Quantum theory & the premises of Kalam cosmological argument

[ZackMartin]

In principle, it seems that even though we may conceive of an absolute nothing

I'm not even sure if we can conceive of it.

If you ask me if I can conceive of something, I tend to interpret that as asking me whether, however vaguely, I can imagine what it would be like for it to be true. And I can't imagine what it would be like for an absolute nothing to exist, not even very vaguely. Which suggests to me, that at least for me, an absolute nothing is not conceivable at all - it is beyond my powers of conception.

[robertb]

I'm not even sure if we can conceive of it.

If you ask me if I can conceive of something, I tend to interpret that as asking me whether, however vaguely, I can imagine what it would be like for it to be true. And I can't imagine what it would be like for an absolute nothing to exist, not even very vaguely. Which suggests to me, that at least for me, an absolute nothing is not conceivable at all - it is beyond my powers of conception.

Not that hard, really. An absolute nothing is simply the absense of everything. (Of course taking into account the symantic difficulties created by the word 'is'.)

[shunyadragon]

The randomness of virtual particles is predictable, but the precise form that randomness takes is not.

True

I'm not using words in a "layman's" sense. In the layman's sense, there is no distinction between reducible and irreducible chance. In the philosophy of physics, there is.

Careful using random or chance ( I consider it a bad word, I do not believe your reference uses the word 'chance.') in a general sense. In Physics it is used in describing specific properties observed in the natural behavior of 'things.'

A truly random number can still have predictable components. Take one of Chaitin's constants, let us call that C. Now write down C as an infinite binary string. Now, change every second bit to 0. Now you have a number with a partly predictable pattern, but it is still an uncomputable number, and hence still truly random.

True, but my specific description of the nature of randomness applies to certain behaviors observed in the physical world, and not a construct of math.

[shunyadragon]

Not that hard, really. An absolute nothing is simply the absense of everything. (Of course taking into account the symantic difficulties created by the word 'is'.)

I believe 'absolute nothingness' can be conceived, but it is not a very practical concept in science. There is confusion at times with what physicists describe as 'nothing.' but this has no parallel to 'absolute nothingness.'

[robertb]

I believe 'absolute nothingness' can be conceived, but it is not a very practical concept in science. There is confusion at times with what physicists describe as 'nothing.' but this has no parallel to 'absolute nothingness.'

I suppose that since phycists should try to deal with empirical reality, conceptual nothingness might be rather useless to them, but that's what philosophers are for.

[ZackMartin]

I'm not even sure if we can conceive of it.

If you ask me if I can conceive of something, I tend to interpret that as asking me whether, however vaguely, I can imagine what it would be like for it to be true. And I can't imagine what it would be like for an absolute nothing to exist, not even very vaguely. Which suggests to me, that at least for me, an absolute nothing is not conceivable at all - it is beyond my powers of conception.

Not that hard, really. An absolute nothing is simply the absense of everything. (Of course taking into account the symantic difficulties created by the word 'is'.)

Right, and I can't conceive of the absence of everything. I can conceive of the absence of all sorts of particular things or classes of things, but the absence of everything, I can't. That's inconceivable to me. Maybe it's conceivable for you; but maybe you and I have different standards for conceivability?

[robertb]

Right, and I can't conceive of the absence of everything. I can conceive of the absence of all sorts of particular things or classes of things, but the absence of everything, I can't. That's inconceivable to me. Maybe it's conceivable for you; but maybe you and I have different standards for conceivability?

Interesting.

[shunyadragon]

Right, and I can't conceive of the absence of everything. I can conceive of the absence of all sorts of particular things or classes of things, but the absence of everything, I can't. That's inconceivable to me. Maybe it's conceivable for you; but maybe you and I have different standards for conceivability?

I have heard of similar problems of conceiving of infinities from apologists like Craig arguing for KCA cosmological arguments. I have no problems with mentally conceiving of infinities and absolute nothingness, but beyond philosophically conceiving of 'absolute nothingness,' I find no value in applying the concept to reality.

[robertb]

I have heard of similar problems of conceiving of infinities from apologists like Craig arguing for KCA cosmological arguments. I have no problems with mentally conceiving of infinities and absolute nothingness, but beyond philosophically conceiving of 'absolute nothingness,' I find no value in applying the concept to reality.

Thus, as I said, interesting.

[Juice]

So I would say, virtual particles are a counterexample to KCA if (1) my theory of causation is correct, (2) hidden variable theory is false. Based on the collective judgement of contemporary physics, (2) is probably true - hidden variable theories are probably false. So unless there is something major wrong with my theory of causation, virtual particles are a counterexample to KCA.

Hey Zack. I suppose I should respond to this as you posted it for me. First, I appreciate the effort and thought you put into this post.

Regarding (1). It seems we do have knowledge of A that will help predict something about B. That is, when we know when A (a quantum vacuum) exists we can at least predict that B (virtual particles) will probably begin to exist at some point. Hence, it seems to me using your definition (if I understand it correctly), A does cause B, or a quantum vacuum does cause virtual particles.

Further, you seem to be interpreting the first premise of the KCA as “Every event has a cause.” If you are, I think this fundamentally misrepresents the KCA as far as I can see for it doesn’t necessarily commit itself to that but rather every thing that begins to exist has a cause.

The phenomena of virtual particles could be classed as an event I should think. But are they truly a real thing in the sense of the meaning that the KCA implies? I don’t think they are. Physicist Matt Strassler writes:

The best way to approach this concept, I believe, is to forget you ever saw the word “particle” in the term. A virtual particle is not a particle at all. It refers precisely to a disturbance in a field that is not a particle. A particle is a nice, regular ripple in a field, one that can travel smoothly and effortlessly through space, like a clear tone of a bell moving through the air. A “virtual particle”, generally, is a disturbance in a field that will never be found on its own, but instead is something that is caused by the presence of other particles, often of other fields.

(Emphasis added by Strassler) Source

Later, from the same source Strassler further writes:

That said, it is not at all mysterious; it is something whose details, if we know the initial motions of the electrons, can be calculated easily. Exactly the same equations that tell us about photons also tell us about how these disturbances work; in fact, the equations of quantum fields guarantee that if nature can have photons, it can have these disturbances too.

(emphasis and italics added by Strassler)

I’ll add your conclusion rests upon an appeal to unnamed authorities for (2) as the “majority of physicists” that are, by own your admission, in dispute over a theory you require to be false for your argument to work.

I can see where your argument might give you reason to not believe the first premise of the KCA, I'm happy to concede that. But I can’t see how it conclusively falsifies it. Which is what I asked for because a reason to not believe (in the sense of undercutting the strength of the premise) and conclusively falsifying it are two very different things.

Cheers.

[magellan004]

In principle, it seems that even though we may conceive of an absolute nothing, that this fact alone does not immediately mean that such a situation is actually possible in reality. In other words a basic state of energy may be the absolute bottom turtle after all.

This (what I am about to say in reply) isn't really helpful because it's just inverted philosophy - but you are conceiving a world where what you conceive is not possible.

Magellan

[shunyadragon]

This (what I am about to say in reply) isn't really helpful because it's just inverted philosophy - but you are conceiving a world where what you conceive is not possible.

Magellan

What are you referring to as impossible?

That the basic state of energy (zero-state field) is the basic infinite and eternal matrix of existence, 'ie, the biggest last turtle of all.'?

[JimL]

Right, and I can't conceive of the absence of everything. I can conceive of the absence of all sorts of particular things or classes of things, but the absence of everything, I can't. That's inconceivable to me. Maybe it's conceivable for you; but maybe you and I have different standards for conceivability?

I think I agree with you Zack, I cannot concieve of absolute nothingness either. The term nothing doesn't even make sense to me since it defines a certain state of affairs and you cant have a certain state of affairs if there is nothing. Could an absolute vacuum be defind as nothing? Or is it better defined as empty space? Is empty space nothing? I don't think so, because I can concieve of empty space. What I can't conceive of is, no space.

[robertb]

I think I agree with you Zack, I cannot concieve of absolute nothingness either. The term nothing doesn't even make sense to me since it defines a certain state of affairs and you cant have a certain state of affairs if there is nothing. Could an absolute vacuum be defind as nothing? Or is it better defined as empty space? Is empty space nothing? I don't think so, because I can concieve of empty space. What I can't conceive of is, no space.

I would say that the term absolute nothingness defines no state of affairs, not a certain state, which would, of course, be something. And you are correct, no space, no time, no thing.

[robertb]

What are you referring to as impossible?

That the basic state of energy (zero-state field) is the basic infinite and eternal matrix of existence, 'ie, the biggest last turtle of all.'?

Perhaps this is where cosmology is heading, yes.