Is This Where Godless Philosophy Natural Leads?

[seer]

Well, here I disagree completely. I believe that capital punishment is murder, it is wrong always and everywhere, always has been and always will be. I think the very idea of capital punishment is completely disgusting, immoral and vile.

And I think putting a murder to death is just. Perfectly just and rational. At least we found one line you would not cross.

I don't see how it is at all arbitrary. So many of our ethical and legal rules in society revolve around consent. Consent is the difference between an act of love and an act of rape. Consent is the difference between a legal medical or cosmetic procedure, and an unlawful assault. Consent is the difference between giving and theft, between hospitality and trespass. Consent, while not an absolute that permits no exceptions, is a key concept in our moral and legal reasoning, as it should be. So why should the concept be irrelevant in questions of life and death, when it is undoubtedly relevant in so many other areas of law and ethics?

And I'm saying that, especially in the case euthanasia, that the ontological question is the primary consideration. What are human beings Zack, are they valuable within themselves? Does their value decrease with specific disabilities?

Peter Singer's argument for infant euthanasia is based on preference utilitarianism - we ought to treat everyone's preferences equally. In the case of normal adults or older children, they have preferences with respect to life or death, so we ought to respect those preferences. In the case of infants, they themselves don't have any such preferences, but their parents do, so we should respect the preferences of their parents. Personally, I think Singer's position on this issue is overly simplistic, but nonetheless it is worthy of serious engagement.

As vile as you see capital punishment is as vile as I see Singer. So we are even.

Different answers to that question are possible. One might say yes, one might say no. I would suggest that parenting is fundamentally an individual-to-individual thing - the state can't itself be a parent - and so becoming a ward of the state does not grant the state the full powers of a parent. (The fiction of legal personality can only be stretched so far.) I might suggest, it gives the state the powers to assign new parents (to adopt), but it does not give the state the full powers an individual parent would possess. In most cases nowadays, when a child is made a ward of the state, they are placed in foster care, and the foster parent has most of the powers of a parent, but not all the powers. Only if the foster parent ends up adopting the child do they end up with the full powers of a parent with respect to the child.

Different answers to that question are possible? Sure I guess, but why - why not allow the state to murder the child? If the child is a burden I see no rational reason for the state not to have that power.

That's not Singer's standard. Singer's standard is whether the being understands the difference between life and death, and is capable of forming and expressing a preference to live or die. Infants clearly don't; normal older children clearly do; of course there are grey areas on the continuum between these two endpoints, but one might suggest that in the grey areas one should err on the side of caution. Of course one cannot always guarantee one will get everything right, but life and morality doesn't operate on that standard - one is simply required to honestly do one's best. Like my example of the US President ordering a missile strike on an orphanage under the mistaken but reasonably-held belief that it was a terrorist base - so long as you honestly and rationally believe you are doing the right thing, then in a way you are, even if in fact you are not.

Err on the side of caution? Gray areas? Of course this would all be moot if we just decide to do the right thing and care for the children in - instead of murdering them.

Not arbitrary, there is logic to them, and no more susceptible to being changed than any other standards are.

There is no man made standard that can not logically be pushed further out. Like in your "gray areas." Then beyond. And the fact is a three year old (especially a mentally ill one) really has no concept of life and death and can not make an informed choice. So why not choose for him? Yes Zack - your standards are arbitrary.

There is a major difference between acting in genuine accord with the parents' wishes, and ignoring their opinions (which the Nazis did). Look at this article, which discusses some of the attitudes of actual parents of Down's syndrome children. Some of them express upset at the fact that medical professionals undertook life-saving procedures on their infants without consulting them first. These doctors were like the Nazis, in that they did not consider the parent's wishes in making medical decisions for the infants. You can deny the Nazi connection all you want, but the bottom line remains the same - the wishes of the parents being disregarded.

Back to the arbitrary idea of consent. BTW - I never said we had to take extraordinary steps to keep a dying child alive, but in keeping with the article in question they are speaking of children, like with Down's, who may in fact go on and live quite fufilling lives, and are generally rather healthy.

[ZackMartin]

And I think putting a murder to death is just. Perfectly just and rational.

And I think it is disgusting and immoral and vile, far far worse than euthanasia could possibly be.

So there we go, you've got your morals and I've got mine. You think some of my views are unacceptable, and I think some of your views are unacceptable. After death, God will tell us who is right. (Of course I believe he will tell us I am right, and you probably believe he will tell us you are right, and one of us must be wrong, but we'll just have to see which one is.)

At least we found one line you would not cross.

Why did you assume there were no lines I would cross? Everyone has lines they will not cross. The form of state murder called "capital punishment" is a line I will not cross, but one you have no qualms about crossing.

And I'm saying that, especially in the case euthanasia, that the ontological question is the primary consideration. What are human beings Zack, are they valuable within themselves?

Unlike you, my ontology doesn't give any special value to human beings in themselves. A being does not have value simply by being a member of the species "homo sapiens". Most members of that species have certain attributes that cause them to have a particular value on account of those attributes, but it does not thereby follow that members of that species lacking those attributes have the same value.

Peter Singer attacked the position that human beings have value simply as members of their species as "speciesism", and argued it was fundamentally no different than racism. I am sympathetic to his position.

Does their value decrease with specific disabilities?

It depends on the specific nature of the disability, and what we specifically mean by "value". Your question is too vague to answer.

As vile as you see capital punishment is as vile as I see Singer. So we are even.

Okay, sure we are even then. I don't necessarily agree with all of Singer's views, but I think he has made impressive contributions to the contemporary philosophical debate about ethics; even if he is wrong about some things, his contribution to the debate is still valuable.

Different answers to that question are possible? Sure I guess, but why - why not allow the state to murder the child? If the child is a burden I see no rational reason for the state not to have that power.

I gave a reason - "parenting is fundamentally an individual-to-individual thing - the state can't itself be a parent - and so becoming a ward of the state does not grant the state the full powers of a parent. (The fiction of legal personality can only be stretched so far.)"

Err on the side of caution? Gray areas? Of course this would all be moot if we just decide to do the right thing and care for the children in - instead of murdering them.

The existence of grey areas is not an argument against applying a standard in more clear cut cases.

There is no man made standard that can not logically be pushed further out. Like in your "gray areas." Then beyond.

That's your assertion. I don't agree with it. Human beliefs are changeable things, so any belief system can potentially turn into any other with time.

And the fact is a three year old (especially a mentally ill one) really has no concept of life and death and can not make an informed choice. So why not choose for him? Yes Zack - your standards are arbitrary.

That's a factual question which needs to be answered. Singer argues, that a being doesn't need to have an understanding of life and death, but simply a concept of the future and the ability to form desires for the future (e.g. "we are going to the zoo tomorrow", "when I grow up I want to be a fireman", etc.), which desires death would presumably frustrate. Many three year olds would have such concepts; even if they don't always yet have the linguistic skills to express these concepts. There is no reason to suppose infants have such concepts (what does an infant want to do tomorrow? what does an infant want to do when it grows up? does it even have any idea what "tomorrow" means?)

Back to the arbitrary idea of consent. BTW - I never said we had to take extraordinary steps to keep a dying child alive, but in keeping with the article in question they are speaking of children, like with Down's, who may in fact go on and live quite fufilling lives, and are generally rather healthy.

Many Down's syndrome children are born with serious medical problems (e.g. heart defects), which would cause a high rate of infant mortality were it not for existence of surgical interventions. I think parents should be consulted on whether they want these procedures to be performed or not.

[seer]

And I think it is disgusting and immoral and vile, far far worse than euthanasia could possibly be.

So there we go, you've got your morals and I've got mine. You think some of my views are unacceptable, and I think some of your views are unacceptable. After death, God will tell us who is right. (Of course I believe he will tell us I am right, and you probably believe he will tell us you are right, and one of us must be wrong, but we'll just have to see which one is.)

Why did you assume there were no lines I would cross? Everyone has lines they will not cross. The form of state murder called "capital punishment" is a line I will not cross, but one you have no qualms about crossing.

Unlike you, my ontology doesn't give any special value to human beings in themselves. A being does not have value simply by being a member of the species "homo sapiens". Most members of that species have certain attributes that cause them to have a particular value on account of those attributes, but it does not thereby follow that members of that species lacking those attributes have the same value.

Peter Singer attacked the position that human beings have value simply as members of their species as "speciesism", and argued it was fundamentally no different than racism. I am sympathetic to his position.

It depends on the specific nature of the disability, and what we specifically mean by "value". Your question is too vague to answer.

Okay, sure we are even then. I don't necessarily agree with all of Singer's views, but I think he has made impressive contributions to the contemporary philosophical debate about ethics; even if he is wrong about some things, his contribution to the debate is still valuable.

I gave a reason - "parenting is fundamentally an individual-to-individual thing - the state can't itself be a parent - and so becoming a ward of the state does not grant the state the full powers of a parent. (The fiction of legal personality can only be stretched so far.)"

The existence of grey areas is not an argument against applying a standard in more clear cut cases.

That's your assertion. I don't agree with it. Human beliefs are changeable things, so any belief system can potentially turn into any other with time.

That's a factual question which needs to be answered. Singer argues, that a being doesn't need to have an understanding of life and death, but simply a concept of the future and the ability to form desires for the future (e.g. "we are going to the zoo tomorrow", "when I grow up I want to be a fireman", etc.), which desires death would presumably frustrate. Many three year olds would have such concepts; even if they don't always yet have the linguistic skills to express these concepts. There is no reason to suppose infants have such concepts (what does an infant want to do tomorrow? what does an infant want to do when it grows up? does it even have any idea what "tomorrow" means?)

Many Down's syndrome children are born with serious medical problems (e.g. heart defects), which would cause a high rate of infant mortality were it not for existence of surgical interventions. I think parents should be consulted on whether they want these procedures to be performed or not.

On most of this Zack we are going to disagree but there are a couple of points I would like to explore.

1. This whole consent thing. Let's be honest - with the disabled baby, the child is not giving consent. Her parents are. Asked why the State couldn't make the same call you said that "parenting is fundamentally an individual-to-individual thing." But how is that not arbitrary? Like I said I worked with the mentally ill for a number of years and as their care giver (and as an agent of the state) our relationship was certainly an individual-to-individual thing. State agencies are made up of people - people dealing with people. So I don’t get the logic.

Then ask why not apply this standard to older children you say we should not because they have ability to form desires about the future. What? But why should we consider that? How is that also not an arbitrary line? Besides most one or two year olds could not form or relay such desires - especially if they are mentally handicapped. So why not put the one year old “down?”

2. In the other thread you made eloquent case for objective ethics. I’m just having a hard time getting my mind around a set of ethics that would allow the killing of the most vulnerable, innocent members of society while protesting against the killing of the guilty. I just have no idea of where this theology or philosophy comes from - what culture or religion did this spring? What objective source of ethics teaches you this?

[ZackMartin]

On most of this Zack we are going to disagree but there are a couple of points I would like to explore.

1. This whole consent thing. Let's be honest - with the disabled baby, the child is not giving consent. Her parents are. Asked why the State couldn't make the same call you said that "parenting is fundamentally an individual-to-individual thing." But how is that not arbitrary? Like I said I worked with the mentally ill for a number of years and as their care giver (and as an agent of the state) our relationship was certainly an individual-to-individual thing. State agencies are made up of people - people dealing with people. So I don’t get the logic.

The parents generally have an emotional relationship with the child, or at least the potential for one. The State does not have an emotional relationship with the child; abstract entities like the State can't have emotions. State officials don't have the same emotional relationship - in fact they are discouraged to some extent from developing one, it is not seen as professionally appropriate. Foster parents are getting closer to that, but even there, if adoption has not taken place (or at least, if adoption is not foreseeable), then one has to ask if it is appropriate for the foster parents to form the kind of emotional attachment to the child that natural or adoptive parents do, given that the fostering could well be a temporary arrangement.

The reality is, we frequently let parents make health decisions for their children. Medical procedures generally require parental consent. Doctors have legal means to override parental consent in certain cases (i.e. if the doctors genuinely believe the parents are acting against the best interests of the child), but in many cases where the answers are less clear cut, doctors will accept the parent's health decisions for the child. If a child has cancer, and the prognosis is good with treatment, but the parents refuse treatment because say they are Christian Scientists who don't believe in medicine, then it is likely the doctors will apply to a court to override the parent's decisions. On the other hand, if the prognosis is poor, and the doctor's themselves are doubting whether further treatment is worth it, then the parent's decision of whether to continue treatment can be decisive.

We assume that parents are best suited to determine what is in the best interests of their own children. The assumption is not absolute - if it's a serious matter, and there is strong reason to believe they are not serving their own children's best interests, then the assumption can be over-ridden. But it is right that we make this assumption in general.

Already, passive euthanasia, in the form of deciding not to perform certain surgical procedures, happens on newborns. Doctors consult with parents in these decisions - if they feel that the prognosis is utterly hopeless, they will generally refuse to operate even if the parents demand it - but where the prognosis is poor but less certain, whether the parents wish them to continue treatment or not can be the decisive factor in whether the treatment proceeds. So we already involve parents in end of life decisions regarding their children; the only question is, do we limit ourselves only to passive euthanasia, or do we accept active euthanasia also?

Is there a clear line between active and passive euthanasia? I'm not sure there is. It is not uncommon for people who are nearing death to be given large doses of morphine. Morphine is given in the knowledge and expectation that it will likely hasten their deaths. However, it is justified as not being killing, because it is said the main intention is not to shorten the patients life, it is just to further reduce their pain, even if reducing their pain to that degree has the unavoidable and easily foreseen side effect of hastening their deaths.

Then ask why not apply this standard to older children you say we should not because they have ability to form desires about the future. What? But why should we consider that? How is that also not an arbitrary line? Besides most one or two year olds could not form or relay such desires - especially if they are mentally handicapped. So why not put the one year old “down?”

Singer's argument is based on preference utilitarianism - we ought to consider the preferences of everyone. If a person has preferences, those preferences ought to be respected; if they don't have preferences, there is nothing to respect.

It is not that infants lack preferences - they certainly do - they have preferences to be fed, to be kept warm, to know the presence of other people (especially those they have bonded to, such as their parents). But the question is, are they future-oriented? Or are they purely concerned with the present? There is no evidence that newborns have any concept of time, of past and future. Certainly older children do, and the ability to use or understand concepts like "later", "soon", "tomorrow", "we are going to the zoo", "where did you go yesterday? the zoo", indicates that such an awareness has developed. It seems likely though, that their development of these concepts precedes somewhat their ability to express these preferences.

I don't think it makes sense to completely rule out euthanasia at any age, but age is going to be an relevant factor to consider. I don't pretend to be able to come up with abstract rules that govern every situation beforehand. You need to evaluate each situation as it is. And I am not the person most qualified to engage in that evaluation; the best people qualified are the person themselves (if they have the capacity to do that), the person's family members (if they don't), and the person's doctors. Not me and not you.

2. In the other thread you made eloquent case for objective ethics. I’m just having a hard time getting my mind around a set of ethics that would allow the killing of the most vulnerable, innocent members of society while protesting against the killing of the guilty. I just have no idea of where this theology or philosophy comes from - what culture or religion did this spring? What objective source of ethics teaches you this?

The put yourself in their shoes principle.

When you execute someone, the vast majority of them don't want to die, but can you imagine the terror going through their minds in the lead up to their deaths?

When an adult of sound mind has voluntary euthanasia, they want to die, and they are looking forward to it.

When an infant has nonvoluntary euthanasia, they have no idea that they are going to die, and don't even realise they are dying when they do.

So this teaches me that the first scenario is far worse than the second and third.

The golden rule "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you".

I would not want someone to take my life against my permission - regardless of what I might have done, or what it might be alleged that I have done - and the execution of innocents can and does happen. Can you imagine what it must be like to be executed for a crime you didn't commit?

If I was suffering from a terminal illness, I am not sure I personally would ever choose euthanasia for myself. But that's what I think now, when I haven't been through all the pain and suffering involved, so who knows how I'd think then. But if I had genuinely and freely chosen death for myself, in such circumstances, I would not object to being killed.

If I had been euthanised as an infant, I struggle to see the difference between that and simply never having been born at all. I could have been aborted, I could have been miscarried, I could have been stillborn, I could have just never been conceived to begin with. I have older siblings; they weren't euthanised, they died naturally in infancy, but it's all the same to them, dead is dead. I struggle to feel worse about being euthanised as an infant than I feel about these other outcomes.

Let me tell you a story about capital punishment: A while back I went on a trip to Old Melbourne Gaol, in Melbourne, Australia, and saw some displays about the very sad case of Colin Campbell Ross. In 1922, he was hanged for the alleged rape and murder of a 12 year old girl, Alma Tirtschke - a crime he insisted he did not commit. The girl's own family do not believe he was guilty - members of her family have since said that they suspect that a family member was actually responsible (although they have not named who). He was a bar owner, with enemies in the underworld scene - many of the witnesses against him were disreputable characters who were quite possibly using the trial as a way to get rid of him. He supposedly confessed to a fellow inmate - but this inmate's previous convictions for perjury were kept from the jury. At the execution, the government decided to "experiment" with a new type of rope - the experiment went wrong, and rather than dying quickly, he was slowly and painful strangled to death. It turns out that some of the forensic evidence (hairs) from the trial survived all these years. Forensic examination of these hairs disproved one of the key pieces of prosecution evidence. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Victoria recommended that Mr. Ross be pardoned, and the Governor pardoned him on the advice of the Attorney-General. Both his family, and the murdered girl's family, believe in his innocence and were pleased with the pardon; one relative of the girl complains that the pardon does not go far enough, and he instead should have been formally found not guilty. (That still remains legally possible - the Attorney-General of Victoria could still refer the conviction for review to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court in its recommendation said that if he did so, they would likely find him not guilty; the Attorney-General at the time chose not to go down that path, but legally the option remains open for any future Attorney-General to pursue.)

As far as I am concerned, an innocent man was brutally murdered by the State of Victoria. It made me very angry when I learnt about it. And I'm sure he's not the only innocent person in history to be murdered by the state ("executed").

The state murdering an innocent man did not do anything to bring the murdered girl back to life. The state should know better. If I was her, I don't think I would be very happy to see that they had used my name to justify the murder of an innocent man. It's actually victimising the poor girl twice, once by whoever actually raped and murdered her, and a second time by the state killing an innocent man in her name. Her family should be commended for their pursuit of justice for Mr. Ross after all these years.

[seer]

The parents generally have an emotional relationship with the child, or at least the potential for one. The State does not have an emotional relationship with the child; abstract entities like the State can't have emotions. State officials don't have the same emotional relationship - in fact they are discouraged to some extent from developing one, it is not seen as professionally appropriate. Foster parents are getting closer to that, but even there, if adoption has not taken place (or at least, if adoption is not foreseeable), then one has to ask if it is appropriate for the foster parents to form the kind of emotional attachment to the child that natural or adoptive parents do, given that the fostering could well be a temporary arrangement.

But this is no argument for your point. As a matter of fact state agents may be in a better position to make a clear headed decision since they are not emotionally involved. Really Zack...

Singer's argument is based on preference utilitarianism - we ought to consider the preferences of everyone. If a person has preferences, those preferences ought to be respected; if they don't have preferences, there is nothing to respect.

Again, why is this even a consideration. Why is the ability to voice "preference" the deciding factor. I'm trying to get you to tell us why this is not an arbitrary standard.

The put yourself in their shoes principle.

When you execute someone, the vast majority of them don't want to die, but can you imagine the terror going through their minds in the lead up to their deaths?

Well we had a case in my state of Connecticut where Michael Ross begged to be put to death - he hated the idea of spending life in prison. He was finally put to death - you have no problem with that - correct.

The golden rule "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you".

Wouldn't the golden rule apply to disabled infants? Are they not "others?" How do you define "others" and why?

I would not want someone to take my life against my permission - regardless of what I might have done, or what it might be alleged that I have done - and the execution of innocents can and does happen. Can you imagine what it must be like to be executed for a crime you didn't commit?

And? You would not want to be jailed for life either. That would also be "against your permission."

Let me tell you a story about capital punishment: A while back I went on a trip to Old Melbourne Gaol, in Melbourne, Australia, and saw some displays about the very sad case of Colin Campbell Ross. In 1922, he was hanged for the alleged rape and murder of a 12 year old girl, Alma Tirtschke - a crime he insisted he did not commit. The girl's own family do not believe he was guilty - members of her family have since said that they suspect that a family member was actually responsible (although they have not named who). He was a bar owner, with enemies in the underworld scene - many of the witnesses against him were disreputable characters who were quite possibly using the trial as a way to get rid of him. He supposedly confessed to a fellow inmate - but this inmate's previous convictions for perjury were kept from the jury. At the execution, the government decided to "experiment" with a new type of rope - the experiment went wrong, and rather than dying quickly, he was slowly and painful strangled to death. It turns out that some of the forensic evidence (hairs) from the trial survived all these years. Forensic examination of these hairs disproved one of the key pieces of prosecution evidence. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Victoria recommended that Mr. Ross be pardoned, and the Governor pardoned him on the advice of the Attorney-General. Both his family, and the murdered girl's family, believe in his innocence and were pleased with the pardon; one relative of the girl complains that the pardon does not go far enough, and he instead should have been formally found not guilty. (That still remains legally possible - the Attorney-General of Victoria could still refer the conviction for review to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court in its recommendation said that if he did so, they would likely find him not guilty; the Attorney-General at the time chose not to go down that path, but legally the option remains open for any future Attorney-General to pursue.)

As far as I am concerned, an innocent man was brutally murdered by the State of Victoria. It made me very angry when I learnt about it. And I'm sure he's not the only innocent person in history to be murdered by the state ("executed").

The state murdering an innocent man did not do anything to bring the murdered girl back to life. The state should know better. If I was her, I don't think I would be very happy to see that they had used my name to justify the murder of an innocent man. It's actually victimising the poor girl twice, once by whoever actually raped and murdered her, and a second time by the state killing an innocent man in her name. Her family should be commended for their pursuit of justice for Mr. Ross after all these years.

That's fine, and we should take all the necessary precautions to avoid wrongful convictions. But human beings don't do everything perfectly - I'm sure that there have been innocent men who died in jail because of a life term. Does that mean we could never give a murderer life in prison?

[ZackMartin]

But this is no argument for your point. As a matter of fact state agents may be in a better position to make a clear headed decision since they are not emotionally involved. Really Zack...

So you think that the state is better placed than the parents to decide what is in the best interest of their child? You'd rather have decisions be made by government bureaucrats? How about government bureaucrats deciding for parents what school their children attend, what diet they eat, where they live, what religious, political or philosophical beliefs to raise them in? Why couldn't bureaucrats make better decisions in the interest of the child in these cases too?

You also ignore the fact that euthanising an infant without the consent of the parents harms the parents. Many of them will be understandably very upset about that. Whereas, if they freely consent to it, those hurt feelings of the parents will not occur. If someone murders a child, it is not just the child who is a victim, but the parents also. But when the child is euthanised with parental consent, how does that victimise the parents?

Again, why is this even a consideration. Why is the ability to voice "preference" the deciding factor. I'm trying to get you to tell us why this is not an arbitrary standard.

"We ought to respect everyone's preferences" - do you disagree with that moral principle? Respecting everyone's preferences doesn't mean everyone gets their preferences fulfilled - we have to do so within resource constraints (I might have a preference to own a private jet - but we don't have the economic resources to give every single person in the world their own private jet), and with the understanding that fulfilling one person's preferences can frustrate or violate the preferences of another, so when people's preferences conflict we have to balance them. But everyone has an equal right to have their preferences considered - we might end up fulfilling some people's preferences and not fulfilling other people's, but that must be justified in an objective manner (e.g. the particular thing that person A prefers is more important than the particular thing person B prefers). And we need to explain why killing is wrong - and a good explanation of why, is it frustrates people's preferences - their own preference to live, their own preference to achieve their future goals that can only be achieved if they go on living, the preferences of friends and family who value their companionship and support. But once we've justified the prohibition on killing as being a violation of a (direct or indirect) preference not to die, whether on the person's own part or those of others, it implies that situations where that preference is lacking, the prohibition may not apply.

You already agree that the prohibition on killing has exceptions - the only question is how we determine the nature and scope of those exceptions. Preference utilitarianism attempts to determine the nature and scope of those exceptions based on a more abstract moral principle (respecting everyone's preferences equally). You have different ideas about the nature and scope of those exceptions, but I think you also try to justify them using more abstract moral principles, you just seem to choose a different set of more abstract principles from which to start.

Well we had a case in my state of Connecticut where Michael Ross begged to be put to death - he hated the idea of spending life in prison. He was finally put to death - you have no problem with that - correct.

I think this case shows the warped value system expressed by the laws of the state of Connecticut. Suppose an innocent person suffers from a terrible disease, certain to kill them, but they have a long and loathsome path to the grave ahead of them. They want assistance in dying, yet the state of Connecticut (which outlaws assisted suicide) refuses to give it to them. Yet its happy to provide the same assistance to a murderer? It refuses to help the innocent victims of horrible diseases who want to die - it threatens those who would help them with punishment - but it is happy to help a convicted serial killer? How warped is that?

And it is incomprehensible the trouble that death rows go to in order to stop the condemned from committing suicide. They put them on a suicide watch before executing them. If the State wants them dead anyway, why does it bother? It's because it doesn't want to have stolen from it the privilege of killing them itself. It wants them dead, but only on its own terms. I find that sickening.

Capital punishment is wrong because the risk of executing an innocent person can never be eliminated, and one innocent person executed is one person too many. It is wrong because of the suffering it causes to the family and friends of the condemned - a suffering that is very real, but which capital punishment supporters want to ignore. If a parent endures the agony of losing their child, is our best answer to cause yet another parent to endure the same agony too? It is wrong because, even in cases of indubitable guilt, two wrongs don't make a right. My mother told me that as a little boy, and I believed her then, and I believe it now. Killing killers just means we are no better than they are. State murder is worse than most murder - how many murderers lock their victim up in a tiny cell for years, even decades, before finally killing them? How many murderers say to their victim, "I will kill you at 6am on Wednesday", and then leave them to count down the clock for a week before finally doing it? How many murderers make such a pretence of doing the right thing even as they do grave wrong? And where do you draw the line on which crimes deserve the death penalty? Murder? Rape? Treason? Espionage? Desertion? Mutiny? Witchcraft? Theft? Fraud? Bribery? Counterfeiting? Sedition? Drug trafficking? Adultery? Heresy? Apostasy? -- these are all crimes which have at some point in history received the death penalty, and most of them still attract it somewhere in the world today. You accuse me of drawing arbitrary lines -- don't death penalty supporters draw arbitrary lines with respect to which crimes receive the death penalty and which do not?

I should add, I am very hesitant about permitting euthanasia for those with depression or similar mental illnesses. Very many of these people will later recover from their depression, providing they don't die from suicide first. (A relative of mine committed suicide, and I've attempted it myself in the past, and I have family and friends who have attempted it too.) There is a real question over whether the desire to die is rational, or is a result of cognitive distortions caused by the illness. On the other hand, when someone has a terminal physical illness, that will often produce depression too, but the odds of recovery are much more remote, and the rationality of their desire to die is harder to impugn.

Imprisoning some people is necessary to protect society from them. A serial killer such as Michael Ross, I don't think allowing him out unsupervised could be justified unless he reaches the point where he is so frail or sick that he would not be physically capable of hurting anyone any more. But at the same time, I think we should care about the psychological health of prisoners, and if a prisoner is feeling suicidal, we need to have a serious look at what can be done (compatible with the needs of security) to improve their psychological situation. Killing them is not the answer.

Wouldn't the golden rule apply to disabled infants? Are they not "others?" How do you define "others" and why?

Of course it does. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. If I had been born with such serious problems, that both my parents and several senior doctors felt that my being euthanised was the best option, then I have no qualms at the thought of myself being euthanised under such a circumstance. I expect it would be painless, and I wouldn't fear because I would have no idea what was happening to me, and it would quite possibly save me from a lot of pain and suffering ahead. So I am applying the concept of doing unto others as I would have them do unto me in this case.

Likewise, if I imagine myself encountering such severe and incurable illness that it would make me want to end my own life, then I have no qualms about the idea of myself being killed in such a circumstance. So likewise I am applying the concept of doing unto others as I would have them do unto me in this case.

Now tell me, how are you applying the golden rule when you execute people? You aren't; you are violating it.

And? You would not want to be jailed for life either. That would also be "against your permission."

There's a couple of very big differences between life imprisonment and the death penalty. First of all, if you are wrongly convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, you can retain the hope that you will be exonerated in the future. Whereas, if you are executed, then even if you are exonerated, it's too late. So for that reason alone I'd much prefer to be sentenced to life imprisonment than death for a crime I didn't commit. There are people out there who have spent decades in prison for a crime they didn't commit, and finally the authorities accepted that the convictions were unsafe, and they were released. If you asked any of those people, if they would rather have been executed instead, what do you think they would say? I think they'd all say they much preferred the outcome when they lived to be exonerated, than to have been executed.

Secondly, imagine the terror of knowing you are going to be executed tomorrow? Normally in life, although you know you are going to die eventually, you don't really know when. Even those near death from illness or old age, it's often unclear if they'll die tomorrow or if they'll hang on for a few more days. Death is far more frightening when someone isolates it down to a certainty at a particular time. Being executed is a far more terrifying experience than spending a few decades in prison - try to close your eyes and imagine what it would be like to be executed for a crime you didn't commit.

Thirdly, consider the harm done to the family, friends and loved ones of the wrongly convicted. If someone you love is sent to prison for a long time for a crime you do not believe they committed, you would feel rather hurt. But imagine how much more hurt you would feel if they were executed instead?

Fourthly, if we honestly believe someone is dangerous, then we need to keep them locked up to protect society from them, even if there is still a small chance they aren't as dangerous as we think they are. But while imprisonment is justified by the need to protect society, the death penalty does not serve that need. Imprisonment serves a legitimate societal need; the death penalty does not.

That's fine, and we should take all the necessary precautions to avoid wrongful convictions. But human beings don't do everything perfectly - I'm sure that there have been innocent men who died in jail because of a life term. Does that mean we could never give a murderer life in prison?

You seem to show a complete lack of outrage at the idea of an innocent man being lead in terror to the gallows and then painfully strangled to death. Shouldn't this outrage you? Do you care about Colin Campbell Ross at all? You care so much about a hypothetical discussion about infants being painlessly euthanised with the consent of their parents and doctors, but you care so little about a real case of an innocent man, with full awareness of what is going to happen to him, being lead to the gallows and then slowly and painfully strangled to death by the agents of the State. What is wrong with you? You ask me where my morals come from; I can ask what kind of moral system justifies you in failing to be outraged by what happened to him?

And, there is an easy way to guarantee that there will be no executions of the innocent - abolish the death penalty. As much as I hold the State of Victoria morally responsible for the brutal murder of Colin Campbell Ross, and as much as I think it has failed to fully atone for this crime, the fact that it abolished the death penalty in 1975, and that the political culture is such that it is highly unlikely to ever be reintroduced, means that the State of Victoria will not commit the same crime again in the future. For other places, that possibility is still there.

[seer]

So you think that the state is better placed than the parents to decide what is in the best interest of their child? You'd rather have decisions be made by government bureaucrats? How about government bureaucrats deciding for parents what school their children attend, what diet they eat, where they live, what religious, political or philosophical beliefs to raise them in? Why couldn't bureaucrats make better decisions in the interest of the child in these cases too?

You also ignore the fact that euthanising an infant without the consent of the parents harms the parents. Many of them will be understandably very upset about that. Whereas, if they freely consent to it, those hurt feelings of the parents will not occur. If someone murders a child, it is not just the child who is a victim, but the parents also. But when the child is euthanised with parental consent, how does that victimise the parents?

Zack, I'm just pointing out how the logic will eventually go. "Well you know, the parents are too emotionally involved to make a rational decision..." Especially if the child will need state aid to survive, I can see that coming even if you can't.

"We ought to respect everyone's preferences" - do you disagree with that moral principle? Respecting everyone's preferences doesn't mean everyone gets their preferences fulfilled - we have to do so within resource constraints (I might have a preference to own a private jet - but we don't have the economic resources to give every single person in the world their own private jet), and with the understanding that fulfilling one person's preferences can frustrate or violate the preferences of another, so when people's preferences conflict we have to balance them. But everyone has an equal right to have their preferences considered - we might end up fulfilling some people's preferences and not fulfilling other people's, but that must be justified in an objective manner (e.g. the particular thing that person A prefers is more important than the particular thing person B prefers). And we need to explain why killing is wrong - and a good explanation of why, is it frustrates people's preferences - their own preference to live, their own preference to achieve their future goals that can only be achieved if they go on living, the preferences of friends and family who value their companionship and support. But once we've justified the prohibition on killing as being a violation of a (direct or indirect) preference not to die, whether on the person's own part or those of others, it implies that situations where that preference is lacking, the prohibition may not apply.

I think personal preference is certainly a consideration, but never the overriding criterion. I mean above you agree that many personal preferences will and must be violated. That is why I asked why would the ability to voice "preference" be the deciding factor in the life or death of a child. Just because the one year old is unable to voice a preference we get to kill her? Again Zack, this seems completely arbitrary. I find no historic reference for this in philosophy or theology. So one wonders if you really do believe in objective moral law why hasn't this seeped into human thought until recently - I believe.

Imprisoning some people is necessary to protect society from them. A serial killer such as Michael Ross, I don't think allowing him out unsupervised could be justified unless he reaches the point where he is so frail or sick that he would not be physically capable of hurting anyone any more. But at the same time, I think we should care about the psychological health of prisoners, and if a prisoner is feeling suicidal, we need to have a serious look at what can be done (compatible with the needs of security) to improve their psychological situation. Killing them is not the answer.

Not the point Zack. You were making the case that it would be wrong to execute a murderer because it was "against your/his permission." Well so would life in prison. That is not a good argument.

Of course it does. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. If I had been born with such serious problems, that both my parents and several senior doctors felt that my being euthanised was the best option, then I have no qualms at the thought of myself being euthanised under such a circumstance. I expect it would be painless, and I wouldn't fear because I would have no idea what was happening to me, and it would quite possibly save me from a lot of pain and suffering ahead. So I am applying the concept of doing unto others as I would have them do unto me in this case.

Again not the point, you don't know that another would find a life, a life even with suffering, worth living. And the authors in this thread were speaking of Down's babies who could in fact have relatively happy lives.

Now tell me, how are you applying the golden rule when you execute people? You aren't; you are violating it.

I look at the golden rule in the context of a Biblical worldview - and it is a bit more complicated. And remember in a Biblical understanding - no man who dies in this world is dead - he is simply translated into a different realm. Anyway, I don't have time to flesh out the whole death penalty thing right now...

[ZackMartin]

Zack, I'm just pointing out how the logic will eventually go. "Well you know, the parents are too emotionally involved to make a rational decision..." Especially if the child will need state aid to survive, I can see that coming even if you can't.

Your just guessing how things will evolve in the future. You don't have any evidence. I present you with one position, and then you claim that if that position was adopted, then it will inevitably evolve into another different position - but we only have your guesses that this is what will happen. No actual evidence things will pan out that way, just your supposition. You don't have a convincing argument, just a mass of inchoate fear.

I think personal preference is certainly a consideration, but never the overriding criterion. I mean above you agree that many personal preferences will and must be violated. That is why I asked why would the ability to voice "preference" be the deciding factor in the life or death of a child. Just because the one year old is unable to voice a preference we get to kill her?

The question is not whether she can voice a preference; the question is whether she has one. Not only can newborns not voice a preference, there is absolutely no evidence they have one; all the evidence suggests they don't. Newborns have no plans, hopes or fears for the future; the concept is meaningless to them.

Certainly older children do have such plans, hopes or fears for the future. Their ability to express them in communication (however inarticulately) is a clear sign they exist. But as I said, they almost certainly arise prior to the ability to communicate them. But at which exact point, I don't think we can say for certain. But the existence of grey areas does not prevent us from acting in clear cut cases, and newborns are such a case.

I find no historic reference for this in philosophy or theology. So one wonders if you really do believe in objective moral law why hasn't this seeped into human thought until recently - I believe.

Ancient philosophers debated suicide, and some of the circumstances they debated we would understand today as voluntary euthanasia. In Plato's Laws, he opposed suicide in general, but listed a number of exceptions, including suicide "under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable misfortune which has come upon him", which would describe voluntary euthanasia. Cicero said "When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life". Epictetus memorably said "If the room is smoky, if only moderately, I will stay; if there is too much smoke I will go. Remember this, keep a firm hold on it, the door is always open." The Roman philosopher Seneca said "To such a life, as you are aware, one should not always cling. For mere living is not a good, but living well. Accordingly, the wise man will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can... It is not a question of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well means escape from the danger of living ill..."

While these philosophers were primarily discussing whether an adult should choose to take their own life or not, Seneca's principle "For mere living is not a good, but living well", could be applied equally well to the case of infants or children. And we have to remember, that infanticide was a common practice in the ancient world, and Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca all advocated it. So contrary to your claim that "why hasn't this seeped into human thought until recently - I believe", philosophers have been proposing these ideas since well over two thousand years old. Neither Plato nor Aristotle would have been shocked by Francesca Minerva's paper which you cited; on the contrary they would have endorsed its conclusions. I'm not saying I endorse the views of these philosophers - in many cases I would disagree with them - just to show, that if you think these ideas are new to philosophy, then you are ignorant of history. None of these men were atheists either. In Plato and Aristotle's cases in particular, their musings on God have been quoted with enthusiasm by numerous Christian theologians.

You were making the case that it would be wrong to execute a murderer because it was "against your/his permission." Well so would life in prison. That is not a good argument.

If we are going to violate the preferences of others, we have to violate them to the minimum degree necessary to achieve legitimate ends. The fact that I acknowledge the necessity of a certain degree of violation (restricting for those whom we honestly believe pose a threat to society) doesn't justify a far greater degree of violation which is completely unnecessary.

Again not the point, you don't know that another would find a life, a life even with suffering, worth living.

The whole point of the "Do unto others as they do unto you" is that we should be guided in ethics by imagining ourselves as the person we are acting towards. To the extent you argue we can't actually do that, you render the principle inapplicable.

And the authors in this thread were speaking of Down's babies who could in fact have relatively happy lives.

There is a lot more to life that is valuable than just being "relatively happy".

I look at the golden rule in the context of a Biblical worldview - and it is a bit more complicated.

I look at the Bible as a book which has some good ideas in it - like the Golden Rule we are discussing - which is by the way far more ancient than the New Testament - and also some very bad ideas. Capital punishment is one of those very bad ideas. I think God may have inspired the good ideas in the Bible, but the bad ideas it contains are of human origin.

And remember in a Biblical understanding - no man who dies in this world is dead - he is simply translated into a different realm.

I believe that human justice should not attempt to substitute for divine justice. The justice of human beings is imperfect and error-prone, and always shall be; the justice of God is perfect and without error. That is why I believe, that when it comes to those who are believed to have done wrong (e.g. murder), we should limit ourselves to protecting society from them. For actual justice, we should trust in God to deliver that in the next life; I think to demand it in this life displays a lack of faith, and to pretend to impose it in God's place is to usurp God's authority.

And if you really believe that "no man who dies in this world is dead - he is simply translated into a different realm", why are you so opposed to euthanasia for infants? Do they go to heaven? Won't their lives in heaven be far better than their lives upon the earth could possibly be? If heaven exists, how does painlessly dying harm them?

Anyway, I don't have time to flesh out the whole death penalty thing right now...

The question I would really like to know, is how you don't seem to feel any outrage at what actually happened to Colin Campbell Ross, yet can feel so much outrage at hypothetical cases of euthanasia? How can you explain that an actual case of an innocent man in full possession of his faculties being lead in terror to the gallows then painfully and slowly strangled to death does not seem important to you, while the possibility (even the purely hypothetical possibility) of the painless death of an infant who doesn't understand what is happening to them is so much more significant? Your moral sense is back to front.

[seer]

Your just guessing how things will evolve in the future. You don't have any evidence. I present you with one position, and then you claim that if that position was adopted, then it will inevitably evolve into another different position - but we only have your guesses that this is what will happen. No actual evidence things will pan out that way, just your supposition. You don't have a convincing argument, just a mass of inchoate fear.

No, no Zack - You have not presented a logical argument that could not eventually give the state the same rights as the parents. That "individual to individual" thing is totally irrelevant. State agents as care givers could have (and often do BTW) have a deeper emotional connection with the mentally ill than the parent. The distinction is meaningless.

The question is not whether she can voice a preference; the question is whether she has one. Not only can newborns not voice a preference, there is absolutely no evidence they have one; all the evidence suggests they don't. Newborns have no plans, hopes or fears for the future; the concept is meaningless to them.

Certainly older children do have such plans, hopes or fears for the future. Their ability to express them in communication (however inarticulately) is a clear sign they exist. But as I said, they almost certainly arise prior to the ability to communicate them. But at which exact point, I don't think we can say for certain. But the existence of grey areas does not prevent us from acting in clear cut cases, and newborns are such a case.

Ancient philosophers debated suicide, and some of the circumstances they debated we would understand today as voluntary euthanasia. In Plato's Laws, he opposed suicide in general, but listed a number of exceptions, including suicide "under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable misfortune which has come upon him", which would describe voluntary euthanasia. Cicero said "When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life". Epictetus memorably said "If the room is smoky, if only moderately, I will stay; if there is too much smoke I will go. Remember this, keep a firm hold on it, the door is always open." The Roman philosopher Seneca said "To such a life, as you are aware, one should not always cling. For mere living is not a good, but living well. Accordingly, the wise man will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can... It is not a question of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well means escape from the danger of living ill..."

While these philosophers were primarily discussing whether an adult should choose to take their own life or not, Seneca's principle "For mere living is not a good, but living well", could be applied equally well to the case of infants or children. And we have to remember, that infanticide was a common practice in the ancient world, and Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca all advocated it. So contrary to your claim that "why hasn't this seeped into human thought until recently - I believe", philosophers have been proposing these ideas since well over two thousand years old. Neither Plato nor Aristotle would have been shocked by Francesca Minerva's paper which you cited; on the contrary they would have endorsed its conclusions. I'm not saying I endorse the views of these philosophers - in many cases I would disagree with them - just to show, that if you think these ideas are new to philosophy, then you are ignorant of history. None of these men were atheists either. In Plato and Aristotle's cases in particular, their musings on God have been quoted with enthusiasm by numerous Christian theologians.

I'm not questioning the history of suicide or euthanasia or infanticide - I'm questioning this arbitrary standard that you have suggested - that if a being does not voice or have preferences that that some how gives us a right to kill her. That is the argument I have not run into - at least in my limited studies.

If we are going to violate the preferences of others, we have to violate them to the minimum degree necessary to achieve legitimate ends. The fact that I acknowledge the necessity of a certain degree of violation (restricting for those whom we honestly believe pose a threat to society) doesn't justify a far greater degree of violation which is completely unnecessary.

True, but then "personal preference" is not the highest, governing, consideration. So what is? Safety? Moral order? So is the safety of the child more important than her lack of personal preference? Or the personal preference of the parents?

There is a lot more to life that is valuable than just being "relatively happy".

But again - arbitrary. I have worked with adult men with Down's - they often have wonderful lives. And they are great people to be around - yet these are the very humans that would be snuffed out as babies. I mean who are you or we to decide for them that their lives would not be worthy of living?

And if you really believe that "no man who dies in this world is dead - he is simply translated into a different realm", why are you so opposed to euthanasia for infants? Do they go to heaven? Won't their lives in heaven be far better than their lives upon the earth could possibly be? If heaven exists, how does painlessly dying harm them?

There are things in this world, trials, and the possibility for moral growth, that I don't believe will be offered in Heaven. Second, caring for the weak and disabled forces us out of our selfishness. It reaffirms our humanity and theirs. Third, killing the disabled and unwanted fuels our self centered and selfish nature, and generally undermines, I believe, our reverence for life. Finally, as a Christian I believe men do have an inherent worth that animals do not have and the innocent should not be disposed of at will.

The question I would really like to know, is how you don't seem to feel any outrage at what actually happened to Colin Campbell Ross, yet can feel so much outrage at hypothetical cases of euthanasia? How can you explain that an actual case of an innocent man in full possession of his faculties being lead in terror to the gallows then painfully and slowly strangled to death does not seem important to you, while the possibility (even the purely hypothetical possibility) of the painless death of an infant who doesn't understand what is happening to them is so much more significant? Your moral sense is back to front.

Well, like I said - I certainly don't want to see an innocent man executed - but I have no problem with the guilty being executed. And now a days most executions are rather painless.

[Seasanctuary]

Will catch up on this interesting thread later. I haven't abandoned ship (yet). Just been busy writing elsewhere.

[seer]

Will catch up on this interesting thread later. I haven't abandoned ship (yet). Just been busy writing elsewhere.

Ok...

[Seasanctuary]

So long as the universe is indeed his narrative creation, it is "objectively" correct that his values are what the world is really about. God's opinion is not just one more competing with ours. God's are "built in" to the fabric of our world.

So to use a Matrix analogy, even though other sorts of entities are in the Matrix, since it was created to keep human minds occupied, humans would be especially important within that world even if its creators later died off. There would still be some human-oriented intentionality to that world's structure.

Whereas in Tron Legacy, the sentient isomorphs spontaneously arose from the world's structure, so they would be more in line with the naturalistic view of human evolution, i.e. we reflect the world rather than the world reflects us.

#SciFiAnalogies

[Seasanctuary]

So regarding the child killing thing, I look at the paper as an exercise in thinking through one view on what makes it wrong to kill people. If what makes it wrong to kill is the thwarting of a being's valuing of its own existence, then it's conceivable that killing newborns doesn't do any such thwarting...and is therefore not wrong.

Most people have an extremely negative reaction to this conclusion (myself included). But I consider this an opportunity to think about why, without any immediate worry about anyone actually killing newborns just because it's being discussed in an entirely appropriate venue to discuss such things.

Personally, I consider it 100% ok to kill humans which have not yet become consciously aware to any degree. Why humans? Species prejudice. Why draw the line at the beginning of conscious awareness? Because until then, there's no subject involved. There's no one "in there," so to speak. If you prefer the imagery, there's no soul associated with that body. Some people still have a negative reaction to statements like this, but not as many and not usually as strongly.

[ZackMartin]

No, no Zack - You have not presented a logical argument that could not eventually give the state the same rights as the parents. That "individual to individual" thing is totally irrelevant.

No it's not; maybe if I explain it some in more detail it might make more sense. I believe in moral particularism, by which I mean, we have special moral obligations towards certain people (e.g. family members, close friends) that we don't owe to humanity in general. Of course there are common moral obligations we owe to every fellow human being, but there on top of that, there are special moral obligations we owe to our own children, parents, siblings, wider family, close friends, etc. So I think there is a special bond which exists between parents and children, which is morally significant, and produces special rights for both parent and child. Whereas, state agents, don't participate in that morally significant bond, so their moral rights and obligations are not the same. You can say they can have an emotional bond - fair enough - but except in the case of adoption, the bond they have is not a parent-child bond, and doesn't have the same moral significance that the parent-child bond has.

State agents as care givers could have (and often do BTW) have a deeper emotional connection with the mentally ill than the parent. The distinction is meaningless.

It's not meaningless; state agents / care givers don't have the same rights under the law as actual parents do. For example, a parent has the right not to be deprived of contact with their child except for a legitimate reason (e.g. parent posing a risk of harm to child); whereas, a care giver employed by a state agency, no matter how many years of contact they have had, don't have any such right. If the state agency decides to terminate or reassign the caregiver, and prevent further contact with the individual cared for, then it can, and I don't believe the caregiver has much legal recourse.

So the question is, is it morally right that the state make the distinction it does between state agent care givers and parents? If one answers yes, one is saying that the category of parenthood has a special moral significance, that being a caregiver employed by a state agency lacks. Given that, the position that parental consent to euthanasia is required, while state agent caregiver consent is insufficient, has some logic to it.

I'm not questioning the history of suicide or euthanasia or infanticide - I'm questioning this arbitrary standard that you have suggested - that if a being does not voice or have preferences that that some how gives us a right to kill her. That is the argument I have not run into - at least in my limited studies.

Aristotle wrote (Aristot. Pol. 7.1335b): As to exposing or rearing the children born, let there be a law that no deformed child shall be reared; but on the ground of number of children, if the regular customs hinder any of those born being exposed, there must be a limit fixed to the procreation of offspring, and if any people have a child as a result of intercourse in contravention of these regulations, abortion must be practised on it before it has developed sensation and life; for the line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact of having sensation and being alive. The reference to "sensation" seems very similar to the modern idea that the permissibility of abortion depends on the nature of the mind that one has; obviously, the ability to have future-oriented preferences is relevant to the kind of mind one has; but if lack of a particular kind of mind can justify abortion, it can also justify infant euthanasia, for birth is an arbitrary line. So, while Singer's ideas are different from Aristotle's, they are not as far apart as you suggest.

And you complain that Singer's line is arbitrary - but what line do you draw? And how is your line not arbitrary? I bet your line is based on membership of the species homo sapiens, which Singer argues is a form of speciesism, which in his view is no better than racism - judging individuals on their DNA rather than on their actual individual abilities. Humans and chimpanzees share a lot of DNA, but obviously are different, especially our brains are very different. But, it's likely in the years and decades to come, we'll work out what differences in genes make humans so much smarter than chimps. Once you know what genes are responsible, what's to stop you genetically modifying the chimp to be as smart as a human? But the chimp wouldn't be a member of homo sapiens - it probably wouldn't be able to interbreed with humans (past attempts to breed chimpanzees with humans have failed - although some argue there has been insufficient research to conclude that definitely), even though it would be as intelligent as them. It quite possibly would still be able to interbreed with unmodified chimpanzees. So, would it be wrong to kill this chimpanzee of human level intelligence? But if you say yes, then it's not membership of the species homo sapiens itself that is morally significant. But if you say no, well, when it tells you that you are wrong, how will you answer it?

Anyway, you began this by suggesting that support for infant euthanasia originated in atheism. Yet I've presented you with multiple examples of well known theist philosophers from over 2000 years ago supporting abortion, infanticide, euthanasia and suicide (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca). So your suggestion that support for these practices comes from atheism is false, when theists supported them first:

the fact is these are ideas are being generated by the godless

True, but then "personal preference" is not the highest, governing, consideration. So what is? Safety? Moral order? So is the safety of the child more important than her lack of personal preference? Or the personal preference of the parents?

But many of these other values can be reduced to personal preference. For example, safety is reducible to a preference for safety. Individuals have a personal preference for their own safety, and a personal preference for the safety of others whom they particularly care about, and more broadly even a personal preference for the safety of people indiscriminately. So rather than seeing a balance between safety and personal preference, we can see that as itself a balance between different personal preferences, since safety is a personal preference.

But again - arbitrary. I have worked with adult men with Down's - they often have wonderful lives. And they are great people to be around - yet these are the very humans that would be snuffed out as babies. I mean who are you or we to decide for them that their lives would not be worthy of living?

And yet, if you could cure them of it, would you? If you could give them some wonder drug that would make it all go away, would you? If you say yes, then you are admitting that the quality of their lives is far less than it would be without the disease which afflicts them.

And who are you to decide for people that they shall live? If the parents and doctors both agree that euthanasia is in an infant's best interests, who are you to intervene and override that decision?

There are things in this world, trials, and the possibility for moral growth, that I don't believe will be offered in Heaven.

So, what happens to those who die in infancy due to natural causes? Do they just plain miss out?

Second, caring for the weak and disabled forces us out of our selfishness. It reaffirms our humanity and theirs. Third, killing the disabled and unwanted fuels our self centered and selfish nature, and generally undermines, I believe, our reverence for life.

If a parent makes the choice, who are you to say that their choice is selfish? And when other people seek to take away that choice, to fulfil their own emotional needs, how is that is not selfish?

Finally, as a Christian I believe men do have an inherent worth that animals do not have

Why should anyone who doesn't share your religious beliefs accept that viewpoint?

and the innocent should not be disposed of at will.

But you have no problem with disposing of the innocent at will, so long as a fallible court says they are guilty?

Well, like I said - I certainly don't want to see an innocent man executed - but I have no problem with the guilty being executed.

But you think its worth it? You think the deaths of the guilty are so valuable, that it is worth the deaths of a few innocents to get there? Because no matter how many safeguards you put in place, you can never reduce the chance of executing an innocent person to zero. But you are willing to live with that? It's worth it in your eyes?

And now a days most executions are rather painless.

What about the psychological terror of counting down the days, hours, minutes, you've got left to live? Of not knowing if that last minute phone call will come through or not. That's not painless. Now imagine yourself as an innocent person going through that pain. How much worse would that be? Because you can't deny it's happened, and you can't guarantee it will never happen again.

And you have to remember, that through the vast majority of history, the death penalty was far from painless; and many parts of the world today still carry it out in barbaric ways. Consider Lev 20:14 - if a man has sexual intercourse with both a woman and her mother, then the man, and the two women, are to be burnt to death. I suppose as a believer in the Bible, and a supporter of capital punishment, you'd have no problem with that? Do you think we should reintroduce that law today? If God thought it was okay then, why not burn people to death for that today? And one can think of a lot worse things than that one could do, so if that deserves burning to death, shouldn't worse things like rape (the text gives no indication the sex was non-consensual) or incest (this behaviour is getting quasi-incestuous, but it's not really incest proper, so arguably not as bad as incest proper), or murder? So you are okay with burning people alive? The Bible endorses it. (This is why I don't believe the Bible is the Word of God - burning people to death is not something God would ever command.)

Even with lethal injection, which is supposedly painless, there is a lot of debate about if that is really true.

[seer]

No it's not; maybe if I explain it some in more detail it might make more sense. I believe in moral particularism, by which I mean, we have special moral obligations towards certain people (e.g. family members, close friends) that we don't owe to humanity in general. Of course there are common moral obligations we owe to every fellow human being, but there on top of that, there are special moral obligations we owe to our own children, parents, siblings, wider family, close friends, etc. So I think there is a special bond which exists between parents and children, which is morally significant, and produces special rights for both parent and child. Whereas, state agents, don't participate in that morally significant bond, so their moral rights and obligations are not the same. You can say they can have an emotional bond - fair enough - but except in the case of adoption, the bond they have is not a parent-child bond, and doesn't have the same moral significance that the parent-child bond has.

Sorry Zack, I agree that there is a special bond between parent and child - generally, but not always. And state agents certainly can have a bond even stronger than the parent/child bond especially if the parent had abandoned the child - which I can personally give witness too. And in what parallel universe do these "special moral obligations" suggest that we should kill the disabled child? One would think that these special moral obligations would compel us to do all we could to save the child and do our best to see that they have a relatively happy life.

So the question is, is it morally right that the state make the distinction it does between state agent care givers and parents? If one answers yes, one is saying that the category of parenthood has a special moral significance, that being a caregiver employed by a state agency lacks. Given that, the position that parental consent to euthanasia is required, while state agent caregiver consent is insufficient, has some logic to it.

But this only has to do with how we craft our laws, which can be changed. Which I believe will be as this idea gains strength and medical and financial resources become more scarce.

Aristotle wrote (Aristot. Pol. 7.1335b): As to exposing or rearing the children born, let there be a law that no deformed child shall be reared; but on the ground of number of children, if the regular customs hinder any of those born being exposed, there must be a limit fixed to the procreation of offspring, and if any people have a child as a result of intercourse in contravention of these regulations, abortion must be practised on it before it has developed sensation and life; for the line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact of having sensation and being alive. The reference to "sensation" seems very similar to the modern idea that the permissibility of abortion depends on the nature of the mind that one has; obviously, the ability to have future-oriented preferences is relevant to the kind of mind one has; but if lack of a particular kind of mind can justify abortion, it can also justify infant euthanasia, for birth is an arbitrary line. So, while Singer's ideas are different from Aristotle's, they are not as far apart as you suggest.

I think, if we go back, that I was linking this with your belief in objective morality. What source of possible objective ethics would suggest that we kill the disabled child rather than do all we can to save the disabled child? I wasn't arguing that infant euthanasia did not exist in the past or that Aristotle didn't make such arguments - but how would you link these to an objective moral source.

And you complain that Singer's line is arbitrary - but what line do you draw? And how is your line not arbitrary? I bet your line is based on membership of the species homo sapiens, which Singer argues is a form of species-ism, which in his view is no better than racism - judging individuals on their DNA rather than on their actual individual abilities. Humans and chimpanzees share a lot of DNA, but obviously are different, especially our brains are very different. But, it's likely in the years and decades to come, we'll work out what differences in genes make humans so much smarter than chimps. Once you know what genes are responsible, what's to stop you genetically modifying the chimp to be as smart as a human? But the chimp wouldn't be a member of homo sapiens - it probably wouldn't be able to interbreed with humans (past attempts to breed chimpanzees with humans have failed - although some argue there has been insufficient research to conclude that definitely), even though it would be as intelligent as them. It quite possibly would still be able to interbreed with unmodified chimpanzees. So, would it be wrong to kill this chimpanzee of human level intelligence? But if you say yes, then it's not membership of the species homo sapiens itself that is morally significant. But if you say no, well, when it tells you that you are wrong, how will you answer it?

Well I do not want to argue hypotheticals here, but yes I certainly do believe that human beings are something other or more that mere animals. That we are God's unique image bearers, that we have a value to Him far above all other species. And I have no problem with species-ism - I eat cows, I don't eat humans. Do you eat animals Zack - would you eat humans?

Anyway, you began this by suggesting that support for infant euthanasia originated in atheism. Yet I've presented you with multiple examples of well known theist philosophers from over 2000 years ago supporting abortion, infanticide, euthanasia and suicide (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca). So your suggestion that support for these practices comes from atheism is false, when theists supported them first:

No Zack, I'm speaking of contemporary supporters of these things. Which almost always is coming from non-believers.

But many of these other values can be reduced to personal preference. For example, safety is reducible to a preference for safety. Individuals have a personal preference for their own safety, and a personal preference for the safety of others whom they particularly care about, and more broadly even a personal preference for the safety of people indiscriminately. So rather than seeing a balance between safety and personal preference, we can see that as itself a balance between different personal preferences, since safety is a personal preference.

What? You said that a baby could be killed because she yet did not have personal preferences. I'm asking why not having personal preferences is the standard we should use - why this suddenly gives us the right to kill the child?

And yet, if you could cure them of it, would you? If you could give them some wonder drug that would make it all go away, would you? If you say yes, then you are admitting that the quality of their lives is far less than it would be without the disease which afflicts them.

Again Zack, just because they would not have the exact same kind of life that we have does not give us the right to end that life.

And who are you to decide for people that they shall live? If the parents and doctors both agree that euthanasia is in an infant's best interests, who are you to intervene and override that decision?

Who is on the side of life here and who is on the side of death?

Why should anyone who doesn't share your religious beliefs accept that viewpoint?

Well that is the clash of worldviews isn't? My belief tells me that human beings have inherent worth, far above any other animal species. Your worldview tells us that we have no more intrinsic than a common house fly. I'm fighting to save the unborn and the just born - you think they can be disposed of at will. Like I said Zack, no matter how eloquently you argue your case this is the bottom line.