How obviously true is Christianity or Atheism?

[Adrift]

I'm a little pooped, and I think we're going to the Alamo tomorrow.

Make sure to check out the basement.

[Kenny]

I think we're going to the Alamo tomorrow. I'll be back.

Don't forget!

[Rolo megatheist]

Did not say you did. I said they are bad examples of what atheists believe. I do not know if skeptics would let theists say that. The question is irrelavant.

Unfortunately, the question is not irrelevant. All you're doing is cherry picking who you want to call an atheist or not. Both Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were consistent in their belief in metaphysical naturalism which makes them atheists. They did not believe in theism or a supernatural force. Unless "consistent metaphysical naturalist" means something for you that it doesn't mean for everyone else you're argument that Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were inconsistent metaphysical naturalists fails.

Unfortunately, like other ancient religions, Christianity limits the consideration of a universal view of the history of the world and the roll of the different religions in favor of one centered on Christianity.

This is a baseless assertion. As I explained, in a previous post Christianity does take into account a universal view of the world. Among other things it claims that God created the entire world and that Jesus died for the sins of all humanity. It doesn't get more universal then that.

Many may take science into account, but that, 'taking into account,' is hedging for that matter. You would represent a distinct minority depending on how much you are willing to take science 'into account.' YEC fundamentalists represent greater than 50% Christians in the USA, the more people go to church the more they will oppose evolution. Based on statistics the OEC, Intelligent Design Crowd likely make up the next 20 to 30 %, or more, leaving those who are willing to accept science without conditions a distinct minority

This is completely irrelevant, whether or not I'm a majority or minoirity, the fact of the matter is theism is able to do exactly what you claim atheism/agnosticm does leaving your argument worthless.
Also if you believe that atheism/agnosticm represent a more consistent and objective worldview then why are you a theist?

[Jaecp]

He has faith in spite of that

[robertb]

Unless you provide an actual argument, then I am free to dismiss your position out of hand.
…

I will go back and address the initial part of the argument you made. As this is a broad topic, once we deal with this, you can bring up any additional objections you might think are relevant.

I asked you to justify the statement that "If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist."

I suppose we can agree that the word morality generally means something like proper behavior. The question then becomes, for any given situation is there something like the most proper behavior? Both you and I believe that there is and that this most proper behavior may be referred to as a moral fact, in that this particular response to a particular situation is, in fact, the most proper. So, on this point at least, I believe we should be generally in agreement.

Where the issue arises is your contention that moral facts need to be grounded in something beyond the universe. Moral facts are, as I would argue, actually grounded in rationality. There is no need for platonic realism, nor is the embrace of theism required. Morality is grounded in rationality which is in turn grounded in perception. A moral fact is therefore what the most perfectly rational response would be to any specific situation given perfect perception. By perception, I mean the understanding of reality.

So, the question now becomes, can we know these moral facts? To this question, my answer would be not absolutely, but that we can continually improve our understanding of them and in doing so get ever closer to knowing them. Our limitations are that we are not perfectly rational, nor do we have perfect perception, we can only work to lessen the effect of our imperfections, analogous to approaching a limit in calculus. In fact, this is surely the case as it is exactly what we find when we look back historically at our continuously evolving morality.

So not only is my view of morality empirically evidenced, it also answers your initial claim that

if moral truths exist, then, in order for atheism to be true, moral truths need to be grounded in something other than God

They are grounded in something other than God, morals are grounded in rationality.

I do not see the Is/Ought issue to be relevant to issue of the existence of moral facts themselves. This is, however, relevant to what we can know in practice due to our less than perfect rationality and perception. From that perspective, the issue can be put aside as irrelevant to the “fact of the matter”. In other words, that we may come up short of the facts says absolutely nothing about the facts themselves.

I suppose that we can start here.

[Rational Gaze]

"Proving" your point? RG, your mind was made up on the issue before you typed your first post--as at least one of your previous threads (the one about Obama suing Ohio) has already established, you are more than willing to listen to any lie that satisfies your preconceptions, and more than willing to ignore contradictory evidence to your preferred lies based on non-rational grounds.

You mean the thread where I changed my mind based on evidence? Huh. I would say that I don't want to insult your intelligence by accusing you of actually believing what you have written here, but given your past performance, I can deduce that you probably are that stupid.

I could say "Thank you for proving my point," but I doubt you even understand what my point is.

Whatever helps you get to sleep at night, son. Let me know when you have actual arguments.

[Rational Gaze]

Ok, cool. What I'm hearing now is something like this:

A. All moral facts are objective prescriptive "ought" statements.
B. No objective prescriptive "ought" statements can be grounded in natural features.
C. Therefore, no moral facts can be grounded in natural features.

Which is valid. I'm not sure whether I agree with this (A) and (B) because it can be hard to pin down exactly what someone means by "objective." They're not specific enough to be propositions for me.

Objective simply means independent of human beliefs and social conventions, etc. For example, if the ethical proposition: 'murder is wrong' is objectively true, then it is true regardless of whether anybody believes it. As such, objective moral values and duties need a non-subjective ground (since otherwise, moral values and duties would not be objective.)

My metaethics does include a significant element of objectivity, to the point that I can affirm that any true or false moral fact is that way objectively and without necessarily relying on anyone's desires (though some moral facts may still be about desires). Or at least moral facts are objectively true or false in the sense that this non-moral prescriptive "ought" statement is objectively true:

"Since you're in Arizona, in order to get to California, you ought to head West."

Whether or not you desire to get to California, it's still objectively true that in order to get to California, you ought to head West. In other words, desire is not part of the truth conditions of this prescriptive "ought" statement. Geography fixes its truth value.

A moral fact is an ethical proposition that is true. Moral facts, furthermore, imply that a certain course of action is either right or wrong. The statement: 'California is West of Arizona' does not imply the statement: 'you ought to go west.' I consider your example defective, because it is not actually an example of an prescriptive ought statement. You've simply played around with words. The fact that certain actions inflict suffering, pain, and misery upon people is a descriptive statement. Nothing about this fact says anything about whether or not we have a moral requirement to refrain from such actions. Moral facts tell us what should happen, and what ought to be, whereas natural facts about the world are merely descriptive. They tells us what is, or what will happen given certain circumstances. The biggest problem with your example is that: "in order to get to California from Arizona" is not a natural fact. A natural fact would be: "California is west of Arizona" or "travelling west from Arizona will get you to California." It seems to me all you've done is re-word the second statement.

[Seasanctuary]

Objective simply means independent of human beliefs and social conventions, etc. For example, if the ethical proposition: 'murder is wrong' is objectively true, then it is true regardless of whether anybody believes it. As such, objective moral values and duties need a non-subjective ground (since otherwise, moral values and duties would not be objective.)

"Murder is wrong" can be objectively true, if what's meant by "Murder is wrong" reduces down to a true hypothetical imperative. (This particular example might be true by definition just because "murder" is usually taken to mean "wrongful killing.")

More generally, "X is wrong" — when spoken by a Utilitarian — might mean "X lowers aggregate happiness." In that case, it can be true that "X [lowers aggregate happiness]" no matter what people believe about this proposition. The Utilitarian has affirmed an objective truth.

What you probably want, however, is for "X is wrong" to mean just "X is wrong" without any kind of reduction. But without any implicit reduction, I don't think "X is wrong" could possibly mean anything. At best it would be an expression of negative emotion. I would be an error theorist if I didn't think the average person really is using reducible moral language, despite their folk theories about what they themselves are doing.

A moral fact is an ethical proposition that is true. Moral facts, furthermore, imply that a certain course of action is either right or wrong. The statement: 'California is West of Arizona' does not imply the statement: 'you ought to go west.'

Correct, it doesn't.

But "Since you're in Arizona, you ought to go west to get to California" can be a true normative fact as a complete statement. There is a correct association of an end and the best means to that end, within some implicit limitations.

I consider your example defective, because it is not actually an example of an prescriptive ought statement. You've simply played around with words. The fact that certain actions inflict suffering, pain, and misery upon people is a descriptive statement.

Those facts alone are purely descriptive, sure. I'm talking about means and ends, which takes us beyond the purely descriptive. I'm saying "ought" claims are composed of means, ends, and their relationships.

The biggest problem with your example is that: "in order to get to California from Arizona" is not a natural fact. A natural fact would be: "California is west of Arizona" or "travelling west from Arizona will get you to California." It seems to me all you've done is re-word the second statement.

It's an end, not a natural fact. Glad you noticed the difference. I agree we wouldn't get far just by adding natural fact to natural fact. But the extra ingredient is an end — a goal — not some kind of nonnatural fact.

[Rational Gaze]

I will go back and address the initial part of the argument you made. As this is a broad topic, once we deal with this, you can bring up any additional objections you might think are relevant.

I asked you to justify the statement that "If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist."

I suppose we can agree that the word morality generally means something like proper behavior. The question then becomes, for any given situation is there something like the most proper behavior? Both you and I believe that there is and that this most proper behavior may be referred to as a moral fact, in that this particular response to a particular situation is, in fact, the most proper. So, on this point at least, I believe we should be generally in agreement.

Here we go. Some actual meat!

Where the issue arises is your contention that moral facts need to be grounded in something beyond the universe. Moral facts are, as I would argue, actually grounded in rationality. There is no need for platonic realism, nor is the embrace of theism required. Morality is grounded in rationality which is in turn grounded in perception. A moral fact is therefore what the most perfectly rational response would be to any specific situation given perfect perception. By perception, I mean the understanding of reality.

You need to unpack this idea more thoroughly. What do you mean by rationality? Is it whether or not a choice conforms to the rules of logical inference, or do you mean something else? The reason I ask is that people use the term 'rationality' to refer to quite different things. For example, some people take rationality to refer to a decision that is optimal for achieving a goal or solving a problem. You need to answer this question before we can continue with this discussion.

I do not see the Is/Ought issue to be relevant to issue of the existence of moral facts themselves.

The whole Is/Ought issue is about the basis for moral facts. We both agree that moral facts exist objectively. What matters is their basis.

[Rational Gaze]

"Murder is wrong" can be objectively true, if what's meant by "Murder is wrong" reduces down to a true hypothetical imperative. (This particular example might be true by definition just because "murder" is usually taken to mean "wrongful killing.")

More generally, "X is wrong" — when spoken by a Utilitarian — might mean "X lowers aggregate happiness." In that case, it can be true that "X [lowers aggregate happiness]" no matter what people believe about this proposition. The Utilitarian has affirmed an objective truth.

What you probably want, however, is for "X is wrong" to mean just "X is wrong" without any kind of reduction. But without any implicit reduction, I don't think "X is wrong" could possibly mean anything. At best it would be an expression of negative emotion. I would be an error theorist if I didn't think the average person really is using reducible moral language, despite their folk theories about what they themselves are doing.

I'm not against reducing moral statements to something. The problem is when people try to reduce moral statements to something subjective, i.e. human happiness. As I said previously, I argued that morality can be reduced to the worth of moral agents. When we reason morally, we assume that we, as moral agents, have intrinsic worth. Thus, murder is wrong because it devalues human life. Of course, the only way human life has any objective worth is if there is objective meaning and purpose to our existence. If atheism is true, then we are just random accidents, but if theism is true, then we were purposively created. In Divine Command theory, moral values and duties are derived from God's commands, which are a reflection of God's nature. In traditional/classical theism, God is defined as an absolutely necessary, maximally great being. Thus, God is all-good by nature; God's nature IS the good. In Christian Theism, this is reflected in the two commandments: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind," and, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Morality hangs on these two commandments.

Correct, it doesn't. But "Since you're in Arizona, you ought to go west to get to California" can be a true normative fact as a complete statement. There is a correct association of an end and the best means to that end, within some implicit limitations. Those facts alone are purely descriptive, sure. I'm talking about means and ends, which takes us beyond the purely descriptive. I'm saying "ought" claims are composed of means, ends, and their relationships. It's an end, not a natural fact. Glad you noticed the difference. I agree we wouldn't get far just by adding natural fact to natural fact. But the extra ingredient is an end — a goal — not some kind of nonnatural fact.

The problem is that ends or goals are person or community specific. Thus, this is entirely subjective. There is no moral imperative to take a course of action that would fulfil some goal [x] if they do not have that end or goal in mind.

[37818]

The Atheist dilemma is not there being no objective morality in there not being any god, but by there not being any objective purpose (design) for anything. And the fact that the theist lie offers purpose!

[pancreasman]

The Atheist dilemma is not there being no objective morality in there not being any god, but by there not being any objective purpose (design) for anything. And the fact that the theist lie offers purpose!

It's not much of a dilemma. Atheists manage to function quite well creating meaning and purpose for themselves.

[robertb]

It's not much of a dilemma. Atheists manage to function quite well creating meaning and purpose for themselves.

In fact, one could say that such is the only meaning and purpose that actually matters.

[robertb]

Here we go. Some actual meat!

You need to unpack this idea more thoroughly. What do you mean by rationality? Is it whether or not a choice conforms to the rules of logical inference, or do you mean something else? The reason I ask is that people use the term 'rationality' to refer to quite different things. For example, some people take rationality to refer to a decision that is optimal for achieving a goal or solving a problem. You need to answer this question before we can continue with this discussion.

Fair enough. with regards to this conversation I am using rationality to mean something like the necessarily most correct response based upon actual knowledge. With limited actual knowledge, many reponses may appear equally correct. As actual knowledge increases the number of equally correct responses will reduce towards the most correct response.

The whole Is/Ought issue is about the basis for moral facts. We both agree that moral facts exist objectively. What matters is their basis.

I disagree that the Is/Ought issue is about the basis for moral facts. The Is/Ought issue is perhaps more relevant to how one approaches moral facts, though is irrelevant to the basis for moral facts itself, which is as I would argue, rationality based on perception, (more correctly: perfect rationality based on perfect perception.).

[Carrikature]

Thus, murder is wrong because it devalues human life.

Devalues all human life, or just the one that is taken? Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that it is the actor that does not value human life, not the act itself? Doesn't murder typically reinforce the value of human life in the surrounding community?


Because I feel like being quasi-pedantic in an issue where I think it's important, it should be noted that murder itself is too broad a term to use meaningfully.