The Fallacy of Composition and the Cosmological Arguments

[robertb]

Please notice that "every single thing within the universe" is fundamentally different from "all parts of the universe". "every single thing within the universe" would mean all of the things that are within whatever constitutes the boundaries of the universe, while "all parts of the universe" would mean everything that the universe is made up of, including it's boundaries.

Umm no, because the universe is not a single thing made out of parts, unless you are simply redefining the word to further confuse yourself, so saying "all parts of the universe" is no different from saying "every single thing within the universe".

And of course, in my example, if there is anything in the universe that cannot even in principle be red, such as empty space, empty space would not exist at all in my theoretical universe.

Even if empty space could be red, it would still be a category error to say that the universe was red in that sense. Again, the universe is not a single thing, it is the single collection of all things.

I was talking about the specific value of the size of the individual parts.

You were seriously asking my why adding a bunch of, say 3 inch cubes together does not leave you with one 3 inch cube? Really?

[Chrawnus]

A metaphysical reason for the properties of weight and colour? Really? Even if there are metaphysical reasons for the properties of weight and colour, what makes you think that those reasons would be applicable to contingency and finitude?

Anyway, just to bring this back to the OP:

Metaphysical could have been a poor choice of words. Maybe "reasons that are not dependent on the physical make-up of the properties" would be better. And also note that it's not "a...reason for the of weight and colour", but the reason why the properties are (or are not) transferable from the parts to the whole.

And whether or not these reasons are applicable to finitude and contingency can only be discovered after we know what (if they exist) they are, so I don't really think that they are applicable to finitude and contingency. That's what this thread is about, trying to figure that out.

As I cannot, for the life of me, figure out what it is you are looking for, though I have tried, why don't you explain your "thoughts about this matter" and perhaps your thoughts will give me a clue to exactly what it is you are asking. As far as I can tell, I have answered both of the questions that follow - (The following is the main topic of the thread) in other posts in this thread.

I recently stumbled over an article that discusses almost the exact same question which I have been asking, and I'm reading that article right now. The article in question can be accessed here: http://www.illc.uva.nl/j50/contribs/eemeren/eemeren.ps (You either need a program able to read postscript-files, or a program that can convert from postscript to a readable format, a pdf-file for example (which can be done by Acrobat Distiller, if you have it).

Anyway, the author seems to speak of absolute/relative and structure-dependent/structure-independent properties and the difference it makes regarding the fallacy of composition (and division). After I've digested the contents of the article I'll be writing a longer post, which will hopefully clear up some of the confusion.

[robertb]

The argument "The universe is contingent" is too easily challenged as an unsupported assertion. Many cosmological arguments attempt to buttress that assertion.

Hmmm....

Wouldn't:

Universe = {EverythingThatExists}

be true regardless of the value of EverythingThatExists?

So perhaps not only easily challenged but simply false.

[robertb]

Metaphysical could have been a poor choice of words. Maybe "reasons that are not dependent on the physical make-up of the properties". And also note that it's not "a...reason for the of weight and colour", but the reason why the properties are (or are not) transferable from the parts to the whole.

And whether or not these reasons are applicable to finitude and contingency can only be discovered after we know what (if they exist) they are, so I don't really think that they are applicable to finitude and contingency. That's what this thread is about, trying to figure that out.



I recently stumbled over an article that discusses almost the exact same question which I have been asking, and I'm reading that article right now. The article in question can be accessed here: http://www.illc.uva.nl/j50/contribs/eemeren/eemeren.ps (You either need a program able to read postscript-files, or a program that can convert from postscript to a readable format, a pdf-file for example (which can be done by Acrobat Distiller, if you have it).

Anyway, the author seems to speak of absolute/relative and structure-dependent/structure-independent properties and the difference it makes regarding the fallacy of composition (and division). After I've digested the contents of the article I'll be writing a longer post, which will hopefully clear up some of the confusion.

Thanks for the link. I'll take a look as well and we can discuss it if you like.

[Chrawnus]

Umm no, because the universe is not a single thing made out of parts, unless you are simply redefining the word to further confuse yourself, so saying "all parts of the universe" is no different from saying "every single thing within the universe".

The universe is a single thing made out of parts, if a single thing made out of parts is all that exists.

Even if empty space could be red, it would still be a category error to say that the universe was red in that sense. Again, the universe is not a single thing, it is the single collection of all things.

That's only true if there is anything to make up a collection of. And again, the word "collection", just like the word "set" is only a conceptualization, not a real thing, so what you're doing above is essentially nothing more than semantic word games.

You were seriously asking my why adding a bunch of, say 3 inch cubes together does not leave you with one 3 inch cube? Really?

No, I was asking what it is that makes the property of colour (or it's specific value, such as red, or even the intensity of the colour) distributive from the parts to the whole while the property of size (or it's specific value) is not.

[robertb]

The universe is a single thing made out of parts, if a single thing made out of parts is all that exists.

If I have a grocery bag, does it matter which, how many, or even if there are any groceries at all in the grocery bag in order for it to still be a grocery bag?

That's only true if there is anything to make up a collection of. And again, the word "collection", just like the word "set" is only a conceptualization, not a real thing, so what you're doing above is essentially nothing more than semantic word games.

What you have done is fundamentally misunderstood the meaning of the word "universe" and in doing so, continue to fall into the fallacy of composition.

No, I was asking what it is that makes the property of colour (or it's specific value, such as red, or even the intensity of the colour) distributive from the parts to the whole while the property of size (or it's specific value) is not.

Physics.

[Chrawnus]

If I have a grocery bag, does it matter which, how many, or even if there are any groceries at all in the grocery bag in order for it to still be a grocery bag?

I'm not sure I understand your point. If you're comparing a grocery bag with the universe, and the groceries in the bag with the parts in the universe I think you're not only doing a bad comparison, it's not even consistent with your own definition of the universe as the "single collection of all things". Not to mention that in my example, not only the groceries in the bag would be red, but also the parts that make up the grocery bag itself.

What you have done is fundamentally misunderstood the meaning of the word "universe" and in doing so, continue to fall into the fallacy of composition.

I don't think I am. Let me ask you a question. If all parts of the universe are expanding, or even if just all the empty space in the universe is expanding, does that mean that the universe as a whole is expanding?

And just to be clear, I don't think the definition of the universe as "the collection of all things" or "the set of all things" is a particularly good definition, because it introduces concepts like sets and collections, where they really don't belong and allows for bait-and-switch types of reasonings. I think a better definition of the universe would be "physical reality (as a whole)" with the parentheses added for clarification.

Physics.

Perhaps, but even so, the particular reason does not have be limited to physics per se. It could be that the reason is is of a different order of explanation, but that it in this case simply is applied to the level of physics if that makes any sense. I.e going from the general (the reason itself) to a particular (it's application, in this case physics)

[Griggsy]

Indeed, the fallacy applies ,because the Cosmos -the Metaverse, the Cosmos- is unique and thus no other object outside it exists so that it is like a team with a mother- no mother, and not like an automobile whose parts come from elsewhere. The philosophers who find that the fallacy doesn't apply ignore Reichenbach's argument from Existence that as it is all, no transcendent being can exist anyway.
We naturalists can rationally declare no God exists by analysis, not by dogma and need not traverse the Cosmos nor have omniscience ourselves!

[Chrawnus]

Indeed, the fallacy applies ,because the Cosmos -the Metaverse, the Cosmos- is unique and thus no other object outside it exists so that it is like a team with a mother- no mother, and not like an automobile whose parts come from elsewhere. The philosophers who find that the fallacy doesn't apply ignore Reichenbach's argument from Existence that as it is all, no transcendent being can exist anyway.
We naturalists can rationally declare no God exists by analysis, not by dogma and need not traverse the Cosmos nor have omniscience ourselves!

Whether or not the Universe is unique, or it's parts come from somewhere else has no significance whatsoever on whether the fallacy of composition applies to the argument given in the OP or not. In fact, things like that has no significance upon the applicability of the fallacy of composition in general.

[robertb]

I'm not sure I understand your point. If you're comparing a grocery bag with the universe, and the groceries in the bag with the parts in the universe I think you're not only doing a bad comparison, it's not even consistent with your own definition of the universe as the "single collection of all things". Not to mention that in my example, not only the groceries in the bag would be red, but also the parts that make up the grocery bag itself.

If there was only one grocery bag filled with groceries in existence, then it would be the "single collection of all groceries" by definition.

The analogy that I made is correct even though the universe is not, in fact, a grocery bag, thus why it is an analogy. So, even if, per your example, all of the groceries were red, it wouldn't effect the colour of the grocery bag itself. Even as a red grocery bag does not effect the colour of the individual groceries contained within the bag.

I don't think I am. Let me ask you a question. If all parts of the universe are expanding, or even if just all the empty space in the universe is expanding, does that mean that the universe as a whole is expanding?

And just to be clear, I don't think the definition of the universe as "the collection of all things" or "the set of all things" is a particularly good definition, because it introduces concepts like sets and collections, where they really don't belong and allows for bait-and-switch types of reasonings. I think a better definition of the universe would be "physical reality (as a whole)" with the parentheses added for clarification.

All the parts of the universe are not expanding. In fact, none of the "parts" of the universe are expanding. The universe, itself, is expanding.

"Physical reality (as a whole)" is exactly the same as saying "the single collection of all things"...

There is no 'bait and switch'. Set and collection are merely synonyms of a singular group.

Perhaps, but even so, the particular reason does not have be limited to physics per se. It could be that the reason is is of a different order of explanation, but that it in this case simply is applied to the level of physics if that makes any sense. I.e going from the general (the reason itself) to a particular (it's application, in this case physics)

If something is explainable, what value does adding additional complexity over and above that explanation serve. One would be simply begging the razor, I suppose.

[Griggsy]

I supose so, but then it hardly matters as Reichenbach's argument from Existence claims that as Exitence is all then we find no transcendent beiing, and transcendence denies omnipresence, and ti's no false dilemma, so God cannot exist as Himself.
God adds nothing to explanations or as a relationship! See mu arguments about God thread.
The quantum fields it now seems to me also make the fallacy an ignoration elenchi- irrelevant, red herring. So, I think for now.
That the parts are contingent still is irrelevant to the whole, because eternal quantum bespeaks eternal Existence! And again, ti's nonsence to require the sufficient reason-putative God.

[seer]

That the parts are contingent still is irrelevant to the whole, because eternal quantum bespeaks eternal Existence! And again, ti's nonsence to require the sufficient reason-putative God.

And you have evidence for the "eternal quantum" where?

[Cerebrum123]

I supose so, but then it hardly matters as Reichenbach's argument from Existence claims that as Exitence is all then we find no transcendent beiing, and transcendence denies omnipresence, and ti's no false dilemma, so God cannot exist as Himself.
God adds nothing to explanations or as a relationship! See mu arguments about God thread.
The quantum fields it now seems to me also make the fallacy an ignoration elenchi- irrelevant, red herring. So, I think for now.
That the parts are contingent still is irrelevant to the whole, because eternal quantum bespeaks eternal Existence! And again, ti's nonsence to require the sufficient reason-putative God.

The Quantum Field is not "nothing", so you are introducing the red herring here.

[Griggsy]

Yes, Victor Stenger and others should never use the term nothing for the quantum fields as that leads to equivocation with nothngness, which cannot exists as ancient Greeks knew.
Ponder Alex Vilenkin's " Many Worlds in One" and David Mills' " Atheist Universe for information on the fields and how they relate to the Cosmos and not to such as Billy Lane.
That the parts are contingent however does not relate to the eternal quanta,because of the law of conservation and so the Cosmos - the Megaverse-exists eternally, and it does no good for Billy Lane and Eddy Feser and Tommy Aquinas and God Billy Leibniz to assert that still the Cosmos needs a personal cause: that is the reduced animism that is theism. See my thread arguments... about all that.
Ah, but contingency is a red herring,because the out of existence refers to an item when its quarks are eternal! Never do we notice an absolute annhilation of matter-energy! So, science rules whilst theology rings a succession of false notes due to its study of that square circle called God.
Victor Stenger and such offer evidence whilst the Craigs and the Fesers pontificate using solecistic, sophisticated sophistry of wily,woeful woo!

[MaxVel]

Yes, Victor Stenger and others should never use the term nothing for the quantum fields as that leads to equivocation with nothngness, which cannot exists as ancient Greeks knew.
Ponder Alex Vilenkin's " Many Worlds in One" and David Mills' " Atheist Universe for information on the fields and how they relate to the Cosmos and not to such as Billy Lane.
That the parts are contingent however does not relate to the eternal quanta,because of the law of conservation and so the Cosmos - the Megaverse-exists eternally,

How do you know this? What science do you have that shows this?

and it does no good for Billy Lane and Eddy Feser and Tommy Aquinas and God Billy Leibniz to assert that still the Cosmos needs a personal cause: that is the reduced animism that is theism. See my thread arguments... about all that.
Ah, but contingency is a red herring,because the out of existence refers to an item when its quarks are eternal! Never do we notice an absolute annhilation of matter-energy!

So because we haven't observed it, it can't happen? Sounds like a fallacy to me....

So, science rules whilst theology rings a succession of false notes due to its study of that square circle called God.

Empty rhetoric that begs the question.

Victor Stenger and such offer evidence whilst the Craigs and the Fesers pontificate using solecistic, sophisticated sophistry of wily,woeful woo!

Sadly for Griggsy, Stenger and other physicists operate out of an unexamined metaphysics, doing their science and showing their 'evidence' without actually reasoning through the underlying metaphysical conclusions that their science rests on. They assume certain metaphysical positions to do their science, then use that science to 'prove' that their metaphysical assumptions are correct. Circular reasoning, you are my master.