Weak to Moderate Foundationalism

[shunyadragon]

A thread started by Occam titled 'Classical Foundationalism' at CARM made the following claim . . .

Originally Posted by http://forums.carm.org/vbb/showthrea...76#post2330976

So, it would seem that atheists have to either refute Plantinga's line of reasoning or choose an epistemology other than classical foundationalism from which to launch their attack on theism.

I will propose that forms of 'Weak to Moderate Foundationalism' are more reasonable alternatives not only for atheists, agnostics and other humanists, but for all arguments in general regardless of what one believes. Many of the posters that objected to Occam's objections to 'Classical Foundationalism,' and those that have objected to Plantinga's arguments in general in this forum and CARM's have expressed views that come closest to these views, but have not specifically defined an alternate epistomology that would respond to Plantinga's and other Theists who argue from the perspective that Classical Foundationalism is self-refuting.'.

His philosophy is best described in The Epistomology of Keith Leher in Philosophical Studies Series, Vol. 95

http://www.springer.com/philosophy/b...-1-4020-1605-9

http://www.springer.com/philosophy/book/978-1-4020-1605-9

Keith Lehrer is one of the leading proponents of a coherence theory of knowledge that seeks to explain what it means to know in a characteristically human way. Central to his account are the pivotal role played by a principle of self-trust and his insistence that a sound epistemology must ultimately be ecumenical in nature, combining elements of internalism and externalism. The present book is an extensive, self-contained, up-to-date study of Lehrer's epistemological work. Covering all major aspects, it contains original contributions by some of the most distinguished specialists in the field, outgoing from the latest, significantly revised version of Lehrer's theory. All basic ideas are explained in an introductory chapter. Lehrer's extensive replies in a final chapter give unique access to his current epistemological thinking.

© source where applicable

It is pricy book and best acquired through a library. I am going to get this book again through library loan. It has been a while since I have read it.

[Seasanctuary]

In what might be my most heretical stance around here, I lean toward infinitism.

[shunyadragon]

In what might be my most heretical stance around here, I lean toward infinitism.

Reading over your reference on 'Infinitism ' and others on 'Coherentism,' and others on the justification of different views of epistemology I had an interesting mini satori, concerning this issue that resulted in epistemology of 'So Whatism,' which will be the subject of my next thread. Yes, epistemology is the study of 'What is knowledge?', 'How do we acquire it?', and 'How do we know?', but I find epistemology a slippery thing when we try to justify one view of 'knowledge' over another from a human perspective. I question what really is the value in epistemology of trying to support one justification over another, except the agenda of buttressing one's own world view over another.

In part what inspired this is Plantinga's claims that 'Classical Foundationalism' is self-refuting and why he believes this, other than a theist agenda. Part of the answer is, no Plantinga did not succeed in demonstrating that Classical Foundationalism is self-refuting, he simply presented his view that it is from his perspective as a theist.

In just uncliping my box cutter and slicing the 'Gordian Knot' concluding that humans are simply rational thinking beings that are able to know things through our reasoning abilities.

More to follow. . .

[nightbringer]

In what might be my most heretical stance around here, I lean toward infinitism.

You need to learn to behave.

Seriously though, interesting article. I still don't see infinitism as at all attractive (I don't see any problem with some form of foundationalism) but it brought up some interesting issues, like what it actually means to believe something. In particular I enjoyed this part:

I mentioned earlier that I thought there was a deep misunderstanding of the infinitist's position underlying the infinite mind objection. Now is the time to consider it. I have already said that the infinitist is not claiming that during our lifetime we consciously entertain an infinite number of beliefs. But what might not be so obvious is that the infinitist is also not even claiming that we have an infinite number of what Williams calls "unconscious beliefs" if such beliefs are taken to be already formed dispositions. (We might, but that isn't necessary for infinitism.) Consider the following question: Do you believe that 366 + 71 is 437? I take it that for most of us answering that question brings into play some of our capacities in a way that answering the question "Do you believe that 2 + 2 = 4?" does not. For I simply remember that 2 + 2 = 4. I have already formed the belief that manifests itself when I consciously think that 2 + 2 = 4. By contrast, I had not already formed a similar disposition concerning the sum of 366 plus 71. We do not simply remember that 366 + 71 = 437. Rather, we do a bit of adding. We are disposed to think that 366 + 71 = 437 after a bit of adding given our belief that 6 + 1 = 7, that 7 +6 = 13, etc. We have a second order disposition -- a disposition to form the disposition to think something. Thus, there is clearly a sense in which we believe that 366 + 71 = 437. The proposition that 366 + 71 = 437 is subjectively available to me because it is correctly hooked up to already formed beliefs.

[Seasanctuary]

I question what really is the value in epistemology of trying to support one justification over another, except the agenda of buttressing one's own world view over another.

There's the general interest of figuring out what it means for a belief to be justified or not. It comes up in discussions of worldview conflicts because these are conflicts about the justification of beliefs.

Though I don't see a very strong correlation between the usual worldview categories and models of justification.

[shunyadragon]

There's the general interest of figuring out what it means for a belief to be justified or not. It comes up in discussions of worldview conflicts because these are conflicts about the justification of beliefs.

Though I don't see a very strong correlation between the usual worldview categories and models of justification.

I believe there is a strong correlation between 'Classical Foundationalism' and proponents of physicalism like Rosenberg, and Naturalists in general. I believe this is the underlying reason Plantinga attacks this view.The following article goes into more detail. In brief . . .

http://www.truthawakens.com/foundationalism.asp

http://www.truthawakens.com/foundationalism.asp

An epistemic chain “is simply a chain of beliefs, with at least the first constituting knowledge, and each belief linked to the previous one by being based on it.”(Audi 206)

4 types of epistemic chains:

1. Infinite
2. Circular
3. Justified beliefs/knowledge can come from epistemic chains that are not based on direct perceptual beliefs.
4. Justified beliefs/knowledge must come from epistemic chains that are based on direct perceptual beliefs.

Foundationalists reject epistemic chains 1 through 3 and argue that the 4th is valid.

© source where applicable

[shunyadragon]

I think it is worthwhile at this point to directly take on Plantinga's claims that 'Classical Foundationalism' is self-refuting. I have already taken the position that Plantinga's argument is insufficient to reach that conclusion. The following is a reasonable reference that goes into detail concerning the weaknesses in Plantinga's argument.

http://www.johndepoe.com/CF-Plantinga.pdf

http://www.johndepoe.com/CF-Plantinga.pdf

“In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of
Plantinga’s Argument that Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting”
by John M. DePoe, University of Iowa
ABSTRACT: In numerous works Alvin Plantinga has argued that
classical foundationalism is a failed theory of knowledge due to its selfreferential incoherence. Plantinga’s argument, however, falls short of demonstrating that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga’s argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not selfrefuting as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga’s argument against classical foundationalism, which shows at best that Plantinga’s argument cannot be reconstructed to show that classical foundationalism is improbable. While Plantinga’s argument may highlight a challenge for classical foundationalism, his argument does not establish the falsity of classical foundationalism, nor does it offer any other overriding reason to reject it. Thus, Plantinga’s criticisms of classical foundationalism are not sufficient by themselves to rule out the theory’s viability.

© source where applicable