Occam's Razor And Creation

[JimL]

First a quote from Paul Davies



Ok, according to Paul Davies the idea of a multiverse is a leap of faith. So a question comes to mind, if we are all on the same ground of faith - what more aligns with Occam's Razor - an infinite number of past creation events leading to this present cosmos or a single intelligent Creator? Which is more parsimonious, and why?

In my opinion the multiverse scenario would align more with Occams Razor. My reasoning is that we know the nature of the universe, and it seems more likely to me that beyond our own universe there is more of the same stuff, so to speak, from out of which ours emerged. Empirical evidence tells us that nothing comes from nothing, and that the effect is in its cause, and vice versa. To posit a distinct creator, a cause that has a nature different from that which it creates has no empirical basis.

[Carrikature]

Since this is my thread the discussion, for now, is between a single Creator and a multiverse. Which is more parsimonious? Like I said I would be happy to entertain and compare other other creation theories as we go along. I think it is clear to any non-bias reader that a single Creator is more parsimonious. But non-believes seem to have a hard time admitting that.

Of course, any non-biased reader should agree with you.

Technomage even wanted to deny the usefulness of Occam's Razor.

No. He denied that it is applicable in this scenario. Occam's Razor is very useful, but it must be used correctly. Most often it is not. This is one of those times.

[pancreasman]

Occam's razor is about not multiplying entities unnecessarily. To begin with, postulating multiple universes might not classify as multiplying entities because they are all the same kind of entity. God on the other hand is definitely a new entity. Secondly, the key word is 'unnecessarily'. Claiming my lawn mower starts by magic is a very simple explanation. It is also incorrect. Thirdly, it's worth noting that Occam said "God's existence cannot be deduced by reason alone."

See here for more info if interested. (which you aren't)

http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physic...ral/occam.html

[seer]

Occam's razor is about not multiplying entities unnecessarily. To begin with, postulating multiple universes might not classify as multiplying entities because they are all the same kind of entity. God on the other hand is definitely a new entity. Secondly, the key word is 'unnecessarily'. Claiming my lawn mower starts by magic is a very simple explanation. It is also incorrect. Thirdly, it's worth noting that Occam said "God's existence cannot be deduced by reason alone."

I don't agree. We would be multiplying entities. Each universe would be similar but not the same, so they are separate entities (different universal constants and such). And it is this universe that needs to be explained, it is the universe that just as well may be the "new entity." I think one of Davies' point is that we live in a universe with very special properties conducive to life. I would say with very precise conditions. So one could suggest that if we ran through an infinite numbers of universes we are bound to hit on a life friendly cosmos. A kind of lottery. I’m sorry, a single intelligent agent seems much more simple.

[robertb]

I don't agree. If I said that it took an infinite number of creating gods before we got to the god that created this particular universe I would be multiplying entities, the same with previous universes. Which would be similar but not the same, so they are separate entities (different universal constants and such). And it is this universe that needs to be explained, it is the universe that just as well may be the "new entity." I think one of Davies' point is that we live in a universe with very special properties conducive to life. I would say with very precise conditions. So one would conclude that if we ran through an infinite numbers of universes we are bound to hit on a life conducive cosmos. A kind of lottery. I’m sorry, a single intelligent agent would be more simple

It seems to me that you are looking at this backwards.

We are here due to certain conditions, not that certain conditions exist in order for us to be here.

You see the difference? You are painting the bullseye after the dart was thrown. (Which I suppose is the actual argument you wish to make.)

[seer]

It seems to me that you are looking at this backwards.

We are here due to certain conditions, not that certain conditions exist in order for us to be here.

You see the difference? You are painting the bullseye after the dart was thrown. (Which I suppose is the actual argument you wish to make.)

No actually my point was that each universe would be different, not the same entity - of course they would have some things in common - I would think - though we have no idea if such universes could or did exist, or what properties they would have.

[JimL]

No actually my point was that each universe would be different, not the same entity - of course they would have some things in common - I would think - though we have no idea if such universes could or did exist, or what properties they would have.

I think that each universe would be different due to their initial conditions, but they would be made of the same stuff, i.e. energy/matter.

[seer]

I think that each universe would be different due to their initial conditions, but they would be made of the same stuff, i.e. energy/matter.

But they would be different entities. A child is a different entity from the mother even though she is made of the same stuff. I certainly do not see why a mulitverse would be, in any sense, more parsimonious than a single intelligent creator.

[robertb]

But they would be different entities. A child is a different entity from the mother even though she is made of the same stuff. I certainly do not see why a mulitverse would be, in any sense, more parsimonious than a single intelligent creator.

How about a single multiverse (with a bunch of different stuff) as opposed to a single creator (with a bunch of different stuff)?

[seer]

How about a single multiverse (with a bunch of different stuff) as opposed to a single creator (with a bunch of different stuff)?

Well a single creator would not have a bunch of different stuff. The God of classic theism is simple, one substance.

[robertb]

Well a single creator would not have a bunch of different stuff. The God of classic theism is simple, one substance.

Is the creation simple and of one substance?

[seer]

Is the creation simple and of one substance?

I wouldn't say so. We made be all made up of atoms but they are configured quite differently. Rocks don't think, humans do.

[pancreasman]

I wouldn't say so. We made be all made up of atoms but they are configured quite differently. Rocks don't think, humans do.

That's only an assertion grounded in faith and nothing more. Shame on you for disparaging rocks.

[JimL]

But they would be different entities. A child is a different entity from the mother even though she is made of the same stuff.

A child differs from the mother, yes, the one is distinct from the other, but they are both of one and the same substance, they exist within one and the same system, i.e. the universe, without the which, neither would exist. Multiple universes too would be distinct from each other, but they would both be of the same eternal and infinite substance, which would mean that they would exist within the same eternal and infinite system, a substance existing both within and without of themselves.

I certainly do not see why a mulitverse would be, in any sense, more parsimonious than a single intelligent creator.

Well, I gave my answer to that. Multiverses would be made of the same stuff as the eternal existence, a stuff that we know to exist. The stuff of a distinct creator, a God, on the other hand, we have to imagine to exist.

[robertb]

I wouldn't say so. We made be all made up of atoms but they are configured quite differently. Rocks don't think, humans do.

Right. Now look back at what I pointed out to you earlier.