Phoenix and Indy discuss God's Existence

[ApologiaPhoenix]

Anytime one "does" something, one actualizes a potential. To "cause" something, one must do something, because "causing" is in itself "doing something."

Correct, but this is the difference between active potential and passive potential. Aquinas's argument seeks to explain the problem of passive potential. Your position assumes the unmoved mover was in a state of not doing something and then went to doing something.

If I'm standing on a sidewalk, and two cars crash because one driver was distracted by my lack of pants, I've still actualized my potential to cause a crash, even if per accidens. So even if the "first mover" started "the first motion", he/she/it still actualized a potential merely by doing so.

Active and not passive. This is the problem I cited earlier. (And please get some pants on!)

...Beyond this, we haven't even begun to delve into why this "first mover" would necessarily have certain properties, such as sentience and/or omniscience, or would even necessarily still exist. But I'm guessing you're holding onto other arguments to those effects. (Not to mention, God is commonly described as an active creator and interventionist, so that would hardly be a passive causation.)

No. We haven't got to those yet but when we establish some nature of the first mover, it will be self-evident why that is so. Also, this does not require God being a creator and interventionist. Neither of those are classically necessary attributes of God but descriptive characteristics of what He does.

[Indy]

Agreed that this argument alone doesn't necessitate any particular attributes of God. So, where does this leave us? It appears you're asserting that God would be a per accidens cause of the first motion, and we apparently agree that passive causation is still a motion, as in the sun causing a leaf to turn color. So, I still assert that leaves the introductory premise violated, since you've stated that something is in motion without a predecessor. I would call it QED, but you seem to think otherwise. Ball's in your court.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

Agreed that this argument alone doesn't necessitate any particular attributes of God.

False. I have said it does not necessitate all immediately. I have stated that when its conclusion is reached and we get some description of God from the argument, we will see why some attributes are there.

So, where does this leave us? It appears you're asserting that God would be a per accidens cause of the first motion,

No. In fact, I am arguing from a per se chain instead of per accidens.

and we apparently agree that passive causation is still a motion, as in the sun causing a leaf to turn color. So, I still assert that leaves the introductory premise violated, since you've stated that something is in motion without a predecessor. I would call it QED, but you seem to think otherwise. Ball's in your court.

No. THe problem again is you're equating receiving motion with causing motion. Aquinas is interested in passive potentiality being actualized. Naturally, there has to be something causing all that motion at the start but because it is causing that, it does not necessitate that it is part of the chain itself. If a solution is put forward that is part of the chain, then the problem still exists. The solution must be that which moves others without itself being moved. Thus, it does not violate its own premise as the argument deals with things that are moved.

Also, you STILL have not shown the apologist who argues that everything needs a cause.

[Indy]

Also, you STILL have not shown the apologist who argues that everything needs a cause.

And that matters... why? a) I'm not arguing someone else's arguments; and b) we're not arguing the Second Way, as of yet.

No. The problem again is you're equating receiving motion with causing motion.

Actually, no... we agree they are two separate things. I am, however, arguing that causing motion in something else is itself a motion. Whether it's direct or indirect is inconsequential. This would also be the Aristotlean view, e.g. the example of sunlight "incidentally" causing leaves to change color, or fire "incidentally" causing wood to get hot. A "first mover" did something, realized a potential, or "moved", simply by virtue of being a "mover" of something else.

Or, look at it this way. Let's assume the universe exists, but is not in any kind of motion, not changing. Let's also assume the "prime mover" is not in any kind of motion, not changing in any way. Were that the case, nothing would ever happen; the universe would never be set in motion. At some point, the prime mover has to do something to cause motion in the universe, even if he does so incidentally and not directly.

Let's say I am the prime mover. If I never do anything for all of eternity other than one thing - causing the universe to be set in motion - I've still done one thing, realized one potential, performed one act.

(Plus, if you're planning to argue a per se causation, the prime mover has to be in motion, in the same sense that we agreed that I would be "moving" even if I willed a ball to move via telepathy, or caused someone to fall ill by wishing for it; while my attributes have not changed in any regard, I still have "moved".)

Thus, the prime mover must be in motion, or at least must have been in motion at some point.

Why is this important? Because if the prime mover is itself in motion, or ever was, but was not set in motion by something else, then the statement "everything in motion must have been set in motion by something else" is false, and the initial premise is void.

On a side note, we haven't even discussed another tenuous premise: the assertion than an infinite regress of motion-causes is impossible.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

And that matters... why? a) I'm not arguing someone else's arguments; and b) we're not arguing the Second Way, as of yet.

It is because you are saying this is what apologists say. So far, you have not found one example. If you say I am violating a principle that apologists always violate, then show that they have.

Actually, no... we agree they are two separate things. I am, however, arguing that causing motion in something else is itself a motion.

You are, but you have not shown it. Instrumental causes in a per se chain cause motion. Instrumental causes need efficient causes at their heads.

Whether it's direct or indirect is inconsequential. This would also be the Aristotlean view, e.g. the example of sunlight "incidentally" causing leaves to change color, or fire "incidentally" causing wood to get hot. A "first mover" did something, realized a potential, or "moved", simply by virtue of being a "mover" of something else.

To say the first mover did something is not the same as to say this first mover itself underwent change. That is your assumption but you have not demonstrated it.

Or, look at it this way. Let's assume the universe exists, but is not in any kind of motion, not changing. Let's also assume the "prime mover" is not in any kind of motion, not changing in any way. Were that the case, nothing would ever happen; the universe would never be set in motion. At some point, the prime mover has to do something to cause motion in the universe, even if he does so incidentally and not directly.

Actually, even if the universe is not moving, it is still existing and unless the cause of its own existence is in itself, it still needs a cause, but that is getting into the second way. If God was not acting, nothing would happen. Correct. That does not demonstrate that God's acting is dependent on anything beyond Himself so that He Himself is the recipient of motion.

Let's say I am the prime mover. If I never do anything for all of eternity other than one thing - causing the universe to be set in motion - I've still done one thing, realized one potential, performed one act.

Active potential. Not passive potential. The argument is to explain the fulfillment of passive potential.

(Plus, if you're planning to argue a per se causation, the prime mover has to be in motion, in the same sense that we agreed that I would be "moving" even if I willed a ball to move via telepathy, or caused someone to fall ill by wishing for it; while my attributes have not changed in any regard, I still have "moved".)

I have no problem with active potential again. It's passive potential.

Thus, the prime mover must be in motion, or at least must have been in motion at some point.

Thomists don't argue that the prime mover is in repose. We argue that he is actualizing potential but He Himself does not have potential to be actualized.

Why is this important? Because if the prime mover is itself in motion, or ever was, but was not set in motion by something else, then the statement "everything in motion must have been set in motion by something else" is false, and the initial premise is void.

It's a good thing that's not the argument then.

On a side note, we haven't even discussed another tenuous premise: the assertion than an infinite regress of motion-causes is impossible.

What kind of infinite regress?

[Indy]

If you say I am violating a principle that apologists always violate, then show that they have.

That's not exactly what I said, so rather than introduce an unnecessary thread, how about we stick with the current argument?

To say the first mover did something is not the same as to say this first mover itself underwent change. That is your assumption but you have not demonstrated it.

I demonstrated it by saying that at a minimum, the first mover had to change from being in an idle state, to being in the state of acting. If something never changes, it's an idle blob with no capacity to act.

That does not demonstrate that God's acting is dependent on anything beyond Himself so that He Himself is the recipient of motion.

And that's not the point. The point is to show that God is moving. Which means that unless God was induced to move, then something exists that is in motion without being moved. Which in turn makes the first premise of the Way, that all motion requires a cause, false.

We argue that he is actualizing potential but He Himself does not have potential to be actualized.

So how is that not self-contradicting? I don't even see where that statement makes sense.

It's a good thing that's not the argument then.

Really? "The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion..."

What kind of infinite regress?

What substantiates the assumption that "this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand." After all, that's not really true; the hand has indeed been put into motion by something, which in turn has been put into motion by something else, and on and on. At some point, you must give a sound argument that an infinite regress of motion-causes is impossible, as it's a premise of the Way.

An aside: you surely realize that to an atheist (and certainly many theists) this all reads like an exercise in obfuscation via mental gymnastics rather than actual evidence of anything? Not that these are new arguments by any means. But I'll play along. I'd still prefer we restate the argument in your own terms rather than Aquinas's, since your understanding of reality and knowledge of physics is not quite the same as someone who lived in the 13th century.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

That's not exactly what I said, so rather than introduce an unnecessary thread, how about we stick with the current argument?

Sure. It couldn't have been found anyway. That's a straw man atheists have put out for years to trick those who don't bother checking original sources.

I demonstrated it by saying that at a minimum, the first mover had to change from being in an idle state, to being in the state of acting. If something never changes, it's an idle blob with no capacity to act.

This assumes that something is temporal and thus also part of the creation. That has not been demonstrated.

And that's not the point. The point is to show that God is moving. Which means that unless God was induced to move, then something exists that is in motion without being moved. Which in turn makes the first premise of the Way, that all motion requires a cause, false.

All motion in this case is the actualizing of passive potential. The argument is that God is in fact actualizing the potential in all other things without He Himself having any potential of His own being actualized. Saying God is doing something does not violate the argument. It works with it perfectly.

So how is that not self-contradicting? I don't even see where that statement makes sense.

How is it self-contradictory? Is it a contradiction to say you can do something in another without having the same situation yourself?

Really? "The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion..."

Correct. Motion is the actualizing of passive potential. You're still confusing active and passive. You are confusing doing something with being the recipient of something.

What substantiates the assumption that "this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand." After all, that's not really true; the hand has indeed been put into motion by something, which in turn has been put into motion by something else, and on and on. At some point, you must give a sound argument that an infinite regress of motion-causes is impossible, as it's a premise of the Way.

All causes in between are instrumental causes. Instrumental causes are the cause through which something takes place. Thus, they have behind them an efficient cause. The carpenter is the efficient cause of the house. Carpentry is the instrumental cause as well as hammers, nails, bricks, wood, etc. If all you have are instrumental causes, then you have nonsense since they cannot actualize themselves. You might as well say a paint brush can paint on its own if the handle is really long.

An aside: you surely realize that to an atheist (and certainly many theists) this all reads like an exercise in obfuscation via mental gymnastics rather than actual evidence of anything? Not that these are new arguments by any means. But I'll play along. I'd still prefer we restate the argument in your own terms rather than Aquinas's, since your understanding of reality and knowledge of physics is not quite the same as someone who lived in the 13th century.

My knowledge of physics is irrelevant since the argument has nothing to do with physics. I realize this is the way it is for many atheists because for them, they honestly cannot think outside of science. I find it important to be able to think in many fields.

[Indy]

Sure. It couldn't have been found anyway. That's a straw man atheists have put out for years to trick those who don't bother checking original sources.

I'd still argue that the first three "ways" are variations of the same "chain of causation" theme, with some finesse. Even modern-day apologists like William Lane Craig have their own distinct variants, but they come back to the same basic priniciple, "there can not be an infinite regress of causes for X, so God must be the un-X'ed X." I'd still argue they suffer the same fundamental flaws: a) unjustified assumption that there cannot be an infinite regress; and b) special pleading for the "prime X'er".

This assumes that something is temporal and thus also part of the creation. That has not been demonstrated.

I'd argue the opposite; that you're special pleading for "non-temporal" things being exempt from your own rules. But even then, did we not mutually establish, earlier on, that your prime mover is beholden to the arrow of time? (If I understand correctly the usage of temporal you intended.)

For something to be in the causal chain, even if it is the beginning of the chain with no cause of its own, it has to be time-bound. The very concept of cause relies on time, on there being a "before" and an "after". Also, there cannot be a first cause if the starting link is unbound-by-time; there is simply an infinite state of causing. Which, you might actually agree with - but then, any argument that uses a "first cause" as one of its premises is void, since causation is infinite and then nothing is "the beginning of the line."

All motion in this case is the actualizing of passive potential. The argument is that God is in fact actualizing the potential in all other things without He Himself having any potential of His own being actualized. Saying God is doing something does not violate the argument. It works with it perfectly.

I disagree. You can't on one hand say that I would be actualizing a potential by incidentally causing a car crash by the sheer accident of wearing sunglasses that put glare in a driver's eyes, and simultaneously argue that God is not actualizing a potential by incidentally causing the first motion, by whatever unspecified "non-moving" means he would have done so. If one is the actualization of a potential, then so is the other.

(PLUS, let's assume you did succeed in arguing a timeless God or a God with no changeable attributes i.e. "potential" - that would not be the God of Christianity. The God of Christianity exhibits "motion"; his moods change, his decisions change, he speaks, he smites, he influences the physical world, and only at individual points in time. But that's not really relevant, yet.)

So let's get to the heart of the matter:
A) Do you classify God in this argument as moving or non-moving?
B) If the answer to (A) is "moving", you've posited that something exists that is in motion without having being moved, correct?
C) If the answer to (A) is "non-moving", you have two problems: 1) If God is non-moving and the universe was non-moving, how did anything ever get into motion; 2) How can anything, even God, act upon anything else without some kind of "movement", even if that movement consists of nothing more than willing something to be set in motion, OR, exerting influence in some manner, even if it's a passive or accidental influence?

After all, the foundation of this whole argument is a posteriori based on our empirical experience of causation of motion. The same empirical experience tells us that if nothing at all is moving, then nothing ever happens; everything just sits idle and unchanging. Hence the first mover must be in motion.

How is it self-contradictory?

Never mind, I misread. Retracted.

All causes in between are instrumental causes. Instrumental causes are the cause through which something takes place. Thus, they have behind them an efficient cause. The carpenter is the efficient cause of the house. Carpentry is the instrumental cause as well as hammers, nails, bricks, wood, etc. If all you have are instrumental causes, then you have nonsense since they cannot actualize themselves. You might as well say a paint brush can paint on its own if the handle is really long.

OK, so we understand the difference (in Aristotle-speak) between efficient causes and material/instrumental causes. So, how do we justify our premise that there cannot be an infinite linkage of Efficient Causes (perhaps with Material Causes along the way) going forever back in time? There is still no basis for this premise. Aquinas's only argument is "if this were infinite, there would be no first mover," to which most people would reply, "well, duh." :) "If there's not a first mover, there cannot be a second mover." We might as well argue that because a line extends infinitely in either direction, it cannot possibly have any points, because there's no "first" point. Seems to be an Argument From Failure to Grasp The Concept Of Infinity.

My knowledge of physics is irrelevant since the argument has nothing to do with physics. I realize this is the way it is for many atheists because for them, they honestly cannot think outside of science. I find it important to be able to think in many fields.

I bring it up because Aquinas's arguments are a posteriori based on their understanding of physics at that time. To make the argument today, one should really be formulating it with respect to today's body of knowledge. Metaphysics is not a static discipline. But we need not go there.

Another note: we may need to hold onto this for later, when and if we start talking about "necessary attributes", but it's noteworthy that there's nothing in this argument that proves there is only one prime mover. There's no reason there can't be multiple simultaneous causes of the first motion.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

I'd still argue that the first three "ways" are variations of the same "chain of causation" theme, with some finesse. Even modern-day apologists like William Lane Craig have their own distinct variants, but they come back to the same basic priniciple, "there can not be an infinite regress of causes for X, so God must be the un-X'ed X." I'd still argue they suffer the same fundamental flaws: a) unjustified assumption that there cannot be an infinite regress; and b) special pleading for the "prime X'er".

Actually, Aquinas does think an infinite regress per accidens is allowable. See Q. 46. Art. 2 of the Prima Pars. The beginning of the universe cannot be known by reason alone for Aquinas. He is speaking about per se and I've shown why there has to be a foundation in per se.

As for special pleading, not at all. The ultimate in the argument is not subject by nature of what He is as is seen when the argument reaches its conclusion.

I'd argue the opposite; that you're special pleading for "non-temporal" things being exempt from your own rules. But even then, did we not mutually establish, earlier on, that your prime mover is beholden to the arrow of time? (If I understand correctly the usage of temporal you intended.)

I hold that God cannot change the past because that involves a contradiction. It means God does and undoes for the same time and in the same sense. It does not mean He is bound by time. God does not do anything necessarily save will Himself, but once He does anything, He is necessarily doing it. There is a difference.

For something to be in the causal chain, even if it is the beginning of the chain with no cause of its own, it has to be time-bound. The very concept of cause relies on time, on there being a "before" and an "after". Also, there cannot be a first cause if the starting link is unbound-by-time; there is simply an infinite state of causing. Which, you might actually agree with - but then, any argument that uses a "first cause" as one of its premises is void, since causation is infinite and then nothing is "the beginning of the line."

This is assuming a chronological understanding rather than an ontological one. Picture for all eternity a chair has been holding up a book somewhere. The two have remained stationary physically and unmoved physically, yet there has never been a time that the chair has not been holding up the book. In this case, there is no chronological cause of the chair holding the book, but there is an ontological cause. The chair is first not chronologically but ontologically.

I disagree. You can't on one hand say that I would be actualizing a potential by incidentally causing a car crash by the sheer accident of wearing sunglasses that put glare in a driver's eyes, and simultaneously argue that God is not actualizing a potential by incidentally causing the first motion, by whatever unspecified "non-moving" means he would have done so. If one is the actualization of a potential, then so is the other.

No. THe difference is that you change your way of existing. God does not change His. Whatever He does, He eternally does.

(PLUS, let's assume you did succeed in arguing a timeless God or a God with no changeable attributes i.e. "potential" - that would not be the God of Christianity. The God of Christianity exhibits "motion"; his moods change, his decisions change, he speaks, he smites, he influences the physical world, and only at individual points in time. But that's not really relevant, yet.)

You take the idea of God having emotions in the text literally? It's just as literal as talking about God's arm. My hermeneutic is consistent as it makes all human attributes applied to God, such as emotions and body parts, to be metaphorical. Meanwhile, God is eternally doing all things at all times. So, He is performing miracles as well as judging the world right now.

So let's get to the heart of the matter:
A) Do you classify God in this argument as moving or non-moving?

I classify God as having active potential actualized while no passive potential is actualized as He has none. There is nothing God has to do but once He does it, he does it necessarily.

B) If the answer to (A) is "moving", you've posited that something exists that is in motion without having being moved, correct?

Remember what motion we are talking about here. I have said you are confusing passive with active potential. You have not shown any idea that you recognize the distinction.

C) If the answer to (A) is "non-moving", you have two problems: 1) If God is non-moving and the universe was non-moving, how did anything ever get into motion; 2) How can anything, even God, act upon anything else without some kind of "movement", even if that movement consists of nothing more than willing something to be set in motion, OR, exerting influence in some manner, even if it's a passive or accidental influence?

My answers based on passive potential and active potential being differentiated and God being timeless and eternally acting answer these.

After all, the foundation of this whole argument is a posteriori based on our empirical experience of causation of motion. The same empirical experience tells us that if nothing at all is moving, then nothing ever happens; everything just sits idle and unchanging. Hence the first mover must be in motion.

If nothing is moving? We have no such luxury. We live in a world where potentialities are being actualized. The world you speak of is one without time, but time is the means whereby such potentialities are actualized.

OK, so we understand the difference (in Aristotle-speak) between efficient causes and material/instrumental causes. So, how do we justify our premise that there cannot be an infinite linkage of Efficient Causes (perhaps with Material Causes along the way) going forever back in time?

We don't. That's not Aquinas's argument. Aquinas has no problem with an infinite chain of efficient causes. He has one with an infinite chain of instrumental causes.

There is still no basis for this premise. Aquinas's only argument is "if this were infinite, there would be no first mover," to which most people would reply, "well, duh." :)

No. His reply is instrumental causes by their nature are secondary causes. A secondary cause makes no sense without a primary one.

"If there's not a first mover, there cannot be a second mover." We might as well argue that because a line extends infinitely in either direction, it cannot possibly have any points, because there's no "first" point. Seems to be an Argument From Failure to Grasp The Concept Of Infinity.

Aquinas would have no problem with a line extending forever.

I bring it up because Aquinas's arguments are a posteriori based on their understanding of physics at that time. To make the argument today, one should really be formulating it with respect to today's body of knowledge. Metaphysics is not a static discipline. But we need not go there.

No. They're not based on physics at all. That's your assertion.

Another note: we may need to hold onto this for later, when and if we start talking about "necessary attributes", but it's noteworthy that there's nothing in this argument that proves there is only one prime mover. There's no reason there can't be multiple simultaneous causes of the first motion.

Actually, there are several reasons why there can only be one prime mover. Anything else would be part of the change and if something is pure actuality, it could only differ by something else that is pure actuality. But if something is pure actuality it has no potential to be actualized. Two beings who have no difference between them would be identical. They could only differ by having a perfection one does not have or one lacking a perfection the other has. Neither would be purely actual then.

Aquinas sees it all coming. Nothing new.

[Indy]

You take the idea of God having emotions in the text literally?

a) There is no evidence that I shouldn't; but b) Even if I don't take "emotions" literally, it can still be said at a minimum that Biblical God can be either pleased or displeased, which are still dichotomous attributes, thus implying that God changes in at least one regard. c) Even if you discount that, Biblical God inarguably physically interacts with the world.

Aquinas would have no problem with a line extending forever.

The line of course is a metaphor for the "line of causation," which he does have a problem with. A crucial point of his argument is that unless there was a "first motion", there could be any successive motions. This is the logical equivalent of saying a line cannot have any points unless there is a "first" point.

No. They're not based on physics at all. That's your assertion.

It's Aquinas's assertion. A premise of the a posteriori argument is an observation of the natural world, i.e. his understanding of the nature of physics at the time. The whole reasoning is based on the idea - introduced as a given assumption based on empirical experience - that all objects/matter have a default state of "unmoving" (both in terms of physical location and in terms of "change"), and remain so until "moved" by an external force.

Sooner or later we're going to have to deal with the ways in which our current body of knowledge about the physical world, accumulated since the 1200's contradict this assumption; but for our current lines of debate we can stick with the Aristotlean view of the world.

Two beings who have no difference between them would be identical. They could only differ by having a perfection one does not have or one lacking a perfection the other has.

That's introducing material outside the scope of the First Way; I stated there's nothing in this argument that precludes multiple first causes. I'm guessing we're on the same page on that point.

(May return to some other points later... next few days are pretty busy so may not have a lot of time. Cheers.)

[ApologiaPhoenix]

a) There is no evidence that I shouldn't; but b) Even if I don't take "emotions" literally, it can still be said at a minimum that Biblical God can be either pleased or displeased, which are still dichotomous attributes, thus implying that God changes in at least one regard. c) Even if you discount that, Biblical God inarguably physically interacts with the world.

A) In a high context society, the reader was expected to recognize anthropomorphisms. The Jews didn't take the hands, arms, and eyes of God literally. If you don't, why do you take one non-literally and one literally?
B) What this refers to is being in a position of favor. It is not that God changes to man but man changes to God.
C) Yes, and these are eternal actions just like all of His actions.

The line of course is a metaphor for the "line of causation," which he does have a problem with. A crucial point of his argument is that unless there was a "first motion", there could be any successive motions. This is the logical equivalent of saying a line cannot have any points unless there is a "first" point.

You are still making the exact same mistake. This is not an infinite regress per accidens. Aquinas is open to that. This is one per se. An infinite chain of instrumental causes produces an absurdity. The first cause is first in ontology. Not chronology.

It's Aquinas's assertion. A premise of the a posteriori argument is an observation of the natural world, i.e. his understanding of the nature of physics at the time. The whole reasoning is based on the idea - introduced as a given assumption based on empirical experience - that all objects/matter have a default state of "unmoving" (both in terms of physical location and in terms of "change"), and remain so until "moved" by an external force.

Sooner or later we're going to have to deal with the ways in which our current body of knowledge about the physical world, accumulated since the 1200's contradict this assumption; but for our current lines of debate we can stick with the Aristotlean view of the world.

You're also forgetting that all of this deals with being. If there is a change in being, there is a cause for that change. Note again this is passive and not active.

That's introducing material outside the scope of the First Way; I stated there's nothing in this argument that precludes multiple first causes. I'm guessing we're on the same page on that point.

No. We're not. The conclusion denies any multiple first causes. There can only be one ultimate.

[firstfloor]

Are you still debating the first way? Please allow me to help. Even if you accept the principle of a first mover, there is no reason to suppose that the first mover is a god or in particular the Christian God. All that can be said is that the cause of first motion is unknown and there is no memory of it in the Universe. You are of course free to claim that the first mover is God knowing that your claim is founded in scripture. This is called Christianity (or some other religion). The claim has no foundation outside of scripture.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

Are you still debating the first way? Please allow me to help.

I'll instead allow you to get help.

Even if you accept the principle of a first mover, there is no reason to suppose that the first mover is a god or in particular the Christian God.

Wow! This doesn't prove the Christian God?! No joke! Aquinas never meant for it to! Neither would Aristotle! All this demonstrates is theism! Now once you get what the first way is arguing for, you find that it does give a small slice of theism. It's not all the way, but it refutes atheism.

All that can be said is that the cause of first motion is unknown and there is no memory of it in the Universe.

Why would the universe remember something? Is the first cause unknown? Entirely? Yes. Partially? No. Otherwise, we could not know that it's the first mover so even that which is unknown to you has some knowledge of it. I claim even more can be known through reason alone about this first mover.

You are of course free to claim that the first mover is God knowing that your claim is founded in scripture. This is called Christianity (or some other religion). The claim has no foundation outside of scripture.

This must be why Avicenna, the Muslim, and Maimonides, the Jew, were both able to use the exact same argument. Assertions don't demonstrate anything. Instead, look at the argument and actually state where you think Aquinas went wrong. Hint. If you don't understand Aristotle, don't bother. You have to.

[firstfloor]

The first way says that nothing cam move itself except God who is therefore the first mover. It is completely circular and also wrong because we have no physics for describing the beginning of things and therefore cannot conclude that nothing can move itself.

[firstfloor]

Richard Holloway finished the latest episode of Honest Doubt: The History of an Epic Struggle, with Wittgenstein – “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” The episode concerned the mystery of God. It straightaway reminded me of this discussion.