Atheists who believe in objective morality

[Seasanctuary]

A statement is objective if it is capable of being true or false independently of whether any individual or group believes that it is true or false.

Suppose I point at Europe on a globe and say "This...", then point at Africa and say, "...is north of this." Am I making an objective assertion?

Once we've decided what north and south mean then, sure, the truth of the statement no longer depends on beliefs. But at some point in the past, someone made up the concepts of north and south. We're following convention. Would the concepts of north and south exist in a world without sentient beings? Could statements involving them be true in such a world? I suggest: no. It's easy for us to imagine north and south still existing because we import our own concepts into the thought experiment.

Likewise, we have some conventional meaning(s) for good and evil which we can use to talk about the world. We can point at indiscriminate killing and say "This...", then point at kindness and say, "is morally worse than this." It doesn't matter if some individual or group now believes differently, based on conventional meanings they would be as incorrect as someone who claims Africa is north of Europe. But this doesn't make the concepts of moral good and evil any more objective than the concepts of north and south.

This is how moral judgments (measurements) can be correct or incorrect regardless of beliefs, but moral definitions (definitions of measurements) can be conventions.

[ZackMartin]

Suppose I point at Europe on a globe and say "This...", then point at Africa and say, "...is north of this." Am I making an objective assertion?

Once we've decided what north and south mean then, sure, the truth of the statement no longer depends on beliefs. But at some point in the past, someone made up the concepts of north and south. We're following convention. Would the concepts of north and south exist in a world without sentient beings? Could statements involving them be true in such a world? I suggest: no. It's easy for us to imagine north and south still existing because we import our own concepts into the thought experiment.

Are there any statements we can make about the world without importing human conventions? In a world without sentient beings, would any concepts exist at all? Would anything be true or false? This almost seems to be an argument for idealism - physical reality does not exist apart from minds observing it. But I doubt that's what you believe (though it is what I believe).

Many concepts that start out as purely conventional, but we later find a non-conventional basis for them. For example, units of distance were once purely conventional - there is a story (I believe it is just a legend though) that the length of the "foot" was originally the length of the King's foot - but now we have a non-conventional basis for them. Non-metric units such as the inch are precisely defined in terms of the SI metre, and the SI metre in turn is precisely defined in terms of the speed of light in a vacuum and the hyperfine structure transition frequency of Caesium-133 at absolute zero upon the surface of the Earth's geoid (due to gravitational time dilation, time varies by altitude). Since this definition refers to the Earth's geoid, it could be said to not be completely non-conventional (an alien civilisation would pick a different planetary geoid to use); but we do have a unit of measuring distance which could be argued to be close to completely non-conventional - Planck length. It is defined in terms of the fundamental physical constants - the speed of light in a vacuum, the Gravitational constant, and Planck's constant. If there is an intelligent extraterrestrial civilisation in a distant galaxy, they would not have come up with the SI metre as a unit of measurement, but they could arrive at Planck length independently. (For various practical reasons, the SI unit system and the Planck unit system are currently disconnected, but they are currently in the process of redefining the SI units to be closer to the Planck units, and eventually SI units may come to be defined purely in terms of Planck units.)

So are "north" and "south" purely conventional, or will some non-conventional footing be found for them eventually? Geographical north and south can be said to be purely conventional, but magnetic north and south are not (even though they are not stable over time). The labelling of magnetic poles as north and south is to my knowledge purely conventional at present. But further physics research might discover some asymmetry between magnetic north and south, which would enable us to label them in a non-conventional manner. Maybe, if we discover magnetic monopoles, experiments upon them might reveal some way of distinguishing north monopoles from south monopoles other than comparison to the Earth's magnetic field - then "north" and "south" might go from being conventional to non-conventional concepts. Since we don't know whether any such future physics discoveries will be made or not, we don't know whether "north" and "south" are purely conventional or not.

Likewise, we have some conventional meaning(s) for good and evil which we can use to talk about the world. We can point at indiscriminate killing and say "This...", then point at kindness and say, "is morally worse than this." It doesn't matter if some individual or group now believes differently, based on conventional meanings they would be as incorrect as someone who claims Africa is north of Europe. But this doesn't make the concepts of moral good and evil any more objective than the concepts of north and south.

As I said, we don't know whether "North" and "South" are ultimately conventional or not; it might turn out to be possible to define at least magnetic north/south without reference to any human-specific concept.

This is how moral judgments (measurements) can be correct or incorrect regardless of beliefs, but moral definitions (definitions of measurements) can be conventions.

And yet, humans don't have a single set of definitions. Most humans don't even proceed from definitions to measurements - most people have many specific moral judgements, but far fewer people are able to relate those specific judgements back to abstract moral principles, and there is vast disagreement over what the correct set of moral principles to use is. Suppose some guy picks up a gun, goes to a crowded public place, and kills fifty people at random. Just about everyone would agree his action is gravely immoral. But if you ask people why it is gravely immoral, people won't agree. A utilitarian might say it was gravely immoral due to the amount of suffering it caused; a deontologist would insist that the act itself was immoral, and the amount of suffering it happened to cause was not particularly relevant. The divine command theorist would say that it was wrong because it violated God's law, as revealed in the Bible or the Quran or the Vedas or whatever. The deontologist might say that "killing innocent human beings is wrong". The opponent of capital punishment might question why the word "innocent" is present in that principle. The animal rights theorist would complain about the principle being restricted to "human", and argue that such a restriction is speciesism. The argument goes on and on - we can all agree that act is wrong, but we struggle severely to agree on why it is wrong.

As a practical matter, most people make concrete moral judgements long before we develop moral definitions or principles we can use to back those judgements. The abortion rights opponent believes abortion is wrong before they've read any philosophical argument for the immorality of abortion. The abortion rights supporter believes abortion is morally acceptable (in at least some cases) before they've read any philosophical argument for the moral permissibility of abortion. The conclusion comes first; the premises turn up later (for a great many people, they never turn up at all), and their choice is driven by the need to reach the desired conclusion. So your measurements-vs-definitions dichotomy gets the reality of human moral reasoning back to front. We don't start out by defining and then apply those definitions; we start out by applying, and then look for definitions which make sense of our applications.

[JimL]

Are there any statements we can make about the world without importing human conventions? In a world without sentient beings, would any concepts exist at all? Would anything be true or false? This almost seems to be an argument for idealism - physical reality does not exist apart from minds observing it. But I doubt that's what you believe (though it is what I believe).

Many concepts that start out as purely conventional, but we later find a non-conventional basis for them. For example, units of distance were once purely conventional - there is a story (I believe it is just a legend though) that the length of the "foot" was originally the length of the King's foot - but now we have a non-conventional basis for them. Non-metric units such as the inch are precisely defined in terms of the SI metre, and the SI metre in turn is precisely defined in terms of the speed of light in a vacuum and the hyperfine structure transition frequency of Caesium-133 at absolute zero upon the surface of the Earth's geoid (due to gravitational time dilation, time varies by altitude). Since this definition refers to the Earth's geoid, it could be said to not be completely non-conventional (an alien civilisation would pick a different planetary geoid to use); but we do have a unit of measuring distance which could be argued to be close to completely non-conventional - Planck length. It is defined in terms of the fundamental physical constants - the speed of light in a vacuum, the Gravitational constant, and Planck's constant. If there is an intelligent extraterrestrial civilisation in a distant galaxy, they would not have come up with the SI metre as a unit of measurement, but they could arrive at Planck length independently. (For various practical reasons, the SI unit system and the Planck unit system are currently disconnected, but they are currently in the process of redefining the SI units to be closer to the Planck units, and eventually SI units may come to be defined purely in terms of Planck units.)

So are "north" and "south" purely conventional, or will some non-conventional footing be found for them eventually? Geographical north and south can be said to be purely conventional, but magnetic north and south are not (even though they are not stable over time). The labelling of magnetic poles as north and south is to my knowledge purely conventional at present. But further physics research might discover some asymmetry between magnetic north and south, which would enable us to label them in a non-conventional manner. Maybe, if we discover magnetic monopoles, experiments upon them might reveal some way of distinguishing north monopoles from south monopoles other than comparison to the Earth's magnetic field - then "north" and "south" might go from being conventional to non-conventional concepts. Since we don't know whether any such future physics discoveries will be made or not, we don't know whether "north" and "south" are purely conventional or not.

As I said, we don't know whether "North" and "South" are ultimately conventional or not; it might turn out to be possible to define at least magnetic north/south without reference to any human-specific concept.

And yet, humans don't have a single set of definitions. Most humans don't even proceed from definitions to measurements - most people have many specific moral judgements, but far fewer people are able to relate those specific judgements back to abstract moral principles, and there is vast disagreement over what the correct set of moral principles to use is. Suppose some guy picks up a gun, goes to a crowded public place, and kills fifty people at random. Just about everyone would agree his action is gravely immoral. But if you ask people why it is gravely immoral, people won't agree. A utilitarian might say it was gravely immoral due to the amount of suffering it caused; a deontologist would insist that the act itself was immoral, and the amount of suffering it happened to cause was not particularly relevant. The divine command theorist would say that it was wrong because it violated God's law, as revealed in the Bible or the Quran or the Vedas or whatever. The deontologist might say that "killing innocent human beings is wrong". The opponent of capital punishment might question why the word "innocent" is present in that principle. The animal rights theorist would complain about the principle being restricted to "human", and argue that such a restriction is speciesism. The argument goes on and on - we can all agree that act is wrong, but we struggle severely to agree on why it is wrong.

As a practical matter, most people make concrete moral judgements long before we develop moral definitions or principles we can use to back those judgements. The abortion rights opponent believes abortion is wrong before they've read any philosophical argument for the immorality of abortion. The abortion rights supporter believes abortion is morally acceptable (in at least some cases) before they've read any philosophical argument for the moral permissibility of abortion. The conclusion comes first; the premises turn up later (for a great many people, they never turn up at all), and their choice is driven by the need to reach the desired conclusion. So your measurements-vs-definitions dichotomy gets the reality of human moral reasoning back to front. We don't start out by defining and then apply those definitions; we start out by applying, and then look for definitions which make sense of our applications.

I don't think that you can separate the cause of evil from the effect when considering it's morality. The reason we define a thing as immoral is because of the resulting effect. There is always an effect, which we call evil, that results from what we call an immoral act, and all of the differing reasons that you listed above as to how different humans relate their specific judgements back to abstract moral principles, ultimately rest upon the effect. When we all agree that killing someone is wrong, it is the actual effect of the act of killing, I.E. the suffering and the loss of ones life, by which we judge the action to be immoral. Without an effect, there can be no immoral act. So, I don't agree that we all struggle severely to agree on why a particular action is wrong. It is wrong because of it's effect. But, at any rate, thinking about this subject, and the theistic concept of it, the idea that morality is objective, I began to wonder, in regards to something you mentioned above, i.e., that animal rights advocates would complain about moral principles being restricted to human beings, and why the killing of the innocent apllies only to human beings, in other words why the killing of innocent animals is not also considered immoral. What is objective about that? Lets say that there is found to be an alien race, a creature that is more evolved than humans, would it in your opinion be objectively moral for that alien race to treat humans the way that humans treat animals, i.e. to breed them and raise them in cages for the sole purpose of killing and eating them? There is no real consenses on this in regards to humans treating animals this way, but in general we do not consider the practice immoral, the effect by which we determine the act to be moral is the effect that it has upon us, it nourishes us, not the effect it has upon the lower life form, it's imprisonment, suffering and death. So, if morality is truly objective, why would it be immoral for a higher form of life to treat humans, now a lower form of life in comparison, the same way that humans treat animals. We would probably consider such alien creatures to be immoral beings for treating us in the same manner that we treat, and accept as moral, the animals subordinate to us. This seems to me to be an indication of the subjectiveness of our moral principles.

[ZackMartin]

I don't think that you can separate the cause of evil from the effect when considering it's morality. The reason we define a thing as immoral is because of the resulting effect. There is always an effect, which we call evil, that results from what we call an immoral act, and all of the differing reasons that you listed above as to how different humans relate their specific judgements back to abstract moral principles, ultimately rest upon the effect. When we all agree that killing someone is wrong, it is the actual effect of the act of killing, I.E. the suffering and the loss of ones life, by which we judge the action to be immoral. Without an effect, there can be no immoral act. So, I don't agree that we all struggle severely to agree on why a particular action is wrong. It is wrong because of it's effect.

Your position is fundamentally consequentialist, but not everyone is a consequentialist - deontologists for example are opposed to consequentialism. You seem to me to be projecting your own ethical views on to everyone, ignorant of the fact that others view ethics very differently from how you do.

But, at any rate, thinking about this subject, and the theistic concept of it, the idea that morality is objective, I began to wonder, in regards to something you mentioned above, i.e., that animal rights advocates would complain about moral principles being restricted to human beings, and why the killing of the innocent apllies only to human beings, in other words why the killing of innocent animals is not also considered immoral. What is objective about that? Lets say that there is found to be an alien race, a creature that is more evolved than humans, would it in your opinion be objectively moral for that alien race to treat humans the way that humans treat animals, i.e. to breed them and raise them in cages for the sole purpose of killing and eating them? There is no real consenses on this in regards to humans treating animals this way, but in general we do not consider the practice immoral, the effect by which we determine the act to be moral is the effect that it has upon us, it nourishes us, not the effect it has upon the lower life form, it's imprisonment, suffering and death. So, if morality is truly objective, why would it be immoral for a higher form of life to treat humans, now a lower form of life in comparison, the same way that humans treat animals. We would probably consider such alien creatures to be immoral beings for treating us in the same manner that we treat, and accept as moral, the animals subordinate to us. This seems to me to be an indication of the subjectiveness of our moral principles.

Maybe the animal rights activists are right, and we should all become vegetarians, or vegans even?

What if we genetically engineered brainless animals? Or grew parts of animals from stem cells in vats? Would they be wrong to eat? Maybe an advanced alien civilisation would have no interest in enslaving us for food - they'd already grow their meat in vats? I think a lot more people would support animal rights, if they didn't have to give up meat to do it.

[shunyadragon]

Your position is fundamentally consequentialist, but not everyone is a consequentialist - deontologists for example are opposed to consequentialism. You seem to me to be projecting your own ethical views on to everyone, ignorant of the fact that others view ethics very differently from how you do.

This problem goes back to your projection of the theist concept of 'objective' on scientists, atheists and agnostics (Aquinas Descartes), who use a different definition that scientists, atheists, agnostics (Kant) when defining the nature of morality and ethics to define their world view. I will not go into the wrongness nor rightness of wither view, but emphasize the problem that you will apparently not acknowledge the difference.

You need you acknowledge that the use of 'objective' is different from two different world views.

Also, considering the reference, consequentialism is not necessarily wrong, only a different view.

Maybe the animal rights activists are right, and we should all become vegetarians, or vegans even?

What if we genetically engineered brainless animals? Or grew parts of animals from stem cells in vats? Would they be wrong to eat? Maybe an advanced alien civilisation would have no interest in enslaving us for food - they'd already grow their meat in vats? I think a lot more people would support animal rights, if they didn't have to give up meat to do it.

What if??? and 2 dollars qill get you a cup of coffee at most, but not all McDonald/s. I do not see hypothetical arguments very useful here.

[JimL]

Your position is fundamentally consequentialist, but not everyone is a consequentialist - deontologists for example are opposed to consequentialism. You seem to me to be projecting your own ethical views on to everyone, ignorant of the fact that others view ethics very differently from how you do.

Perhaps, and maybe on second thought I am not exactly a consequentialist, since to me, attempting to shoot someone in the head and missing them is as immoral as hitting the target and killing them. But at any rate I think that whatever ones particular view, whether consequentialist or deontologist, is off topic, because it doesn't speak to whether morality is objective or not.

Maybe the animal rights activists are right, and we should all become vegetarians, or vegans even?

And since we don't know if they are right, then whether or not there is an objective source of morality, for ourselves morality will always be subjective. So what is the point in arguing for objective morals if for us, they are, for all intents and purposes, subjective.

What if we genetically engineered brainless animals? Or grew parts of animals from stem cells in vats? Would they be wrong to eat? Maybe an advanced alien civilisation would have no interest in enslaving us for food - they'd already grow their meat in vats? I think a lot more people would support animal rights, if they didn't have to give up meat to do it.

Are you asking or making a rhetorical point? My answer is that morality is subjective, so that the "what if's" depend upon ourselves. Your argument is that morality is objective, and yet, being that you don't know the answers, that you have no knowledge of objective morals, your answer too must needs be, that the answer is subjective, that it depends upon ourselves.

[Tassman]

Perhaps, and maybe on second thought I am not exactly a consequentialist, since to me, attempting to shoot someone in the head and missing them is as immoral as hitting the target and killing them. But at any rate I think that whatever ones particular view, whether consequentialist or deontologist, is off topic, because it doesn't speak to whether morality is objective or not.

And since we don't know if they are right, then whether or not there is an objective source of morality, for ourselves morality will always be subjective. So what is the point in arguing for objective morals if for us, they are, for all intents and purposes, subjective.

Are you asking or making a rhetorical point? My answer is that morality is subjective, so that the "what if's" depend upon ourselves. Your argument is that morality is objective, and yet, being that you don't know the answers, that you have no knowledge of objective morals, your answer too must needs be, that the answer is subjective, that it depends upon ourselves.

Yes morality is subjective but I would add that our subjective choices are largely determined by our instincts as evolved by Natural Selection, e.g. the nurturing instinct re our young and the inborn tendency for reciprocity found among all sentient creatures. Therefore, as shunya said, “evolution has determined our morals and ethics independently of the beliefs and preferences of individuals or groups”.

[Leonhard]

Well, his definition, he's not very clear about exactly what he means by "objective morality"

My definitions:

Objective morality: The belief that moral statements are capable of being true or false independently of the beliefs of any individual or group.

Subjective morality: The belief that moral statements are incapable of being true or false independently of the beliefs of any individual or group.

I think that's the proper way of classifying what makes a moral statement objective vs subjective. Anything else (ala Shunya) is just confusing. I believe in objective moral values. Namely that moral statements are true or false regardless of the beliefs of individuals or groups. However I don't believe in absolutely morality.

[shunyadragon]

I think that's the proper way of classifying what makes a moral statement objective vs subjective. Anything else (ala Shunya) is just confusing. I believe in objective moral values. Namely that moral statements are true or false regardless of the beliefs of individuals or groups. However I don't believe in absolutely morality.

I am not sure what the confusion is here with my view, please clarify. I have no disagreement concerning your statement above. The traditional Christian belief is that an 'objective morality' equates to the existence of an absolute morality. I simply believe that morality and ethics exist as a construct of human cultures and societies, and have objective and subjective qualities.

Yes, moral statements are either true of false regardless of the belief of individuals and groups. What determines that they are True or False?

[Leonhard]

I am not sure what the confusion is here with my view, please clarify. I have no disagreement concerning your statement above.

You seemed to disagree with Zack on this, and despite putting some effort into making sense of what you were writing I didn't get you right. I'm sorry to say this Shunya, but you tend to write in a very annoying style. Its hard to figure out what you're getting at half the time. I've watched you post in various threads for years now. I still don't know exactly what you're arguing for, except that you make it habit to disagree with just about everyone. Why not simple agree with Zack? You agree with me, so why spend excessive verbiage arguing for something that's the same?

[Leonhard]

Here's an example of the trouble I have with reading you Shunya.

I guess they could, but they probably would not. Their preference would be more the 'objective' first specifically proposed by Kant. Your definition does not reference clearly what it is that independently and objectively determines morals and ethics, and fits the Aquinas model that God is the independent and objective source of morality. If you wanted to bend your definition and say what is the determining nature of morality and ethics 'independent' of the mind it would our physical existence makes that determination independently and 'objectively,' which would in a way fit the view that evolution determined our morals and ethics independently of the beliefs and preferences of individuals or groups.

I'll go through this slowly so you can see my reactions.

I guess they could, but they probably would not

Not much to object to here. This is one of the few sentences which is easy to understand. I think its irrelevant, but its readable.

Their preference would be more the 'objective' first specifically proposed by Kant.

Ugh ugly sentence construction this happens to specifically more be.

Your definition does not reference clearly what it is that independently and objectively determines morals and ethics, and fits the Aquinas model that God is the independent and objective source of morality.

This can be split up into at least two sentence.

If you wanted to bend your definition and say what is the determining nature of morality and ethics 'independent' of the mind it would our physical existence makes that determination independently and 'objectively,' which would in a way fit the view that evolution determined our morals and ethics independently of the beliefs and preferences of individuals or groups.

This sentence (almost paragraph sized) is completely unintelligible. As if that wasn't enough its ugly as well. It could easily be split into three individual sentences. I'd split it up for you to give you an example, but unfortunately I have no idea what the sentence means. It sounds like something a post-modernist thesis generator would spit out.

Here's another example.

This problem goes back to your projection of the theist concept of 'objective' on scientists, atheists and agnostics (Aquinas Descartes), who use a different definition that scientists, atheists, agnostics (Kant) when defining the nature of morality and ethics to define their world view.

For crying out loud Shunya, split up these monstrous sentences. There's no reason to make them so convoluted. And what do you mean with "scientists, atheists and agnostics (Aquinas Descartes)" and what do those two philosophers have in common. Its hard to find two philosophers who disagreed more than Descartes and Aquinas. Similarly with Kant I have no idea what it means when you put these names within bubble. Finally Zack wasn't 'projecting', this sounds like a technical term thrown in for the sake of sounding savvy.

[Leonhard]

Yes, moral statements are either true of false regardless of the belief of individuals and groups.

I'm not gonna comment more on why you tend to disagree with people you really agree with.

What determines that they are True or False?

Great question, but I think its irrelevant to the OP. If you agree that moral statements are true or false in the sense that Zack asked, then you agree that morality is objective. Thi is important because a lot of atheists are under the impression that morality is simple subjective. And that there can't be genuine rational discussions of what's moral.

[shunyadragon]

I'm not gonna comment more on why you tend to disagree with people you really agree with.



Great question, but I think its irrelevant to the OP. If you agree that moral statements are true or false in the sense that Zack asked, then you agree that morality is objective. Thi is important because a lot of atheists are under the impression that morality is simple subjective. And that there can't be genuine rational discussions of what's moral.

Wrote some stuff in a bad time. I will go back and rewrite with some explanation.

[JimL]

I think that's the proper way of classifying what makes a moral statement objective vs subjective. Anything else (ala Shunya) is just confusing. I believe in objective moral values. Namely that moral statements are true or false regardless of the beliefs of individuals or groups. However I don't believe in absolutely morality.

In what sense are morals objective? Is it your opinion that morals have some kind of reality of their own, a reality that is independent of human minds.

[Leonhard]

In what sense are morals objective? Is it your opinion that morals have some kind of reality of their own, a reality that is independent of human minds.

No I don't think that's how morality works. I would say that moral values supervene on the natural world. Its not that moral values are some abstract disembodied sentences floating around in a platonic realm or something like that. They're pretty down to earth. I think morality comes from natural facts about the nature of happiness and virtue. I believe the virtues that produce a happy life can be known through empirical research. That knowledge is right or wrong, independent of what a person believes. Therefore that knowledge is objective. Ethics is the science of figuring out which virtues lead to a happy life (and what that is), and because its based on things that can be known objectively (except perhaps for an odd axiom) then morality is objective. At least this is what I believe morality is.