Atheism and rationality

[Roy]

Just a quick response - will come back later if time permits.

specially when one considers that some of these arguments have convinced the likes of Antony Flew?

Argument from authority fallacy.

How is it an argument from authority fallacy? Are you arguing Antony Flew would not be a qualified authority on recognizing a valid argument when he saw one?

It's an argument from authority because you are citing Flew as an authority who thought the arguments were convincing, instead of citing the arguments that convinced him.

If you can't work this out then there is no point in further logic-chopping.

Roy

[Tassman]

I don't think that's fair. I'm sure Juice believes he has good reasons to support that premise. He hasn't listed those reasons in this post, but he has likely discussed them in other posts, and I'm sure he'll volunteer information about them upon request. I probably won't find his reasons convincing, but I don't think your accusation is a fair one either.

Undoubtedly, as a Christian, Juice believes he has good reasons to support the premise. But in terms of his syllogism the conclusion is invalid because his major premise is conditional and dependent on the minor premise, but his minor premise (“Jesus returned from the dead”) is a bare assertion - a statement of faith. Thus it cannot support his major premise and provide a valid conclusion.

[Doug Shaver]

How is it an argument from authority fallacy? Are you arguing Antony Flew would not be a qualified authority on recognizing a valid argument when he saw one?

What Flew could or could not recognize is beside the point. An argument from authority is fallacious regardless of the authority's qualifications. In logic, it is never the case that X may be inferred from "Professor so-and-so says X," no matter who Professor so-and-so is.

[Psychic Missile]

I agree with you on that one, PsychicMissile. I'd add that, part of the problem here, is all this talk of "things" that "begin to exist" due to "causes", we lack a precise definition of what these terms mean. A furniture maker makes a table out of wood. Is that a case of something beginning to exist? Or is that a case of something already existing (matter, more specifically wood and nails and glue and varnish and so on) being rearranged into a new and more useful arrangement. The furniture-maker certainly doesn't create the furniture in the same sense of "create" in which it is claimed that God created the universe.

I like your last sentence there. In Genesis, God makes the world/universe that we know out of nothing. He speaks, and it appears. This simply isn't comparable to anything we are capable of. From a Christian perspective, everything we "create" is made from God's creation. We're just altering it to suit our needs.

In the case of a furniture maker making a table, I think that's more of an issue of ideas and concepts. When the first wooden table was made, that table, as a concept, coming into being is much closer to God's creation of the universe. However, I assume God would know beforehand all of mankind's capabilities and could conceive of us making a chair long before we as a species first conceive of the idea. So really, I can only see the concept of something being truly created either in an atheist sense (in that humans are the first to think of those concepts) or in a theistic sense where the only real creator is God. If God is the only creator, and the purpose of the argument is to establish God as existing, it doesn't make sense to have the first premise assume his existence.

I agree here too. I'd add that, there are some philosophical arguments against an infinitely old universe. I don't find the classical ones to be convincing. I actually think I have some more novel arguments of my own on this topic, but I agree that for the claim that an infinite past is impossible, the onus of proof is on those of us who assert that.

Right. I think a lot of the problems with these arguments is that there are missing premises. I can see how, to many theists, those premises could be assumed since they are part of that belief system, but that doesn't do very well when they're trying to use those arguments to convince nonbelievers!

I believe that many of those "mistakes" you speak of are actually intentional on God's part. Is it inconceivable that a supernatural intelligence might have reasons for doing things which are beyond your comprehension at the moment, but which if one day you came to understand them might make perfect sense?

I considered this, and I think that while it is certainly conceivable, it's also conceivable for God to be able to prove a square circle exists or 1+1=5. I think biological mistakes like in my video example are equivalent to accepted ideas like circles and squares being incompatible sets or 1+1=2. If I were to concede this point, my other objection still stands, so I'm not too attached to it.

I disagree with the argument, but not for the reason you gave. The argument is based on the idea that morality is objective. I don't see how those purported naturalistic explanations are relevant to the question of how morality is objective.

My objection to premise 2 is that I'm not convinced there is a contradiction in being a non-naturalist atheist and believing in objective morality. An atheist who accepted Platonism might believe that objective morality is grounded in the Platonic Form of the Good; such a belief does not necessarily require nor imply theism.

They're objective in the same sense that to birds, the idea that they have to migrate in the winter is objective. Morality doesn't extend beyond our species outside of religion. I think it would be better if "objective" was replaced by "universal".

I don't really buy non-naturalist atheist beliefs a tenable, but I think your example helps in pointing out that God being the best possible example of an objective morality is an argument that has yet to be proven.

I don't find this objection convincing. Sure, humans disagree about what God wants us to do; but I think God will judge us based on our honest obedience to our own consciences and reason, rather than on whether we chose the right sect to follow. If a religious leader tells us to do something that our heart tells us is wrong, we should listen to our heart above the leader, and God will hold us responsible for following our own hearts, even when our hearts are wrong.

That's an interesting point of view. From what I could tell, God is very clear about following his word over our own moral compass. The way I see it, if people are going to do what they think is right in the hopes of pleasing God, there's no difference between them and an atheist following whatever moral code they believe in.

Good points. I don't think several of the other scenarios you mention are likely, but the onus is on the advocates of this argument to demonstrate that.

I think they're ludicrous scenarios. I was just using them as examples of other possibilities that, like you said, must all be demonstrated to be false.

I agree. I don't think the Resurrection is historically proven, nor do I think it is likely to ever be historically provable.

I think that's another case of Christians taking their belief for granted, not realizing that nonbelievers are going to be much more scrutinous.

[magellan004]

What Flew could or could not recognize is beside the point. An argument from authority is fallacious regardless of the authority's qualifications. In logic, it is never the case that X may be inferred from "Professor so-and-so says X," no matter who Professor so-and-so is.

From time to time in TWEB the issue of Logical Fallacies' comes up.
All logical fallacies involve valid arguments so they cannot be fallacious as in 'False' arguments or 'Wrong deductions'.

For example it certainly is the case that if:
A. Whatever Professor Smythers Bones says is true.'
B. Professor Smythers Bones says X.'
C Therefore X is true.

The thing about Logical Fallacies is that they are usually bad arguments in the sense of being inappropriate, unfounded, unsound or annoying etc.

But having said that - Arguments from Authority are what academic papers, essays and research are based on. So as a form of argument, it's difficult to criticise.




Magellan

[ZackMartin]

What Flew could or could not recognize is beside the point. An argument from authority is fallacious regardless of the authority's qualifications. In logic, it is never the case that X may be inferred from "Professor so-and-so says X," no matter who Professor so-and-so is.

An argument for authority is valid when the authority is reliable. When it comes to scientific questions, does one seek to answer them for oneself? Or does one accept the advice of experts? Unless you are an expert in that particular scientific field, you will most commonly rely on that expert advice; and there is nothing fallacious about that. No one person can possibly be an expert in every scientific field, so even scientific experts rely on the authority of experts in fields other than their own.

If Professor X says Y, that is no certain proof that Y is true. But if Professor X is a demonstrated expert in the relevant field, that makes Professor X's opinions about Y far more likely to be correct than someone who is not an expert in that field. So as a non-expert, I would be rationally justified in accepting Professor X's opinion. If I have doubts, and the time and inclination, there is nothing wrong with me seeking on a second or third or fourth opinion, or attempting to research the issue for myself; but if I have no good reasons to doubt what the expert says, and lack the time or inclination to seek further opinions or independently investigate the topic, then I am rationally justified in believing the expert's claims. So arguments from authority are not inherently fallacious.

[ZackMartin]

I considered this, and I think that while it is certainly conceivable, it's also conceivable for God to be able to prove a square circle exists or 1+1=5. I think biological mistakes like in my video example are equivalent to accepted ideas like circles and squares being incompatible sets or 1+1=2. If I were to concede this point, my other objection still stands, so I'm not too attached to it.

Let me be a little more specific. I, as the particular person that I am, can only exist in an imperfect world. A perfect world could exist, but neither I myself, nor anyone whom I love, could exist in such a world. In a perfect world, none of us would have ever been born; different people would exist in our place.

Now, if we want to talk about God's love, I'd say let's start by talking about human love. We love other people in two different ways. Firstly, we can have this generalised love, the "love of one's fellow man". This love doesn't have specific persons as its target, to the exclusion of other specific persons. Secondly, we can have this particular love, the love of particular persons - I Iove my girlfriend, my parents, my siblings and other family, my friends, as particular persons; this is a love I feel for some persons and not others. Generalised love is fungible - if you are going to do a good deed to a stranger, it doesn't matter who the stranger is. Particular love is not fungible - sure, its targets can vary over time (I might break up with my girlfriend; I might make new friends and drift away from my old ones; family members are born and die; etc.) - but I can't just arbitrarily turn it on or off, or change its targets at the drop of a hat. I can't make myself suddenly love someone, and I can't make myself suddenly unlove someone either.

Suppose you had the power to replace this world with a world perfect from the beginning, as if this one had ever existed, such that none of the evils of history would ever have happened. Generalised love might tell you to do this - the people in that world would be unimaginably happier than anyone in this world could ever be. But it would not comply with your particular love - the particular people whom you love would never have been born. Generalised love demands perfection; but particular love requires imperfection. It would also be incompatible with our love for our self, for in such a world, we would not exist to experience it.

Applying the same idea to God, it gives us a new perspective on the problem of evil. What if God loves us, not just as people in general, but as particular people? What if God chose us, out of the near-infinity of possible people, to love us, and in loving us to bring about our existence? But our existence requires an imperfect world, so to create a perfect world would be to offend against God's particular love, even as it might serve his generalised love.

And if God has a good reason to create an imperfect world - then obviously "design mistakes" in biology are part of those imperfections. A world without disease, illness and infirmity would be a world in which none of us were ever born.

You still probably don't agree with this, but does it seem more plausible than it did initially, now I have explained my thoughts in more detail?

They're objective in the same sense that to birds, the idea that they have to migrate in the winter is objective. Morality doesn't extend beyond our species outside of religion. I think it would be better if "objective" was replaced by "universal".

"Objectivity" is really an argument about whether certain types of statements are capable of truth or falsehood independent of our individual or collective belief in them. Most people agree that factual matters are objective, in the sense that the truth or falsehood of the "the Earth is the third planet from the Sun" is completely independent of what we or anyone else may believe about it. The question is whether or not ethical statements are objective in roughly the same way as factual statements are. Since it's doubtful birds are capable of believing statements in the sense that humans can, it's questionable what relevance the behaviour of birds has to the question of whether morality is objective.

I don't really buy non-naturalist atheist beliefs a tenable, but I think your example helps in pointing out that God being the best possible example of an objective morality is an argument that has yet to be proven.

Well, I'm not a non-naturalist atheist, but there are more than you might think. One that comes to mind is the British philosopher John McTaggart, who while he disbelieved in God, did believe that reality ultimately consisted of nothing but timeless immortal souls loving one another, and time and space and matter were just illusions hiding that fundamental reality. Also, look at Buddhism, or Jainism - neither religion believes in God in the Western sense, but they are far from being naturalistic. I wouldn't say Buddhism is entirely atheistic; some forms of it (especially Tibetan Buddhism, and Pure Land Buddhism) show strong theistic tendencies, but there are other forms, such as Theravada, that are largely free of theistic elements.

On the other hand, non-naturalist atheism is much closer to theism than naturalist atheism is. It is not a far leap from being a non-naturalist atheist to being a non-naturalist theist; the jump from naturalist atheism to non-naturalist theism is much further. (Naturalist theism is also possible - UFO cults that believe in salvation by all-powerful space aliens are an example - but it is not a view very many would take seriously.)

That's an interesting point of view. From what I could tell, God is very clear about following his word over our own moral compass.

Well, that is only true if you believe that the Bible (or the Quran, or whatnot) is the Word of God. I don't believe that. I think parts of it may come from God, but I'm confident the whole does not. Parts of the Bible I find morally reprehensible, and I believe God finds them morally reprehensible also. What justification do I have for this belief? My own moral intuitions. Christians will ask, Can I trust them? Well, I suppose I don't have much choice in the matter; anyway, I trust them more than their unconvincing arguments that we ought to accept the Bible as entirely true and entirely inspired. As a practical matter of psychology, it would require strong evidence for me to ignore my own moral intuitions, and that strong evidence has not been forthcoming for me, and I doubt it ever will.

The way I see it, if people are going to do what they think is right in the hopes of pleasing God, there's no difference between them and an atheist following whatever moral code they believe in.

One clear difference I see is the type of moral hope they have. The theist has the moral hope that God will right the evils of the world in the next life, and at the end of this world. Atheists can also have moral hope, that social and economic progress will slowly right the evils of the world. But I would still say overall, that whatever moral hope the atheist has, the theists moral hope is greater; as optimistic as the atheist is entitled to be for the morality of the future, the theist's optimism will always be of a greater order.

However, this might not be a purely theistic hope. Conceivably a non-naturalist atheist, who believes in objective morality, might also believe in a non-theistic afterlife (e.g. Buddhist rebirth), and in some impersonal moral force driving the universe towards greater morality, such as karma or dharma. I guess it is really the non-naturalism, rather than the theism, which is the key distinguishing factor here.

Another is, if the atheist rejects objective morality - which most do, but as I've argued, they needn't do - is that their honest powers of moral judgement are weaker. Iran executes a 15 year old rape victim for "adultery"; I say that is gravely evil. But moreso, as a believer in objective morals, I can honestly claim that its evil is independent of my own personal feelings, and independent of my culture. I can honestly claim, That would be wrong even if I thought it was right. The moral subjectivist, if they are honest, all they can really say, is it is against their own personal moral beliefs, and against the shared moral values of their own culture. But, the Iranian mullah will ask, Why should I care about your personal moral beliefs? I am not you. And why should I care about the shared moral values of your culture? My culture is not your culture. How can one respond to that? Well, I suppose the believer in objective morality is not a huge amount better off; the mullah will agree that morality is objective, and then reject the idea that objective morality prohibits the execution of 15 year old girls for "adultery" - two people can both agree on the objectivity of morality, and completely disagree on what that objective morality actually is. But still, I would say they are better off, because at least they can honestly claim that others are wrong, even if it is near (or even actually) impossible for them to prove this.

[Tassman]

Well, I'm not a non-naturalist atheist, but there are more than you might think. One that comes to mind is the British philosopher John McTaggart, who while he disbelieved in God, did believe that reality ultimately consisted of nothing but timeless immortal souls loving one another, and time and space and matter were just illusions hiding that fundamental reality. Also, look at Buddhism, or Jainism - neither religion believes in God in the Western sense, but they are far from being naturalistic. I wouldn't say Buddhism is entirely atheistic; some forms of it (especially Tibetan Buddhism, and Pure Land Buddhism) show strong theistic tendencies, but there are other forms, such as Theravada, that are largely free of theistic elements.

On the other hand, non-naturalist atheism is much closer to theism than naturalist atheism is. It is not a far leap from being a non-naturalist atheist to being a non-naturalist theist; the jump from naturalist atheism to non-naturalist theism is much further. (Naturalist theism is also possible - UFO cults that believe in salvation by all-powerful space aliens are an example - but it is not a view very many would take seriously.)

Please explain what a non-naturalist atheist’s beliefs would consist of given that an atheist by definition does not believe supernatural beings exist. Do non-naturalist atheists accept the paranormal given that the paranormal beliefs are akin to supernatural beliefs – i.e. non-natural? And, by ‘natural’ I’m referring to the viewpoint that the laws of nature (as opposed to supernatural or paranormal ones) have the potential to explain all phenomena and occurrences in the universe.

So what’s left for the non-naturalist atheist?

[magellan004]

Let me be a little more specific. I, as the particular person that I am, can only exist in an imperfect world. A perfect world could exist, but neither I myself, nor anyone whom I love, could exist in such a world. In a perfect world, none of us would have ever been born; different people would exist in our place.

Now, if we want to talk about God's love, I'd say let's start by talking about human love. We love other people in two different ways. Firstly, we can have this generalised love, the "love of one's fellow man". This love doesn't have specific persons as its target, to the exclusion of other specific persons. Secondly, we can have this particular love, the love of particular persons - I Iove my girlfriend, my parents, my siblings and other family, my friends, as particular persons; this is a love I feel for some persons and not others. Generalised love is fungible - if you are going to do a good deed to a stranger, it doesn't matter who the stranger is. Particular love is not fungible - sure, its targets can vary over time (I might break up with my girlfriend; I might make new friends and drift away from my old ones; family members are born and die; etc.) - but I can't just arbitrarily turn it on or off, or change its targets at the drop of a hat. I can't make myself suddenly love someone, and I can't make myself suddenly unlove someone either.

Suppose you had the power to replace this world with a world perfect from the beginning, as if this one had ever existed, such that none of the evils of history would ever have happened. Generalised love might tell you to do this - the people in that world would be unimaginably happier than anyone in this world could ever be. But it would not comply with your particular love - the particular people whom you love would never have been born. Generalised love demands perfection; but particular love requires imperfection. It would also be incompatible with our love for our self, for in such a world, we would not exist to experience it.

Applying the same idea to God, it gives us a new perspective on the problem of evil. What if God loves us, not just as people in general, but as particular people? What if God chose us, out of the near-infinity of possible people, to love us, and in loving us to bring about our existence? But our existence requires an imperfect world, so to create a perfect world would be to offend against God's particular love, even as it might serve his generalised love.

And if God has a good reason to create an imperfect world - then obviously "design mistakes" in biology are part of those imperfections. A world without disease, illness and infirmity would be a world in which none of us were ever born.

You still probably don't agree with this, but does it seem more plausible than it did initially, now I have explained my thoughts in more detail?

"Objectivity" is really an argument about whether certain types of statements are capable of truth or falsehood independent of our individual or collective belief in them. Most people agree that factual matters are objective, in the sense that the truth or falsehood of the "the Earth is the third planet from the Sun" is completely independent of what we or anyone else may believe about it. The question is whether or not ethical statements are objective in roughly the same way as factual statements are. Since it's doubtful birds are capable of believing statements in the sense that humans can, it's questionable what relevance the behaviour of birds has to the question of whether morality is objective.

Well, I'm not a non-naturalist atheist, but there are more than you might think. One that comes to mind is the British philosopher John McTaggart, who while he disbelieved in God, did believe that reality ultimately consisted of nothing but timeless immortal souls loving one another, and time and space and matter were just illusions hiding that fundamental reality. Also, look at Buddhism, or Jainism - neither religion believes in God in the Western sense, but they are far from being naturalistic. I wouldn't say Buddhism is entirely atheistic; some forms of it (especially Tibetan Buddhism, and Pure Land Buddhism) show strong theistic tendencies, but there are other forms, such as Theravada, that are largely free of theistic elements.

On the other hand, non-naturalist atheism is much closer to theism than naturalist atheism is. It is not a far leap from being a non-naturalist atheist to being a non-naturalist theist; the jump from naturalist atheism to non-naturalist theism is much further. (Naturalist theism is also possible - UFO cults that believe in salvation by all-powerful space aliens are an example - but it is not a view very many would take seriously.)

Well, that is only true if you believe that the Bible (or the Quran, or whatnot) is the Word of God. I don't believe that. I think parts of it may come from God, but I'm confident the whole does not. Parts of the Bible I find morally reprehensible, and I believe God finds them morally reprehensible also. What justification do I have for this belief? My own moral intuitions. Christians will ask, Can I trust them? Well, I suppose I don't have much choice in the matter; anyway, I trust them more than their unconvincing arguments that we ought to accept the Bible as entirely true and entirely inspired. As a practical matter of psychology, it would require strong evidence for me to ignore my own moral intuitions, and that strong evidence has not been forthcoming for me, and I doubt it ever will.

One clear difference I see is the type of moral hope they have. The theist has the moral hope that God will right the evils of the world in the next life, and at the end of this world. Atheists can also have moral hope, that social and economic progress will slowly right the evils of the world. But I would still say overall, that whatever moral hope the atheist has, the theists moral hope is greater; as optimistic as the atheist is entitled to be for the morality of the future, the theist's optimism will always be of a greater order.

However, this might not be a purely theistic hope. Conceivably a non-naturalist atheist, who believes in objective morality, might also believe in a non-theistic afterlife (e.g. Buddhist rebirth), and in some impersonal moral force driving the universe towards greater morality, such as karma or dharma. I guess it is really the non-naturalism, rather than the theism, which is the key distinguishing factor here.

Another is, if the atheist rejects objective morality - which most do, but as I've argued, they needn't do - is that their honest powers of moral judgement are weaker. Iran executes a 15 year old rape victim for "adultery"; I say that is gravely evil. But moreso, as a believer in objective morals, I can honestly claim that its evil is independent of my own personal feelings, and independent of my culture. I can honestly claim, That would be wrong even if I thought it was right. The moral subjectivist, if they are honest, all they can really say, is it is against their own personal moral beliefs, and against the shared moral values of their own culture. But, the Iranian mullah will ask, Why should I care about your personal moral beliefs? I am not you. And why should I care about the shared moral values of your culture? My culture is not your culture. How can one respond to that? Well, I suppose the believer in objective morality is not a huge amount better off; the mullah will agree that morality is objective, and then reject the idea that objective morality prohibits the execution of 15 year old girls for "adultery" - two people can both agree on the objectivity of morality, and completely disagree on what that objective morality actually is. But still, I would say they are better off, because at least they can honestly claim that others are wrong, even if it is near (or even actually) impossible for them to prove this.

A great post !
May I butt in and comment on the last few paragraphs?
Thank you for saying Yes.
You say 'The theist has the moral hope that God will right the evils of the world in the next life, and at the end of this world. Atheists can also have moral hope, that social and economic progress will slowly right the evils of the world. '

This is one facet of morality - but removing evil is sort of like removing a pimple - it doesn't tell you if the organism is whole. The Christian has the moral hope that God's good will be the order of the day, His good will be how the world works - or whatever phrase using 'good' you like. That is far different from avoiding a negative or having a hope for the future in the sense of 'I hope my children's children are happy/prosperous etc.

How can an atheist hope for good? Sure they can want an end to suffering in a quasi Buddhist way - but they can't have a hope in goodness. I think - and ok this is my perception - that atheists want to avoid the least misery. That has nothing to do with Christian morality.

Magellan

[headheart]

Please explain what a non-naturalist atheist’s beliefs would consist of given that an atheist by definition does not believe supernatural beings exist. Do non-naturalist atheists accept the paranormal given that the paranormal beliefs are akin to supernatural beliefs – i.e. non-natural? And, by ‘natural’ I’m referring to the viewpoint that the laws of nature (as opposed to supernatural or paranormal ones) have the potential to explain all phenomena and occurrences in the universe.

So what’s left for the non-naturalist atheist?

This should be very interesting.

Peace,
Eric.

[ZackMartin]

Please explain what a non-naturalist atheist’s beliefs would consist of given that an atheist by definition does not believe supernatural beings exist.

No. An atheist does not believe that God exists. Strictly speaking, atheism is silent on the issue of the existence or non-existence of any being other than God. If a person rejects belief in God, they are an atheist; they might believe in other non-natural objects, such as immortal souls, but that does not make them not an atheist.

The British idealist philosopher John McTaggart is an example of this - he denied the existence of God, but he believed in the existence of immortal souls. He believed that the material universe is illusory, and immortal souls are all that actually exist. So he was definitely an atheist (he denied God's existence), but he was not a naturalist by any means.

Do non-naturalist atheists accept the paranormal given that the paranormal beliefs are akin to supernatural beliefs – i.e. non-natural?

Some do. A friend of mine is an atheist, but she believes in ghosts.

And, by ‘natural’ I’m referring to the viewpoint that the laws of nature (as opposed to supernatural or paranormal ones) have the potential to explain all phenomena and occurrences in the universe.

So what’s left for the non-naturalist atheist?

You can reject the existence of God, yet also reject naturalism ("the viewpoint that the laws of nature (as opposed to supernatural or paranormal ones) have the potential to explain all phenomena and occurrences in the universe"), as you say. There is no logical contradiction in such a belief; in fact, it is a lot more common than you think.

[ZackMartin]

You say 'The theist has the moral hope that God will right the evils of the world in the next life, and at the end of this world. Atheists can also have moral hope, that social and economic progress will slowly right the evils of the world. '

This is one facet of morality - but removing evil is sort of like removing a pimple - it doesn't tell you if the organism is whole. The Christian has the moral hope that God's good will be the order of the day, His good will be how the world works - or whatever phrase using 'good' you like. That is far different from avoiding a negative or having a hope for the future in the sense of 'I hope my children's children are happy/prosperous etc.

How can an atheist hope for good? Sure they can want an end to suffering in a quasi Buddhist way - but they can't have a hope in goodness. I think - and ok this is my perception - that atheists want to avoid the least misery. That has nothing to do with Christian morality.

An atheist can look at the history of the world, and see signs of moral improvement - the abolition of slavery in most of the world, the spread of democracy throughout large chunks of it, women's suffrage, desegregation, the end of apartheid, the fall of Soviet tyranny, etc. They can see that in the developed world, we have in a few generations greatly alleviated poverty and disease, with longer lives and infant mortality rates far less than they used to be, with near universal literacy. If you go back a few generations, you'd find most of my ancestors were poor uneducated Irish farmers; now we are affluent well-educated professionals. Of course other countries are far behind in these measures, but many of them are improving fast. So I think the atheist has a good argument for a certain degree of optimism about the future of the world, when measured against their own personal moral values. But their optimism doesn't work so well at the level of the individual - when someone's life is cut short by tragedy or evil - how can the atheist have moral hope about that situation?

(Although, when I speak of "atheist" here, I should really be speaking about "disbeliever in an afterlife". An atheist who believes in karma and rebirth, like many Buddhists, could still have something like the moral hope of which I speak; but the materialist naturalist atheist can't.)

[Juice]

Hey Zack.

Premise (2), of course, is the subject of endless historical dispute. There are arguments in favour of it, but there is no settled consensus that it is correct.

Yes, (2) will be the sticking point. I would look to establish this premise as an historical fact in as much as anything from ancient history can be established as a fact using historical methodology. For anyone to demand (2) be established with any greater certainty than that would be unreasonable.

Premise (1) has some problems - there are conceivable scenarios in which Jesus might return from the dead, even though God does not exist. For example, the disciples saw Jesus ghost (you can believe in ghosts without believing in God). Many people who believe in ghosts, believe that they are confused beings, who often refuse to believe they are really dead. The ghost of Jesus could have appeared to Jesus' disciples, honestly but mistakenly believing that God had risen him from the dead, and told that to his disciples. This leaves us to explain how Thomas felt the hole in Jesus' side, or how Jesus appeared to eat fish. One possible explanation is that those accounts are later legends and never actually happened; another is that they did, but to point to claims that ghostly apparitions can sometimes take a more tactile form, such as poltergeists, or ectoplasm.

In suggesting alternatives such as Jesus appearing as a ghost, spirit, etc you are offering alternatives to the nature of Jesus’ resurrected body, not alternatives to a return from the dead conclusion. Even if Jesus returned as a spirit of some type we still have him retuning from the dead thus proving his claims. As far as later embellishments are concerned, are you assuming that I would argue that the resurrection is true on the basis it is claimed in the NT and that the NT is entirely reliable? Because we don’t need to do that at all. We can still infer Jesus' return from the dead even assuming embellishments and no eyewitness accounts.

The mere fact that someone rises from the dead, doesn't automatically prove all their claims are true. Suppose our planet is, unknown to us, visited by aliens with very advanced technology, thousands or millions of years ahead of our own; almost anything we can imagine, they can do; they decide it would be a funny prank to raise some recently executed religious leader from the dead - why should we suppose such a religious leader's teachings were true? Maybe they used their mind control rays before hand, to cause this religious leader to predict his own resurrection, just to give the prank a bit of an extra kick.

Sure Zack, you can propose any number of conceptual possibilities however farfetched and without evidential support they may be. This does not diminish the fact that when one predicts one’s death and subsequent return from the dead as proof one wields the power/authority of God and then does it we are justified in believing the claims made about God by that person.

Or consider the maltheistic hypothesis - God exists, but God is evil - or one might say, there is no God, only Satan. Satan created humanity for the purpose of hurting them and deceiving them, for these things cause him pleasure. Since he loves deceiving humans so much, he sends false prophets to earth to teach false doctrines, because that causes him pleasure. Then Satan decides to raise one of his false prophets from the dead, since people will (mistakenly) view that as a sign that the prophet was true, and even more people will be deceived by the false prophet's teachings, which causes Satan even more pleasure.

If there is no God but only Satan (or God is evil), and Satan wields the power of God we are truly deceived and in the end it makes no difference as we have absolutely no way to escape the end result of destruction.

In that case you give above I could also argue I probably do not exist as my existence is dependent upon Satan, the deceiver, who has deceived me into believing I exist when I do not. If it is the case that there is no God, only Satan (or God is evil) and Satan (God) gains so much pleasure from deceiving humans, then I probably do not exist (I have only been deceived into believing I exist because this would give Satan (God) immense pleasure as it would be the ultimate deception for a human). But I’m very certain I do exist, therefore I’m very certain it is not the case that there is no God, only Satan (or God is evil) and Satan (God) gains so much pleasure from deceiving humans.

I'm not saying I personally believe any of this is true - I don't - I'm just pointing out that your argument as stated fails, because it doesn't exclude these possibilities. To succeed, you need to add to your argument evidence or subarguments that these alternative explanations are false.

The argument as it stands certainly needs fleshing out. But I think you know where the argument is heading and that it hinges upon Jesus returning from dead. I don’t see anything you’ve presented here as derailing the conclusion that God exists if I can establish historically that Jesus returned from the dead.

[Juice]

But, given you are claiming “Modus Ponens Logic” you are assuming that the response to the conditional premise of “IF Jesus returned from the dead”, namely: “Jesus returned from the dead” to be true. But this is a classic example of the Bare Assertion Fallacy. There is no substantiated evidence to support this assertion. It is a faith-belief. The claims remain unproven.

Settle down Tassman. At this stage I’m merely presenting valid arguments to demonstrate my larger argument that the atheist cannot claim he has arrived at his position rationally if all he does is withhold assent to the weight of theistic arguments and/or merely attacks valid theistic arguments. So, to make my argument stick I have to show some valid theistic arguments and thus tip the scale in favour of theism, which I have done. I haven’t yet moved to the stage of establishing premise (2):Jesus returned from the dead because I don't feel I need to at this stage. And frankly I'm not sure I will in this thread as I'm not trying to prove God's existence per se. But if we do happen to get to it all I’ll need to do is “prove” (2) as much as any claim from the distant past can be “proven.” For you to expect a greater level of “proof” than this would be unreasonable.

One withholds consent to any proposition that cannot be supported by credible evidence, whether it is dead people resurrecting or mental-illness being caused by evil demons. And while the weight of theistic arguments is considerable in terms of quantity, there are NO theistic claims of miraculous occurrences which do not have a possible natural explanation.

There are always alternative explanation(s) for any set of facts, that is not disputed. The question will be which is the best explanation of the facts.

A natural explanation is always more probable than a non-natural explanation. To say otherwise is to argue that nature is capricious and inscrutable and that miraculous violations of nature are possible and unpredictable.

If science cannot rely with certainty on the principle of uniformity or any other natural law or constant its demonstrable ability to make predictions about nature, that are later validated and produce yet further predictions, would not be possible.

If your world view hinges on uniformity you’re in trouble. Some foundational assumptions of uniformity have been falsified. Such as the constancy of radioactive decay rates.

[Juice]

My ears were burning. Okay Juice, I'll be specific in the flaws of these arguments (as quoted from your sources)
Kalam Cosmological Argument:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause
2. The universe began to exist
3. Therefore, the universe had a cause


Premise 1 is faulty because we have never seen something truly begin to exist outside of, as far as we can guess, quantum physics (particles popping in and out of existence), which we cannot explain. Everything else has always existed as long as the universe has, just in a previous form. A table existed as a tree which existed as a seed which existed from a tree... etc. ... which started from the first plants, from the first microorganisms, from the first self-replicating molecules... etc ... all the way to the energy released from the big bang.

There is dispute over virtual particles. Matt Strassler seems to think they aren’t truly a “particle” but a rather a “disturbance.” See here. Further, even if virtual particles are real they arise in a quantum vacuum so it cannot be claimed that they arise without cause from nothing.

Further to your points. All you are doing here is playing semantics with what it means to “begins to exist.” How we define "begins to exist" doesn’t fundamentally change the outcome of the KCA unless you are arguing we have no way to reasonably determine when a tree no longer exists as a tree but begins to exist as a table. Is a table a tree? Is a tree a table? Certainly not.

Premise 2 is faulty because nobody can say this for sure. The idea that the universe exists as an infinite series of bangs and crunches is still on the table, for example.

Premise (2) is not merely an assumption as you stated it was here. It is an inference from the observable data.

”All the evidence seems to indicate, that the universe has not existed forever, but that it had a beginning, about 15 billion years ago. This is probably the most remarkable discovery of modern cosmology” – Stephen Hawking, The Beginning of Time

Argument from Design:

(1) It is an indisputable and yet remarkable fact that many natural objects appear to have been designed for a purpose: the eye for seeing, the hand for grasping, etc.

(2) The only reasonable explanation for this appearance of purpose is that natural things are ultimately the product of an immensely powerful supernatural intelligence, namely God.

(IBE) If an hypothesis H is the only reasonable explanation of a remarkable fact F, then it is reasonable to believe that H is true.

(3) Therefore, it is reasonable to believe is that God exists.


Premise 2 is faulty for two reasons.

First, because the other reasonable explanation is that things can appear designed because humans look for patterns.

You are misrepresenting the argument. When the argument states “natural objects appear to have been designed for a purpose” it wasn’t referring to things such as rock formations, snowflakes, and the appearance of order in simple inanimate objects. It was referring to the likes of complex systems like eyes and so on as the first premise clarifies. So although your pics were very cool and could be seen as evidence of self ordering in nature they are ultimately knocking down a strawman.

This is the Giant's Causeway. It looks like the ruins from some ancient structure, but it's actually just an astonishing geological phenomenon.

Again you seem to be misrepresenting the argument and the concept of complexity and purpose. But as a note of interest, when we look at actual ruins with complex formations of brick (or stone work), doorways, waterways, sewage systems, streets, etc that were all created for a purpose do we infer natural processes or a designer as their cause?

These are snowflakes, as seen through a microscope. They look like microscopic sculptures, but they're actually the result of ice crystallization.

Again this seems to be a strawman. We don’t necessarily infer design because there is a pattern or the appearance of order in non complex systems. But again, as a note of interest, if you came across snowflakes reconfigured in the following formation…


…would you infer natural processes or a designer?

Biological mechanisms like an eye or a hand also have the great fortune of being the result of a directed process (natural selection), in much the same way a chemical reaction is a directed process. So in a way they were designed, but by natural processes.

Setting aside this is merely an assertion that assumes evolution let’s suppose on an excavation 1,000,000 years from now long after our current culture is forgotten and lost to history they dig up a motor such as the one in the following image…

If those who discover it infer it came into being from natural processes they would be mistaken.

Now look at the next image…

Why would we not also infer a designer for this motor? Why would we infer a designer for one complex motor but natural processes for another? Which would be a better explanation when we take into account the complexity of this motor, a designer or natural processes?

Second, there are many design flaws. Here's a video of Richard Dawkins explaining one dramatic flaw that makes perfect sense when natural selection is considered, but not when a god is considered. That's just one example. There are many, many more. No immensely powerful supernatural intelligence would be foolish enough to leave so many mistakes.

Design flaw arguments are useful against the idea that the designer is perfect or created perfect things. They are not good arguments against a designer existing for a designer could conceivably design with flaws either intentionally or unintentionally for any number of reasons. In fact we know this to be the case today.

Consider the outboard motor above. Let’s assume for a moment it has a serious design flaw, where the engine still works but not as optimally as we would like. Does it logically follow from there that the motor must not have been designed and must have come to be as it is by natural processes? No, that would be silly. But that’s how Dawkin’s logic works in the video clip. So I don’t see how this falsifies the inference from design.

Argument from Morality:
1. It appears to human beings that moral normativity exists.
2. The best explanation of moral normativity is that it is grounded in God.
3. Therefore God exists.


Premise 2 fails because morality is naturalistic. We can see this in the behavior of similar animals, like apes, dolphins, and dogs (social mammals). Morality is indistinguishable from instinct, with the major complications being A. our much greater intellect and B. mental illness (a side effect of A).

But you haven’t shown that the best explanation of morality is naturalistic. If morality is naturalistic and indistinguishable from instinct why do some animals eat their off spring but humans recognize this as immoral for humans? Shouldn’t we also eat our off spring when we get really hungry and there is no other food available if instinct is indistinguishable from morality? Why do you and I agree that eating our off spring is morally wrong even if we get really hungry and there is no other food? If there is virtually universal agreement among mutually exclusive cultures on an issue of morality then we have proof that morality is objective as people tend to disagree on most things. The best explanation for objective morality is God not natural processes.

Another version of the argument is thus:
1.Moral normativity is best explained through the existence of authoritative moral rules.
2.Authoritative moral rules must be promulgated and enforced by an appropriate moral authority.
3.The only appropriate moral authority is God.
4.Thus, given that there is moral normativity, there is a God.


Premise 3 fails not just because of the point I just made, but also because there is no real religious moral authority. This can be seen in the many moral issues with which two people in the same religion, reading the same holy book, in the same sect can disagree upon. Contrast this with the moral authority of our legal system. The laws are (in most cases) very clear. What's debated is what laws should exist. I think this debate exists among the religious as well, in their minds.

Not necessarily. Most religions would agree with the basic principle of the Golden Rule for example. In fact, almost everyone would agree with it, religious or not. Further, there would be almost universal agreement for example that the torture, mutilation, and killing of helpless children (even if disabled) for pure enjoyment is morally wrong. Thus we have evidence of objective morality.

From these two failed premises I think my objections to the other variations of the argument can be extrapolated.

I don’t see where you’ve either shown the logic to be invalid or any one premise to be false.

Argument from History:
1. If Jesus returned from the dead, then God exists.
2. Jesus retuned from the dead
3. Therefore, God exists


Premise 1 fails because if you accept the possibility of supernatural phenomenon, then you have to consider the possibility that Jesus was lying. It's just as possible (again assuming the supernatural exists) that we live in either an atheist universe or a universe in which some other religion besides Christianity is true, and Jesus was some sort of supernatural entity that was simply lying about being the son of God. Perhaps Jesus was Loki in disguise, or God doesn't exist but demons do, and Jesus was one. Really, the argument should look like this:

Argument from History:
1. If Jesus returned from the dead and is telling the truth, then God exists.
2. Jesus retuned from the dead
3. Jesus was telling the truth
4. Therefore, God exists

First off, what you have presented, even if it were a legitimate complaint where we had no reason to think Jesus was not a lair, would only prevent us from inferring the Christian God with any certainty. It would not prevent us from inferring a god or the supernatural.

Secondly, regarding Jesus possibly being a demon or empowered by Satan and so on. That Jesus was telling the truth is implied in my argument as it commonly accepted that Jesus taught that lying is of Satan and wrong. I don’t see the need to make it explicit as you’ve done. If Jesus was a demon (or empowered by Satan) why wouldn’t he just claim that and thus glorify Satan? Why did Jesus distance himself from Satan? Why wouldn’t Jesus have taught that we should lie, murder, have sex with lots of different people, and worship Satan and so on if he was from Satan? Why would he draw people away from Satan’s glory and draw them toward God’s glory? To think Jesus would draw his followers away from Satan and teach the things Jesus did and also give glory to God in the process if Jesus was a demon (or empowered by Satan) grossly misunderstands the character and purpose of Satan’s actions.

Regardless, however, premise 2 fails, because the truth value of the gospels is debatable. Just ask any non-Christian. Really, at the very least, this premise must be supported by a large amount of evidence (since it is an extraordinary claim).

How much more evidence? Give me a number and explain why that number is correct.

I can't see where anything you've presented falsifies any premise of the arguments I've cited. Certainly you haven't shown the logic of the arguments to be invalid.

So again, if all you can do is withhold assent and/or attack valid theistic arguments can you really claim you have arrived at your position rationally? I don't think you can.