A shared challenge regarding the foundation of ethics

[Charles]

This is why seer’s argument that one must have a divine standard for morality to be real...as opposed to the relative standards of men...is nonsense. Ongoing subjective interpretation of “God’s Law” explains why it has changed so much over the centuries.

Yes. There is a tendency among many to believe that relativism exists due to the lack of faith in a God or something divine. However, it is important to remember that you can find (so called) divine standards of morality pointing in every directory. So even among these theories relativism is as present as everywhere else.

[Jim B.]

In current times and throughout history there has been a tendency among many to believe that a religious approach to ethics already included a foundation, a basis, on which to base moral judgments, while a non religious approach would somehow have to “come up with something” that could make it out for the divine revelations of right and wrong.

Unfortunately this line of reasoning has been and is very dominant and in some cases it seems even more dominant today than in many other periods in world history. However that makes it even easier to show why the approach that a religious approach to ethics carries justification within takes reconsidering. The most extreme interpretations of this approach is found among religious extremists who simply seem to find that as long as God says or commands something, there is no discussion whatsoever and no other considerations are appropriate.

Why one would think the difference exists
Confronted with such an approach one would often be struck by the “clearness”. These people always seem to know what to do and what not to do. While professors in philosophy will take us through complicated lines of reasoning and pointing to theories that all seem to come to a limit at some point, religiously based ethics provide clear guidelines (at least that is the claim) and instead of “muddy” lines of reasoning about a foundation, one can point to a God who’s line of reasoning is way beyond ours and who’s commands we cannot discuss or vote about for that matter.

As already noted the religious extremist confront us with the extreme version of this. They are probably beyond the reach of any line of reasoning. However, others with a lighter approach but in the same category will usually allow themselves to make statements like “how can I claim that there is nothing wrong with being homosexual, if the Bible says it is wrong?”, “how can I claim that the idea of eternal punishment in Hell is absurd, when God is the one who judges?” and so on…

The difference only exists between extremist and non-extremists
Having come this far, one would think there is a significant difference between the positions. However that is based on a simplified approach. The quite simple reason is that a believer must either be able to justify (at least to some extent) his claim that God is right in doing this or that or he must blindly follow. If he blindly follows, he is going for an extremist position in which we can only hope his reading does not convince him of way to many absurdities. If he starts to confront himself with the question as to why God’s commands are the right ones and why God is acting fairly when judging e.g. that babies who died at an early stage must go to Hell, he will find himself in a position in which he needs to establish a foundation on which to justify such lines of reasoning.

Leibniz’s points
A prominent Christian thinker, Leibniz, actually did point to some very interesting facts about this theme. Let’s hear the man himself:

"Furthermore, if you say - as Descartes did - that things are good not because they match up to objective standards of goodness, but only because God chose them, you will unthinkingly destroy all God’s love and all his glory. For why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy for doing just the opposite?"

The point is quite obvious that if there is no objective good to be known prior to God’s choices, then there is absolutely no good to be known afterwards. The praise is completely blind, as Leibniz points out. It is a praise of whatever. This is the praise we find among extremists. It should not be the kind of praise we expect to find among reflecting religious people. Thus, the challenge of finding ethical foundation is equally shared by all those who reflect, religious or not.

Leibniz goes on to say that:

"And another point: it seems that any act of the will presupposes some reason for it - a reason that naturally precedes the act so that God’s choices must come from his reasons for them, which involve his knowledge of what would be good; so they can’t be the sources of the goodness of things. That is why I find it weird when Descartes says that the eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry, and therefore also the rules of goodness, justice, and perfection, are brought about by God’s will."

Now, Leibniz was a Christian and I do not intend to use his words to put religion in a worse situation. Actually I think he is pointing to something that all reflecting people can agree on. Leibniz also makes the statement that God could not create a world in which 2 + 3 = 6. His point is the same about ethics.

What we are looking for is that which cannot be different, which could not, no matter how the world was created, be different. That kind of moral truths. If they do not exist, religious and secular people are equally worse of. Religious belief is no “stairway to heaven” when it comes to this specific challenge. It is shared.

Sounds like you're describing divine command theory. I would guess that not that many theists subscribe to this theory. A more widely held theory is that God would be the embodiment or the instantiation of the good, that the good coincides with his nature as much as necessity does, not that God can will the good to be good, anymore than he can will himself to be.

[Tassman]

Yes. There is a tendency among many to believe that relativism exists due to the lack of faith in a God or something divine. However, it is important to remember that you can find (so called) divine standards of morality pointing in every directory. So even among these theories relativism is as present as everywhere else.

Exactly. So a code of behaviour based on "divine revelation" or based upon cultural tradition will be equally relative, because social mores keep changing and will require reinterpretation in both instances.

[Charles]

Exactly. So a code of behaviour based on "divine revelation" or based upon cultural tradition will be equally relative, because social mores keep changing and will require reinterpretation in both instances.

Yep. Equally as relative and then often more harmful because as soon as it becomes a part of a "divine revelation" people are very reluctant to change their ideas even if very good reason exists for doing so.

[shunyadragon]

Yep. Equally as relative and then often more harmful because as soon as it becomes a part of a "divine revelation" people are very reluctant to change their ideas even if very good reason exists for doing so.

Yes, unfortunately by far the majority rarely do so.

[Jim B.]

Yes. There is a tendency among many to believe that relativism exists due to the lack of faith in a God or something divine. However, it is important to remember that you can find (so called) divine standards of morality pointing in every directory. So even among these theories relativism is as present as everywhere else.

Forgive this "drive by" post, since I haven't read most of it. It's possible to believe in moral objectivism that has nothing to do with God. Man ahteist and agnostic moral philosophers believe in moral objectivism and many theists believe in determinism. There are good arguments against relativism and in favor of objectivism that don't rely on a belief in God.

[Charles]

Forgive this "drive by" post, since I haven't read most of it. It's possible to believe in moral objectivism that has nothing to do with God. Man ahteist and agnostic moral philosophers believe in moral objectivism and many theists believe in determinism. There are good arguments against relativism and in favor of objectivism that don't rely on a belief in God.

I agree with you on that. That is what I have stated all along in this thread (which I believe you would take interest in reading). I don't see how the lines you refer to would contradict that. Have I expressed myself unclearly? At least now you know my position on this.

[siam]

Exactly. So a code of behaviour based on "divine revelation" or based upon cultural tradition will be equally relative, because social mores keep changing and will require reinterpretation in both instances.

Yep. Equally as relative and then often more harmful because as soon as it becomes a part of a "divine revelation" people are very reluctant to change their ideas even if very good reason exists for doing so.

So if all ethical/moral principles/codes are relative---not universal---then whichever principle/code is used---it will need to be forcefully imposed on a large group of people who do not agree with it....Which then makes the nature of such a code/set of principles the same---that is they need to be forced to be accepted by people who do not give assent to them regardless of the label (religious/secular)used....

If ethical/moral codes are universal---not relative---then again---it does not matter what label is used as large groups of people around the world will give assent to them anyway, regardless of what label they are---"Christian" values will not differ greatly from "Hindu" values which will be similar to "Buddhist" values---etc....

In either case (universal/relative)---the difference will only be in the issuing authority---Secular values issued by State institution whereas non-secular values (theistic/non-theistic) issues by non-state institutions such as Sangha (Buddhism) Ulama (Islam), Church (Christianity), Rabbis (Judaism), and other such groupings of philosopher-scholars....

Reason is not a good excuse to change ethico-moral principles---it is a straight path to hypocrisy---for example, the U.S. declares that everyone is "equal" but when it comes to some of its territories neither the constitution nor the bill of rights applies---the "reason' being that these peoples are not "civilized" enough for American laws.....

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/...n-samoa-tuaua/

The decisions, known as the Insular Cases, date back to the early 20th century, when the US had just won the Spanish-American War and acquired Puerto Rico and the far-flung new territories of Guam and the Philippines. The US acquired American Samoa in two parts in 1900 and 1904 as part of its continued expansion. But American political leaders had a problem: They wanted the United States to become a colonial power, but they didn’t want to extend constitutional protections to the overwhelmingly nonwhite residents of the new territories. (As one of the friend-of-the-court brief in the current case notes, the Democratic Party’s official platform in 1900 argued that “the Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization.”)

To solve that problem, the Supreme Court came up with a bizarre, racially minded solution. The court invented two categories of territory; the Constitution applied fully in “incorporated territories,” such as Arizona, which were settled mostly by white people and destined for statehood, while much of the Constitution did not apply in “unincorporated territories,” such as American Samoa, which were not considered candidates for statehood, largely because of their racial and ethnic makeup.

In fact--the U.S. and U.K. courts/judiciary systems are a laboratory of how "reason" is abused for the whims/convenience of the powerful.....

It is not that ethico-moral principles should change or remain static---what is important is that they remain consistent. For this, a paradigm/meta-narrative is required that spells out the nature, purpose and meaning of human beings and living here on earth. (Such a meta-narrative does not need to be theistic) only then can one develop consistency.....(to that meta-narrative/paradigm).

[siam]

An-Na’im is a Muslim Scholar who is generally pro-Secular ethics/secularization yet he also recognizes the problems:-
......here he speaks of human rights---and some assumptions that come along with it....
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MCkvt9y46o

[shunyadragon]

So if all ethical/moral principles/codes are relative---not universal---then whichever principle/code is used---it will need to be forcefully imposed on a large group of people who do not agree with it....Which then makes the nature of such a code/set of principles the same---that is they need to be forced to be accepted by people who do not give assent to them regardless of the label (religious/secular)used....

First before we go any further I do not believe anyone proposes that all ethical/moral principles/codes are relative---not universal---, except maybe anarchist libertarians. This is absolutely NOT TRUE. Even humanist secular systems of morals and ethics have principles that are considered universal such as wrongful death and theft of another persons property. Even concepts of adultery are pretty much universal in all cultures Theist and secular. Before you argue further you need to come back to reality and realize this.

It is the nature of different cultures and religions over the history of humanity that ALL morals and ethics are not universal. This is an interesting point to begin with. For example: The scripture of Judaism, Christianity and Islam is ambiguous as to whether slavery in all cases is unethical and immoral, but in the Baha'i Faith all forms of slavery are forbidden by spiritual law.

[shunyadragon]

Reason is not a good excuse to change ethico-moral principles---it is a straight path to hypocrisy---for example, the U.S. declares that everyone is "equal" but when it comes to some of its territories neither the constitution nor the bill of rights applies---the "reason' being that these peoples are not "civilized" enough for American laws.....

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/...n-samoa-tuaua/

The decisions, known as the Insular Cases, date back to the early 20th century, when the US had just won the Spanish-American War and acquired Puerto Rico and the far-flung new territories of Guam and the Philippines. The US acquired American Samoa in two parts in 1900 and 1904 as part of its continued expansion. But American political leaders had a problem: They wanted the United States to become a colonial power, but they didn’t want to extend constitutional protections to the overwhelmingly nonwhite residents of the new territories. (As one of the friend-of-the-court brief in the current case notes, the Democratic Party’s official platform in 1900 argued that “the Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization.”)

To solve that problem, the Supreme Court came up with a bizarre, racially minded solution. The court invented two categories of territory; the Constitution applied fully in “incorporated territories,” such as Arizona, which were settled mostly by white people and destined for statehood, while much of the Constitution did not apply in “unincorporated territories,” such as American Samoa, which were not considered candidates for statehood, largely because of their racial and ethnic makeup.

In fact--the U.S. and U.K. courts/judiciary systems are a laboratory of how "reason" is abused for the whims/convenience of the powerful.....

It is not that ethico-moral principles should change or remain static---what is important is that they remain consistent. For this, a paradigm/meta-narrative is required that spells out the nature, purpose and meaning of human beings and living here on earth. (Such a meta-narrative does not need to be theistic) only then can one develop consistency.....(to that meta-narrative/paradigm).

Your description of the history of the American legal and constitutional system is highly biased and bogus as a three dollar bill.

Your seriously neglecting the enormous problems of the Islamic world that almost all Islamic countries severely restrict religious diversity, and most forbid the Baha'i Faith and in some to be a Baha'i is punishable by death. The minority religions and Judaism and Christianity are leaving Islamic countries for good reasons they are being driven out.

An honest less biased comparison of secular and religious systems of government would be appreciated. Your diatribe against secular governments is uncalled for when compared to Islam today.

[Anomaly]

Coming in late and not sure the thread is still alive, but been reading here and wanted to share an idea aimed to these comments from post #25.

Seer:

God constitutes moral values through his perfect nature

Charles:

You have given no account as to why this is good.

I've been working on a hypothesis following Avicenna that truth is in the essence of things. [Bear with me, this is actually going somewhere pertinent to the op.] I broaden this to the notion that from a reductive point of view, essence contains value or one of two possible denominations--true or false. Following traditional Christian thinking, human choice has the power to fragmentally falsify what was originally a wholly true creation.

Presuppositions relevant to the discussion are:
1) All goods are derivatives of truth. Degrees of falsification produce degrees of good; perfect is an interchangeable term with wholly true. This works for moral and material things, i.e., the value of a bar of gold (in reference to the assigner(s) of gold's value) is relative to its impurities. Impurity is a falsification of the purity or truth of gold.
2) Truth has two aspects, descriptive (virtually inert) and prescriptive (forceful).
3) Descriptive truth in convergence with descriptive falsity produces a mild tension in intellectual apprehension, as in 2+3=6. Prescriptive truth and falsity create a more robust resistance. The moral sense is in effect our perception of fragmentally falsified truth in reference to an external standard, in this case absolute prescriptive truth. For example the willful torture of an innocent human being for pleasure is a falsification of the good of that person's mental and physical health. Health is a good we possess relative to our biological system's truth value; hence, the falsification of truth in the state of affairs in which the torture took place.
4) To say God is perfect or entirely good is simply to say He is wholly True. The Gen story of creation presents the proper standard, that all things conform to truth.

From within the model above Seer would be correct that moral value references the perfection (Truth) of God's nature. Why this is good is because we know intuitively and experientially that the true is in all ways and at all times better [in all those ways better can be construed] than the false.

An interesting feature of this idea is that because truth itself is the simple standard for all good, it's available to and can be seen to operate equally within theist and atheist minds; both either resist or unite with moral truths to the extent essence and cognitive functions are falsified. Disagreements are between persons in possession of various degrees of falsification relative to standards external to the conversation--moral discussions ebb and flow in degrees of variance with truth itself. My two cents worth anyway.

[seer]

Coming in late and not sure the thread is still alive, but been reading here and wanted to share an idea aimed to these comments from post #25.

Seer:
Charles:

I've been working on a hypothesis following Avicenna that truth is in the essence of things. [Bear with me, this is actually going somewhere pertinent to the op.] I broaden this to the notion that from a reductive point of view, essence contains value or one of two possible denominations--true or false. Following traditional Christian thinking, human choice has the power to fragmentally falsify what was originally a wholly true creation.

Presuppositions relevant to the discussion are:
1) All goods are derivatives of truth. Degrees of falsification produce degrees of good; perfect is an interchangeable term with wholly true. This works for moral and material things, i.e., the value of a bar of gold (in reference to the assigner(s) of gold's value) is relative to its impurities. Impurity is a falsification of the purity or truth of gold.
2) Truth has two aspects, descriptive (virtually inert) and prescriptive (forceful).
3) Descriptive truth in convergence with descriptive falsity produces a mild tension in intellectual apprehension, as in 2+3=6. Prescriptive truth and falsity create a more robust resistance. The moral sense is in effect our perception of fragmentally falsified truth in reference to an external standard, in this case absolute prescriptive truth. For example the willful torture of an innocent human being for pleasure is a falsification of the good of that person's mental and physical health. Health is a good we possess relative to our biological system's truth value; hence, the falsification of truth in the state of affairs in which the torture took place.
4) To say God is perfect or entirely good is simply to say He is wholly True. The Gen story of creation presents the proper standard, that all things conform to truth.

From within the model above Seer would be correct that moral value references the perfection (Truth) of God's nature. Why this is good is because we know intuitively and experientially that the true is in all ways and at all times better [in all those ways better can be construed] than the false.

An interesting feature of this idea is that because truth itself is the simple standard for all good, it's available to and can be seen to operate equally within theist and atheist minds; both either resist or unite with moral truths to the extent essence and cognitive functions are falsified. Disagreements are between persons in possession of various degrees of falsification relative to standards external to the conversation--moral discussions ebb and flow in degrees of variance with truth itself. My two cents worth anyway.

That was interesting, though I may need to read it a couple of more times.

[Charles]

From within the model above Seer would be correct that moral value references the perfection (Truth) of God's nature. Why this is good is because we know intuitively and experientially that the true is in all ways and at all times better [in all those ways better can be construed] than the false.

I may have missed some details, however, I don't feel too certain this makes much sence. You say "[...] we know intuitively and experientially that the true is in all ways and at all times better [in all those ways better can be construed] than the false." This sound something along the lines, though not identical, to Kant's statement that you can never lie. I guess both seer and I would agree that this is not the case. You can lie to a nazi if you are hiding jews in your basement. Telling him the truth would be a catastrophe in most cases (unless he decided he was actually doing something morally wrong).

If we don't know that God exists, then how do we know that moral value referenes the perfection (Truth) of God's nature? And how do we know that we know God's nature, when so many suggestions of God's nature are given, and the claim seems to be that there are no objective values without God by whom we can determine that God is good? I don't really see how this gets us anywhere beyond the problem I pointed to initially, but I may have missed something along the way, it was a rather complex and detailed presentation. Perhaps you will share some more words on this?

[Anomaly]

I may have missed some details, however, I don't feel too certain this makes much sence. You say "[...] we know intuitively and experientially that the true is in all ways and at all times better [in all those ways better can be construed] than the false." This sound something along the lines, though not identical, to Kant's statement that you can never lie. I guess both seer and I would agree that this is not the case. You can lie to a nazi if you are hiding jews in your basement. Telling him the truth would be a catastrophe in most cases (unless he decided he was actually doing something morally wrong).

I understand it not making sense, this notion of value departs from orthodox thinking and is a bit awkward to wrap one’s head around in the beginning. Having worked on this idea for more than 20 years now I’ve suspected for some time that value and essence might be just one and the same thing, in which case things like properties and relations could be reduced to bundles or expressions of value(s), but this would be another discussion…

I agree that from a practical (i.e., utilitarian) point of view lying to save life seems meritorious. Not sure what Kant’s sense that we shouldn’t lie entails altogether, but from the hypothetical mechanism of value in essence, not lying is merely the ideal (striving for the perfection truth in thought and act) all fall short of. Seems to me we can be forgiven for lying under the kinds of situations noted above. We’re all fragmentally falsified agents participating in a similarly infected existence. We stuggle to meet the ideal in normal life circumstances, we could hardly be expected to perform perfectly in extreme situations.

If we don't know that God exists, then how do we know that moral value referenes the perfection (Truth) of God's nature?

I suspect not knowing God exists is rarely—maybe never—simply a naïve proposition by the time we reach adulthood. The more interesting question to me is, assuming God does exist and there exist sufficient evidences to warrant this belief, why do some who obtain these same evidences believe and others not? Of course if God does not exist, the question is reversed: why do some ignore evidences for the truth of nonexistence and believe in His existence? This enters an area about “value mechanics” (for lack of a better term) I find intriguing; it has theoretical ramifications in a variety of areas of the cognitive sciences, mostly regarding how value factors into the computational architecture of the brain and nervous system.

…how do we know that we know God's nature, when so many suggestions of God's nature are given, and the claim seems to be that there are no objective values without God by whom we can determine that God is good?

Assume God does exist. “A” believes this to be true. Since fragmentally falsified agents lack certitude in their beliefs, “A” maintains a subset of propositions as warrant for her belief in God.

“B” does not believe that God exists and maintains his own subset of propositions to support the case for unbelief. For me, a sufficient proof that “A” is correct and will likely, given that belief, also accept the revelatory goodness of God, is drawn from the proposal that goods derive from the true. To say God is good identifies an effect; truth is the cause and maker of good, thus God’s nature is in its purest form not merely good but true.

Because the scenario above holds that God does exist, we can know God’s nature by the fact that both A and B seek true propositions to support their respective beliefs about the existence of God. “A” seeks true propositions to support the truth that God exists, while B seeks true propositions to support the falsehood that God does not exist. The objective in all cases is to pull together and formulate truth connections to sustain belief.

The mechanics of value are pretty simple: because an agent’s moral beliefs are often inconsistent, many and variable, it seems reasonable to suppose that fragmental falsification can be mapped to an assortment of “areas” [to borrow language appropriate to spatiotemporal reality] of the soul—or content of essence or spirit or whatever term fits best—sufficient to produce these varieties of resistance or attraction to various prescriptive propositions. On the aforementioned value functions, “A” demonstrates a true-true union (e.g., the external truth “God exists” united with the internally formulated proposition “God exists”) while “B” accepts as true the false proposition “God does not exist” not in spite of its resistance to the external truth, but specifically because of it. “A” was—due to the appropriate sphere or region of essence/mind “cleansed” [made true]—free to unite with external prescriptive truth. “B”, not similarly truth-bearing in those areas, is not and resists the external truth.

This idea of value in essence directing us toward or away from absolute truth sounds deterministic, but I suspect there is in all agents a period (probably as young adults) during which attempts are made internally to overcome the resistance falsity imposes on reason to attempt proper correspondence of moral propositions. Eventually established falsehoods tend to beget more false beliefs as resistance to external truth mounts in intellectual operation. Yet in every instance of a false belief, its holder will inexorably search for true propositions to support those falsehoods.

I think the idea of God as Truth combined with supporting claims of His nature (good, derivatively) in Scripture are borne out by the fact that we support both the moral truths we believe as well as those we don’t believe only with what we accept as true propositions.