Dementia and Dualism

[Lili]

Dementia seems to prove that memories are stored in the brain. It also shows that thinking and reasoning become impossible when the brain is severely damaged. Does this prove that consciousness depends on the brain?

[robertb]

Dementia seems to prove that memories are stored in the brain. It also shows that thinking and reasoning become impossible when the brain is severely damaged. Does this prove that consciousness depends on the brain?

Not sure about 'prove', but 'provides strong evidence for' might be more appropriate at this point in time.

[Chrawnus]

Dementia seems to prove that memories are stored in the brain. It also shows that thinking and reasoning become impossible when the brain is severely damaged. Does this prove that consciousness depends on the brain?

Actually, we don't know if thinking and reasoning becomes impossible when the brain is severely damaged. All we know is that those who become severely brain damaged can't express their thinking and reasoning. So it could be that they lose their ability to think and reason, but it might also be that their mind is simply cut off from the outside world.

[Lili]

I found an article that states that memories and personality could be stored both in the brain and the soul. Although memories can be lost when the brain is damaged, it is possible that a copy of them is stored and accessible from the soul.

[shunyadragon]

I found an article that states that memories and personality could be stored both in the brain and the soul. Although memories can be lost when the brain is damaged, it is possible that a copy of them is stored and accessible from the soul.

Could be? Yes, it could be if the soul exists. I believe it does, but realize that this is a hypothetical relationship without evidence that soul either is our consciousness, or that it mirrors our consciousness. There basically is no evidence that consciousness exists separate from the brain.

The refrigerator light goes out when we close the door even though we do not see it go out.

[Kenny]

There’s little doubt that consciousness in some sense depends on the brain (it also depends on things like not having taken too many sleeping pills). But that’s entirely consistent with mind-body dualism. Dependence is not the same as identity.

As for whether it is possible for a human person to be conscious without a brain, that too (the claim that it is possible) is consistent with the claim that the mind depends on the brain. If the dependence relation here is merely a causal one, for example, then the mind can keep going on without the brain as long as something else steps in to plug the causal gap. Certainly a being like God could do that if he wanted to. (Keep in mind that orthodox Christians believe that disembodied existence is at best a temporary and less-than-ideal state for human persons, seeing as how we look forward to the resurrection of the body).

[robertb]

There’s little doubt that consciousness in some sense depends on the brain (it also depends on things like not having taken too many sleeping pills). But that’s entirely consistent with mind-body dualism. Dependence is not the same as identity.

Though I do think that, in light of our current understanding, mind-body dualism is highly unlikely, I am interested in understanding what evidence you think might clinch the argument for the proposition that the mind is completely dependent on the brain.

[Kenny]

Though I do think that, in light of our current understanding, mind-body dualism is highly unlikely, I am interested in understanding what evidence you think might clinch the argument for the proposition that the mind is completely dependent on the brain.

This may seem like an attempt to weasel out of the question, but it is not. I honestly don’t know what is meant here by “completely dependent on the brain”?

“Identical to the brain?” If that’s what’s meant, then, frankly, I doubt that any amount of empirical evidence (of any ordinary sort) could show that. Maybe if there were an extremely empirically well confirmed theory (one that made a host of correct predications, was explanatorily useful, etc.) of consciousness that was antecedently credible on an extant body of background knowledge, and which entailed mind-brain identity, that would do the trick. But I have no idea what such a theory might look like (or even whether there could possibly be such a theory), and neither (imo) does anyone else.

If you mean something like, say, perfect causal correlation between brain activity and mental activity, then I think we’ve got pretty good (but not conclusive) evidence for that thesis right now. What would clinch it is just enough of more observations of mind-brain correlations of the same sort that we’ve been making.

[robertb]

This may seem like an attempt to weasel out of the question, but it is not. I honestly don’t know what is meant here by “completely dependent on the brain”?

“Identical to the brain?” If that’s what’s meant, then, frankly, I doubt that any amount of empirical evidence (of any ordinary sort) could show that. Maybe if there were an extremely empirically well confirmed theory (one that made a host of correct predications, was explanatorily useful, etc.) of consciousness that was antecedently credible on an extant body of background knowledge, and which entailed mind-brain identity, that would do the trick. But I have no idea what such a theory might look like (or even whether there could possibly be such a theory), and neither (imo) does anyone else.

If you mean something like, say, perfect causal correlation between brain activity and mental activity, then I think we’ve got pretty good (but not conclusive) evidence for that thesis right now. What would clinch it is just enough of more observations of mind-brain correlations of the same sort that we’ve been making.

Thanks Kenny. I did not mean to imply "identical to the brain" as, from my perspective, the mind is one of the things the brain does, in other words, an effect of electro-chemical processes within the brain and not the brain itself. If that clarifies it for you.

[Sparko]

Memory is data. If you forget something, does that change WHO you are? I don't think so. I forget stuff all the time and still remain me. Depending on what you forget, it could affect how you interact with the world, but it doesn't change who you are at your core.

[robertb]

Memory is data. If you forget something, does that change WHO you are? I don't think so. I forget stuff all the time and still remain me. Depending on what you forget, it could affect how you interact with the world, but it doesn't change who you are at your core.

"Depending of what you forget" being key, I suppose.

I went through the various stages of Dementia with my late grandmother. Sadly, towards the end, she became a completely different person.

[seer]

Dementia seems to prove that memories are stored in the brain. It also shows that thinking and reasoning become impossible when the brain is severely damaged. Does this prove that consciousness depends on the brain?

Well since I lean towards emergent dualism I would say yes. But the mind is not reduced to physical properties.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Hasker

[pancreasman]

We're in those murky waters of subjective versus objective again. I think the mind (although that word covers a multitude of sins) is the subjective experience of what the brain is doing. The brain is objective. Even its activity is objective. But the experience of that activity is limited to the 'person' (whatever that is) whose brain it happens to be.

When I have a toothache, the cause and mechanism of that toothache is objective. The experience of pain is subjective. Would we say that my toothache has some separate existence apart from its physical, objective dimension? I don't think so.

[Kenny]

Thanks Kenny. I did not mean to imply "identical to the brain" as, from my perspective, the mind is one of the things the brain does, in other words, an effect of electro-chemical processes within the brain and not the brain itself. If that clarifies it for you.

When I’m trying to be precise (as opposed to just throwing ideas out there in a quick, intuitive way), I tend to use the word ‘mind’ to denote the thing that thinks. So, given my terminology, if the brain is the thing that thinks, the brain is identical to the mind. I tend to use ‘brain activity’ to denote the things the brain does and ‘mental activity’ to denote the activities associated with thinking, experiencing, etc. If the brain is identical to the mind, then mental activity is a subset of brain activity. I’m not arguing here that everyone should use their terms this way (there’s no point in arguing about merely stipulative definitions of terms). But this is the terminology I like to use, terminology that I find helpful in making the right distinctions and in avoiding some confusions. So that lets you know how I’m talking about things.

[robertb]

When I’m trying to be precise (as opposed to just throwing ideas out there in a quick, intuitive way), I tend to use the word ‘mind’ to denote the thing that thinks. So, given my terminology, if the brain is the thing that thinks, the brain is identical to the mind. I tend to use ‘brain activity’ to denote the things the brain does and ‘mental activity’ to denote the activities associated with thinking, experiencing, etc. If the brain is identical to the mind, then mental activity is a subset of brain activity. I’m not arguing here that everyone should use their terms this way (there’s no point in arguing about merely stipulative definitions of terms). But this is the terminology I like to use, terminology that I find helpful in making the right distinctions and in avoiding some confusions. So that lets you know how I’m talking about things.

To me, when you say that the mind is the thing that thinks, it seems that you are sayng that the mind is the thing that is the mind, as the mind and thinks are, in my view, pretty much the same thing. So the brain enables thinking, but the brain is not, itself, equal to thinking.

If that is clear.