A Seldom Considered Argument for Dualism

[Kenny]

Hello all. I have little time to post now. Sorry. Holidays and travel and all. I'll try to get back to this sometime next year.

[Teallaura]

No prob - see you when you have time!

[JimL]

Kenny's argument would have us believe that every animate material object, a blade of grass for instance, has a soul, a mereological simple entity that inhabits the body, and if we shuold snip the tip of it off, though its body, the blade of grass itself, no longer exists, it becomes blade of grass-minus, its soul continues to survive the loss of a part of the body that it inhabits. So, what is the soul of an individual blade of grass, does the blade of grass, in the form of its soul, continue to exist when the blade of grass no longer does? Does it go to heaven and get together with all its earthly relatives or do some of them go to hell for their iniquitous ways on earth? I think that you have to define what immaterial souls are before you can argue for their existence, or that they are distinct, or something other than the material body.

[mattbballman]

[QUOTE]

If you accept that Body ceases to exist when it loses its pinky then yes, exactly. If you think Body continues to exist minus its pinky then Body becomes Deformed - they are the same entity.

If Body becomes Deformed, it's no longer Body, but Deformed. There's no identity here. A seed becomes a flower, but a flower and a seed are two different things. Kenny has got to mean by 'Body' that particular thing which has as a part of what it is some enduring quality (soul?) that stays in tact as various events attenuated it in whatever ways.

There's got to be that sinuous link. Think of a Christmas tree. If you do have a soul, the properties we lose can't be things like the branches or the trunk or the foliage, it's got to be things like the lights or ornaments, things the tree can lose and still be a Christmas tree.

You've got the definitions right - the question is what becomes of Body once it loses its pinky? We know Body minus pinky = Deformed - but what happens to Body? If Body persists then it must be Deformed.

I guess it comes down to every single aspect of what makes us what we are. If we are extended space/time blocks existing tenselessly, then we were always Body-at-T1-and-Deformed-at-T2. It doesn't make sense to me say we're the very same thing if at T1 we're Body and at T2 we're Deformed, unless the deformation is on par with losing an ornament or a light. If we're not space/time blocks, and we're persisting along with the 'temporal becoming', something like the Christmas tree analogy has to hold for me to be persuaded that I'm the same 'object' even though I was a Body and am now Deformed. The question then becomes, "What properties does this soul-thing have that distinguishes it from other soul-things out there?" After all, underneath all the ornamentation, the only thing distinguishing me from you (this Christmas tree for your Christmas tree) is spacial location, which isn't precise enough to establish difference of identity, unless you think it's impossible for two spacially distinct objects to have all the same properties. But I think that is quite possible. The only solution I can think of is something along the lines of Aristotle, to distinguished one substance from another by giving a 'this-ness' (a whatness) along with a such-ness (an existence), and the 'this-ness' is a unique property only had by the particular substance. Perhaps I can elaborate on that later.

If Clark Kent runs into a phone booth and Superman emerges, what happens to Clark? Either: 1) Clark ceases to exist or 2) Clark continues to exist and becomes Superman. If 2, then Clark Kent is Superman and Superman is Clark Kent. If 1, then Superman is a separate entity that exists only when Clark doesn't (ya know, this seemed like a good analogy when I started... ).

This is a good analogy. Is Clark Kent Clark Kent-minus-Superman? And is Superman Superman-plus-Clark-Kent? The key lies in the riverbed properties underlying them both. Clark Kent seems to be the riverbed which establishes persistence of identity. If Superman was a property like losing a trunk on a Christmas tree, radical changes in identity ensue; but I think we'd both agree that when Clark dons the costume, it's more like festooning what is already a pre-existing Christmas tree.

[Kenny]

For me, it isn't the terminology per se - it's the concept behind it I'm chewing on - which in your last post would be P2. I get it and haven't a rational objection to it but my little bulb is having a hissy fit and does not want to accept P2 as true. In my little bulb's world 'survive' and 'strictly survive' lack distinction since (to my bulb) Tree and Tree Minus are still the same tree.

Would you say that it’s the same aggregate of matter? In any case, I agree that there is a sense in which Tree and Tree-Minus are the “same” tree. I just deny that Tree is numerically identical to Tree-Minus (i.e. that it is numerically one and the same object as Tree-Minus). I think that the sameness relations by which we ordinarily keep track of material items such as cars, trees and the like is a looser sort of sameness relation than that of identity.

My little bulb (this keeps up and I'm gonna have to give it a name) won't believe Tree is any the less still Tree just cause a few atoms, limbs or half its mass cease to exist. Yet clearly as Tree loses bits of itself it cannot still be the same Tree - unless it is more than the mere sum of its parts which seems fine for people, passable for trees and silly for bouncing balls. That would be fudging at the very least if I grant that Tree is greater than the sum of its parts but Bouncing Ball is not - especially since I have no rational basis for such an assumption.

I agree that what a materialist about human persons should try to maintain is that it is possible for certain sorts of material objects to strictly survive the loss of some of their parts. I agree that there is nothing conceptually absurd or anything like that in idea that some material objects can strictly survive the loss of their parts. Nevertheless, there is a powerful argument for the conclusion that they can’t – the Body-minus argument. Any materialist who wants to deny that conclusion is going to need to come up with something to say about that argument.

[Kenny]

Kenny defines survival as that which remains fully intact

I take the claim that material objects do not continue to exist after the loss of some of their parts to be a substantive metaphysical conclusion, not something that is true by definition. Things that are true by definition are uninteresting logical tautologies. This is a debate about metaphysics, not semantics.

[Kenny]

I have a question now, Kenny - if we accept P2 aren't we denying the persistence of objects?

No. First, given my view, there are lots of things that persist through time by way of having things at other times that are strictly and literally identical to them – persons, electrons, aggregates of matter that don’t lose any parts, etc. Second, I hold that there is a sense in which a material object such as a tree persists (qua tree) in spite of the fact that it losses parts – it persists by way of having tree-successors.

I haven't been clear on the need for annihilation in your argument other than to avoid 'but the limb is still laying there' as an objection.

On some views (including my own), the material object that is Body continues to exist as long as its parts do (however widely scattered there may be). That’s why (to secure the conclusion that Body no longer exists) I need to have it that the lost part is annihilated.

It seems to me that merely ceasing to be a part of Thing is sufficient to change Thing to Thing Minus

In the strictest since, Tree never “changes” into Tree-minus; rather, the former succeeds the latter when it comes to playing the role of the tree (think of actresses swapping out roles on a soap opera – the one actress does not change into the other; rather, she takes over the role played by the former actress).

- in which case I'm probably on my twentieth successor* since I started typing (especially given how hard I have to tap this ^*&%&^% keyboard!).

No. You’re an immaterial simple that does not gain or lose parts :)

[Kenny]

P2 is probably weak.

I agree that it is the premise that the materialist should deny. But, since I gave an argument for it, it is not enough for the materialist to simply deny it; she needs to respond to that argument.

It would apply to a spider if it lost part of one of its legs, wouldn't it?

Yep. It generalizes to any case in which a material object loses a part.

Or, would you say that spider-at-time-1 is a completely different material object than spider-at-time-2?

I’m not sure what ‘completely different’ means in this context. I would say that the latter is a numerically distinct material object from the former.

Intuitively, it seems to be the same spider even though part of its leg got lost in a fight for mate, say.

I agree that there is a looser sense in which it is the same spider, but the sameness relation involved in that sense is not that of strict numerical identity, but one that involves standing in a appropriate relation of succession.

But then your critic could say we are material objects, not in a strict sense, but a loose one.

As I’ve been saying all along, if the materialist wants to say that we don’t strictly survive the loss of some of our body’s parts, I’ll say “More power to her”; my only request of her at that point is that she seriously reflect on what this view commits her to, asking herself if she really can take it seriously.

Huh? No, I disagree here. Body has the pinky; Deformed doesn't. What else could Body be at that time? Well, we know what Body couldn't be: Deformed. Why? Body has got a pinky. I pinky swear.

If Body strictly survived the loss of its pinky, then at t2, Body would no longer have a pinky. We shouldn’t suppose that objects cannot continue to exist after any change whatsoever. Certainly I do not suppose that.

Break down the equivalence thing for me. That's what I'm missing.

What’s at issue here is whether things continue to exist after the loss of some of their parts. In order for some entity, x, that exists at t1 to continue to exist from t1 to t2 (inclusive interval), there must be something at t1 that is identical to x (something at t1 that is that very entity) and something at t2 that is identical to x (something at t2 that is that very entity). Furthermore, at any given time, t, x and y are numerically identical only if every property that x has at t is a property that y has at t. So if, at a given time, an object x has a different property than an object y, x is not numerically identical to y.

[Kenny]

Do I have this right?:

Definitions:

Body: Everything plus pinky.

Deformed: Everything but the pinky.

No. ‘Body’ and ‘Deformed’ are meant to be taken as proper names, the referents of which are initially picked out by various descriptions; the descriptions are not meant to be taken as definitions of those terms.

Compare, we see a group of people from a distance and I say “Let’s call the guy wearing the top hat over there ‘Carl’”. Later on, we encounter the same group of people again but this time no one is wearing a hat. We can still coherently ask “Which one of these people is Carl?” If we pick some hatless guy out of the crowd and say “That’s Carl!” we are correct as long as he is the same guy as the one that we originally named “Carl”.

[Kenny]

Kenny's argument would have us believe that every animate material object, a blade of grass for instance, has a soul

Nope. I don’t have any trouble denying that, strictly speaking, a blade of grass ceases to exist after its “body” loses a part. I find it incredible, however, to say that the same is true of human persons.

[Teallaura]

Hi,

I'm gonna think a while before answering. Mostly to make sure I'm understanding correctly (the fact that I think I do worries me... ) since I've been sick for a while and away from this. I must admit, if I got it right, it's a more compelling argument than I'd originally thought.

But whatta I know? I'm a simple!

[shunyadragon]

Nope. I don’t have any trouble denying that, strictly speaking, a blade of grass ceases to exist after its “body” loses a part. I find it incredible, however, to say that the same is true of human persons.

I do not believe that all that it is human dies when the body dies, but based on this argument I do not see anything different between the grass plant and our human body.

[shunyadragon]

I take the claim that material objects do not continue to exist after the loss of some of their parts to be a substantive metaphysical conclusion, not something that is true by definition. Things that are true by definition are uninteresting logical tautologies. This is a debate about metaphysics, not semantics.

I do not consider it a semantics problem at all, and yes it is a metaphysics question, but I do not consider it a substantive metaphysical conclusion to equate the lose of a physical part and the survival of the human or anything else physically, equating logically to the conclusion that part of the human identity we call the soul would survive death or any other version of dualism..

[Kenny]

I do not consider it a semantics problem at all, and yes it is a metaphysics question, but I do not consider it a substantive metaphysical conclusion to equate the lose of a physical part and the survival of the human or anything else physically, equating logically to the conclusion that part of the human identity we call the soul would survive death or any other version of dualism..

I haven’t argued that the human soul survives death in this thread.

Come back when you’re ready to engage with the argument in the OP.

[shunyadragon]

I haven’t argued that the human soul survives death in this thread.

Come back when you’re ready to engage with the argument in the OP.

Please note what I said in the post again . . .

. . . equating logically to the conclusion that part of the human identity we call the soul would survive death or any other version of dualism..

You arguing for some form of dualism aren't you?