A Seldom Considered Argument for Dualism

[JimL]

Kenny, before your mereological simples, particles such as electrons, quarks or immaterial souls if you like, before they come to be mereological simples, what, if anything, were they?

[Kenny]

Kenny, before your mereological simples, particles such as electrons, quarks or immaterial souls if you like, before they come to be mereological simples, what, if anything, were they?

They didn't exst.

[JimL]

They didn't exst.

Well, just so that I'm sure as to your meaning, when you say that they didn't exist do you mean that they as individuals didn't exist or that the substance out of which they are made, their essence, if you will, did not exist?

[Kenny]

Well, just so that I'm sure as to your meaning, when you say that they didn't exist do you mean that they as individuals didn't exist

I mean they didn’t exist, period.

or that the substance out of which they are made

I don’t believe there is any such substance.

[nightbringer]

Well, you’re not the only one. There’s currently a roaring debate in the literature about this very subject.

I'm glad I'm in good company then!

In philosophy, we not only get to have debates, we get to have debates about our debates!

But, as far as the purposes of this thread are concerned, I think this position lends itself to another argument for dualism. If the position you suggest is correct, then whether or not there are composite objects is simply a matter of which conventions are in force (/concepts are being used/definitions are being supplied to the relevant terms).

But, while this may be a plausible thing to think about the issue of whether or not there is a table in my house or merely simples arranged tablewise, it is not a plausible thing to think about the issue of whether or not there are persons. Even if I could bring myself to believe that whether or not my table exists is a matter of convention, I can’t believe that whether or not I exist is simply a matter of convention.

So this is another example of how a robust realism about human persons combined with materialism about human persons boxes one in when it comes to the composition debate. If one is a robust realist about human persons and a materialist, it will be difficult for one to consistently adopt a deflationary attitude toward the debate over composition.

I'm inclined to agree. At least it seems that when I do things like assign moral blame, what I am assigning that blame to is something that does not just depend on convention.

Well, what do you mean by “what stuff you’d find”. If you mean what individual things you’d find then there sure is a disagreement among those with different views about mereology (my world has tables in it; the nihilist’s does not).

I don't think it's especially easy to explain what I'm getting at. It's hard to talk about this without presupposing some view of individual/composite things. I guess I'd ask you to consider all the sensory data currently being sent to your brain (or mind). Imagine the state this raw data is in prior to your brain's processing of it. Now, would this data "look" different depending on whether mereological nihilism or essentialism were true or not? I don't think so. As far as I can tell, the raw data would remain the same. And so it seems to me that the reality of the external world is the same irregardless of which mereological position is true.

If mereological universalism is true, dualism is true.

If mereological nihilism is true, dualism is true.

If deflationism about the debate over composition is true, dualism is true.

…

There’s a nice pattern emerging here

That does seem to be the way of it, yeah.

[Xru]

Well, just so that I'm sure as to your meaning, when you say that they didn't exist do you mean that they as individuals didn't exist or that the substance out of which they are made, their essence, if you will, did not exist?

Reminds me of the time I tried to read "Being and Time."

[Kenny]

I don't think it's especially easy to explain what I'm getting at. It's hard to talk about this without presupposing some view of individual/composite things.

I think I do have the intuition that you are gesturing toward. It’s not that I’ve never been tempted toward the deflationary perspective concerning this debate. It can seem that it doesn’t make a difference to “how the world really is” whether there are composite objects or not. (However, ultimately, I think there are powerful arguments against that perspective). But I think the difficulty of clearly cashing out this intuition is at least some evidence that it is confused.

I guess I'd ask you to consider all the sensory data currently being sent to your brain
(or mind). Imagine the state this raw data is in prior to your brain's processing of it. Now, would this data "look" different depending on whether mereological nihilism or essentialism were true or not? I don't think so. As far as I can tell, the raw data would remain the same. And so it seems to me that the reality of the external world is the same irregardless of which mereological position is true.

Well, if we simply individuate this “sensory data” (I don’t take notion of sensory data with ontological seriousness, but it can be useful to talk this way sometimes) by how it looks “from the inside” so to speak, then my sensory data also fails to discriminate between a world in which I am having veridical perceptions and one in which I am the victim of an evil demon who is causing me to experience as if I am having those perceptions. It doesn’t follow that “the reality of the external world is the same regardless” of which of these positions is true. If, on the other hand, we individuate the sensory data based in part on what’s causing us to have it, then we would have different items of sensory data if mereological nihilism were true than if mereological universalism is true (in one case we wouldn’t be aware of composite objects and in the other we would).

[Kenny]

Reminds me of the time I tried to read "Being and Time."

That wasn't philosophy

[Xru]

That wasn't philosophy

Well I couldn't read or understand it so I'm not surprised;)

[Kenny]

Well I couldn't read or understand it so I'm not surprised;)

I was half joking.

[nightbringer]

I think I do have the intuition that you are gesturing toward. It’s not that I’ve never been tempted toward the deflationary perspective concerning this debate. It can seem that it doesn’t make a difference to “how the world really is” whether there are composite objects or not. (However, ultimately, I think there are powerful arguments against that perspective). But I think the difficulty of clearly cashing out this intuition is at least some evidence that it is confused.

Yeah I'm willing to consider that. For instance, I find it hard to "cash out" the intuition that alternate possibilities are required for libertarian free will, and I take that as evidence that there is some confusion going on.

Well, if we simply individuate this “sensory data” (I don’t take notion of sensory data with ontological seriousness, but it can be useful to talk this way sometimes) by how it looks “from the inside” so to speak, then my sensory data also fails to discriminate between a world in which I am having veridical perceptions and one in which I am the victim of an evil demon who is causing me to experience as if I am having those perceptions. It doesn’t follow that “the reality of the external world is the same regardless” of which of these positions is true. If, on the other hand, we individuate the sensory data based in part on what’s causing us to have it, then we would have different items of sensory data if mereological nihilism were true than if mereological universalism is true (in one case we wouldn’t be aware of composite objects and in the other we would).

I feel that there's still an argument to be had here, but it seems it would require a lot of care to put together. I agree that the illustration I gave is not itself sufficient. As things stand I'm happy to not take a particularly firm position either way.

[nightbringer]

I was half joking.

Or maybe three-quarters joking I suspect.

[Kenny]

Or maybe three-quarters joking I suspect.

[nightbringer]

Or maybe three-quarters joking I suspect.

Woops what I meant was only a quarter joking, not three quarters >.<

I think you got the point though.

[Kenny]

Woops what I meant was only a quarter joking, not three quarters >.<

I think you got the point though.

I'm joking sixty percent of the time, every time.