How obviously true is Christianity or Atheism?

[pancreasman]

You know, you'll all (especially RG) just call me names but I think this whole philosophical preoccupation with particular words (like 'ought' and 'should' and 'is' and 'duck') is straining at semantic gnats. We have to accept that moral statements have to be prescriptive 'oughts' and that they are a special class of statements. I just can't see it.

I think of it in terms of game theory. In any particular circumstance one can analyze (or simply intuit) that there are certain actions I can take will be more or less beneficial to me over the short or long term. I will then choose to act accordingly depending on what in particular value. I like the benefits of living in a civil society so I act as a law abiding citizen.

I could quote lots of very smart philosophers over the centuries who have offered complex and interesting theories of ethics and morality. None of them is blindingly self evident and many have interesting insights. But nobody cares. I, for one, am all in favour of another pointless thread where we beat the dead horse of objective morality with no chance of anyone changing their position.

[Adrift]

You know, you'll all (especially RG) just call me names but I think this whole philosophical preoccupation with particular words (like 'ought' and 'should' and 'is' and 'duck') is straining at semantic gnats. We have to accept that moral statements have to be prescriptive 'oughts' and that they are a special class of statements. I just can't see it.

Sorry pancreasman (why pancreas by the way?). we don't "have to accept that moral statements have to be prescriptive 'oughts'", but it seems to me that we should accept that objective moral statements have to be prescriptive 'oughts'. That's really what is in contention here.

I think of it in terms of game theory. In any particular circumstance one can analyze (or simply intuit) that there are certain actions I can take will be more or less beneficial to me over the short or long term. I will then choose to act accordingly depending on what in particular value. I like the benefits of living in a civil society so I act as a law abiding citizen.

In terms of game theory, this seems to work out okay in the short run. Divinely based objective morality works on a far bigger picture than game theory usually encapsulates, I think. From a divine perspective, morality works in both the here today physical, and the everlasting spiritual. There's presumably, a bigger picture in the natural as well as the spiritual.

I could quote lots of very smart philosophers over the centuries who have offered complex and interesting theories of ethics and morality. None of them is blindingly self evident and many have interesting insights. But nobody cares.

Well somebody cares, otherwise there would be no need to label these philosophers smart.

I, for one, am all in favour of another pointless thread where we beat the dead horse of objective morality with no chance of anyone changing their position.

That's usually how it goes on these types of forums... isn't it?

[Kenny]

It is hard for me to answer the question in the OP for a couple of reasons.

First, I think that something can be obvious to me but not to someone else (and vice versa). Theism is often obvious to me, but I can enter sympathetically into the minds of some of my atheists friends and colleagues and see why it doesn’t strike them that way. The same sort of phenomenon arises in other areas. Some purely philosophical positions that both atheists and theists could consistently hold, for example, are such that they strike me as obviously true. Still, I can sympathize with those who don’t agree with them. I don’t think they are crazy or stupid or anything of the sort merely because they disagree. The same goes for many of my political views.

Second, in my case, how obvious theism or Christianity seems to me fluctuates somewhat over time. Sometimes theism (sometimes just generic theism, sometimes specifically Christian theism) seems absolutely obvious to me. Other times, I find myself with significant doubts. Occasionally (though not at all often) it can even seem silly to me. This isn’t a phenomenon that is unique to my religious beliefs, however. I find the same to be true of some of my philosophical and political beliefs as well.

I do find, however, that practically speaking, I am pretty much always taking Christian theism for granted. This is particularly manifest to me when I notice that even in the midst of significant doubts about theism or Christianity, I still find myself inclined to pray, and still find myself with a sense of security brought on by the thought that there is a larger providential plan at work in my life.

So in some ways (though it isn’t exactly like this) the phenomenology I find associated with my doubts about theism is similar to the sort of phenomenology that accompanies, say, finding myself with doubts about whether I have free will, or whether I strictly endure through time, or whether I really exist (as opposed, say, to there merely being simples arranged Kenny-wise involved in a collective activity of thinking), or don’t live in a simulation (darn you Nick Bostrom for actually providing an argument for taking Cartesian skepticism as a live option, as opposed to a mere philosophical device!), or have genuine moral obligations. Occasionally, I can, under certain conditions, find myself with genuine intellectual doubts along one of these lines (that’s what happens when you read too much philosophy). But, all the while, I still find myself taking it for granted at a practical level that the things I am doubting are true.

[Rational Gaze]

You claimed that moral facts can't be grounded in natural facts on the basis that moral facts are prescriptive "ought" statements and no such statements can be grounded in natural facts. I responded by showing that prescriptive "ought" statements can — sometimes at least — be grounded in purely natural facts.

No, you responded by proffering a line of argument that presupposes the very moral assumptions you are trying to ground... which is circular reasoning. You stated, if one wants to achieve X, then they OUGHT to do Y. You need to show that X is something one OUGHT to strive for, i.e. that it is morally good. This you did not do, and until you do so, it is simply another IS statement that you are trying to pass off as an OUGHT statement by playing semantic games. I could re-phrase moral facts so that they are IS statements, but that won't get us anywhere, since that would be equivocation.

[Rational Gaze]

I think that part of the problem is that RG is familiar enough with the arguments against objective morality (arguments on both sides of the issue are pretty well known to both sides of the debate), that he's simply cutting to the chase. He knows where the argument is leading, and doesn't feel it necessary to engage with arguments like "well any 'is' can be turned to an 'ought'" [I'm paraphrasing of course] because he's clearly dealing with the "ought" that derives from objective morality. Sea and robert's arguments may be technically correct, but RG is just replying to their (presumed) conclusions.

Actually, the problem is that I am familiar with at least some of the literature on meta-ethics and the philosophy of religion whereas the people I am trying to have a conversation with don't appear to be familiar with said literature. Since I made an argument, but neither Seasanctuary nor robertb responded to my actual argument. Sea's response was to basically repeat an argument I had dealt with in the very post he was responding to, and then argued against what he thought I was arguing. robertb, on the other hand just flat out straw-manned my position based on his preconceived ideas of Divine Command Theory, and not actually addressing anything I actually said.

[Rational Gaze]

You know, you'll all (especially RG) just call me names

I don't recall calling you any names. In fact, I don't recall calling anybody any names with the sole exception of technomage, who I called an idiot since he is apparently operating under the delusion that calling people names, and making bare assertions in lieu of argument is a valid form of discourse.

[shunyadragon]

[QUOTE=Rolo megatheist;3446963]So basically what you're saying is that atheism is better able to incorporate the scientific and "objective" evidence correct? Also Christianity and other religions fail, because they are theories which have to coerce the evidence into agreeing with their desired conclusion or else ignore it completely is that also what you're trying to say.? [quote]

Close, Fundamentalist YEC is the extreme ignoring science ranging to ID views that are selective about science and try and manipulate science.

You're missing what I'm trying to say. I'm not talking about the strength of their disbelief, I'm talking about their beliefs in general. The one common feature of atheism may be disbelief, but beyond that little is as consistent as you say. Stalin and Nietzsche were both atheists, but their worldviews were different in profound ways. My point is that while the one constant of atheism is that their are no gods outside of that atheists have widely diverged in the same ways theists have.

Well, your missing the point. first problem is people like Stalin and Hitler are bad examples of atheists. Their views in their writings are confusing, warped and mixed on belief issues, to the point they were more anti everything and killed or sent to Siberia or concentration camps other atheists, particularly intellectuals or ethnic minorities.

Nietzsche is closer, maybe atheist or agnostic, but definitely a naturalist. I like Neitzsche, he had a lot to say about the phony Superstitious world of the churches and the state. Unfortunately his work was misappropriated by his sister to support Hitler.

I am referring to the main stream and by far the majority atheist/agnostics in history particularly today. They are basically Metaphysical Naturalists consistently, and consider the objective evidence of science to be the standard of human knowledge.

[Adrift]

Actually, the problem is that I am familiar with at least some of the literature on meta-ethics and the philosophy of religion whereas the people I am trying to have a conversation with don't appear to be familiar with said literature.

Well, to be honest, I, don't think I'm completely familiar with said literature. Are you? I think I remember you saying (at one point, in some thread) that you are in school studying out similar issues that we are currently debating, or at least, that you are a student of ancient history. Can you point out any specific works that would help out in this debate? If not, that's cool. I know that I've forgotten half the books on the subject of Romantic and Post-Modern Literature that I've studied in college. I wish that weren't the case.

neither Seasanctuary nor robertb responded to my actual argument.

Just as a refresher, what exactly is your argument?

Sea's response was to basically repeat an argument I had dealt with in the very post he was responding to, and then argued against what he thought I was arguing.

I agree. You are referring to ought statements tied to moral truths while Seasanctuary seems to be basing ought statements on "natural facts" (whatever those might be), however, it seems to me that you know what he is getting at (with, so called "natural facts"), yet you aren't going there, because the two are not the same. Is that correct?

robertb, on the other hand just flat out straw-manned my position based on his preconceived ideas of Divine Command Theory, and not actually addressing anything I actually said.

I agree, Divine Command theory seems contingent on a branch of Euthyphro's dilemma which orthodoxy denies (by splitting the dilemma down the center) the orthodox teaching seems to be that objective morality is a property of God, and not simply that which he commands.

[Rational Gaze]

Well, to be honest, I, don't think I'm completely familiar with said literature. Are you? I think I remember you saying (at one point, in some thread) that you are in school studying out similar issues that we are currently debating, or at least, that you are a student of ancient history. Can you point out any specific works that would help out in this debate? If not, that's cool. I know that I've forgotten half the books on the subject of Romantic and Post-Modern Literature that I've studied in college. I wish that weren't the case.

I am currently studying Music and History BA (Hons) at the University of Chichester. The History department here focuses mostly on Western history from the Medieval period until the present, and the Music modules focus primarily on the history of Western music, but I am doing my dissertation on 1st century New Testament culture, specifically the resurrection of Jesus. As for moral theory, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of religion and all that, I have not done a great of reading yet. I have purchased Divine Commands and Moral Requirements by Phillip L. Quine (which was recommended to me by Glenn Peoples), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology by JP Moreland and William Lane Craig (which covers the moral argument for theism and is now available as an e-book for really cheap), as well reading and watching stuff by Ravi Zacharias and William Lane Craig on moral theory and the moral argument. I also recommend Glenn Peoples' blog and podcast. I also have a bunch of intro and popular level philosophy books, such as Terminator and Philosopher, Matrix and Philosophy, Final Fantasy and Philosophy. I also recommend watching various debates on the issue, such as William Lane Craig's debate with Stephen Law and his debate with Sam Harris.

Just as a refresher, what exactly is your argument?

I first argued that the nature of moral facts imply a personal, non-natural origin. I noted that natural facts do not give rise to moral facts. For example, we can know that giving drinking water to someone who is thirsty will alleviate their thirstiness. We know that alleviating their thirstiness will prevent them from dying of dehydration. Neither of these two natural facts tell us anything about whether or not it is morally good, i.e. whether we OUGHT to give them water. We obviously value human life, but we cannot presuppose the value of human life, since this would be to reason in a circle. For example, I could argue that human life is valuable, therefore we ought to take actions that preserve human life. If asked for why human life is valuable, however, then I need an answer, one that is objective. (I noticed you earlier noted the distinction of objective moral values and duties. In a subjective moral system, there are no actual moral values and duties.) Now, my answer that I gave later on in the post, was that human life is valuable, because we were created by an absolutely necessary, maximally great intelligent creator. In this regard, I argued that without God, we are nothing more than a random accident, which would mean that there is no purpose, and, by extension, no meaning or value to our lives. This gives us an adequate ground for moral epistemology. I also argued that, in order for a moral system to be objective, then it needs to be independent of human opinion and social conventions. This is true, since objective morality is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express factual propositions about robust, mind-independent features of the world. Since God, being maximally great, is good by nature (since being all-good is a great-making property) His nature is an adequate ground for moral ontology. This is internally consistent, non-circular, and obliterates the Euthyphro Dilemma. I lastly argued that non-theistic moral theories totally fail to give an adequate ground for moral facts. I agree that I probably worded my argument a little wrong (I have The 'Pergers^TM you see), though. If that is the case, then I apologise.

I agree. You are referring to ought statements tied to moral truths while Seasanctuary seems to be basing ought statements on "natural facts" (whatever those might be), however, it seems to me that you know what he is getting at (with, so called "natural facts"), yet you aren't going there, because the two are not the same. Is that correct?

A natural fact is simply a fact about the universe, i.e. drinking water prevents dehydration, eating food prevents starvation. None of these type of facts can give us any insight into moral facts, i.e. we ought to give water to thirsty people, we ought to give food to starving people. Sea argued that these facts do provide us with moral facts. For example, giving water and food to impoverished people will prevent them from dying. The problem is that this presuppose the moral value of human life, as aforementioned.

I agree, Divine Command theory seems contingent on a branch of Euthyphro's dilemma which orthodoxy denies (by splitting the dilemma down the center) the orthodox teaching seems to be that objective morality is a property of God, and not simply that which he commands.

Divine Command theory gets round Euthyphro's dilemma in two ways: first, God, being a maximally great, absolutely necessary being, is all-good by very definition, i.e. being all-good is a great making property. This grounds moral ontology. Secondly, human life has value if we are created by God, since that would mean our lives have purpose, and by extension, meaning and value. This grounds moral epistemology. I hope I explained this well enough.

[Adrift]

I am currently studying Music and History BA (Hons) at the University of Chichester. The History department here focuses mostly on Western history from the Medieval period until the present, and the Music modules focus primarily on the history of Western music, but I am doing my dissertation on 1st century New Testament culture, specifically the resurrection of Jesus.

I envy you.

As for moral theory, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of religion and all that, I have not done a great of reading yet. I have purchased Divine Commands and Moral Requirements by Phillip L. Quine (which was recommended to me by Glenn Peoples),

I like Glenn Peoples. Wish he posted more often here.

The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology by JP Moreland and William Lane Craig (which covers the moral argument for theism and is now available as an e-book for really cheap)

I remember, not long ago, when this was prohibitively expensive... (though certain forum members were able to acquire this at reasonable cost )

as well reading and watching stuff by Ravi Zacharias and William Lane Craig on moral theory and the moral argument.

Yeah, a lot of this is probably free through podcasts, online lectures, and youtube videos.

I also recommend Glenn Peoples' blog and podcast.

Not a member. I should rectify this.

I also have a bunch of intro and popular level philosophy books, such as Terminator and Philosopher, Matrix and Philosophy, Final Fantasy and Philosophy.

Hmm..

I also recommend watching various debates on the issue, such as William Lane Craig's debate with Stephen Law and his debate with Sam Harris.

Fair enough. I think I've watched the Sam Harris debate, but that was some time ago.

I first argued that the nature of moral facts imply a personal, non-natural origin. I noted that natural facts do not give rise to moral facts. For example, we can know that giving drinking water to someone who is thirsty will alleviate their thirstiness. We know that alleviating their thirstiness will prevent them from dying of dehydration. Neither of these two natural facts tell us anything about whether or not it is morally good, i.e. whether we OUGHT to give them water. We obviously value human life, but we cannot presuppose the value of human life, since this would be to reason in a circle. For example, I could argue that human life is valuable, therefore we ought to take actions that preserve human life. If asked for why human life is valuable, however, then I need an answer, one that is objective. (I noticed you earlier noted the distinction of objective moral values and duties. In a subjective moral system, there are no actual moral values and duties.) Now, my answer that I gave later on in the post, was that human life is valuable, because we were created by an absolutely necessary, maximally great intelligent creator. In this regard, I argued that without God, we are nothing more than a random accident, which would mean that there is no purpose, and, by extension, no meaning or value to our lives. This gives us an adequate ground for moral epistemology. I also argued that, in order for a moral system to be objective, then it needs to be independent of human opinion and social conventions. This is true, since objective morality is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express factual propositions about robust, mind-independent features of the world. Since God, being maximally great, is good by nature (since being all-good is a great-making property) His nature is an adequate ground for moral ontology. This is internally consistent, non-circular, and obliterates the Euthyphro Dilemma. I lastly argued that non-theistic moral theories totally fail to give an adequate ground for moral facts. I agree that I probably worded my argument a little wrong (I have The 'Pergers^TM you see), though. If that is the case, then I apologise.

Fair enough, and I think this accurately describes in fair detail your position. As I hinted at before, I think your argument assumes certain unargued positions, but I think think that's fair seeing as most of us can anticipate the basis for counter-argument (Asperger or not).

A natural fact is simply a fact about the universe, i.e. drinking water prevents dehydration, eating food prevents starvation. None of these type of facts can give us any insight into moral facts, i.e. we ought to give water to thirsty people, we ought to give food to starving people. Sea argued that these facts do provide us with moral facts. For example, giving water and food to impoverished people will prevent them from dying. The problem is that this presuppose the moral value of human life, as aforementioned.

Technically, Sea did not argue these points (of course, he can speak for himself), but I can see why you anticipated these points.

Divine Command theory gets round Euthyphro's dilemma in two ways: first, God, being a maximally great, absolutely necessary being, is all-good by very definition, i.e. being all-good is a great making property. This grounds moral ontology. Secondly, human life has value if we are created by God, since that would mean our lives have purpose, and by extension, meaning and value. This grounds moral epistemology. I hope I explained this well enough.

I think what you mean to say is that "Divine Command Theory" is party to Euthyphro's dilemma, since it seems to rely on that part of the dilemma that says, "good is what God commands" regardless of the nature of God which is, as you put it, maximally great.

[Seasanctuary]

No, you responded by proffering a line of argument that presupposes the very moral assumptions you are trying to ground... which is circular reasoning. You stated, if one wants to achieve X, then they OUGHT to do Y. You need to show that X is something one OUGHT to strive for, i.e. that it is morally good.

"Since you're in Arizona, in order to get to California, you ought to head West."

"No, no, no! First you have to show that it's morally good to get to California!"

[Rational Gaze]

"Since you're in Arizona, in order to get to California, you ought to head West."

Which isn't a moral fact. Thank you for proving my point.

"No, no, no! First you have to show that it's morally good to get to California!"

Which proves my point again. I noted that moral facts cannot be derived from natural facts. You respond by giving an example of a natural fact that does not lead to a moral fact. I'm reluctant to call you an idiot, but your responses so far are indicative of someone who is just plain not paying attention.

[Chrawnus]

"Since you're in Arizona, in order to get to California, you ought to head West."

"No, no, no! First you have to show that it's morally good to get to California!"

I'm having a hard time figuring out why Nightbringer amen'd this post. It wasn't like it was particularly insightful, or anything like that.

[Seasanctuary]

I noted that moral facts cannot be derived from natural facts. You respond by giving an example of a natural fact that does not lead to a moral fact.

This started with you saying: "The problem is that the nature of moral facts is incompatible with moral facts being grounded in a natural feature or features of the universe. Moral facts are prescriptive "ought" statements, whereas facts about the universe are descriptive "is" statements (a fact that dum-dum fatalists seem to have a hard time grasping.)"

Which I understood to mean something like:

A. Moral facts are prescriptive "ought" statements.
B. Prescriptive "ought" statements can't be grounded in natural features.
C. Therefore, moral facts can't be grounded in natural features.

I accepted premise (A), but challenged premise (B). So far, you haven't indicated whether or not you still affirm (B). Alternatively, you could deny that you ever made an argument like this.

[Rational Gaze]

This started with you saying: "The problem is that the nature of moral facts is incompatible with moral facts being grounded in a natural feature or features of the universe. Moral facts are prescriptive "ought" statements, whereas facts about the universe are descriptive "is" statements (a fact that dum-dum fatalists seem to have a hard time grasping.)"

Which I understood to mean something like:

A. Moral facts are prescriptive "ought" statements.
B. Prescriptive "ought" statements can't be grounded in natural features.
C. Therefore, moral facts can't be grounded in natural features.

I accepted premise (A), but challenged premise (B). So far, you haven't indicated whether or not you still affirm (B). Alternatively, you could deny that you ever made an argument like this.

Well, let's use your example: 'In order to get to California from Arizona, you ought to drive West.' This example presuppose I want to get to California from Arizona, which means that you are attempting to ground morality in human desire (whether you are cognisant of this reality or not.) I already covered this kind of moral system in my previous posts. In order for moral facts to be objective, they need to be mind-independent. That's what objective morality means. If you try to base moral facts on human desires, then such systems are subjective, meaning there are no moral facts at all.