Naturalism is false

[JimL]

There is a saying - "if the supernatural exists, it isn't." I kind of like that...

And the key word is "If." Supernatural is a term defining an existence that is distinct from the natural world of the observation of our senses. The supernatural, "if" it exists, is not known by us to exist, so it is a term merely defining a belief, a belief which may be nothing more than an abstract concept. To say that "if the supernatural exists, it isn't," is a kind of pantheistic concept.

[magellan004]

And the key word is "If." Supernatural is a term defining an existence that is distinct from the natural world of the observation of our senses. The supernatural, "if" it exists, is not known by us to exist, so it is a term merely defining a belief, a belief which may be nothing more than an abstract concept. To say that "if the supernatural exists, it isn't," is a kind of pantheistic concept.

People have reported seeing ghosts. Ghosts are supernatural.
I think the discussion would be more fruitful if we used 'physical' instead of 'natural'.

Otherwise we are reduced to saying things like 'Ghostly apparitions are natural.'

Magellan

[magellan004]

On the contrary, subtituting the word supernatural with the word fiction makes Zak's opening objection moot.

Sorry, you have lost me. Which is a pity because you have some interesting ideas - then I find myself wondering what you are saying. Just a suggestion - can you precis what you think the Opening post is saying using your own words?

Magellan

[JimL]

People have reported seeing ghosts. Ghosts are supernatural.
I think the discussion would be more fruitful if we used 'physical' instead of 'natural'.

Otherwise we are reduced to saying things like 'Ghostly apparitions are natural.'

Magellan

People report many things, does that mean they exist? People report seeing UFO's all the time, does that mean that UFO's exist? Besides the very idea of a ghost, not being physical, implies that it can't be seen.

[magellan004]

People report many things, does that mean they exist? People report seeing UFO's all the time, does that mean that UFO's exist? Besides the very idea of a ghost, not being physical, implies that it can't be seen.

The way I read the Opening Post is one of the matters to be addressed is -
Is "Naturalism' (whatever that is, however you define it) ruling things out from enquiry? And is it sane to rule things out because of some unfounded assumption - such as 'No one can see Ghosts?

Magellan

[JimL]

The way I read the Opening Post is one of the matters to be addressed is -
Is "Naturalism' (whatever that is, however you define it) ruling things out from enquiry? And is it sane to rule things out because of some unfounded assumption - such as 'No one can see Ghosts?

Magellan

You don't have to rule supernaturalism out any more than you need to rule out the existence of UFO's, but not ruling it out doesn't mean ruling it in.

[pancreasman]

You don't have to rule supernaturalism out any more than you need to rule out the existence of UFO's, but not ruling it out doesn't mean ruling it in.

Besides that, I think the existence of ghosts or ufo's is a conclusion rather than an observation. One might say 'There are strange phenomena in that house. I think it is entirely unnatural and may be a ghost'. The 'strange phenomena' can be investigated scientifically. 5 will get you 10 you'll find natural causes. This rules out your ghost theory. In other words, we need to distinguish between the actual observation and our interpretation of that observation.

[robertb]

Sorry, you have lost me. Which is a pity because you have some interesting ideas - then I find myself wondering what you are saying. Just a suggestion - can you precis what you think the Opening post is saying using your own words?

Magellan

Here is my take.

"Methodological naturalism" is not an accurate description for the scientific method - for deciding whether an idea is "natural" or "supernatural" plays no proper part in evaluating scientific theories. If the theory predicts what we actually observe better than competing theories do, then it should be accepted as science; the fact that someone has arbitrarily chosen to label some of the theoretical entities involved in that theory as "supernatural" is irrelevant.

Naturalists like to harp on that they have the evidence and their opponents don't, but they have absolutely no evidence for their natural-supernatural distinction, for their natural-non-natural distinction, or for their miraculous-non-miraculous distinction. All these distinctions are incoherent and unevidenced. Other incoherent and unevidenced distinctions advocated for by naturalists include the material-immaterial distinction, and the physical-non-physical distinction.

Zak incorrectly identifies Methodological Naturalism as somehow deciding whether an idea is “natural” or “supernatural” when it does not. Methodological Naturalism relates to observable reality and actually makes no determination with regards to an imagined natural/supernatural divide. Whatever interacts with reality is real and can be addressed using Methodological Naturalism. Zak then makes the point that labeling something as supernatural is actually an arbitrary exercise and irrelevant. It would seem that this may be the case due to the fact that there is no coherent definition of the word supernatural in the first place.

What is the supernatural? Who knows? What we usually say is what it is not, i.e. not natural, or not material, etc. Such definitions of the supernatural simply preclude anything classed as supernatural from having any relevance to methodological naturalism at all, perhaps apart from being excluded from the process due to irrelevance.

As far as I can tell, the word supernatural originated in the 16th century as a description of those things not subject to the laws of nature. So, from its inception, the word was simply defined as a negative. That's all well and good except for the fact that being defined in such a way really tells us nothing about what the supernatural actually is.

I think that what this actually boils down to is the divide between what is observed to interact with reality, the real, versus what is not observed to interact with reality, the imaginary and a whole group of stuff about which we simply know nothing about, the unknown.

Zak says, "If the theory predicts what we actually observe better than competing theories do, then it should be accepted as science" and I would say not only should it be accepted, but that is exactly the way science works. That is science. However, this statement itself defeats the rest of his argument, as anything that can be observed, by definition, interacts with reality and is therefore real, or using the semantics of methodological naturalism, natural. In fact, as you might notice, the word supernatural simply goes away once something is observed to interact with reality.

[ZackMartin]

Zak incorrectly identifies Methodological Naturalism as somehow deciding whether an idea is “natural” or “supernatural” when it does not. Methodological Naturalism relates to observable reality and actually makes no determination with regards to an imagined natural/supernatural divide. Whatever interacts with reality is real and can be addressed using Methodological Naturalism. Zak then makes the point that labeling something as supernatural is actually an arbitrary exercise and irrelevant. It would seem that this may be the case due to the fact that there is no coherent definition of the word supernatural in the first place.

This doesn't sound like a definition of methodological naturalism at all. It sounds like a definition of operationalism. Methodological naturalism is defined as "all scientific endeavors—all hypotheses and events—are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events" (to quote Wikipedia). If all you mean by "methodological naturalism" is "operationalism", why call it "naturalism" at all?

According to operationalism, all there is to science is - if you perform experiment or observation X under conditions Y then you will get results Z. All theoretical talk about particles or atoms or wavefunctions or molecules or species or continents or planets is ultimately reducible to statements about the results of experiments. Talk about "material" or "natural" or "physical" is scientifically irrelevant except insofar as it might correlate to a difference in some experiment or observation that we might perform.

If "naturalism" is not a reference to some natural-supernatural distinction, or some "natural"-"non-natural" distinction, then why not pick a better name which doesn't suggest any such questionable and ill-defined distinction. How about "operationalism"?

What is the supernatural? Who knows? What we usually say is what it is not, i.e. not natural, or not material, etc.

I don't believe in the supernatural, and I don't believe in the natural either. I believe in God, but I do not consider God to be either natural or supernatural. I do not consider anything to be natural or supernatural. They are useless terms which are near impossible to define, so it would be best if we simply dispensed with them entirely.

"Material" is also a very troublesome word. By at least some definitions of the word "material", science does deal with non-material things, such as energy and information. Of course, by other definitions of "material", those things are considered material too. If the word is so poorly and variably defined, why not dispense with it?

Zak says, "If the theory predicts what we actually observe better than competing theories do, then it should be accepted as science" and I would say not only should it be accepted, but that is exactly the way science works. That is science. However, this statement itself defeats the rest of his argument, as anything that can be observed, by definition, interacts with reality and is therefore real, or using the semantics of methodological naturalism, natural. In fact, as you might notice, the word supernatural simply goes away once something is observed to interact with reality.

Why not simply reject "naturalism" by rejecting the term "natural"? If this is all you mean by "naturalism", surely there are better terms you could use instead?

[ZackMartin]

The criteria for the word natural is simply anything that observably interacts with reality.

But now you need to define "reality". Do you simply mean to say "observable"? That the natural is what is observable? Well, then why bother with the word "natural" at all - let's just call it the observable. Then, rather than naturalism, how about observabilism? It does not suggest any questionable distinctions involving "natural".

[magellan004]

But now you need to define "reality". Do you simply mean to say "observable"? That the natural is what is observable? Well, then why bother with the word "natural" at all - let's just call it the observable. Then, rather than naturalism, how about observabilism? It does not suggest any questionable distinctions involving "natural".

Zack and Robertb - great discussion ! I love it !

Magellan

[magellan004]

I don't agree with Zack that 'Supernatural' is useless.
I grew weary of definition fights because a lot of what I did and saw in TWeb was just that. . People in society use these terms and these terms mean something to people. Rather than to dismiss their message on grounds of poorly defined words, I'd rather find what peiple mean when they use this language and work out if I find it reasonable.

Supernatural means something - it evokes God - a spiritual being, it makes me think of Ghosts and paranormal things - phenomena that (I'd say) are regarded as beyond the physical realm.
The Physical world means something - it evokes a world where things can be measured - you can poke them with a stick.

A philosophy that says 'Everything is physical - if you can't poke it , it doesn't exist' is as baseless as saying 'Everything is an idea, no physical things exist.'

Magellan

[robertb]

This doesn't sound like a definition of methodological naturalism at all. It sounds like a definition of operationalism. Methodological naturalism is defined as "all scientific endeavors—all hypotheses and events—are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events" (to quote Wikipedia). If all you mean by "methodological naturalism" is "operationalism", why call it "naturalism" at all?

Because the definition you have given for Methodological Naturalism is sufficient, once one defines the phrase “natural causes and events”. I imagine that we both understand what is actually meant by that phrase. To put it bluntly it means not attributing causes and events to the fictitious. The attribution can be to either a known source, or to an unknown source, never to a fictitious source.

I hope that is clear.

According to operationalism, all there is to science is - if you perform experiment or observation X under conditions Y then you will get results Z. All theoretical talk about particles or atoms or wavefunctions or molecules or species or continents or planets is ultimately reducible to statements about the results of experiments. Talk about "material" or "natural" or "physical" is scientifically irrelevant except insofar as it might correlate to a difference in some experiment or observation that we might perform.

Sounds acceptable and it pretty much sounds just like Methodological Naturalism in practice. Just a bit more generalized perhaps.

If "naturalism" is not a reference to some natural-supernatural distinction, or some "natural"-"non-natural" distinction, then why not pick a better name which doesn't suggest any such questionable and ill-defined distinction. How about "operationalism"?

Sure, why not. Of course, I am not sure that such a change would have any impact on how science is actually done. What do you think the practical difference might be?

I don't believe in the supernatural, and I don't believe in the natural either. I believe in God, but I do not consider God to be either natural or supernatural. I do not consider anything to be natural or supernatural. They are useless terms which are near impossible to define, so it would be best if we simply dispensed with them entirely.

Indeed, I prefer real versus imaginary, or nonfiction versus fiction. This due to the difficulty in pinning down exactly what one means by the word supernatural.

"Material" is also a very troublesome word. By at least some definitions of the word "material", science does deal with non-material things, such as energy and information. Of course, by other definitions of "material", those things are considered material too. If the word is so poorly and variably defined, why not dispense with it?

This could be said about a vast quantity of words. I suppose such action would simply leave us mute.

Why not simply reject "naturalism" by rejecting the term "natural"? If this is all you mean by "naturalism", surely there are better terms you could use instead?

But naturalism seems to do the job just fine. I would agree that the word supernatural is fairly useless.

[ZackMartin]

Supernatural means something - it evokes God - a spiritual being, it makes me think of Ghosts and paranormal things - phenomena that (I'd say) are regarded as beyond the physical realm.

Thing is, I believe in God, an afterlife, etc. I just don't see what's the value in calling these things "supernatural". What do we gain by calling them that? Especially when it seems to be a very slippery term that different people define differently, and many people struggle to define at all.

I think the original meaning of "supernatural" was based on the idea that the laws of physics can be broken, and that God (and possibly other beings) broke those laws sometimes. But you can believe in God, and you can even believe in God doing "miraculous" things, without accepting any concept of "breaking the laws of physics". Since, if you believe God wrote the laws of physics, he doesn't need to break them - if he wants something to happen, he just writes them in such a way that it ends up happening. Of course, some things that happen can violate our current imperfect understanding of the laws of physics - the orbit of Mercury used to do exactly that. But the supernatural was usually conceived based on the idea that there were some kind of "absolute" laws of physics, separate from the laws of physics as known by us at some time, and that the supernatural didn't just violate our understanding of the laws of physics, it even violated the absolute laws of physics they approximated to.

The Physical world means something - it evokes a world where things can be measured - you can poke them with a stick.

A philosophy that says 'Everything is physical - if you can't poke it , it doesn't exist' is as baseless as saying 'Everything is an idea, no physical things exist.'

My challenge to you, is to try to move beyond vague ideas that sound right, to more precise definitions. I'd suggest, that when you try to explore definitions more precisely, you'll find that even a seemingly straightforward "physical" is defined in lots of different ways, and some of these definitions make more sense than others. And a claim like "everything is physical" is not a single idea, it is actually many separate ideas, depending on how "physical" gets defined.

[robertb]

But now you need to define "reality". Do you simply mean to say "observable"? That the natural is what is observable? Well, then why bother with the word "natural" at all - let's just call it the observable. Then, rather than naturalism, how about observabilism? It does not suggest any questionable distinctions involving "natural".

If such really floats your boat, start the meme. I am just not sure if the result will simply be a difference without a difference.