Methodological Naturalism (Materialism)

[Jedidiah]

I loathe asparagus (unless it's my wife's marinated-and-grilled asparagus, which I'll eat until I'm absolutely stuffed).

You are clearly a sick man.

[Jedidiah]

Actually, yes, you can--but you have to get a bit inventive. Drill a small hole through the bowl of the spoon and use it as a pinhole camera.

is right. You got the idea, eh?

[technomage]

You are clearly a sick man.

We all have our little quirks. :silly:

[magellan004]

Take one of the plants up to the ISS, thus removing it from (almost all of) the effects of gravity.

Magellan, I am persuaded that you are a non-YEC masquerading as a YEC, and hoping that Poe's law will keep you from being outed. I have NEVER met a YEC as stupid as you pretend to be. Please stop the masquerade--YECs are easy enough to refute without you making a (very poor) parody of them.

For Heaven's sake man ! Think before you post. 'Which plant can I point to and say "this one has no supernatural in it?" or "God is not in this plant?" '
I am not sure if your absurd thinking is that you can point to whatevers on the International Space Station as controls for experiments to do with gravity, radio waves, plants and so on. You seemed to have missed Lucaspa's point. To do a cause and effect experiment (he says) we need to run a controlled experiment where certain agencies are eliminated. That is plainly wrong.


Stop being a bozo.

Magellan

[technomage]

One of the hallmarks of a religious experience is that it CANNOT be intersubjectively validated. So we're not communicating again here.

You have a stricter definition of "intersubjectively validate" than I do--artificially strict, in my opinion. Stars and stones, man, even opinions can be intersubjectively validated--sports fans with a favored team in common do this all the time.

Now, the phrase you may be looking for is "intersubjective verifiability," which (I quite agree) is a stricter standard, and the strictness is necessary for empiricism. But I had to google the phrase to see if there was a reason for our miscommunication.

I would strongly argue that this is an illusion.

Of course you would--you're an atheist, and you're assuming your conclusion.

Sorry, I couldn't help myself. In all seriousness, I would not use the word "illusion," but there has to be some term or concept for the intersubjectivity of events that can be experienced, but do not attain the standards of "intersubjective verifiability." Most people use congruence, and I think that is the most suitable--it acknowledges that two people can share an experience, without bothering with the veracity of the assumed reasons for that experience.

You are working exactly backwards here. There are of course brain structure similarities, which is part of being members of the same species. And this probably does make certain experiences comparable enough for effective communication. From there, we can speculate that, maybe, purely subjective experiences are functionally very similar.

Science should work equally well forwards or backwards.

But this is a hypothesis, as you say, that we can't evaluate.

Maybe one day.

I'm guessing that your personal assessment of the behavior is the basis of deciding whether a fabricated construct is or is not an excuse? I suppose the question is, would these people have engaged in either one of these behaviors if the notion of gods had never occurred to them? I'd hypothesize that they would.

An interesting hypothesis, that is actually capable of being tested, but only to a limited degree. One would have to gather a decent-sized sample group of people who had (a) been atheistic, and were now religious, and (b) had been religious, and were now atheists. I hazard that there are psychological tests that will give a fairly accurate account of how altruistic or selfish a person is--have them take the test, and compare it to their behavior before and after their conversion/deconversion. (Far better would be to apply the tests as they were living in one paradigm, then after, say, five years of living in the other paradigm, but the problem with that is the difficulty of timing the tests accurately.)

It's possible--perhaps not very practical.

Science TELLS us what the results mean.

Science tells us what those results mean only within the scope of natural phenomena.

Current science tells us that the universe is some 13-or-so billion years old, and that during the history of the universe the energy naturally coalesced into subatomic particles, then into atoms, then into gas clouds, then stars, et cetera, et cetera. If we had, upon examining the age of the earth, discovered that it was only 6000 years old, there's insufficient time for all that to occur. Again, to extend the metaphor, let us say that said scientists look at the stars and find that while they should have formed naturally over millions of years, they actually suddenly sprang into existence, again, 6,000 years ago.

Science would have no natural explanation that could account for that phenomena. If it were to be discovered that it had happened that way, science would be at a complete and total loss. So we would have to look at other methods of inquiry to find out how the universe came to be.

Now, of course, the above is just an analogy--the universe is far older than 6,000 years, and we have observed the natural processes that led to star formation. We have modeled the processes that lead to the formation of heavier elements, and lo and behold, when we see a star go nova, it demonstrates that it contains the very elements our models predict. We have a universe where events occurred by natural processes, with no indication of supernatural intervention. But if we ever find a phenomena that clearly demonstrates that it did not occur by natural processes (known or unknown), then we will have questions that science cannot answer. (I do not believe that any such phenomena will ever be discovered, but I want to cover my bases here.)

You start to sound like seer here.

You'd better smile when you say that, pardner.

Sure, ultimately everything that can possibly cross our minds MIGHT be purely subjective, and nothing can be so objective that our appreciation or understanding or observation or experience of it doesn't instantly render it subjective. EVERYTHING is subjective, from this viewpoint, and the outside world might be entirely imaginary!

Come on, Phank. I asked about a specific evaluation on your part. Is that evaluation objective or subjective? Can your evaluation be intersubjectively verified.

It's a simple enough question.

My claims here are that (1) A properly formed claim is one that CAN be intersubjectively validated, across religions and cultures and backgrounds and histories and the like; and (2) that if a claim can NOT be formulated so as to be intersubjectively validatable, then it is semantically empty, and has no objective meaning.

(Again, with the terminology change to "intersubjectively verified".) The statement "That painting is beautiful" cannot be intersubjectively verified, yet it is not semantically empty. Your claim fails.

[technomage]

For Heaven's sake man ! Think before you post. 'Which plant can I point to and say "this one has no supernatural in it?" or "God is not in this plant?" '
I am not sure if your absurd thinking is that you can point to whatevers on the International Space Station as controls for experiments to do with gravity, radio waves, plants and so on. You seemed to have missed Lucaspa's point. To do a cause and effect experiment (he says) we need to run a controlled experiment where certain agencies are eliminated. That is plainly wrong.


Stop being a bozo.

Magellan

You don't know how to run a controlled experience, and I'm a bozo.

[pancreasman]

You don't know how to run a controlled experience, and I'm a bozo.

pssst, 'experiment'. Sometimes exposure to raw stupidity rays make me mistype too.

[phank]

You have a stricter definition of "intersubjectively validate" than I do--artificially strict, in my opinion. Stars and stones, man, even opinions can be intersubjectively validated--sports fans with a favored team in common do this all the time.

Now, the phrase you may be looking for is "intersubjective verifiability," which (I quite agree) is a stricter standard, and the strictness is necessary for empiricism. But I had to google the phrase to see if there was a reason for our miscommunication.

You may be right about this. I would not regard a shared prejudice as constituting intersubjective validation (or verification). Not even if it's MY favorite team we agree on!

Of course you would--you're an atheist, and you're assuming your conclusion.

If there's no difference between assuming a conclusion and deriving or supporting a conclusion, then you're quite right. So I'm trying to ARGUE that it's an illusion, not just assume it.

Sorry, I couldn't help myself. In all seriousness, I would not use the word "illusion," but there has to be some term or concept for the intersubjectivity of events that can be experienced, but do not attain the standards of "intersubjective verifiability." Most people use congruence, and I think that is the most suitable--it acknowledges that two people can share an experience, without bothering with the veracity of the assumed reasons for that experience.

Yes, words tend to fail us a bit here. I would NOT say two people can share an experience, anymore than they can step into the same river twice. But they can have experiences congruent enough for effective communication, and that's what matters, I think.

Science should work equally well forwards or backwards.

I don't know if it should, but in practice it does not. Confirmation bias is insidious and ubiquitous, and the scientific enterprise makes significant procedural efforts to neutralize it, everything from null hypotheses to peer review. And STILL confirmation bias sneaks in. If we START with our biases and work backwards, in practice we "find" our expectations.

An interesting hypothesis, that is actually capable of being tested, but only to a limited degree. One would have to gather a decent-sized sample group of people who had (a) been atheistic, and were now religious, and (b) had been religious, and were now atheists. I hazard that there are psychological tests that will give a fairly accurate account of how altruistic or selfish a person is--have them take the test, and compare it to their behavior before and after their conversion/deconversion. (Far better would be to apply the tests as they were living in one paradigm, then after, say, five years of living in the other paradigm, but the problem with that is the difficulty of timing the tests accurately.)

It's possible--perhaps not very practical.

I don't think we're looking at this quite the same way. Maybe it would be sufficient to observe that the pattern of human similarity and human variation in all respects seems to be irrespective of culture.

Science tells us what those results mean only within the scope of natural phenomena.

Ah, quite so. Science does not INVENT subjective, personal meanings to suit the emotional needs of the observer. If we posit that there are undefinable UNnatural phenomena, immune to any sort of intersubjective examination, then no, science won't Make Stuff Up for you, but won't stop you from making up your own.

Current science tells us that the universe is some 13-or-so billion years old, and that during the history of the universe the energy naturally coalesced into subatomic particles, then into atoms, then into gas clouds, then stars, et cetera, et cetera. If we had, upon examining the age of the earth, discovered that it was only 6000 years old, there's insufficient time for all that to occur.

Technically, the earth is far younger than the universe. Some planets ARE only 6000 years old.

Again, to extend the metaphor, let us say that said scientists look at the stars and find that while they should have formed naturally over millions of years, they actually suddenly sprang into existence, again, 6,000 years ago.

Science would have no natural explanation that could account for that phenomena. If it were to be discovered that it had happened that way, science would be at a complete and total loss. So we would have to look at other methods of inquiry to find out how the universe came to be.

Uh, wow. Okaaay. One of the axioms of science is that the universe is internally consistent, that there is no magic, no paradoxes, no miracles. If this axiom is false, science fails leaving the starting gate! If the axiom is true, we simply have one of many unsolved problems seeking more relevant observations. If the universe is MOSTLY consistent, but can tolerate a couple of miracles here and there, those problems would be regarded by science as not YET solved, indefinitely.

Now, of course, the above is just an analogy--the universe is far older than 6,000 years, and we have observed the natural processes that led to star formation. We have modeled the processes that lead to the formation of heavier elements, and lo and behold, when we see a star go nova, it demonstrates that it contains the very elements our models predict. We have a universe where events occurred by natural processes, with no indication of supernatural intervention. But if we ever find a phenomena that clearly demonstrates that it did not occur by natural processes (known or unknown), then we will have questions that science cannot answer. (I do not believe that any such phenomena will ever be discovered, but I want to cover my bases here.)

Yep, quite so, with the added observation that science cannot KNOW that it can't answer such questions, and will keep trying.

Come on, Phank. I asked about a specific evaluation on your part. Is that evaluation objective or subjective? Can your evaluation be intersubjectively verified.

It's a simple enough question.

Then I would say no, it can't. I'd regard such an evaluation as a convention, something arbitrarily agreed on if such agreement is otherwise useful.

(Again, with the terminology change to "intersubjectively verified".) The statement "That painting is beautiful" cannot be intersubjectively verified, yet it is not semantically empty. Your claim fails.

If you say so! You are relying on the lack of any intersubjectively verified operational definition of beauty. And given that, I need to keep trying to explain my claim. Subjective appreciation of beauty (in the eye of the beholder, yes?) IS some neural firing pattern. If the person making that claim experiences that pattern, in principle that can be verified, and we can know if the person making the claim is being honest.

So what we seem to be working toward is two entirely distinct notions of "meaning" - the intersubjective agreement notion, and the "qualia" notion. And I would argue that even if we grant that qualia exist, we are still equivocating on the word "meaning". Kind of like using "believe" to say both "I believe in garden fairies" and "I believe I'll have a beer". These are different kinds of belief.

So your statement is semantically empty in an objective, intersubjective sense, but not in a qualia sense.

[technomage]

If there's no difference between assuming a conclusion and deriving or supporting a conclusion, then you're quite right. So I'm trying to ARGUE that it's an illusion, not just assume it.

It was a joke, silly--hence the smiley.

Yes, words tend to fail us a bit here. I would NOT say two people can share an experience, anymore than they can step into the same river twice. But they can have experiences congruent enough for effective communication, and that's what matters, I think.

Hmmm ... I think I can agree about the "no shared experiences"--qualia, whether they are neurological or not, are too individual. It's just such a tricky area.

Science should work equally well forwards or backwards.

I don't know if it should, but in practice it does not.

I'm sorry--I did not communicate myself clearly. When I mean "forwards or backwards," I mean mechanically, not assumption to conclusion. A case in point: science can develop a model then look at the "real-space" event, or it can examine an event and develop a model. Aw, heck, that's confusing written like that, but I can't think of a better way to explain it, save to bring in another long-winded example. Please bear with me.

Observation to model: Scientists noted that there was iron present in spectrographs from novas. They develop a model based on their knowledge of fusion that demonstrates how that occurs. They then do further observations to make certain that their model matches thereality.
Model to observation: scientists noted that there was a similarity between chimps and humans, They develop a model of what genetic changes could have occurred to account for this, but at the time the model was made, genome sequencing was not yet invented. When genome sequencing was fully developed, scientists could then check their model for accuracy.

I may be over-complicating things, but this is what I meant.

Science does not INVENT subjective, personal meanings to suit the emotional needs of the observer.

You're quite correct (though I also note, and will pass with only the comment, your dispariaging tone when you say that). But then if science cannot answer the question ... where do we turn? Or would it be your preference to simply leave the question unanswered?

One of the axioms of science is that the universe is internally consistent, that there is no magic, no paradoxes, no miracles.

Not ... quite. The "axiom" of consistency was originally an untested assumption, but is now open to testing (and has been tested, repeatedly, and has been consistantly verified). "no magic, no paradoxes, no miracles" is your own addition to the axiom, and in this particular case I am going to be a stickler for the original.

Then I would say no, it can't. I'd regard such an evaluation as a convention, something arbitrarily agreed on if such agreement is otherwise useful.

If you say so! You are relying on the lack of any intersubjectively verified operational definition of beauty.

Yes, I am--because your statement treats that still-untestable condition (the qualia) as already tested and known. Nonetheless, as it stands, the statement is neither semantically null nor intersubjectively verifiable.

Now, it is possible that someday we will be able to test it, and I do not want to be accused of making a "God of the gaps" argument." It is possible that the appreciation of beauty is nothing more than a neurological pattern that will someday yield to empirical testing. I rather have my doubts that any amount of empirical testing will establish why something is considered beautiful by an individual, but I can no more justifiably base an argument on my hypothesis than you can.

I need to keep trying to explain my claim.

Well, that seems only fair--I've expanded my analogies more than once in this conversation.

Subjective appreciation of beauty (in the eye of the beholder, yes?) IS some neural firing pattern.

Hypothetically. Until we can test that hypothesis, it seems premature to base a worldview on it, does it not? (I know, despite the prematurity, that is precisely what theists do. Hey, we're not perfect! )

So what we seem to be working toward is two entirely distinct notions of "meaning" - the intersubjective agreement notion, and the "qualia" notion. And I would argue that even if we grant that qualia exist, we are still equivocating on the word "meaning". Kind of like using "believe" to say both "I believe in garden fairies" and "I believe I'll have a beer". These are different kinds of belief.

Or the third kind of belief--"I believe (as in give intellectual assent) in the theory of gravity."

They are different meanings of the word ... but to be honest, I'm not sure the terminology exists. English words tend to be multivalent, and they are often so darn slippery as to make communication difficult.

So your statement is semantically empty in an objective, intersubjective sense, but not in a qualia sense.

Which brings me to my next questions:

1. Is the intersubjectively verifiable sense the only sense that you consider valid?
2. Is that decision of validity objective or subjective?

[technomage]

If there's no difference between assuming a conclusion and deriving or supporting a conclusion, then you're quite right. So I'm trying to ARGUE that it's an illusion, not just assume it.

It was a joke, silly--hence the smiley.

Yes, words tend to fail us a bit here. I would NOT say two people can share an experience, anymore than they can step into the same river twice. But they can have experiences congruent enough for effective communication, and that's what matters, I think.

Hmmm ... I think I can agree about the "no shared experiences"--qualia, whether they are neurological or not, are too individual. It's just such a tricky area.

Science should work equally well forwards or backwards.

I don't know if it should, but in practice it does not.

I'm sorry--I did not communicate myself clearly. When I mean "forwards or backwards," I mean mechanically, not assumption to conclusion. A case in point: science can develop a model then look at the "real-space" event, or it can examine an event and develop a model. Aw, heck, that's confusing written like that, but I can't think of a better way to explain it, save to bring in another long-winded example. Please bear with me.

Observation to model: Scientists noted that there was iron present in spectrographs from novas. They develop a model based on their knowledge of fusion that demonstrates how that occurs. They then do further observations to make certain that their model matches thereality.
Model to observation: scientists noted that there was a similarity between chimps and humans, They develop a model of what genetic changes could have occurred to account for this, but at the time the model was made, genome sequencing was not yet invented. When genome sequencing was fully developed, scientists could then check their model for accuracy.

I may be over-complicating things, but this is what I meant.

Science does not INVENT subjective, personal meanings to suit the emotional needs of the observer.

You're quite correct (though I also note, and will pass with only the comment, your dispariaging tone when you say that). But then if science cannot answer the question ... where do we turn? Or would it be your preference to simply leave the question unanswered?

One of the axioms of science is that the universe is internally consistent, that there is no magic, no paradoxes, no miracles.

Not ... quite. The "axiom" of consistency was originally an untested assumption, but is now open to testing (and has been tested, repeatedly, and has been consistantly verified). "no magic, no paradoxes, no miracles" is your own addition to the axiom, and in this particular case I am going to be a stickler for the original.

Then I would say no, it can't. I'd regard such an evaluation as a convention, something arbitrarily agreed on if such agreement is otherwise useful.

If you say so! You are relying on the lack of any intersubjectively verified operational definition of beauty.

Yes, I am--because your statement treats that still-untestable condition (the qualia) as already tested and known. Nonetheless, as it stands, the statement is neither semantically null nor intersubjectively verifiable.

Now, it is possible that someday we will be able to test it, and I do not want to be accused of making a "God of the gaps" argument." It is possible that the appreciation of beauty is nothing more than a neurological pattern that will someday yield to empirical testing. I rather have my doubts that any amount of empirical testing will establish why something is considered beautiful by an individual, but I can no more justifiably base an argument on my hypothesis than you can.

I need to keep trying to explain my claim.

Well, that seems only fair--I've expanded my analogies more than once in this conversation.

Subjective appreciation of beauty (in the eye of the beholder, yes?) IS some neural firing pattern.

Hypothetically. Until we can test that hypothesis, it seems premature to base a worldview on it, does it not? (I know, despite the prematurity, that is precisely what theists do. Hey, we're not perfect! )

So what we seem to be working toward is two entirely distinct notions of "meaning" - the intersubjective agreement notion, and the "qualia" notion. And I would argue that even if we grant that qualia exist, we are still equivocating on the word "meaning". Kind of like using "believe" to say both "I believe in garden fairies" and "I believe I'll have a beer". These are different kinds of belief.

Or the third kind of belief--"I believe (as in give intellectual assent) in the theory of gravity."

They are different meanings of the word ... but to be honest, I'm not sure the terminology exists. English words tend to be multivalent, and they are often so darn slippery as to make communication difficult.

So your statement is semantically empty in an objective, intersubjective sense, but not in a qualia sense.

Which brings me to my next questions:

1. Is the intersubjectively verifiable sense the only sense that you consider valid?
2. Is that decision of validity objective or subjective?

[phank]

I'm sorry--I did not communicate myself clearly. When I mean "forwards or backwards," I mean mechanically, not assumption to conclusion. A case in point: science can develop a model then look at the "real-space" event, or it can examine an event and develop a model. Aw, heck, that's confusing written like that, but I can't think of a better way to explain it, save to bring in another long-winded example. Please bear with me.

<snip examples>I think I know what you're saying, but science in practice is both cumulative and iterative. There's some observation, followed by some speculation about it, followed by some model building, followed by testing, which suggests further observations and around we go. But I would argue that some observation ALWAYS initiates the process in science. Very different from (some) religion, which starts with the conclusion and then if there are supporting observations so much the better. If there aren't, well, worship the conclusion anyway!

You're quite correct (though I also note, and will pass with only the comment, your dispariaging tone when you say that).

Sorry. I admit it's a challenge for me to think religion without thinking Jorge.

But then if science cannot answer the question ... where do we turn? Or would it be your preference to simply leave the question unanswered?

If it's a well-formed scientific question, we don't turn anywhere, we just keep trying. Curing cancer is a perfectly valid scientific challenge, and we don't leave it unanswered because it's hard. Nor do we turn to casting spells, laying on of hands, magic curative baths, etc. If it's NOT a well formed scientific question (like "what is the meaning of life"), we can invent any answer that makes us happy, I guess.

Not ... quite. The "axiom" of consistency was originally an untested assumption, but is now open to testing (and has been tested, repeatedly, and has been consistantly verified). "no magic, no paradoxes, no miracles" is your own addition to the axiom, and in this particular case I am going to be a stickler for the original.

OK, that is not my understanding. And thinking about it some more, I disagree with you. This is a "black swan" sort of thing - if every swan ever observed has been white, can we conclude no black swans are possible? Proving a negative (that there are NO exceptions) isn't feasible. I didn't ADD to the axiom, I illustrated it. Maybe I should say that the axiom states that all natural phenomena have natural causes?

Hypothetically. Until we can test that hypothesis, it seems premature to base a worldview on it, does it not? (I know, despite the prematurity, that is precisely what theists do. Hey, we're not perfect! )

I wouldn't say a worldview is BASED on it, but I think I know what you mean. I find the evidence compelling that consciousness is what the brain does for a living, and neural firing patterns is how the brain does it. There's quite a bit of research in this area, and despite that there's no hint anyone has ever found of any external diddling with this process by supernatural means. There IS a difference between solid indications backed by some research, and no indications backed by, well, whatever religious people back stuff by. Qualia?

Or the third kind of belief--"I believe (as in give intellectual assent) in the theory of gravity."

Ain't language grand? But I don't understand what this sort of belief is intended to convey. Sure, there's a theory of gravity. Is it complete? No theory is or can be. Is it correct? Maybe not (it can't explain all it needs to and it conflicts with other theories at different scales). But I can certainly believe it EXISTS, tentative as it is.

They are different meanings of the word ... but to be honest, I'm not sure the terminology exists. English words tend to be multivalent, and they are often so darn slippery as to make communication difficult.

Which is why most fields of study evolve their own jargon.

Which brings me to my next questions:

1. Is the intersubjectively verifiable sense the only sense that you consider valid?

Yes, given meaning definitioin #1. It seems to me that the concept of validity REQUIRES some sort of external, objective referent. If no such referent exists or CAN exist, nothing can be validated.

2. Is that decision of validity objective or subjective?

More language issues here. Let's say for the sake of discussion that elephants exist. This is the ontological position. But how do we DECIDE they exist? This is the epistemological issue. So we're looking at the intersection of the ontological (what actually exists) with the epistemological (how can we KNOW what actually exists). Intersubjective verification is the attempt to knit these together wherever possible. But (thinking Venn diagram here), there will be some territory where things objectively exist but we can't know them, and areas where we know things that don't objectively exist. I don't think these two territories can ever be made fully congruent.

[technomage]

<snip examples>I think I know what you're saying, but science in practice is both cumulative and iterative.

Oh, of course.

But I would argue that some observation ALWAYS initiates the process in science.

To be sure, If I'm not mistaken, I've seen you quote Dr. Asimov's comment about the most significant statement in science, and I quite agree.

Sorry. I admit it's a challenge for me to think religion without thinking Jorge.

Eh, I can see the difficulty there. Jorge can certainly be ... challenging to deal with.

If it's a well-formed scientific question, we don't turn anywhere, we just keep trying.

I agree, but such does not apply in my analogy. But heck, at this point, the analogy is so stretched as to be more than a bit warped.

OK, that is not my understanding. And thinking about it some more, I disagree with you. This is a "black swan" sort of thing

No, the testing of the axiom is never taken as definitive. But the testing of the axiom has been one of the methods used to refute the "catastrophism" challenges sometimes given by YECs. It's never taken as conclusive, but it is indicative.

Maybe I should say that the axiom states that all natural phenomena have natural causes?

That's actually a different axiom (and comes from the field of the philosophy of science).

Ain't language grand?

Especially English, which is known for borrowing words from multiple languages. Well, not so much "borrowing"--I've heard the process described as "chasing other languages down dark alleys, knocking them unconscious, and rifling their pockets for loose vocabulary."

Yes, given meaning definitioin #1. It seems to me that the concept of validity REQUIRES some sort of external, objective referent. If no such referent exists or CAN exist, nothing can be validated.

I tend to use a different definition of "valid," but I can see where you're coming from.

I don't think these two territories can ever be made fully congruent.

I tend to agree, and I try (but do not always succeed) to be careful of making truth claims in questionable areas.

Phank, I want to thank you. I now have a greater understanding of your worldview, and in my own personal belief system, that is not just an important facet of communication, but ... well, there's no way to say it but the formal way. You've given me some measure of insight into your mind, and that is a precious gift.

From the bottom of my heart, thank you.

[phank]

No, the testing of the axiom is never taken as definitive. But the testing of the axiom has been one of the methods used to refute the "catastrophism" challenges sometimes given by YECs. It's never taken as conclusive, but it is indicative.

I don't think we're quite together on this. The internal consistency of the universe is not tested, it is axiomatic, assumed without test or question, and fundamental. Every application of science at every level rests on this axiom. I'm not quite sure what "catastrophism" refers to here. Is it a reference to the Flud? Is it posited in contrast with the usual misunderstanding of Lyell? I don't know how to relate it to the "non-paradoxical realtity" axiom.

Phank, I want to thank you. I now have a greater understanding of your worldview, and in my own personal belief system, that is not just an important facet of communication, but ... well, there's no way to say it but the formal way. You've given me some measure of insight into your mind, and that is a precious gift.

A valuable discussion for me as well, and for much the same reasons. I have to dredge back many decades trying to recall WHY I built my model of the world the way I did, why I made certain key decisions and what those decisions imply.

[technomage]

The internal consistency of the universe is not tested

I had to look it up to make sure I was remembering it correctly.

If you remember Lyell, then you remember that uniformitarianism is broken into four parts:
* Uniformity of law
* Uniformity of process
* Uniformity of rate
* Uniformity of state.

The first two are assumed (and from the second, your "natural explanations for natural phenomena" can be inferred). The last two are substantive hypotheses, and can be tested.

But my objection on that point is more nit-picking than anything, so we can safely let it go.

Cheers!

[phank]

I had to look it up to make sure I was remembering it correctly.

If you remember Lyell, then you remember that uniformitarianism is broken into four parts:
* Uniformity of law
* Uniformity of process
* Uniformity of rate
* Uniformity of state.

The first two are assumed (and from the second, your "natural explanations for natural phenomena" can be inferred). The last two are substantive hypotheses, and can be tested.

OK, I dig. I was talking about the first one - that the laws are uniform everywhere, and reality cannot break them. This is not testable.