Absolute Contingency

[MikeWC]

Let's start with a dramatic claim: absolute, eternal truth exists, and this truth can be established in an entirely non-question begging way. The truth in question is contingency. Every single thing has the capacity to exist, not exist, or exist in a different way.

1. Causation is not Necessary

We know that there is no way to establish that the future must look like the past. If you observe X leading to Y a thousand times, that does not establish the logical necessity of X leading to Y; there is no way to prove that on the 1001st try, X will still lead to Y.

Now, there is an important distinction to be made here. Local causal necessity does exist; mathematical formulas do tell us truths about physics. We know that two balls of different weights will fall at the same rate, because of the laws governing mass. Under the set of laws we are ever more deeply penetrating into, we can outline a set of identical conditions under which two balls will always fall at the same rate. In the context of physical laws, X does always lead to Y.

The previous two paragraphs seem to contradict one another. But now we ask: can physical laws change, or could they be different? Certainly, we can imagine a possible world in which the laws governing mass and energy do not apply. And we can imagine, without internal contradiction, a future in which physical laws change or cease to function, meaning X would no longer lead to Y. There is no reason, either logical, mathematical or empirical, why gravity cannot suddenly reverse. Australians live precarious lives.

2. The Negative Argument for Contingency

So now the theist will pipe up: "Of course, you are entirely correct. Physical laws are contingent and changeable. But Australians can live in peace: God is the necessary being that causes and sustains physical laws."

Well, how can one prove that God is a necessary being? There are two ways to prove the existence of a necessary being: the ontological and cosmological arguments. My contention is that both arguments beg the question; they already assume the existence of a necessary being in order to prove it.

The ontological argument tries to show that a non-existing God is self-contradictory. I can imagine a greatest possible being; existence is an attribute of greatness, therefore this greatest possible being must exist. The ontological argument fails because a contradiction can only take place for an already existing being; in other words, existence is not a predicate. Deny the existence of the being in question, and the argument falls apart.

There is a version of the ontological argument that claims contingency is at least partially equatable with dependency: contingent beings require initial and/or ongoing conditions for their existence. So there must be an initial and/or ongoing condition for every single dependent being, and that condition must itself not be dependent upon any other initial or ongoing conditions. A being that is not dependent would be the same as a necessary being.

This begs the question of necessity because it already assumes the absoluteness of cause and effect. It cannot prove that a contingent being could, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions. Dependency and contingency are not logically identical, even if they always go together in experience . But it is precisely our experience of necessity as absolute that I am attacking.

Both the ontological and cosmological arguments fail to prove the existence of a necessary being, because they both already assume it.

3. The Positive Argument for Contingency

Consider life after death. The atheist may either say it is not possible, or will withhold a definite opinion, depending on the strength of their atheism. The theist will say it is possible because of God.

The strong atheist is saying, in effect, that we humans will not exist after death. The theist says we will exist differently after death, say as disembodied minds or as one with God or reincarnated in different bodies.

The theist is making a positive claim about the future: we know we will be different. The strong atheist also makes a positive claim: we know we will not exist in the future. The weak atheist, if they deign to grace us with an opinion, knows that it is logically possible that either option could be true: we know we could either not exist or exist differently. If that statement is too strong for any of you weak atheists, consider how saying we do not know what will happen after death leaves open a great many options. One can only claim that they do not know if they have not eliminated a set of options.

Hence, we all have positive knowledge of our own contingency. At bottom, we know that after death, we could not exist or exist differently.

The trick, then, is to expand that knowledge to all things, including physical laws. The way to do this is to show that the principle of sufficient reason is not an absolute.

Take any physical law you wish. The determinist would say the initial conditions of the universe prescribed this law. But how could the determinist argue that the initial conditions were necessary? On the other hand, one who believes in an infinite regress, i.e., in a complete lack of initial conditions, has already found a hole in the principle of sufficient reason by claiming the chain of conditions itself does not have a sufficient reason.

Both the determinist and the believer in an infinite regress can have positive knowledge that everything could be different, in the same way that they themselves could be different or non-existent.

4. The Absoluteness of Contingency

One obvious objection arises. If everything is contingent, then aren’t the laws of logic underlying my arguments also contingent? What if they change? What if there is another being that operates according to a wholly different set of rules?

Why yes, thank you for asking: the laws of logic are contingent. But how do they operate for us, anyways? Let’s take the law of non-contradiction. I think we can easily make the claim that non-contradiction is the baseline requirement for a thought to make sense to us. A cannot be non-A in the same time and the same way. It is impossible for us to actually describe a true contradiction in a way that makes sense; formally contradictory statements are senseless.

We can’t describe the world in a way that makes sense without assuming certain logical forms. But, we cannot actually demonstrate the absolute truth of these logical forms – it’s just that without them, our thoughts are a random jumble. Why can’t there be a being that is entirely senseless to us? Just because we could not coherently describe such a being, does not mean it doesn’t exist.

But this being, existing in a wholly different way, would be nothing other than proof of the contingency of the forms of logic. If a being that is senseless to us exists, it proves that our best ways of thinking are contingent: they could be otherwise.

I say contingency is absolute because it is not derived from any other principle, though it can be demonstrated. And it cannot be criticized on its own grounds without already assuming it, as the foregoing paragraphs show.

5. Two Future Problems

I said that contingency was eternal. This post is already long enough, and I’ll leave it for the future.

There’s a rather obvious objection to what I’ve said here: if the laws of physics are changeable, and there is no necessity underlying them, why don’t they change? Don’t we have to live in fear of every future moment? If gravity is wholly contingent, all the way down without the slightest hint of necessity, shouldn’t we constantly be afraid that it will dissolve or reverse itself? And doesn’t that inevitable fear make my whole position obnoxiously theoretical and impossible to take seriously? That will be part two, and if that is your objection, I’d appreciate it if you waited until part 2.

[GioD]

This begs the question of necessity because it already assumes the absoluteness of cause and effect. It cannot prove that a contingent being could, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions. Dependency and contingency are not logically identical, even if they always go together in experience . But it is precisely our experience of necessity as absolute that I am attacking.

I'm sorry, but I can't decipher your meaning behind this.

Your key sentence seems to be "It cannot prove that a contingent being could, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions.". But the burden is on you to demonstrate that everything changes, which you haven't. Even though you demonstrated some things can be or are contingent, (maybe even every physical or logical thing) you haven't shown that all possible beings must be contingent. But as I said, I'm having trouble pulling out your actual argument in the part about theism, so I could easily be misunderstanding this.

We can’t describe the world in a way that makes sense without assuming certain logical forms. But, we cannot actually demonstrate the absolute truth of these logical forms – it’s just that without them, our thoughts are a random jumble. Why can’t there be a being that is entirely senseless to us? Just because we could not coherently describe such a being, does not mean it doesn’t exist.

While you ask a valid question from the perspective of logical systems, it is deeply flawed from a metaphysical perspective. Aristotle pointed out that the law of non-contradiction must be true for anything to exist in a meaningful way. Denying the law of non-contradiction leads to the possibility if not the actuality of the case that something both does and doesn't exist at the same time in the same sense, which does not correspond to any coherent/accurate form of reality from any perspective.

[MikeWC]

Your key sentence seems to be "It cannot prove that a contingent being could, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions.".

Part of the problem is that I'm stupid. That sentence SHOULD read:

"It cannot prove that a contingent being could not, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions."

Argh. The point is that the cosmological argument cannot prove that a contingent being could exist without initial or ongoing conditions. in other words, without cause.

But the burden is on you to demonstrate that everything changes, which you haven't. Even though you demonstrated some things can be or are contingent, (maybe even every physical or logical thing) you haven't shown that all possible beings must be contingent.

Well, I'm not arguing that everything changes: I'm arguing everything could change, or stay the same forever. Everything, even the rules governing change, is contingent.

In light of the failure of the ontological and cosmological arguments, no being can be shown to not have the capacity to not-exist.

While you ask a valid question from the perspective of logical systems, it is deeply flawed from a metaphysical perspective. Aristotle pointed out that the law of non-contradiction must be true for anything to exist in a meaningful way. Denying the law of non-contradiction leads to the possibility if not the actuality of the case that something both does and doesn't exist at the same time in the same sense, which does not correspond to any coherent/accurate form of reality from any perspective. (emphasis added)

The bolded phrase agrees with what I wrote. But there is no reason why a non-sensical being could not exist.

I do accept the law of non-contradiction, but it's not a first principle: it is derived from contingency, which is the actual absolute.

[MaxVel]

Mike, aren't you arguing here that a contingent thing could exist as a non-contingent thing?

It cannot prove that a contingent being could, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions.

That doesn't make much sense, and you seem to be saying 'this argument doesn't work, because if you re-define the terms it assumes it's conclusion'. Well, do that and you're not addressing the actual argument made. Or are you denying that there are any contingent things at all?

My contention is that both arguments beg the question; they already assume the existence of a necessary being in order to prove it.

I don't think you've yet shown that to be the case for the cosmological argument. That (the existence of a necessary being) is the conclusion of the argument, AFAICT.

Are you familiar with modern presentations of Aquinas' arguments? Edward Feser has a couple of good presentations in his books 'Aquinas' and 'The Last Superstition'

[MikeWC]

Mike, aren't you arguing here that a contingent thing could exist as a non-contingent thing?

How so?

It cannot prove that a contingent being could, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions.

That doesn't make much sense, and you seem to be saying 'this argument doesn't work, because if you re-define the terms it assumes it's conclusion'. Well, do that and you're not addressing the actual argument made. Or are you denying that there are any contingent things at all?

I'm not redefining the terms, I'm claiming when contingency and dependency are mixed, there is a hidden premise: the absoluteness of causation.

I don't think you've yet shown that to be the case for the cosmological argument. That (the existence of a necessary being) is the conclusion of the argument, AFAICT.

Yes, it is supposedly the conclusion, but I am claiming it already assumes it. The cosmological argument depends upon the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of sufficient reason depends upon the absoluteness of causality, which depends on a necessary being.

Are you familiar with modern presentations of Aquinas' arguments? Edward Feser has a couple of good presentations in his books 'Aquinas' and 'The Last Superstition'

Feel free to present one of these arguments.

[MaxVel]

How so?

By saying that a contingent being could exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions.

I'm not redefining the terms, I'm claiming when contingency and dependency are mixed, there is a hidden premise: the absoluteness of causation.

So are you saying that it is possible for a contingent thing to exist without causation? Or are you saying that it is possible that there is no causation? Or...??

Yes, it is supposedly the conclusion, but I am claiming it already assumes it. The cosmological argument depends upon the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of sufficient reason depends upon the absoluteness of causality, which depends on a necessary being.

Edward Feser puts it like this:

"...nothing can cause itself; whatever comes into existence, or more generally whatever must have existence added to it's essence in order for it to be real, must be caused by another.{...}... The principle {of causality/ sufficient reason} says only that what does not have existence on it's own must have a cause."

{"The Last Superstition", page 104; emphasis in original}

Feel free to present one of these arguments.

I don't think it can be done within the character limits of TWeb. Feser, an expert on Aquinas' arguments, refuses to do it on his blog, because there is so much background stuff* that needs to be understood in order to understand what Aquinas is actually arguing. That's why I recommended either of the two books. In The Last Superstition Feser spends 90 pages discussing this 'background stuff' and a further nine pages on the first argument alone. ("The Unmoved Mover").



{* Aquinas' terminology, which can look similar to what we might use, but often means something different; the underlying metaphysical positions that Aquinas is working from, and the arguments for these.}

[sensibletheist]

You claim that the ontological and cosmological arguments beg the question. This is simply false. First of all the ontological argument you gave is one which virtually no one accepts. Look up Planting's version which uses modal logic to establish that God exists. Another thing is that an argument in itself cannot commit the fallacy of begging the question. It is the support of the argument which begs the question, so if the only reason one has for accepting an argument for God's existence is that God exists. That argument begs the question. This is clearly not the case for either argument. Furthermore denying that God exists doesn't demolish any argument, let-alone the ontological argument you gave. You can't just assert the conclusion is false. Logic doesn't work that way.

But you say that the cosmological argument assumes that cause and effect are absolute. Well it doesn't assume it, at least it doesn't have to. But even if it does that's still not begging the question, the conclusion of the argument is not that cause and effect are absolute.

[QUOTE]This begs the question of necessity because it already assumes the absoluteness of cause and effect. It cannot prove that a contingent being could, in fact, exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions. Dependency and contingency are not logically identical, even if they always go together in experience . But it is precisely our experience of necessity as absolute that I am attacking./QUOTE]

I presume you are using Aquinas's argument from contingency which goes something like this; The universe is contingent. If the universe is contingent it is possible for it not to exist. If the universe has an infinite past then every possible state of the universe has been actualized. Therefore if the universe has an infinite past then the universe should have ceased to exist. Thus nothing should be existing now. But necessary being cannot go out of existence and thus can have an infinite past. Thus a necessary being could have sustained the universe which explains why it exists now.

[shunyadragon]

I simply reject the assumption of the necessity of contingency regardless of how you describe it, absolute or not.

[GioD]

I simply reject the assumption of the necessity of contingency regardless of how you describe it, absolute or not.

In other words you're going to a priori throw away indeterministic interpretations of Quantum Physics, any possibility of free will, and every branch of modal logic just because they don't fit in with your worldview.

[shunyadragon]

In other words you're going to a priori throw away indeterministic interpretations of Quantum Physics, any possibility of free will, and every branch of modal logic just because they don't fit in with your worldview.

No. nothing is thrown away. The existence or non-existence of Free Will is not an issue. There is no evidence that the Quantum level of our existence is contingent on any prior first cause. Modal Logic is a construction of logic from the human perspective, and whether our universe is contingent on any prior first cause other than simply natural causes is not dependent the conclusions theists reach using modal logic.

Simply it is not apparent that the universe is contingent on anything. There is no need for anything to have caused the universe to exist other than the natural causes that have observed through science.

[MikeWC]

Sorry for the disappearance.

Mike, aren't you arguing here that a contingent thing could exist as a non-contingent thing?

How so?

By saying that a contingent being could exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions.

Oh, I see. No, a contingent thing that exists without initial or ongoing conditions is still contingent, because it is not necessary. I criticized the mixing of initial and ongoing conditions as being dependent on the hidden premise of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).

So are you saying that it is possible for a contingent thing to exist without causation? Or are you saying that it is possible that there is no causation? Or...??

Yes to the first, no to the second. Causation exists, it is just not necessary.

Edward Feser puts it like this:

"...nothing can cause itself; whatever comes into existence, or more generally whatever must have existence added to it's essence in order for it to be real, must be caused by another.{...}... The principle {of causality/ sufficient reason} says only that what does not have existence on it's own must have a cause." (emphasis added

How can he argue for the truth of the bolded phrase without reference to the PSR? Because it's the PSR that I am calling into question.

I don't think it can be done within the character limits of TWeb. Feser, an expert on Aquinas' arguments, refuses to do it on his blog, because there is so much background stuff* that needs to be understood in order to understand what Aquinas is actually arguing. That's why I recommended either of the two books. In The Last Superstition Feser spends 90 pages discussing this 'background stuff' and a further nine pages on the first argument alone. ("The Unmoved Mover").

Ah, well, fair enough. I've got a reasonable handle on philosophical terminology though, and I'm a quick study. So I invite you to give it a shot.

You claim that the ontological and cosmological arguments beg the question. This is simply false. First of all the ontological argument you gave is one which virtually no one accepts. Look up Planting's version which uses modal logic to establish that God exists.

Well, what are you imagining I am going to do here? Go read the argument and then present it for you? I'm aware of Plantinga's arguments, but I'm not in the habit of doing my opponent's work for them.

nother thing is that an argument in itself cannot commit the fallacy of begging the question. It is the support of the argument which begs the question, so if the only reason one has for accepting an argument for God's existence is that God exists. That argument begs the question. This is clearly not the case for either argument. Furthermore denying that God exists doesn't demolish any argument, let-alone the ontological argument you gave. You can't just assert the conclusion is false. Logic doesn't work that way.

The argument does beg the question. The conclusion is "necessary being," but the argument begins the question of the existence of necessity. Remember, the ontological argument does not seek to prove that God exists, but that God exists necessarily. Yet it assumes the existence of necessity to begin with, and therefore assumes the possibility of a necessary being.

It is not that denying the existence of God demolishes the ontological argument (OA), it is that the OA is circular, and if one refuses to enter the circle, the argument fails.

But you say that the cosmological argument assumes that cause and effect are absolute. Well it doesn't assume it, at least it doesn't have to. But even if it does that's still not begging the question, the conclusion of the argument is not that cause and effect are absolute. (emphasis added)

In response to the bolded bit, what I said was that the cosmological argument (CA) does not establish the existence of a necessary being. If you are not using the CA to prove God is necessary, then my argument does not apply. If you are trying to use the CA to establish God as necessary, the only way you can do that is by already assuming the PSA.

I presume you are using Aquinas's argument from contingency which goes something like this; The universe is contingent. If the universe is contingent it is possible for it not to exist. If the universe has an infinite past then every possible state of the universe has been actualized. Therefore if the universe has an infinite past then the universe should have ceased to exist. Thus nothing should be existing now. But necessary being cannot go out of existence and thus can have an infinite past. Thus a necessary being could have sustained the universe which explains why it exists now. (emphasis added)

The bolded bit is the weak point: it also assumes necessity, i.e., the necessity of an infinite past having actualized every possible state. But again, it is necessity I am attacking.

[shunyadragon]

By saying that a contingent being could exist without initial and/or ongoing conditions.

So are you saying that it is possible for a contingent thing to exist without causation? Or are you saying that it is possible that there is no causation? Or...??

A little puzzled here, because I view anything that is contingent would be by it's nature dependent on something else to exist. I do not believe that something that is contingent could also be without causation.

The present view of what we may call the 'Laws of Nature' and the Quantum World do not appear to be contingent on anything else, nor is there evidence of a prior cause. The existence of a prior 'First Cause' is possible, but at present we have no evidence of any such thing.

Edward Feser puts it like this:



{"The Last Superstition", page 104; emphasis in original}




I don't think it can be done within the character limits of TWeb. Feser, an expert on Aquinas' arguments, refuses to do it on his blog, because there is so much background stuff* that needs to be understood in order to understand what Aquinas is actually arguing. That's why I recommended either of the two books. In The Last Superstition Feser spends 90 pages discussing this 'background stuff' and a further nine pages on the first argument alone. ("The Unmoved Mover").



{* Aquinas' terminology, which can look similar to what we might use, but often means something different; the underlying metaphysical positions that Aquinas is working from, and the arguments for these.}[/QUOTE]