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On Bertrand Russell’s argument against the First Cause Argument for God's Existence.

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  • On Bertrand Russell’s argument against the First Cause Argument for God's Existence.

    An exposition is presented below to expose the errors of Bertrand Russel’s arguments made against the first cause argument for God.

    The English philosopher, Bertrand Russell, proposed an argument against the first cause argument for God, in his book entitled, Why I Am Not a Christian. According to Stanford Encylcopedia, Russell is widely held to be one of the 20th century's premier logicians.

    Together with G.E. Moore, Russell is generally recognized as one of the main founders of modern analytic philosophy. His famous paradox, theory of types, and work with A.N. Whitehead on Principia Mathematica reinvigorated the study of logic throughout the twentieth century (Schilpp 1944, xiii; Wilczek 2010, 74).
    Russell’s argument is presented in a series of short quotes and exposed as fallacious. Bertrand Russell states the following -

    The First-cause Argument Perhaps the simplest and easiest to understand is the argument of the First Cause. (It is maintained that everything we see in this world has a cause, and as you go back in the chain of causes further and further you must come to a First Cause, and to that First Cause you give the name of God.) That argument, I suppose, does not carry very much weight nowadays, because, in the first place, cause is not quite what it used to be. The philosophers and the men of science have got going on cause, and it has not anything like the vitality it used to have;
    Russell’s statement is fallacious. Philosophers disagree on many notions. For philosophers to change the meaning of cause does not provide any evidence against the argument for the first cause. Russell should have shown the reader how the new meaning of cause is more true and real and then shown how the new notion of cause makes the first cause argument unsound. As Russell has not provided any evidence to support his claim, Russell has committed the error of the unsupported assertion. Also Russell does not continue with the use of his so called new notion of cause, thereby committing the fallacy of the irrelevant premise.

    but, apart from that, you can see that the argument that there must be a First Cause is one that cannot have any validity. I may say that when I was a young man and was debating these questions very seriously in my mind, I for a long time accepted the argument of the First Cause, until one day, at the age of eighteen, I read John Stuart Mill's Autobiography,
    John Stuart Mill's argument predates Russell's argument. So now Russell is using a notion of cause in Mill's argument, even though Russell has already stated above that the notion of cause in Russell's time is not as vital as of prior times. So what notion of cause is Russell referring to when Russell uses Mill's argument? We don't know, so the argument premise concerning the definition of cause is unknown. So if Russell is consistent with his own criticism of cause, he should not have used Mill's argument.

    and I there found this sentence: "My father taught me that the question 'Who made me?' cannot be answered, since it immediately suggests the further question `Who made God?'"
    'Who made me?' can be answered. An answer is your parents. Another answer is God as the creator of your soul and the cause of your being. The claim that the question cannot be answered because we don’t know who made God is also false for we can know God made man, and then posit the question, 'who made God?'. Then we can then show God is being without limit, so God is the prime, uncaused being. As God is the prime, the question 'who made God?' is answered - no one, for God does not require a cause.

    Russell's argument assumes there must always be an infinite regress to account for every member in the series. But the infinite regress is only ever assumed and never proven. The appeal to the infinite regress has many unresolved problems, two of which are presented below –

    No causation within the Infinite Series

    An infinite regress of causes is against the nature of cause, for if an infinite regress is posited, every member has the same deficiency in causation, and therefore no member is ever a cause. Or every member is assumed to be a caused cause within the series, but the infinite regress requires an infinite delay for each caused cause as having been caused by a prior, infinite regress. Hence due to the infinite delay implied in the infinite regress, no member is ever a caused cause. The delay is concerned with a series of causes causing now, therefore the delay is always now. Hence a delay that is always present is only ever a delay and not a cause happening now. Therefore as no member in an infinite series is ever a cause, the infinite regress does not account for any cause. Therefore, the questions such as 'who made me?' and 'who made God?' are not solved by an appeal to any infinite regress.

    One may object and say the infinite series is series where all the causes act now. Such a series has no delay; therefore an infinite series can have caused causes and causation. The answer is similar to the above problem. Even if the infinite series occurs now, with all causes acting at once, still no cause within the series is ever a caused cause. For causes are ontologically prior to the effect. For an infinite series of causes to exist, each cause is also an effect. Hence each cause is always dependent upon an ontologically prior cause. The ontological priority of caused cause upon a prior infinite number of causes infers each caused cause is ontologically after an infinite number of causes. But the infinite priority of causes has each member deficient in causation. Hence there is never any cause that is not deficient within the infinite series. Such an infinite series then cannot have any real causes within the series. Hence an infinite series of causes that occur now cannot be real.

    The natures of Cause and Effect mitigate against an Infinite series

    Another problem with the infinite series is according to the nature of cause and effect. A cause is a positive influence regarding the being of another thing. An effect is that which is positively influenced regarding being. As cause influences the effect, the effect will always have something of the similitude of the cause. As the similitude of the cause has less being than the cause, the effect will always have less being than the cause. Therefore, if an infinite series is posited, each member of the series is a cause, and an effect of the prior series of causes.

    Hence as each cause has less influence upon the consequent caused cause, for an effect is always less than its cause, then an infinite series will always result in no being as its ultimate effect. For an infinite series will always have each caused cause have less being than the prior caused cause. So if any-thing is observed to have being, an infinite series cannot be assumed to account for the existence of that thing. Hence no infinite series of causes is possible to cause any thing. As an infinite series of causes cannot exist, then only a finite series of causes can exist. Finite series always has an ultimate term, which is the prime being, which is God.

    One may object by saying an effect does have the same being as the cause. Therefore an infinite series is possible. However, the objection is opposition to the nature of cause and effect, whereby the effect always participates in the influence of the cause and is never identical to the cause. A poet causes the poem. The poem does not have the same being as the poet.

    Even if we propose a cause and effect series such as that of the father generating the son, that appears to have an equivalence of effect to cause, such a series is not pertinent to the notion of infinite regress. For infinite regress requires all members of the series to act now. Whereas the father, son series does not require both the father and son to always be acting now. The father generates the son, but the father need not always exist for the son to exist, or the son to generate another man. In an infinite series, each member must act together, at the same time for all members to cause the same final effect. The father, son example is then not pertinent to the notion of the infinite series.

    That very simple sentence showed me, as I still think, the fallacy in the argument of the First Cause. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
    The first cause argument is better stated as - every finite thing has a cause. But the infinite being does not have a cause.

    If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the world as God, so that there cannot be any validity in that argument.
    The world is both finite and contingent. God is infinite and necessary. Russell is in error.

    It is exactly of the same nature as the Hindu's view, that the world rested upon an elephant and the elephant rested upon a tortoise; and when they said, "How about the tortoise?" the Indian said, "Suppose we change the subject." The argument is really no better than that.
    Now Russell ignores the first cause argument and claims the first cause argument is actually the same as the Hindu infinite series. Russell is in error.

    There is no reason why the world could not have come into being without a cause;
    The principle of sufficient reason says there is sufficient reason for anything to be and to act. Russell thinks the world came from non-being, which is a breach in the principle of sufficient reason. Russell's argument is fallacious.

    Another error in Russell's thinking is if the world came into being without a cause, then non-being which is not a cause also produces an effect. But in accord with the definitions of cause and effect, and effect has sufficient reason from the cause. If the cause is non-being, then the effect is also non-being. But Russell thinks the world is an effect of non-being. Evidently Russell doesn't know what a cause or an effect is.

    nor, on the other hand, is there any reason why it should not have always existed.
    Russell makes a giant leap from the fallacious notion of the world coming into being without a cause, to the world always existing. Russell simply doesn't know that the world always existed. He only assumes that as a response to the first cause argument. Even if the world did always exist, God would still be the first cause of the world, and any other contingent thing. For no contingent thing exists from itself, but always receives being from another. The other that causes the being of the contingent is that thing which is being by nature - God.

    There is no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning at all.
    There is a reason - divine revelation says the universe was created. Even if revelation is ignored, a philosopher can posit the world was created and then make arguments for and against such a proposition. Russell seems to be oblivious to the fundamentals of philosophical enquiry. A philosopher is supposed to ask questions about the nature of things and propose arguments. A philosopher can then propose arguments about the nature of creation of anything from non-being through an agent. Russell has simply ignored this option. Russell's thinking is fallacious.

    Furthermore, the 'no reason to suppose' is a universal negative which is virtually impossible to prove. Russell's statement is then only his evidence free conjecture about the origin of the universe.

    The idea that things must have a beginning is really due to the poverty of our imagination.
    Russell previously inferred God had a cause, and thereby began, when he asked the question 'who made God?'. Now Russell claims if we assume that things must have a beginning we have a poverty of imagination. According to Russell's own argument, he has the same poverty of imagination in one part of his argument that he claims others have in another part of his argument.

    Therefore, perhaps, I need not waste any more time upon the argument about the First Cause.
    Russell's argument was solid evidence for the ease with which educated men can make fundamental blunders when they speak about a part of reality with which they fundamentally disagree about. If a man doesn't want God to exist, then reason is not required to defend his fundamental need to will God away.

    JM
    Last edited by JohnMartin; 06-17-2017, 07:45 PM.

  • #2
    Careful with rapidly posting new threads in succession JohnMartin. Spamming the forum was kinda how you got banned a while back.

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
      An exposition is presented below to expose the errors of Bertrand Russel’s arguments made against the first cause argument for God.

      The English philosopher, Bertrand Russell, proposed an argument against the first cause argument for God, in his book entitled, Why I Am Not a Christian. According to Stanford Encylcopedia, Russell is widely held to be one of the 20th century's premier logicians.



      Russell’s argument is presented in a series of short quotes and exposed as fallacious. Bertrand Russell states the following -



      Russell’s statement is fallacious. Philosophers disagree on many notions. For philosophers to change the meaning of cause does not provide any evidence against the argument for the first cause. Russell should have shown the reader how the new meaning of cause is more true and real and then shown how the new notion of cause makes the first cause argument unsound. As Russell has not provided any evidence to support his claim, Russell has committed the error of the unsupported assertion. Also Russell does not continue with the use of his so called new notion of cause, thereby committing the fallacy of the irrelevant premise.



      John Stuart Mill's argument predates Russell's argument. So now Russell is using a notion of cause in Mill's argument, even though Russell has already stated above that the notion of cause in Russell's time is not as vital as of prior times. So what notion of cause is Russell referring to when Russell uses Mill's argument? We don't know, so the argument premise concerning the definition of cause is unknown. So if Russell is consistent with his own criticism of cause, he should not have used Mill's argument.



      'Who made me?' can be answered. An answer is your parents. Another answer is God as the creator of your soul and the cause of your being. The claim that the question cannot be answered because we don’t know who made God is also false for we can know God made man, and then posit the question, 'who made God?'. Then we can then show God is being without limit, so God is the prime, uncaused being. As God is the prime, the question 'who made God?' is answered - no one, for God does not require a cause.

      Russell's argument assumes there must always be an infinite regress to account for every member in the series. But the infinite regress is only ever assumed and never proven. The appeal to the infinite regress has many unresolved problems, two of which are presented below –

      No causation within the Infinite Series

      An infinite regress of causes is against the nature of cause, for if an infinite regress is posited, every member has the same deficiency in causation, and therefore no member is ever a cause. Or every member is assumed to be a caused cause within the series, but the infinite regress requires an infinite delay for each caused cause as having been caused by a prior, infinite regress. Hence due to the infinite delay implied in the infinite regress, no member is ever a caused cause. The delay is concerned with a series of causes causing now, therefore the delay is always now. Hence a delay that is always present is only ever a delay and not a cause happening now. Therefore as no member in an infinite series is ever a cause, the infinite regress does not account for any cause. Therefore, the questions such as 'who made me?' and 'who made God?' are not solved by an appeal to any infinite regress.

      One may object and say the infinite series is series where all the causes act now. Such a series has no delay; therefore an infinite series can have caused causes and causation. The answer is similar to the above problem. Even if the infinite series occurs now, with all causes acting at once, still no cause within the series is ever a caused cause. For causes are ontologically prior to the effect. For an infinite series of causes to exist, each cause is also an effect. Hence each cause is always dependent upon an ontologically prior cause. The ontological priority of caused cause upon a prior infinite number of causes infers each caused cause is ontologically after an infinite number of causes. But the infinite priority of causes has each member deficient in causation. Hence there is never any cause that is not deficient within the infinite series. Such an infinite series then cannot have any real causes within the series. Hence an infinite series of causes that occur now cannot be real.

      The natures of Cause and Effect mitigate against an Infinite series

      Another problem with the infinite series is according to the nature of cause and effect. A cause is a positive influence regarding the being of another thing. An effect is that which is positively influenced regarding being. As cause influences the effect, the effect will always have something of the similitude of the cause. As the similitude of the cause has less being than the cause, the effect will always have less being than the cause. Therefore, if an infinite series is posited, each member of the series is a cause, and an effect of the prior series of causes.

      Hence as each cause has less influence upon the consequent caused cause, for an effect is always less than its cause, then an infinite series will always result in no being as its ultimate effect. For an infinite series will always have each caused cause have less being than the prior caused cause. So if any-thing is observed to have being, an infinite series cannot be assumed to account for the existence of that thing. Hence no infinite series of causes is possible to cause any thing. As an infinite series of causes cannot exist, then only a finite series of causes can exist. Finite series always has an ultimate term, which is the prime being, which is God.

      One may object by saying an effect does have the same being as the cause. Therefore an infinite series is possible. However, the objection is opposition to the nature of cause and effect, whereby the effect always participates in the influence of the cause and is never identical to the cause. A poet causes the poem. The poem does not have the same being as the poet.

      Even if we propose a cause and effect series such as that of the father generating the son, that appears to have an equivalence of effect to cause, such a series is not pertinent to the notion of infinite regress. For infinite regress requires all members of the series to act now. Whereas the father, son series does not require both the father and son to always be acting now. The father generates the son, but the father need not always exist for the son to exist, or the son to generate another man. In an infinite series, each member must act together, at the same time for all members to cause the same final effect. The father, son example is then not pertinent to the notion of the infinite series.



      The first cause argument is better stated as - every finite thing has a cause. But the infinite being does not have a cause.



      The world is both finite and contingent. God is infinite and necessary. Russell is in error.



      Now Russell ignores the first cause argument and claims the first cause argument is actually the same as the Hindu infinite series. Russell is in error.



      The principle of sufficient reason says there is sufficient reason for anything to be and to act. Russell thinks the world came from non-being, which is a breach in the principle of sufficient reason. Russell's argument is fallacious.

      Another error in Russell's thinking is if the world came into being without a cause, then non-being which is not a cause also produces an effect. But in accord with the definitions of cause and effect, and effect has sufficient reason from the cause. If the cause is non-being, then the effect is also non-being. But Russell thinks the world is an effect of non-being. Evidently Russell doesn't know what a cause or an effect is.



      Russell makes a giant leap from the fallacious notion of the world coming into being without a cause, to the world always existing. Russell simply doesn't know that the world always existed. He only assumes that as a response to the first cause argument. Even if the world did always exist, God would still be the first cause of the world, and any other contingent thing. For no contingent thing exists from itself, but always receives being from another. The other that causes the being of the contingent is that thing which is being by nature - God.



      There is a reason - divine revelation says the universe was created. Even if revelation is ignored, a philosopher can posit the world was created and then make arguments for and against such a proposition. Russell seems to be oblivious to the fundamentals of philosophical enquiry. A philosopher is supposed to ask questions about the nature of things and propose arguments. A philosopher can then propose arguments about the nature of creation of anything from non-being through an agent. Russell has simply ignored this option. Russell's thinking is fallacious.

      Furthermore, the 'no reason to suppose' is a universal negative which is virtually impossible to prove. Russell's statement is then only his evidence free conjecture about the origin of the universe.



      Russell previously inferred God had a cause, and thereby began, when he asked the question 'who made God?'. Now Russell claims if we assume that things must have a beginning we have a poverty of imagination. According to Russell's own argument, he has the same poverty of imagination in one part of his argument that he claims others have in another part of his argument.



      Russell's argument was solid evidence for the ease with which educated men can make fundamental blunders when they speak about a part of reality with which they fundamentally disagree about. If a man doesn't want God to exist, then reason is not required to defend his fundamental need to will God away.

      JM
      I think it might be helpful if you were a little more concise. Anyways, even if the argument in support of infinite regress is in error, that wouldn't make your first cause a god. If god has always existed and only created the universe 14 billion years ago, then an eternal greater Cosnos could do the same.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by JimL View Post
        I think it might be helpful if you were a little more concise. Anyways, even if the argument in support of infinite regress is in error, that wouldn't make your first cause a god. If god has always existed and only created the universe 14 billion years ago, then an eternal greater Cosnos could do the same.
        Your statement is only another version of the regress argument. The prime being is itself being. That prime being is termed God.

        JM

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Leonhard View Post
          Careful with rapidly posting new threads in succession JohnMartin. Spamming the forum was kinda how you got banned a while back.
          Noted.

          JM

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
            Your statement is only another version of the regress argument. The prime being is itself being. That prime being is termed God.

            JM
            Huh, the greater cosmos is a being?

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by JimL View Post
              Huh, the greater cosmos is a being?
              The greater cosmos has being by participation. God is being by essence.

              JM

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
                The greater cosmos has being by participation. God is being by essence.

                JM
                Egad!

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post

                  The first cause argument is better stated as - every finite thing has a cause. But the infinite being does not have a cause.
                  So how does free will work if there's a (single) first cause? The choices we make and our actions begin to exist, and according to first cause argument everything that begins to exist can ultimately be traced back to a first cause. But then that first cause is ultimately the sole explanation for our actions.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by crepuscule View Post
                    So how does free will work if there's a (single) first cause? The choices we make and our actions begin to exist, and according to first cause argument everything that begins to exist can ultimately be traced back to a first cause. But then that first cause is ultimately the sole explanation for our actions.
                    Free will is proven from the nature of the intellect and the understood goods as known to be limited. The will is an appetite for understood good. When the will appetises a finite thing as limited, the good attracts, but the limit of the good sets the will free. The will is free whenever a finite good is known to be both good and limited as good.

                    God acts as the prime mover to move all things in accord with the nature of the thing moved. The human will is free, therefore God moves the human will freely.

                    JM

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
                      Free will is proven from the nature of the intellect and the understood goods as known to be limited. The will is an appetite for understood good. When the will appetises a finite thing as limited, the good attracts, but the limit of the good sets the will free. The will is free whenever a finite good is known to be both good and limited as good.

                      God acts as the prime mover to move all things in accord with the nature of the thing moved. The human will is free, therefore God moves the human will freely.

                      JM
                      I think you're somewhat missing the point. According to you, and given a first cause, who or what is ultimately the first cause for our actions?

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by crepuscule View Post
                        I think you're somewhat missing the point. According to you, and given a first cause, who or what is ultimately the first cause for our actions?
                        God is the first cause of all being and all actions. A first cause does not remove real secondary causes. The human will is dependent upon God as the prime mover to move the will from can appetise, to does appetise. But God never moves the will against the nature of the will as free. The two truths of God as prime mover and the freedom of the will remain. Such two truths a wrapped up in the other mysteries of sin and grace which also occur within the intellect and will.

                        JM

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
                          God is the first cause of all being and all actions. A first cause does not remove real secondary causes. The human will is dependent upon God as the prime mover to move the will from can appetise, to does appetise. But God never moves the will against the nature of the will as free. The two truths of God as prime mover and the freedom of the will remain. Such two truths a wrapped up in the other mysteries of sin and grace which also occur within the intellect and will.

                          JM
                          So how are we responsible if God is the first (and only!) cause of all of our actions? How is a burglar to blame if God caused him to burglarize? If God is the first cause of his "nature of the will"?

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by crepuscule View Post
                            So how are we responsible if God is the first (and only!) cause of all of our actions? How is a burglar to blame if God caused him to burglarize? If God is the first cause of his "nature of the will"?
                            God is perfect and cannot be the author of a defect. All sin is caused by original sin and actual sin as a defect of the human will which desires a good that is disconcordant with the eternal law. The debility in the human will is a debility in a secondary cause, analogous to a defective pen being moved by a poet. The pen is unfree, but has a defect that makes the poem turn out to be less than perfect. Men with the wounds of original sin are free but do not love what they ought and freely choose to bid with an unlawful disordered good in their choices.

                            How does God move the will and the will remain free? Nobody has a complee answer to this question (except God of course). Is God the prime mover? Yes. Does man have a free will? Yes. Does sin exist? Yes. Is sin imputed to God? No. Is sin imputed to man? Yes. This is the natural mystery of the divine premotion and human free agency acting in an imperfect fallen world after Adam's sin. God could always move men to act without sin. We know this because He did it before Adam's sin and is doing it now for those in heaven. We also know God can move men in a manner whereby there is an imperfection in the will of men. We know this from the existence of hell, where every act of creatures is a mortal sin, and the imperfect loves of those in purgatory.

                            The divine premotion and free will problem is wrapped up in the mystery of grace and grace's ability to perfect nature to the point where those in a state of grace no longer sin. Such are the impecible saints who are confirmed in grace in this life and the next.

                            To impute sin to God is to deny God's impecibility of will, deny secondary causation of men, deny the free will of men, and deny the mystery of sin in men. all the denials are false. Hence sin can only be imputed to men and not God.

                            JM

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
                              Is God the prime mover? Yes. Does man have a free will? Yes.
                              Believe what you will, but I'll stick to good ol' logic. Our choices and consequent actions begin to exist. According to the argument from first cause, everything that began to exist can be traced back to a first cause. Then according to said argument, your prime mover is ultimately the only first cause for our choices and actions.

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