placed in the character. You identify yourself strongly with your character, so that is only natural. However, it seems to me that while we have a character, it is not the sole component in our makeup. I think that we have an awareness of ourselves as a whole, which is the true 'I', but that we are obviously quite aware of our own tendencies as evidenced by our character-driven actions. So to summarize, we have the illusion of an 'I' that is making the decisions, but in reality that is the character assessing strengths of motives.

For you, Rberman, do you disagree with my outline of the deliberation process? If not, is the process as I understand it enough to be considered our choosing? If so, it would seem that this comes down to the same thing Seer is saying.

[seer]

Before we do anything, we must lay out the decision process. Essentially, we have a given set of motives that act upon a given person. This person's character determines how that person will react to those motives, which also includes assigning relative strengths to each motive. The deliberation process, then, is the act of the character assessing those strengths allowing the final outcome to be the strongest motivation.

Seer, here is where your answer lies. Your use of the 'I' as a final decider is placed in the character. You identify yourself strongly with your character, so that is only natural. However, it seems to me that while we have a character, it is not the sole component in our makeup. I think that we have an awareness of ourselves as a whole, which is the true 'I', but that we are obviously quite aware of our own tendencies as evidenced by our character-driven actions. So to summarize, we have the illusion of an 'I' that is making the decisions, but in reality that is the character assessing strengths of motives.

Can not one violate his character, or act against it? For instance I am not given to stealing from my fellow man - but does that character trait physically prevent me from changing my mind and stealing? I don't see how it does. So to me, even though character is important there is still something i.e. a "me" that has to decide whether to act on that character trait or ignore it. But perhaps I'm missing your point.

[RBerman]

Let me start by apologizing for the delayed response. I was out for the weekend, and I put in my notice at work yesterday morning, so things were a bit...odd.

D'oh! Hopefully better things await you.

Before we do anything, we must lay out the decision process. Essentially, we have a given set of motives that act upon a given person. This person's character determines how that person will react to those motives, which also includes assigning relative strengths to each motive. The deliberation process, then, is the act of the character assessing those strengths allowing the final outcome to be the strongest motivation.

Seer, here is where your answer lies. Your use of the 'I' as a final decider is placed in the character. You identify yourself strongly with your character, so that is only natural. However, it seems to me that while we have a character, it is not the sole component in our makeup. I think that we have an awareness of ourselves as a whole, which is the true 'I', but that we are obviously quite aware of our own tendencies as evidenced by our character-driven actions. So to summarize, we have the illusion of an 'I' that is making the decisions, but in reality that is the character assessing strengths of motives.

For you, Rberman, do you disagree with my outline of the deliberation process? If not, is the process as I understand it enough to be considered our choosing? If so, it would seem that this comes down to the same thing Seer is saying.

A lot of this comes down to definitions. If you define "character" in such a way as to exclude nurture, then you'll say that our character is not the only factor in our decisionmaking in some circumstance. A certain amount of reification occurs when we say something like, "We have free will." That's a figure of speech roughly equivalent to "We choose freely." It doesn't mean that there's an actual object called "will" which we can either possess or not possess. "Will" and "choose" are basket terms to describe the process by which we do certain things, as opposed to doing other things.

[Carrikature]

Can not one violate his character, or act against it? For instance I am not given to stealing from my fellow man - but does that character trait physically prevent me from changing my mind and stealing? I don't see how it does. So to me, even though character is important there is still something i.e. a "me" that has to decide whether to act on that character trait or ignore it. But perhaps I'm missing your point.

Here I will have to agree with Schopenhauer. According to him, our character is inborn and unchangeable. We learn about our character empirically, by direct observation of our actions. Since for you stealing is a rare occurrence (or has never happened), that tells you at most that you have never had a sufficient motivation to steal. (You can also safely infer that you are not likely to steal, but that doesn't prove you never will.) Concordantly, were you to ever steal, you will learn that your character does not prevent stealing in all cases. Therefore, your base character has not changed, rather you have gained new information regarding the true format of that character.

Further, this new information may prove unpalatable given your environment which may in turn produce a stronger motivation not to steal in the future. Proving unpalatable could either be a emotional response based on what you think a good person *should* be like, or it could be something more concrete like physical punishment or jail time.

You may even be right that we have the ability to override a given character trait. However, if we truly learn about our character empirically (and I think we do), then I'm not sure how you could ever prove that you have done so.

D'oh! Hopefully better things await you.

Thanks! I'm looking forward to the new job, it should be quite a bit better.

A lot of this comes down to definitions. If you define "character" in such a way as to exclude nurture, then you'll say that our character is not the only factor in our decisionmaking in some circumstance.

Most definitely. In my previous descriptions, I've laid out two distinct parts: the character and the motivation(s). Nurture affects our motivations. What I'm unsure of is whether or not there is a third factor that plays some role. According to Schopenhauer, there is not. It sounds to me like you don't think there is either.

A certain amount of reification occurs when we say something like, "We have free will." That's a figure of speech roughly equivalent to "We choose freely." It doesn't mean that there's an actual object called "will" which we can either possess or not possess. "Will" and "choose" are basket terms to describe the process by which we do certain things, as opposed to doing other things.

I actually agree. Our concept of 'choosing freely' is nothing more than the observation of the decision process. This is the definition of self-awareness. However, I don't see how moral freedom (and therefore responsibility) actually exists in such a system.

[RBerman]

Most definitely. In my previous descriptions, I've laid out two distinct parts: the character and the motivation(s). Nurture affects our motivations. What I'm unsure of is whether or not there is a third factor that plays some role. According to Schopenhauer, there is not. It sounds to me like you don't think there is either.

Well, I'd have to hear what you think the third factor is. Is it something you've already mentioned?

I actually agree. Our concept of 'choosing freely' is nothing more than the observation of the decision process. This is the definition of self-awareness. However, I don't see how moral freedom (and therefore responsibility) actually exists in such a system.

Scripture doesn't ground moral responsibility in some conception of self-determination. It grounds moral responsibility in our creatureliness; we are responsible to obey and honor our creator.

[seer]

Here I will have to agree with Schopenhauer. According to him, our character is inborn and unchangeable. We learn about our character empirically, by direct observation of our actions. Since for you stealing is a rare occurrence (or has never happened), that tells you at most that you have never had a sufficient motivation to steal. (You can also safely infer that you are not likely to steal, but that doesn't prove you never will.) Concordantly, were you to ever steal, you will learn that your character does not prevent stealing in all cases. Therefore, your base character has not changed, rather you have gained new information regarding the true format of that character.

Well there is the rub C. Why on earth should I believe that my character if fixed at birth? Rather than something "I" develop as I'm presented with choices as I age?

[Seasanctuary]

Oh hey, just saw this thread. I want to consult my copy to address the first part of the OP. However...

Finally, I have to say that Schopenhauer's treatment of moral responsibility is nonsensical at best. Throughout his essay, he clearly lays out the framework for actions that are necessitated and therefore fully determined. While this would point to moral inculpability for most, he insists that this simply isn't the case. Instead, he maintains that humankind's natural instinct to place the blame for actions on a person's character, coupled with the transcendental existence of alternative actions still places the moral responsibility squarely on the individual.

Alternatively, he could conclude like Dawkins does that it doesn't make sense to blame people for acting according to the way they are. Not any more sense than beating a car that's broken down, anyway! My answer to Dawkins is: beating cars doesn't have any helpful effect, but practices of moral praise and blame often do affect their target or onlookers. In other words, it would make sense to shout at cars or coax cars along if it often helped bring out the behavior we wanted from them...even if their behavior is determined. So maybe this is what human moral blame is really about, despite our thinking it must have to do with ultimate responsibility.

I think Schopenhauer is shifting the meaning of 'moral responsibility' instead of claiming the usual meaning still applies under determinism. Clearly, it wouldn't.

[seer]

Oh hey, just saw this thread. I want to consult my copy to address the first part of the OP. However...



Alternatively, he could conclude like Dawkins does that it doesn't make sense to blame people for acting according to the way they are. Not any more sense than beating a car that's broken down, anyway! My answer to Dawkins is: beating cars doesn't have any helpful effect, but practices of moral praise and blame often do affect their target or onlookers. In other words, it would make sense to shout at cars or coax cars along if it often helped bring out the behavior we wanted from them...even if their behavior is determined. So maybe this is what human moral blame is really about, despite our thinking it must have to do with ultimate responsibility.

I think Schopenhauer is shifting the meaning of 'moral responsibility' instead of claiming the usual meaning still applies under determinism. Clearly, it wouldn't.

How would shouting help is the behavior is determined? And who gets to decide what behavior is acceptable?