Aquinas's argument from Contingency revisited

[Soyeong]

Philosophy sits by itself and ponders what it knows about the world. By itself, philosophy is sterile, because it can only extrapolate from known facts. Philosophy cannot discover unknown facts.

Try science--science discovers what is unknown about the world.

Science is built on the shoulders of philosophy, so it seems like you are being a bit disingenuous here.

[technomage]

Philosophy can and has discovered facts. Philosophers discovered the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle

Incorrect. These assertions were discovered by observation and investigation: they were codified by philosophy.

neither of which in principle could be deductively proved by science.

Science does not deductively "prove" anything. The only use for the word "proof" in science is the measure of alcohol content in distilled spirits.

There is also the problem that non-contradiction and excluded middle are not valid at the quantum level. At that level of existence, "A is true and A is not true" not only can be true, it is a frequent state of things.

Though that does bring up an interesting point. At various times in our history, philosophy and science were interchangeable. They are no longer considered so. What is the dividing line?

As I pointed out above, since the Universe is essentially a set if one thing in the Universe is unnecessary then the whole Universe is unnecessary.

We can only assume that--we cannot verify it, and the assumption is based on the fallacy of composition. Note that this does not make your argument false--but it does mean that your argument is not supported.

The age of the Universe only applies to the post-big bang universe.

If there was anything preceding the pre-Big Bang singularity, it is impossible to know what that was. Thus we can postulate all day that something could have existed--the argument relies on definite assertion as fact, not the acknowledgement of an unknown and unknowable possibility.

[technomage]

Science is built on the shoulders of philosophy, so it seems like you are being a bit disingenuous here.

Not deliberately so. A better analogy (imo) is that science is the child of philosophy ... but now, the child has grown out of its parent's shadow. Science has its own techniques, goals, and processes--the question of where does philosophy stop and science start is a valid one.

[Chrawnus]

There is also the problem that non-contradiction and excluded middle are not valid at the quantum level. At that level of existence, "A is true and A is not true" not only can be true, it is a frequent state of things.

Could you give a concrete example of something at the quantum level where the law of non-contradiction and/or excluded middle do not hold?

[Soyeong]

Not deliberately so. A better analogy (imo) is that science is the child of philosophy ... but now, the child has grown out of its parent's shadow. Science has its own techniques, goals, and processes--the question of where does philosophy stop and science start is a valid one.

Science has, is, and will always be dependent on philosophy, so there is no growing out of it's parent's shadow. While science has it's own techniques, goals, and processes, it is all worthless without its philosophical foundation.

[technomage]

I have to disagree with that sentiment. Science, yes, has its own philosophical foundations, but philosophy deals with areas science cannot, and science deals with areas philosophy cannot. They are not non-overlapping, but if a philosopher attempts to stretch his hand into a scientific area, a scientist has every right to rap him on the metaphorical knuckles. (The reverse is also true, but serious science tends to stay out of areas it's not competent to deal with.)

More to the point, philosophy can have assumptions that are philosophically sound, but scientifically inaccurate: the eternal existence of the universe being an excellent example. In a situation like that, if one of the two must give way, philosophy is on the losing side.

[technomage]

Could you give a concrete example of something at the quantum level where the law of non-contradiction and/or excluded middle do not hold?

Any particle subject to uncertaincy. Yes, I know--apologetes all over the web insist that this is not a violation, but if you have a particle, it must have both a precise location and a precise speed. It possesses both traits, but both cannot be discovered.

[GioD]

Incorrect. These assertions were discovered by observation and investigation: they were codified by philosophy.

False. If they were "discovered" by investigation they would be inductively proved, not deductively. They've been deductively proved not because of scientific observations that correlate with them but because they entail absurdities if false.

Science does not deductively "prove" anything. The only use for the word "proof" in science is the measure of alcohol content in distilled spirits.

Exactly. That's why philosophy proves things.

There is also the problem that non-contradiction and excluded middle are not valid at the quantum level. At that level of existence, "A is true and A is not true" not only can be true, it is a frequent state of things.

This would only be under certain interpretations (assuming your interpretations of these interpretations is correct - many of the "absurd" QM interpretations are epistemic, not ontological), and the validity of those interpretations could be questioned precisely because of the philosophical proofs for the law of non-contradiction.

Though that does bring up an interesting point. At various times in our history, philosophy and science were interchangeable. They are no longer considered so. What is the dividing line?

Science (as defined since the Moderns) is restricted to the empirical and inductive/abductive methods. Philosophy is broader in both object and method.

We can only assume that--we cannot verify it, and the assumption is based on the fallacy of composition.

No. Since physicists define the universe as essentially a giant set, if a single member of that set is non-contingent the set itself is non-contingent - if a single member changed the whole set would change.

If there was anything preceding the pre-Big Bang singularity, it is impossible to know what that was. Thus we can postulate all day that something could have existed--the argument relies on definite assertion as fact, not the acknowledgement of an unknown and unknowable possibility.

Does this matter at all to what I said?

[technomage]

False. If they were "discovered" by investigation they would be inductively proved, not deductively.

Hmm ... OK, I can see your point on this.

They've been deductively proved not because of scientific observations that correlate with them but because they entail absurdities if false.

That's my problem with the argument--the Universe cares not one whit if it is absurd or not. It simply IS. If it is absurd, the problem is not with the universe ... the problem is with our understanding.

This would only be under certain interpretations (assuming your interpretations of these interpretations is correct - many of the "absurd" QM interpretations are epistemic, not ontological), and the validity of those interpretations could be questioned precisely because of the philosophical proofs for the law of non-contradiction.

I have to hold that in the scientific field, science trumps philosophy. If we discover that uncertaincy is "p and not p," as I suspect, the LNC must give way.

However, I've had to think about it--I am NOT proficient enough with either the math or the science to make my statement dogmatically, so I need to modify my argument as follows: "At the quantum level, non-contradiction and excluded middle (and cause and effect, by the way) are ... problematic." That makes that part of my argument much weaker, too weak to support my point, so I withdraw that part of the argument until further advances in science are made.

Science (as defined since the Moderns) is restricted to the empirical and inductive/abductive methods. Philosophy is broader in both object and method.

Yet philosophy cannot dictate physical reality: it attempts to describe it.

No. Since physicists define the universe as essentially a giant set

I would have to see this stated: it is not a definition I am familiar with.

if a single member of that set is non-contingent the set itself is non-contingent - if a single member changed the whole set would change.

That argument depends upon your "set" definition, and upon the assumption that removing a single element from a set changes the entire set. I am not comfortable with the assumption.

Does this matter at all to what I said?

You brought up the possibility of a pre-Big Bang existence for the Universe (technically, we would probably call it a "super-universe"). I do not feel that the possibility of a super-universe is sufficient to base arguments from.

[GioD]

That's my problem with the argument--the Universe cares not one whit if it is absurd or not. It simply IS. If it is absurd, the problem is not with the universe ... the problem is with our understanding.

When Aristotle said the universe was absurd if the LNC was false, he didn't mean impossible to understand (though it would be). He meant that the statement "a = a" is false. "a = a" being true for any given value of "a" is an essential truth; literally every field that studies the Universes' discoveries are dependent on it; more so the existence of the universe itself. Even if you reject the LNC on the epistemic level, rejection on the ontological level is impossible to defend.

Yet philosophy cannot dictate physical reality: it attempts to describe it.

But the laws philosophy discovers can.

I would have to see this stated: it is not a definition I am familiar with.

Universe - "the totality of known or supposed objects and phenomena throughout space;" - http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/universe
^ I know that isn't by physicists but I have to write this on a short timeframe. And in all my reading - including atheists and physicists with no reason to make the universe a set - I've never seen any definition besides this.

upon the assumption that removing a single element from a set changes the entire set. I am not comfortable with the assumption.

If set A = {3, 4, 5} and you have a set of {3, 4, 5} then remove the second element, that set is no longer set A but some other set.

You brought up the possibility of a pre-Big Bang existence for the Universe (technically, we would probably call it a "super-universe"). I do not feel that the possibility of a super-universe is sufficient to base arguments from.

I see. So do you believe in a finite past?

[technomage]

literally every field that studies the Universes' discoveries are dependent on it

This part I agree with:

more so the existence of the universe itself.

This is the part I have problems with.

The "laws philosophy discovers" are descriptive, not proscriptive. They have no force, no authority, and no power to dictate to the universe how it shall behave.

Even if you reject the LNC on the epistemic level, rejection on the ontological level is impossible to defend.

So is supply-side economics, but that doesn't mean people don't try. ;)

No, seriously--I no not reject the LNC per se. I question it, yes, but it seems to work fine on non-quantum levels. What I reject is the assertion that the LNC is proscriptive.

Universe - "the totality of known or supposed objects and phenomena throughout space;" - http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/universe
^ I know that isn't by physicists but I have to write this on a short timeframe. And in all my reading - including atheists and physicists with no reason to make the universe a set - I've never seen any definition besides this.

If set A = {3, 4, 5} and you have a set of {3, 4, 5} then remove the second element, that set is no longer set A but some other set.

You're using two different definitions of "set" here--or, more accurately, two contexts that are so divergent as to render your comparison null. The numerical set example is small, easily identified, easily defined to an acceptable degree of precision, and easily understood: the "universe as a set" definition is impossible to define to the same degree.

I'm not explaining this very clearly ... probably because it's more an conceptual reaction than a coherent argument on my part, and I'm having problems putting the concept into words.

I see. So do you believe in a finite past?

The available evidence indicates that the Big Bang was the beginning of time, as well as space: I posit that the universe is finite in both. (Really, really big, but still finite.) So yes, I have to posit a finite past.

[GioD]

The "laws philosophy discovers" are descriptive, not proscriptive. They have no force, no authority, and no power to dictate to the universe how it shall behave.

This is a valid point. However, if the QM example you gave led to an absurdity in the same way more "broad" violations of the LNC do, it would have to be reinterpreted. You stated elsewhere that you weren't well-versed enough to defend your interpretation, so I think it's best to leave this as a difference in assumptions for the time being.

You're using two different definitions of "set" here--or, more accurately, two contexts that are so divergent as to render your comparison null. The numerical set example is small, easily identified, easily defined to an acceptable degree of precision, and easily understood: the "universe as a set" definition is impossible to define to the same degree.

While the numerical set is indeed more precise the universe as a set, the fact remains that regardless of how many elements are in the set or how difficult it is to describe, a single different element changes the set as a whole.

I'm not explaining this very clearly ... probably because it's more an conceptual reaction than a coherent argument on my part, and I'm having problems putting the concept into words.

Welcome to the club.

The available evidence indicates that the Big Bang was the beginning of time, as well as space: I posit that the universe is finite in both. (Really, really big, but still finite.) So yes, I have to posit a finite past.

Just curious, why do you then reject the Kalam argument (or the slightly more simplified "big bang" argument)?

[technomage]

However, if the QM example you gave led to an absurdity in the same way more "broad" violations of the LNC do, it would have to be reinterpreted.

I'm having trouble following your antecedent--what would have to be interpreted? Currently, I am assuming you mean the LNC would have to be interpreted, and I quite agree. A parallel situation in science is the reinterpretation of the Newtonian concept of gravity after the advent of relativity.

While the numerical set is indeed more precise the universe as a set, the fact remains that regardless of how many elements are in the set or how difficult it is to describe, a single different element changes the set as a whole.

So, a star goes nova ... and suddenly we are in a different universe? (That's not sarcasm, I'm still trying to wrestle with the concept ... and so far it's pinned me for a two-count.)

It sounds very much like one variation of the "Multiple Worlds" scenario--the one that states that when an event occurs, the universe splits into two universes--one universe where the event occurred, one where it did not.

Just curious, why do you then reject the Kalam argument (or the slightly more simplified "big bang" argument)?

Because causation is also problematic at the quantum level, and the pre-BB singularity is surmised to have been below quantum scale. (For more commonplace examples, look at nuclear decay--there can be no cause pinpointed for the decay of a specific atom.) This renders the first term of Kalam false, and renders the argument as a whole as unsupported.

[robertb]

While the numerical set is indeed more precise the universe as a set, the fact remains that regardless of how many elements are in the set or how difficult it is to describe, a single different element changes the set as a whole.

I just wanted to point out the issue here.

The correct analogy would be to compare a set called the universe to a set called fruit, for instance.

Universe usually means something like everything there is
Fruit usually means something like everything that is a fruit.

So if I have a set of fruit, say {apple, pear, banana, grapefruit} and remove the apple, I still have a set of fruit.

I hope that this helps.

[GioD]

I just wanted to point out the issue here.

The correct analogy would be to compare a set called the universe to a set called fruit, for instance.

Universe usually means something like everything there is
Fruit usually means something like everything that is a fruit.

So if I have a set of fruit, say {apple, pear, banana, grapefruit} and remove the apple, I still have a set of fruit.

I hope that this helps.

Good point. But wouldn't the set, while still definitionally a set of all fruit, be a different set as a whole still?