The Fallacy of Composition and the Cosmological Arguments

[Chrawnus]

Well that is much clearer.

It's no different from what I asked in the OP.

The second question first, contingency describes the possible states of being, as in being and non-being. Finitude describes that some specific being will eventually transition to the state of non-being. I am not sure why you would want to categorize these descriptions of states with the other attributes you listed. Are you saying that contingency and finitude are attributes that exist internally within objects? If so, that is an odd way of putting it.

First things first. When I'm talking about finitude I'm talking about finitude both in the past and the future, and not finitude only in regards to the future, i.e going from the state of non-being to the state of being (i.e the reverse of your definition) also counts as finitude.

And to answer your question, no, I'm not saying that contingency and finitude are attributes that exist internally within objects, because I'm not defining attributes/properties as something that merely exist internally within objects. It does not matter in the context of this discussion whether properties are internal to an object or not, unless of course, we discover that this makes some difference whether, as you put it, the attributes are communicative or additive.

To the first question, some attributes are communicative, like colour and some attributes are additive like weight.

Well, that a property is communicative essentially means that it will carry over from all parts to the whole, right? So it doesn't really answer the question, unless you consider "this car is red because it is red" as a proper answer to the question "Why is this car red?" I'm more interested in figuring out why some attributes are communicative, while others are not. If it turns out that there is no answer to this, other than "it just is that way", then that's that, but until that has been established I'm under the delusion that there is, possibly, some sort of answer to the question.

[Chrawnus]

Just to see if I can help you see this better. Take this bit, from the OP.

It is true that the Fallacy of Composition isn't necessarily committed just because one reasons that the whole must have a specific property X just because all individual parts of the whole has property X. It is not true that the specific property X of all individual parts of the whole necessarily means that the whole itself has the specific property X.

True, but it is also true that in regards to atleast a subset of all possible properties (i.e those properties that you call communicative, like colour) the fact that all parts of an object has these special kinds of properties necessarily means that the whole (object) itself will have the specific property X.

The analogy given above work for some things, but do not work for others.

If all parts of a wall are made out of bricks, this says nothing about the composition of all walls.

But then again, that's not really what I'm trying to get across. Let me put it this way. If each and every part of the universe were made of brick, would that mean that the universe as a whole would be made of brick, or not?

Does this help?

No, not really.

But atleast you're trying.

[siliconwafer]

One could argue that the whole universe is contingent and that there must be a necessary being that caused this contingent universe to come into existence. One does not have to argue like this: Part of the universe is contingent. Therefore, the whole universe is contingent.

[robertb]

It's no different from what I asked in the OP.



First things first. When I'm talking about finitude I'm talking about finitude both in the past and the future, and not finitude only in regards to the future, i.e going from the state of non-being to the state of being (i.e the reverse of your definition) also counts as finitude.

And to answer your question, no, I'm not saying that contingency and finitude are attributes that exist internally within objects, because I'm not defining attributes/properties as something that merely exist internally within objects. It does not matter in the context of this discussion whether properties are internal to an object or not, unless of course, we discover that this makes some difference whether, as you put it, the attributes are communicative or additive.



Well, that a property is communicative essentially means that it will carry over from all parts to the whole, right? So it doesn't really answer the question, unless you consider "this car is red because it is red" as a proper answer to the question "Why is this car red?" I'm more interested in figuring out why some attributes are communicative, while others are not. If it turns out that there is no answer to this, other than "it just is that way", then that's that, but until that has been established I'm under the delusion that there is, possibly, some sort of answer to the question.

You are making this quite difficult on yourself. Is there a particular answer that you are looking for?

Some attributes are communicative because it is the nature of the attribute to be what we call communicative. The key being that we assign the description to the attribute, the description is not an actual part of the attribute itself. So, I suppose the answer is that things are the way they are. If you want to get into specific chemical or physical reasons why this is so, you can, but I am not sure that even that says anything more than things are the way they are, in the end.

Regarding finitude, I am not sure where I implied that finitude only describes an objects future, but if I did so, it was not my intention.

[robertb]

Duplicate

[robertb]

One could argue that the whole universe is contingent and that there must be a necessary being that caused this contingent universe to come into existence. One does not have to argue like this: Part of the universe is contingent. Therefore, the whole universe is contingent.

Yes, this is true. It also avoids the fallacy being discussed in this thread.

[robertb]

But then again, that's not really what I'm trying to get across. Let me put it this way. If each and every part of the universe were made of brick, would that mean that the universe as a whole would be made of brick, or not?

No, it would not. Think carefully about the definition of the word 'universe'.

[technomage]

Is it possible to generalise different types of properties based on whether the property is of the type that will carry over from the parts to the whole, or is this something that must be done on a case-by-case basis?

Actually, even if the argument is incidentally true (as it is in your example "The wall is made of matter"), it's still fallacious. It's considered a fallacy not because of specific counter-examples, but because any counterexample exists.

Generally speaking, what makes an argument a fallacy does not depend upon specific examples that may be incidentally false: what makes an argument a fallacy is that it seems applicable, but is not. In this specific case, the general truism is that no set can be assumed to have the attributes of its members.

[robertb]

Except that's not what I'm doing in the slightest. I'm not analogizing anything at all, I'm asking if it's possible categorize properties based on whether they carry over from individual parts of an object to the whole of the object or not. We already know that some properties carry over, like colour, so that if all parts of the universe were red then the universe as a whole would be red, but we also know that some properties, such as size value, do not carry over, so that even if we can divide the universe up into parts that are all a particular size Z, it doesn't mean that, if we add up all the Z-sized parts, we get a universe that is size Z. But what exactly is it that makes redness carry over from the parts to the whole, but not size?

No the universe as a whole would not be red, even if every single thing within the universe was red. You are still comitting the Fallacy of Composition.

And specifically this question that you ask:

But what exactly is it that makes redness carry over from the parts to the whole, but not size?

Leaving the universe aside, as it does not apply to either of these, but referring to a brick wall, the size of the parts DO 'carry over' to the size of the whole ADDITIVELY.

[technomage]

One could argue that the whole universe is contingent and that there must be a necessary being that caused this contingent universe to come into existence. One does not have to argue like this: Part of the universe is contingent. Therefore, the whole universe is contingent.

The argument "The universe is contingent" is too easily challenged as an unsupported assertion. Many cosmological arguments attempt to buttress that assertion.

[Chrawnus]

You are making this quite difficult on yourself. Is there a particular answer that you are looking for?

The right answer.

Some attributes are communicative because it is the nature of the attribute to be what we call communicative. The key being that we assign the description to the attribute, the description is not an actual part of the attribute itself. So, I suppose the answer is that things are the way they are. If you want to get into specific chemical or physical reasons why this is so, you can, but I am not sure that even that says anything more than things are the way they are, in the end.

Well, it doesn't have to be a chemical or physical reason, in fact, I'd prefer a metaphysical reason, if that's possible. It's pretty hard to apply chemical or physical attributes to abstract ideas and concepts such as contingency and finitude.

Regarding finitude, I am not sure where I implied that finitude only describes an objects future, but if I did so, it was not my intention.

You didn't. I just wanted to make sure we were on the same page.

[shunyadragon]

The argument "The universe is contingent" is too easily challenged as an unsupported assertion. Many cosmological arguments attempt to buttress that assertion.

Agreed!!!

[robertb]

Well, it doesn't have to be a chemical or physical reason, in fact, I'd prefer a metaphysical reason, if that's possible. It's pretty hard to apply chemical or physical attributes to abstract ideas and concepts such as contingency and finitude.

A metaphysical reason for the properties of weight and colour? Really? Even if there are metaphysical reasons for the properties of weight and colour, what makes you think that those reasons would be applicable to contingency and finitude?

Anyway, just to bring this back to the OP:

What I've been wondering is this (The following is the main topic of the thread): Is it possible to generalise different types of properties based on whether the property is of the type that will carry over from the parts to the whole, or is this something that must be done on a case-by-case basis? And secondly, if it is possible to generalise different types of properties on the basis of whether they will carry over from the parts to the whole, will the properties of having a finite past (or being contingent) be in the class of properties that applies to the whole as long as they apply to the parts of the whole, or will they be in the class of properties that doesn't necessarily apply to the whole, even if they would apply to all parts of the whole?

I've already got some thoughts about this matter, but I think I'll let you guys see what you think about this before I write anything more.

As I cannot, for the life of me, figure out what it is you are looking for, though I have tried, why don't you explain your "thoughts about this matter" and perhaps your thoughts will give me a clue to exactly what it is you are asking. As far as I can tell, I have answered both of the questions that follow - (The following is the main topic of the thread) in other posts in this thread.

[Chrawnus]

Actually, even if the argument is incidentally true (as it is in your example "The wall is made of matter"), it's still fallacious. It's considered a fallacy not because of specific counter-examples, but because any counterexample exists.

Generally speaking, what makes an argument a fallacy does not depend upon specific examples that may be incidentally false: what makes an argument a fallacy is that it seems applicable, but is not. In this specific case, the general truism is that no set can be assumed to have the attributes of its members.

You don't seem like you know what you are speaking of. The fallacy of composition is only committed when the property in question is not transferable to the whole. From the article on the fallacy of composition at http://www.fallacyfiles.org/composit.html

Fallacy Files

Type: Informal Fallacy
Form:

All of the parts of the object O have the property P.
Therefore, O has the property P.
(Where the property P is one which does not distribute from parts to a whole.)

© source where applicable

Which means that as long as the property is distributable from parts to a whole the fallacy is not committed. Whether something is a fallacy or not always depends on the specific example in question, and cannot be generalized, like you seem to suggest.

[Chrawnus]

No the universe as a whole would not be red, even if every single thing within the universe was red. You are still comitting the Fallacy of Composition.

Please notice that "every single thing within the universe" is fundamentally different from "all parts of the universe". "every single thing within the universe" would mean all of the things that are within whatever constitutes the boundaries of the universe, while "all parts of the universe" would mean everything that the universe is made up of, including it's boundaries.

And of course, in my example, if there is anything in the universe that cannot even in principle be red, such as empty space, empty space would not exist at all in my theoretical universe.

And specifically this question that you ask:



Leaving the universe aside, as it does not apply to either of these, but referring to a brick wall, the size of the parts DO 'carry over' to the size of the whole ADDITIVELY.

I was talking about the specific value of the size of the individual parts.