A Seldom Considered Argument for Dualism

[Carrikature]

Um, that's not the issue. The argument has more to do with what things are and are not. Thing with all its parts is not exactly the same thing as thing minus a part. Thing is replaced by its successor Thing Minus. Kenny's argument is that there is no such change of identity with people when they lose parts so they must be something more than merely material.

Using the car example, if I replace my car's chassis, body, engine, drive train, gas tank, electrical system, fuel system, coolant system, complete interior and exhaust system, but keep the original rear view mirror, is it even arguably the same car? Common sense says no because if it were then exchanging mirrors would make cars parts of each other - which is silly (and I'm certain some school of philosophy believes exactly that.. ). Likewise, a kidney transplant doesn't make the live donor and recipient the same person.

So, if our tree gets shot by a phaser (they really shouldn't let McCoy play with those...) and its limb ceases to exist, its not really the same exact tree anymore, is it? But is the same true when Scotty gets plastered and accidentally shoots McCoy's foot with a phaser? Is McCoy still the same person, sans foot, as he was with both feet? If so, then he isn't strictly (only, just) material because a strictly material object ceases to be the same thing it was before someone let these guys play with phasers.

It doesn't matter what the non-material part (soul) is made of because the argument has nothing to do with the nature of the soul other than that it strictly survives drunken Star Trek characters on shore leave playing with phasers.

I don't think it's accurate to say that a tree that loses a limb ceases to be the same tree. Your qualifier seems to be 'same exact tree', but then it can't be said that a person who loses a limb (or phalange) has not been altered by the experience. The reality of our descriptors generally ignores alterations that aren't transmutations. That is, a broken rock is now multiple rocks, whereas a tree that loses a limb is still a tree. A tree that is cut down is now a tree stump, i.e. transmutation.

[Teallaura]

I don't think it's accurate to say that a tree that loses a limb ceases to be the same tree. Your qualifier seems to be 'same exact tree', but then it can't be said that a person who loses a limb (or phalange) has not been altered by the experience. The reality of our descriptors generally ignores alterations that aren't transmutations. That is, a broken rock is now multiple rocks, whereas a tree that loses a limb is still a tree. A tree that is cut down is now a tree stump, i.e. transmutation.

I think I've represented the argument fairly, which was as far as I intended to go. I'm still chewing on it myself so I'm far from able to debate it properly. If I got it right, Kenny should be able to do a better job than I with this. If not, we'll save a lot of pixels if I wait to find out.

I'm reasonably sure that identity here hasn't anything to do with the impact of the event emotionally - although the question of whether or not significant emotional events change who we are is an interesting one. As I understand it, the argument centers on the sameness of the material thing.

Anyway, I'm pretty sure there's a 'Save the Pixels' group out there somewhere so I best not upset them any further...

[Kenny]

It doesn't matter what the non-material part (soul) is made of because the argument has nothing to do with the nature of the soul other than that it strictly survives drunken Star Trek characters on shore leave playing with phasers.

Exactly! (Well, except for the souls of the poor red shirts).

[Kenny]

Your argument is that the only reason that the material body can be said to survive the loss of a part is because it isn't the material body that is surviving, it is only the immaterial soul that survives.

No. My argument is that since the human person strictly survives the loss of the body’s parts but the body does not (and that the same holds with respect to any other material object that is a reasonable initial candidate for being the thing that is the person), the human person is not identical to the body (or to any other material object). So the human person must be something immaterial, and whatever immaterial thing she is must strictly survive the loss of the body’s parts (because she does and she’s it).

But if a material body is not the person, if it is not itself alive, then what does it even mean to assert that it does not survive?

I told you what I meant in the OP. I gave you a definition of ‘strictly survives’: x strictly survives an occurrence iff x exists before the occurrence and x exists after the occurrence. I could have just dropped the term ‘strictly survives’, if I wanted, and spoke instead of things existing before the body loses its parts and things existing after the body loses its parts. Nothing important turns on this issue.

Thats like saying that an inanimate rock in which a part is innihilated does not strickly survive the loss of that part.

Well, it doesn’t.

If the material body is not alive to begin with then what sense does it make to argue that it does not survive?

We speak of material objects as surviving certain occurrences (e.g. “This is my grandma’s old hutch. It survived the flood of 93!”). That’s how I was speaking. But none of this matters. The entire argument could be put solely in terms of whether things exist before or after certain occurrences. There’s no need to get into a pointless verbal dispute about the meaning of the word ‘survives’.

[Teallaura]

Exactly! (Well, except for the souls of the poor red shirts).

[Carrikature]

I think I've represented the argument fairly, which was as far as I intended to go. I'm still chewing on it myself so I'm far from able to debate it properly. If I got it right, Kenny should be able to do a better job than I with this. If not, we'll save a lot of pixels if I wait to find out.

I'm reasonably sure that identity here hasn't anything to do with the impact of the event emotionally - although the question of whether or not significant emotional events change who we are is an interesting one. As I understand it, the argument centers on the sameness of the material thing.

Anyway, I'm pretty sure there's a 'Save the Pixels' group out there somewhere so I best not upset them any further...

Fair enough.

No. My argument is that since the human person strictly survives the loss of the body’s parts but the body does not (and that the same holds with respect to any other material object that is a reasonable initial candidate for being the thing that is the person), the human person is not identical to the body (or to any other material object). So the human person must be something immaterial, and whatever immaterial thing she is must strictly survive the loss of the body’s parts (because she does and she’s it).

I think you can say this only insofar as the human person is a concept, and as such is immaterial. A concept strictly survives the loss of its parts, unless that loss is great enough to alter it into a new concept (see my tree stump example). In fact, we refer to some people as 'superhuman' or 'subhuman' when the traits they lack/possess somehow transcends our understanding of societal/physical norms. So I agree that there is an immaterial human person, but I'm not yet convinced this is necessarily what we understand to be the soul. (Nonetheless, it is an interesting argument for dualism.)

[Kenny]

I don't think it's accurate to say that a tree that loses a limb ceases to be the same tree. Your qualifier seems to be 'same exact tree', but then it can't be said that a person who loses a limb (or phalange) has not been altered by the experience.

The issue here isn’t about what one might refer to as qualitative sameness (having the same properties as) but numerical sameness (being one and the same thing as). For example, we might say that two spatially separated spheres that are intrinsically exactly alike are qualitatively the same, but clearly they aren’t numerically the same (there’s two of them after all). When something undergoes a qualitative change, it ceases to be qualitatively the same as it was previously, but not numerically the same as it was previously (otherwise, it wouldn’t undergo change; it would simply cease to exist and be replaced by something else).

I think you can say this only insofar as the human person is a concept, and as such is immaterial.

I would say that whatever concepts are (if indeed there are such things) they are things that thinking beings have, but they themselves are not thinking beings. Likewise, I would say that whatever human persons are, they (or at least the paradigmatic examples of them) are thinking beings. These two claims together (which each strike me as obviously true) entail that whatever human persons are, they are not concepts.

A concept strictly survives the loss of its parts, unless that loss is great enough to alter it into a new concept (see my tree stump example).

I’m not even sure I understand what it would be for a concept to literally have parts.

[JimL]

No. My argument is that since the human person strictly survives the loss of the body’s parts but the body does not (and that the same holds with respect to any other material object that is a reasonable initial candidate for being the thing that is the person), the human person is not identical to the body (or to any other material object). So the human person must be something immaterial, and whatever immaterial thing she is must strictly survive the loss of the body’s parts (because she does and she’s it).

But here is the problem that I see in your argument, you first make the assumption that the human person or soul is something different and distinct from the human body and then go on to make the further assumption that this person or soul strickly survives, or continues on intact if you will, whereas the body that houses it, though it to continues on as well, is not fully intact. This says nothing about the existence of a soul or person which is distinct from the body, or even whether or not it strictly survives whereas its body does not, except that you believe it to be so.

I told you what I meant in the OP. I gave you a definition of ‘strictly survives’: x strictly survives an occurrence iff x exists before the occurrence and x exists after the occurrence. I could have just dropped the term ‘strictly survives’, if I wanted, and spoke instead of things existing before the body loses its parts and things existing after the body loses its parts. Nothing important turns on this issue.

And on what are you basing your belief that a distinct soul or person strickly survives when the body that houses it does not. AFAICT You are basing it on nothing other than your belief that it exists in the first place.

Well, it doesn’t.

Of course it doesn't, in order to survive it first must be alive.

We speak of material objects as surviving certain occurrences (e.g. “This is my grandma’s old hutch. It survived the flood of 93!”). That’s how I was speaking. But none of this matters. The entire argument could be put solely in terms of whether things exist before or after certain occurrences. There’s no need to get into a pointless verbal dispute about the meaning of the word ‘survives’.

But I don't think it pointless because not being intact is not the same thing as not surviving. A body which is no longer intact due to a loss of its pinky, does not mean that it does not survive. The same would be so if we assume that a soul could lose its soul pinky. You would say that this soul doesn't stickly survive, but all that would mean is that it no longer has its soul pinky.

[Kenny]

But here is the problem that I see in your argument, you first make the assumption that the human person or soul is something different and distinct from the human body

No I don’t. I gave an argument for the conclusion that the human person is something distinct from the body. Now, the way to respond an argument is to challenge a premise or to argue that the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises. You haven’t done either of those things.

and then go on to make the further assumption that this person or soul strickly survives

I believe that human persons strictly survive for extended periods of time, that’s true. And I employ that belief as a premise in some of the arguments that I make (note, however, that this premise itself says nothing about what sort of thing human persons are, whether they are material or immaterial). I suspect that this is a premise that many other people (including many materialists) who encounter the argument will find themselves (upon due reflection) believing too.

But I noted at that outset that if one is comfortable rejecting that premise, the argument will not move one. That’s fine. A philosophical argument doesn’t have to be persuasive to everyone (or even to all reasonable people) in order to be good, and premises have to stop somewhere (otherwise, we’re off to an infinite regress).

What the argument does is take something that many of us strongly believe (or are strongly inclined to believe upon reflection), namely that we strictly persist through time, and shows that it, in conjunction with other things we have reason to believe, entails something quite interesting, namely, that we’re not material objects. Of course, there are lots of ways to resist the argument even without denying the premise we’ve just been discussing (some of which have been discussed in this thread). I don’t claim that the argument is a “knockdown” (few arguments in philosophy are). But each of those ways of resisting has its own costs.

whereas the body that houses it, though it to continues on as well, is not fully intact.

The body-minus argument that I gave, if sound, shows that, strictly speaking, the body no longer exists after one of its parts is destroyed.

This says nothing about the existence of a soul or person which is distinct from the body, or even whether or not it strictly survives whereas its body does not

That’s right. It wasn’t meant too. That human persons strictly survive the loss of some of their body’s parts is a premise in the argument, not a conclusion. If you’re comfortable denying that premise, fine. But to criticize the argument on the ground that it doesn’t establish it as a conclusion is to criticize the argument for failing to do something it was never intended to do.

except that you believe it to be so.

Yes I do. So do a lot of other people (including many who are materialists about human persons). The argument is directed to people who share that belief (or who are strongly disposed to share it upon reflection). It’s not designed to move those who don’t share it (or who aren’t disposed to share it). I made that clear at the very beginning.

And on what are you basing your belief that a distinct soul or person strickly survives when the body that houses it does not. AFAICT You are basing it on nothing other than your belief that it exists in the first place.

I believe that I exist and that I strictly survive the loss of some of the parts of my body. I have an argument for the conclusion that this entails that I’m something distinct from my body (and from any other material object). And these things together entail that I am something immaterial that strictly survives the loss of some of the parts of my body. I don’t assume the latter to be the case, I arrive at that conclusion through a chain of reasoning.

Of course it doesn't, in order to survive it first must be alive.

I’ve told you how I am using the word ‘survives’. You may not like how I use that word. But that’s just an objection to how I state my argument, not an objection to the argument itself. This is the sort of silly verbal dispute that’s not worth having.

But I don't think it pointless because not being intact is not the same thing as not surviving. A body which is no longer intact due to a loss of its pinky, does not mean that it does not survive.

I gave you an argument for the conclusion that a material object no longer exists after the destruction of one of its parts (see, I said that without even using the word ‘survives’). The way to challenge an argument is not to complain about the conclusion, but to challenge one of its premises or the claim that its conclusion follows from its premises. So far, you haven’t done either of those things.

The same would be so if we assume that a soul could lose its soul pinky. You would say that this soul doesn't stickly survive, but all that would mean is that it no longer has its soul pinky.

If I believed that souls had parts, I’d believe that they couldn’t strictly survive the loss of their parts either.

[JimL]

If I believed that souls had parts, I’d believe that they couldn’t strictly survive the loss of their parts either.

Right, you wouldn't believe that a soul, if it had parts, would "strickly survive" the loss of its parts, but you would still believe that it would nevertheless survive, and that is all I am saying. The same conclusion follows from the materialistic view. If human persons are material objects they may not "strickly survive" the loss of a pinky, but they would nevertheless still survive. The argument is the same in either case, it just so happens that you believe in mereological souls and so make the case on behalf of your belief.

[Kenny]

Right, you wouldn't believe that a soul, if it had parts, would "strickly survive" the loss of their parts, but you would still believe that they nevertheless survive, and that is all I am saying.

If I believed that souls had parts, I’d probably also believe that they don’t lose any of them throughout a person’s life. I can’t think, however, of any good reason to believe that souls have parts.

The same conclusion follows from the materialistic view. If human persons are material objects they may not "strickly survive" the loss of a pinky, but they would nevertheless still survive.

If the body-minus argument is sound, then if human persons are material objects, at best, they “survive” the loss of their parts only by way of having non-identical successors.

If you are a material object and the body-minus argument is sound, then by tomorrow (assuming, as is likely if you are a material organism or a material part of one), you’ll have shed some parts by then), you (that is, the thing to which you are identical) either will no longer exist or will be an unconscious, scattered object, and the person who wakes up on your side of the bed with your apparent memories, beliefs, dispositions and the like will be someone who is not identical to you. That individual, in turn, will be conscious for only a brief amount of time and then will either cease to exist or become an unconscious scattered object, only to be succeeded by another individual who takes up the person-role that you are currently playing.

If, upon reflecting on this picture of how things are, you can really manage to come to believe that this is how it is, then, as I said, more power to you. In that case, the argument in the OP will not move you. I find that when I reflect on this picture of how things are I cannot take it seriously as a live option. I suspect many others will find themselves in the same boat as myself in that regard.

[JimL]

If I believed that souls had parts, I’d probably also believe that they don’t lose any of them throughout a person’s life. I can’t think, however, of any good reason to believe that souls have parts.

Why not? If the assumption is that souls are no different than material bodies, in that they are made up of parts, then why make the assumption that they would be different with respect to losing those parts?

If the body-minus argument is sound, then if human persons are material objects, at best, they “survive” the loss of their parts only by way of having non-identical successors.

Not sure I'm following, if human persons are material objects, and survive the loss of a pinky, then they survive without any successors to that part at all, do they not?

If you are a material object and the body-minus argument is sound, then by tomorrow (assuming, as is likely if you are a material organism or a material part of one), you’ll have shed some parts by then), you (that is, the thing to which you are identical) either will no longer exist or will be an unconscious, scattered object, and the person who wakes up on your side of the bed with your apparent memories, beliefs, dispositions and the like will be someone who is not identical to you. That individual, in turn, will be conscious for only a brief amount of time and then will either cease to exist or become an unconscious scattered object, only to be succeeded by another individual who takes up the person-role that you are currently playing.

Now your getting a little to esoteric for my pay grade. Perhaps you can dumb it down a little so that the laymen amongst us can grasp your meaning. What I think you are refering to is the fact that the cells of the body are constantly dying and being replaced with new cells which would suggest that if you lent me $10.00 yesterday you would need to travel back in time in order to collect it since I am no longer that same material person, made up of the same cells, the same parts if you will, as the person you lent the $10.00 to yesterday. If this is what you are refering to, I think perhaps it is a better argument, or a better way of expressing it than the one in the OP. Though I remember hearing of this fact many years ago, I never gave it much thought at that time, or since then for that matter, and am not sure that I have an argument against it, so I will not attempt to do so without thinking it over some first.

[Kenny]

Why not? If the assumption is that souls are no different than material bodies, in that they are made up of parts, then why make the assumption that they would be different with respect to losing those parts?

I’m am taking it as a given that human persons (whatever they are) strictly persist through extended periods of time (longer periods of time that those typically involved in their body’s gaining and losing various parts). As I said, if you are willing to deny this, more power to you, I won’t have much more to say. I’ll just ask you to be honest with yourself about whether you can really take it seriously.

But given that this is so, there are two options: (1) Human persons are material objects that strictly persist through extended periods of time. (2) Human persons are immaterial objects that strictly persist through extended periods time. If the body-minus argument in the OP is sound, then (1) is ruled out. By the process of elimination, that leaves (2).

Call the immaterial objects to which human persons are identical “souls” (this doesn’t tell us anything more about what sort of immaterial objects human persons are; it just gives us another label to toss around). From (2) it follows that souls strictly persist through extended periods time. Note that I am not assuming that souls strictly persist through time; I am inferring it. You may disagree with one or more of the premises I use to get there, or you may disagree about whether the conclusion logically follows from the premises, but you can’t legitimately accuse me of simply having assumed that souls strictly persist through extended periods time, not when I’ve given you an argument for that conclusion.

Not sure I'm following, if human persons are material objects, and survive the loss of a pinky, then they survive without any successors to that part at all, do they not?

If the body-minus is sound, then the material object that remains behind after the pinky has been annihilated is not identical to the material object that had the pinky as a part. So, if human persons are identical to bodies, then the person who exists after the pinky has been annihilated is not identical to the person who was there before the pinky was annihilated. The latter person has ceased to exist and has been replaced (“succeeded”) by another one.

Now your getting a little to esoteric for my pay grade. Perhaps you can dumb it down a little so that the laymen amongst us can grasp your meaning. What I think you are refering to is the fact that the cells of the body are constantly dying and being replaced with new cells which would suggest that if you lent me $10.00 yesterday you would need to travel back in time in order to collect it since I am no longer that same material person, made up of the same cells, the same parts if you will, as the person you lent the $10.00 to yesterday. If this is what you are refering to, I think perhaps it is a better argument, or a better way of expressing it than the one in the OP. Though I remember hearing of this fact many years ago, I never gave it much thought at that time, or since then for that matter, and am not sure that I have an argument against it, so I will not attempt to do so without thinking it over some first.

Various niceties aside, that is the idea that the argument in the OP is getting at. The problem with putting it as you do above is that it is not clear why the materialist should think that material objects can’t strictly survive losing and gaining parts. The presentation in the OP presents an argument for that conclusion, rather than merely assuming it.

[JimL]

I’m am taking it as a given that human persons (whatever they are) strictly persist through extended periods of time (longer periods of time that those typically involved in their body’s gaining and losing various parts). As I said, if you are willing to deny this, more power to you, I won’t have much more to say. I’ll just ask you to be honest with yourself about whether you can really take it seriously.

But given that this is so, there are two options: (1) Human persons are material objects that strictly persist through extended periods of time. (2) Human persons are immaterial objects that strictly persist through extended periods time. If the body-minus argument in the OP is sound, then (1) is ruled out. By the process of elimination, that leaves (2).

Call the immaterial objects to which human persons are identical “souls” (this doesn’t tell us anything more about what sort of immaterial objects human persons are; it just gives us another label to toss around). From (2) it follows that souls strictly persist through extended periods time. Note that I am not assuming that souls strictly persist through time; I am inferring it. You may disagree with one or more of the premises I use to get there, or you may disagree about whether the conclusion logically follows from the premises, but you can’t legitimately accuse me of simply having assumed that souls strictly persist through extended periods time, not when I’ve given you an argument for that conclusion.



If the body-minus is sound, then the material object that remains behind after the pinky has been annihilated is not identical to the material object that had the pinky as a part. So, if human persons are identical to bodies, then the person who exists after the pinky has been annihilated is not identical to the person who was there before the pinky was annihilated. The latter person has ceased to exist and has been replaced (“succeeded”) by another one.



Various niceties aside, that is the idea that the argument in the OP is getting at. The problem with putting it as you do above is that it is not clear why the materialist should think that material objects can’t strictly survive losing and gaining parts. The presentation in the OP presents an argument for that conclusion, rather than merely assuming it.

I haven't really thought this through a great deal, but I did have this thought regarding the material changes that take place throughout the life span of the body. What if each and every particle or atom that makes up the body whole were replaced with new particles or atoms, but there were no changes in the positioning or arrangements of those parts, in other words the body would remain virtually identical to the one it replaced excepting that the material that makes up the copy has changed. I think that as far as anyone else is concerned, I would still be the same person, no one could see any difference in me, so would there truly be any difference, other than the matter of which I am formed? Just a thought for now.

[Kenny]

I haven't really thought this through a great deal, but I did have this thought regarding the material changes that take place throughout the life span of the body. What if each and every particle or atom that makes up the body whole were replaced with new particles or atoms, but there were no changes in the positioning or arrangements of those parts, in other words the body would remain virtually identical to the one it replaced excepting that the material that makes up the copy has changed. I think that as far as anyone else is concerned, I would still be the same person, no one could see any difference in me, so would there truly be any difference, other than the matter of which I am formed? Just a thought for now.

If, in fact, material objects cannot continue to exist after the loss of their parts, then, if you are a material object, when that occurred, you would cease to exist. The individual left behind would be a different individual, a duplicate of yourself.