The Resurrection and Possible Supernatual Explanations

[magellan004]

Maybe I shouldn't have butted in, since I haven't been paying much attention to Tassman's side of your discussion. I agree with you that his reasoning is not as rigorous as it ought to be.


The conventional wisdom among philosophers of science is that science never proves anything, but only in the sense that the logic of science is not deductive but rather inductive. A defense of inductive reasoning that satisfies everyone's epistemological concerns remains elusive. This is called the "problem of induction." Hume thought he had demonstrated that it was insoluble. Some philosophers nowadays think he was right. Others beg to differ. The debate continues.


A commendable habit.

Thanks :)

Magellan

[GioD]

What would it be moving if there were no parts?

Motion doesn't strictly refer to spatio-temporal motion. A key example of motion in the Aristotelean sense is actualizing something's potential.

[Tassman]

Maybe I shouldn't have butted in, since I haven't been paying much attention to Tassman's side of your discussion. I agree with you that his reasoning is not as rigorous as it ought to be.

Interesting! You agree that “Tassman’s reasoning is not as rigorous as it ought to be”, despite not “paying much attention to Tassman's side of your discussion”.

[Kane]

Motion doesn't strictly refer to spatio-temporal motion. A key example of motion in the Aristotelean sense is actualizing something's potential.

How could something's motion be actualized if all there is is a first-cause without parts?

[Chrawnus]

How could something's motion be actualized if all there is is a first-cause without parts?

He didn't really say that motion could be actualized, he said that the actualization itself is motion.

[Kane]

He didn't really say that motion could be actualized, he said that the actualization itself is motion.

Alright. My bad. But the actualization of what? If simplicity is made less simple by the addition of parts, why actualize something that necessarily has parts (since it's not the first cause)?

[GioD]

But the actualization of what?

Potentiality (that is, the capability of something to exist or have a certain trait which it doesn't currently have), into actuality.

If simplicity is made less simple by the addition of parts, why actualize something that necessarily has parts (since it's not the first cause)?

Why not? This seems irrelevant to God as first cause - actualizing things doesn't change Him.

[Doug Shaver]

Interesting! You agree that “Tassman’s reasoning is not as rigorous as it ought to be”, despite not “paying much attention to Tassman's side of your discussion”.

The reason I have not paid much attention to your side of this discussion is that I've previously read plenty of your comments in other discussions--plenty enough to have formed a defensible judgment about the rigor of your reasoning.

[Tassman]

The reason I have not paid much attention to your side of this discussion is that I've previously read plenty of your comments in other discussions--plenty enough to have formed a defensible judgment about the rigor of your reasoning.

Focusing on just one side of a discussion to the near exclusion of the other does not seem particularly “rigorous reasoning” to me, but we all tend to exempt ourselves from the failings that we attribute to others so I’ll leave you to your generalised “judgments”.

[Doug Shaver]

Focusing on just one side of a discussion to the near exclusion of the other does not seem particularly “rigorous reasoning” to me

I offered it as a result, not an example, of my reasoning, and I made no claim about the rigor of my reasoning except the assertion that my conclusion was defensible. Having read your contributions to other threads, I applied inductive reasoning to reach a judgment about the probability that I would learn something useful from your contribution to this one.

[Tassman]

I offered it as a result, not an example, of my reasoning, and I made no claim about the rigor of my reasoning except the assertion that my conclusion was defensible. Having read your contributions to other threads, I applied inductive reasoning to reach a judgment about the probability that I would learn something useful from your contribution to this one.

Whatever!

[Kane]

Potentiality (that is, the capability of something to exist or have a certain trait which it doesn't currently have), into actuality.

Why not? This seems irrelevant to God as first cause - actualizing things doesn't change Him.

Okay, so are you labeling this 'God' the Christian God? Or is this 'God' the Aristotelian god? If the former, how do you arrive at the conclusion that God is the Christian God without adding parts and making him less simple (e.g., personality)? Wouldn't the simplest first-cause be an abstract, ineffable force?

[GioD]

Okay, so are you labeling this 'God' the Christian God? Or is this 'God' the Aristotelian god? If the former, how do you arrive at the conclusion that God is the Christian God without adding parts and making him less simple (e.g., personality)? Wouldn't the simplest first-cause be an abstract, ineffable force?

Both. No traits or parts are "added" to the Classical Theist conception of God in order to reach the Christian conception of God. Even the Trinity and Incarnation may require some explanation but do not entail an increase in the complexity of God's essence.

[Kane]

Both. No traits or parts are "added" to the Classical Theist conception of God in order to reach the Christian conception of God. Even the Trinity and Incarnation may require some explanation but do not entail an increase in the complexity of God's essence.

So the classical conception of God is the same as the Christian conception of God, yes?

[GioD]

So the classical conception of God is the same as the Christian conception of God, yes?

Yes (keeping in mind it doesn't per se include the Trinity and Incarnation but is compatible with it).