A Seldom Considered Argument for Dualism

[Kenny]

So such a deflationist claims that there is definitely a distinction between simples (electrons, souls etc) and that there is a distinction between simples arranged tree-wise and simples arranged table-wise, but whether in fact a table or a tree is a mereological sum of particular parts, or a mereological sum of different parts at different times is merely a matter of convention...?

Yep, a deflationist could (and probably would) say all that (or something near enough).

[David Hayward]

(1) Assume (for reductio) that cars are material objects.
(2) Cars can strictly survive the loss of some of their parts. [1, P1]
(3) Cars cannot strictly survive the loss of some of their parts. [1, P2]
(4) Contradiction! [2,3]
(5) It is not the case that cars are material objects [1,4, reductio ad absurdum]

Does the same argument apply if I substitute "cars" for "human persons"?

David

[Kenny]

Does the same argument apply if I substitute "cars" for "human persons"?

David

In that case, I'd see no strong reason to accept the resulting version of P1. In fact, I believe that P1, with ‘cars’ substituted for ‘human persons’ is false; I don't believe that cars strictly survive the loss of their parts, though they can survive the loss of their parts in a looser sense, by way of having successors. Though some might disagree, it’s not too counterintuitive to think that cars are like that (even if we had some intuitions to the contrary, it’s easy enough to learn to live with a view that runs contrary to them). But it is (I think) beyond belief to think that human persons are like that.

[nightbringer]

Yep, a deflationist could (and probably would) say all that (or something near enough).

Okay cool, but I guess I'm wondering, how does this position differ from that of the nihilist? The deflationist seems to be saying that there really are simples and simples arranged X-wise, but that when we say there are compositive objects given such and such conditions, these conditions are not reflective of reality - they are merely how we use language. But if there is no true condition on which an object is a composite object, then it seems that only simples really exist.

Or is the deflationist saying that reality itself matches the ambiguity of our differing conventions?

[Kenny]

Okay cool, but I guess I'm wondering, how does this position differ from that of the nihilist?

Actually, in some cases, it can be hard to tell. Depending on the nature of the deflationism in question, it can seem that the deflationist is either presupposes nihilism (there really aren’t any composite objects, but by convention we talk as if there are under certain conditions) or universalism (there really are all those composite objects out there, but by convention we may restrict what we allow our existential quantifiers to range over so that nihilists sentences come out true, or we may expand what we allow them to range over so that nihilist sentences come out false).

This is a way of pushing back against the deflationist – by trying to show that her own deflationism presupposes a non-conventionally right answer to the very question she said has no non-conventionally right answer. Of course, there are ways for the deflationist to push back – I’m just noting that this is a direction in which the debate might go.

The deflationist seems to be saying that there really are simples and simples arranged X-wise, but that when we say there are compositive objects given such and such conditions, these conditions are not reflective of reality - they are merely how we use language.

What a deflationist would say in response depends on the nature of her deflationism. But here’s one thing a deflationist could say:

Reality is determinately such that there are simples arranged X-wise, but it is not determinately such that those simples compose an X, nor is it determinately such that those simples do not compose an X. Reality (to speak metaphorically) simply “doesn’t take a stand” on that issue. It’s up to us to fill in the gap left by reality here via our conventions.

Another thing a deflationist might say is this:

The debate between nihilists and universalists is merely verbal because they both simply mean different things by ‘exist’. There are lots of different candidate meanings for ‘exist’. Some of them are such that ‘Composite objects exist’ comes out true. Some are such that ‘Composite objects exist’ comes out false. But usage (perhaps in conjunction with certain facts about reality) sufficiently narrows down the candidate meanings of ‘exist’ that sentences like ‘Simples exist’ always come out true (no matter what candidate meaning one picks).

Or is the deflationist saying that reality itself matches the ambiguity of our differing conventions?

I think that’s what they’d better say.

[nightbringer]

^ Cool. Guess I now actually understand the position I was arguing for. lol....

Mereology 101 has been fun.

[nightbringer]

Here's another thought, or enquiry.

Given your mereological essentialism, you presumably think that (diving into specifically Christian territory now) our resurrection bodies will not be strictly identical to the bodies we will leave behind at death. Presumably, you think that our resurrection bodies will indeed be our bodies, but only because their constituents are appropriately similar successors to those of the bodies we will leave behind at death.

From what I understand though, there is a large emphasis on the numerical identity of the resurrection body with our current body in Pharisaic and subsequent Christian thought. I take it that to stand in this tradition (or the spirit of this tradition), one must take whatever mereological view one holds to satisfy a "strong sense" of continuity between our present bodies and those of the resurrection. If my assessment of this tradition is correct, and you indeed take yourself to be following it, you consider your view of the persistence of material objects over time to provide a strong enough sense of the shared identity between pre- and post-resurrection bodies. But if the kind of continuity you posit is robust enough to allow that continuity, why, it might be objected, is it not robust enough to allow for the continuity of material persons?

[Kenny]

Given your mereological essentialism, you presumably think that (diving into specifically Christian territory now) our resurrection bodies will not be strictly identical to the bodies we will leave behind at death.

I suppose God could build our resurrection bodies using all and only the same parts of the body we had at death. In that case (given my own views), they would be strictly identical to the bodies we had a death. I don’t see why we should expect that to be the case though. I’m quite certain, in any case, that (baring my immediate demise) my resurrection body will not be numerically identical to the body I have now (well, I guess it’s possible that God could build it out of all and only the same parts my body has now, but that doesn’t seem very likely, no more than it seems likely that he would build it out of all and only the same parts my body had ten years ago, or ten years from now, or …).

Presumably, you think that our resurrection bodies will indeed be our bodies, but only because their constituents are appropriately similar successors to those of the bodies we will leave behind at death.

Yes. Furthermore, I believe that they’ll be numerically the same bodies as those we have now. They’ll be numerically the same bodies we have now in the same sense that the body I have now is numerically the same body as the one I had a week ago. I just don’t believe that the relevant sameness relation here is the one that philosophers and logicians refer to when they speak of “numerical identity”.

From what I understand though, there is a large emphasis on the numerical identity of the resurrection body with our current body in Pharisaic and subsequent Christian thought.

I doubt that this theological tradition is metaphysically refined enough to select the relation that philosophers and logicians refer to as “numerical identity” as the relevant numerical sameness relation. I suspect that all that endorsing this tradition commits one to is believing that the resurrected body will be one and the same body as the one that died in whatever sense the body I had yesterday is one and the same body as the one I had today.

I take it that to stand in this tradition (or the spirit of this tradition), one must take whatever mereological view one holds to satisfy a "strong sense" of continuity between our present bodies and those of the resurrection.

I think that my view satisfies that constraint.

But if the kind of continuity you posit is robust enough to allow that continuity, why, it might be objected, is it not robust enough to allow for the continuity of material persons?

In response to that, I’d say that this is because, while our (that is, most of us, or at least those of us who are disposed to be moved by the argument in the OP ) pre-theoretical commitments allow for some wiggle room when it comes to how tight or loose the relevant sameness relation is when it comes to keeping track of material objects over time (even material objects such as our own bodies), there isn’t corresponding wiggle room with respect to how tight or loose the relevant sameness relation is when it comes to keeping track of human persons over time.

And, again, to support that point, I’d just appeal to you to reflect on the matter for yourself. If, at the end of the day (upon due reflection), you are comfortable with thinking that human persons fail to strictly persist through time for extended periods, more power to you. I’ll have nothing further to say (aside from a few more intuition pumps, perhaps, to try to get you to reconsider).

[Teallaura]

Hi,

Okay, I'm pretty sure I follow the argument but just to make certain I'm not missing a nuance, I have a question. Is there any significance to the term 'strictly survives' beyond 'is the same thing it was prior to occurrence X'?

[Kenny]

Is there any significance to the term 'strictly survives' beyond 'is the same thing it was prior to occurrence X'?

It’s important that the “sameness” relation being referred to here is that of strict numerical identity. Someone (like me) with a Chisholmian view of the persistence of ordinary, commonsense material objects will allow that there is a sense – a “loose and popular” sense – in which my van is “the same van” as the one I brought home from the dealership, in spite of my having changed the spark plugs, in spite of the fact that the van I have now (or, at least, the thing that currently plays the role of my van) is not numerically identical to the one I brought home from the dealership.

[Teallaura]

Okay, I think I got it. Thanks!

<makes note to go read up on 'numeric identity'>















Philosophy and law have a lot in common - both make the simple as complicated as possible in order to be sure you understand what you understood to begin with...

[JimL]

It’s important that the “sameness” relation being referred to here is that of strict numerical identity. Someone (like me) with a Chisholmian view of the persistence of ordinary, commonsense material objects will allow that there is a sense – a “loose and popular” sense – in which my van is “the same van” as the one I brought home from the dealership, in spite of my having changed the spark plugs, in spite of the fact that the van I have now (or, at least, the thing that currently plays the role of my van) is not numerically identical to the one I brought home from the dealership.

So your idea isn't that a material body doesn't survive the loss of its parts, but only that it doesn't "strickly survive" being that it loses some of its parts. And so how do you know that a spirit or soul "strickly survives" anymore than the body that houses it. I mean on what grounds should we assume that there is an immaterial mereological simple which you call a soul due to the material bodies continued survival, though not its strict survival, after the loss of a part or parts of it? What if we were to assume that the soul extended throughout the body and that when the body loses its pinky so too does the soul lose its soul pinky? In such a case, though you might say of either, of both the body and the soul, that they don't strickly survive, yet they would still both survive. I guess what I'm asking is that if a thing survives then what point is there in asking whether or not it "strictly" survives?

[Kenny]

So your idea isn't that a material body doesn't survive the loss of its parts, but only that it doesn't "strickly survive" being that it loses some of its parts. And so how do you know that a spirit or soul "strickly survives" anymore than the body that houses it. I mean on what grounds should we assume that there is an immaterial mereological simple which you call a soul due to the material bodies continued survival, though not its strict survival, after the loss of a part or parts of it? What if we were to assume that the soul extended throughout the body and that when the body loses its pinky so too does the soul lose its soul pinky? In such a case, though you might say of either, of both the body and the soul, that they don't strickly survive, yet they would still both survive. I guess what I'm asking is that if a thing survives then what point is there in asking whether or not it "strictly" survives?

The short answer is that I believe that I strictly survive (as a person) my body’s losing parts. But (I think) I have a good argument for the conclusion that my body cannot strictly survive losing its parts. So, whatever I am, I must not be identical to my body (because I have different persistence conditions than it does). The same argument (if it works in the first place) establishes that I’m not identical to any other of the material objects that is a candidate for being the thing I’m identical to (e.g. the same argument establishes that I’m not identical to my brain). So, whatever I am, I must be an immaterial thing that strictly survives when my body undergoes the loss of some of its parts.

Now, what basis do I have for believing that I strictly survive my body’s gaining and losing parts? That’s a good question. My best answer is that I simply find that belief among my most deeply entrenched beliefs about myself. I’d say that if that belief is in fact warranted, it is among those beliefs that are properly basic for me. In any case, though, I find myself believing it, and I find myself unable not to believe it (and I suspect that many other people who take the time to seriously consider the matter will find themselves in the same position – it’s easy to say one doesn’t believe it, harder to actually mean it). And I think it is a good idea (generally speaking) to have consistent beliefs, and so I think it is a good idea (generally speaking) to go ahead and accept the known entailments of my beliefs. So, given that I have this belief (which I cannot give up) and it (in conjunction with other beliefs I have that I think are well supported) entails that I am an immaterial object that strictly persists through time, I accept that entailment.

[JimL]

The short answer is that I believe

And I think that the above pretty much sums up your argument Kenny. I see no logic in the argument. Your argument is that the only reason that the material body can be said to survive the loss of a part is because it isn't the material body that is surviving, it is only the immaterial soul that survives. But if a material body is not the person, if it is not itself alive, then what does it even mean to assert that it does not survive? Thats like saying that an inanimate rock in which a part is innihilated does not strickly survive the loss of that part. If the material body is not alive to begin with then what sense does it make to argue that it does not survive? If you are going to make the argument that a thing does not survive, or strickly survive, then don't you have to first acknowledge that thing to be alive?

[Teallaura]

And I think that the above pretty much sums up your argument Kenny. I see no logic in the argument. Your argument is that the only reason that the material body can be said to survive the loss of a part is because it isn't the material body that is surviving, it is only the immaterial soul that survives. But if a material body is not the person, if it is not itself alive, then what does it even mean to assert that it does not survive? Thats like saying that an inanimate rock in which a part is innihilated does not strickly survive the loss of that part. If the material body is not alive to begin with then what sense does it make to argue that it does not survive? If you are going to make the argument that a thing does not survive, or strickly survive, then don't you have to first acknowledge that thing to be alive?

Um, that's not the issue. The argument has more to do with what things are and are not. Thing with all its parts is not exactly the same thing as thing minus a part. Thing is replaced by its successor Thing Minus. Kenny's argument is that there is no such change of identity with people when they lose parts so they must be something more than merely material.

Using the car example, if I replace my car's chassis, body, engine, drive train, gas tank, electrical system, fuel system, coolant system, complete interior and exhaust system, but keep the original rear view mirror, is it even arguably the same car? Common sense says no because if it were then exchanging mirrors would make cars parts of each other - which is silly (and I'm certain some school of philosophy believes exactly that.. ). Likewise, a kidney transplant doesn't make the live donor and recipient the same person.

So, if our tree gets shot by a phaser (they really shouldn't let McCoy play with those...) and its limb ceases to exist, its not really the same exact tree anymore, is it? But is the same true when Scotty gets plastered and accidentally shoots McCoy's foot with a phaser? Is McCoy still the same person, sans foot, as he was with both feet? If so, then he isn't strictly (only, just) material because a strictly material object ceases to be the same thing it was before someone let these guys play with phasers.

It doesn't matter what the non-material part (soul) is made of because the argument has nothing to do with the nature of the soul other than that it strictly survives drunken Star Trek characters on shore leave playing with phasers.