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This is the forum to discuss the spectrum of views within Christianity on God's foreknowledge and election such as Calvinism, Arminianism, Molinism, Open Theism, Process Theism, Restrictivism, and Inclusivism, Christian Universalism and what these all are about anyway. Who is saved and when is/was their salvation certain? How does God exercise His sovereignty and how powerful is He? Is God timeless and immutable? Does a triune God help better understand God's love for mankind?

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Atheists are welcome to discuss and debate these issues in the Apologetics 301 or General Theistics 101 forum without such restrictions. Theists who wish to discuss these issues outside the parameters of orthodox Christian doctrine are invited to Unorthodox Theology 201.

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Is everything part of God's plan?

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  • #31
    Originally posted by phat8594 View Post
    I think it is in his book 'Almight Over All'
    OK. He doesn't use the word "author," but I can see the concern some might have with what you quote. It sounds like a standard supralapsarian position, which I find to be an unreliable interpretation of Scripture inasmuch as it requires extrapolating quite a bit from what God has said about creation, to what God might have been thinking before creation. We can really tie ourselves in knots trying to figure out God's mind on matters that he hasn't revealed to us.

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    • #32
      Originally posted by phat8594 View Post
      The only 'hook' He would be on is the 'hook' of creating free creatures who had the ability to sin. But with LFW, it was the person who ultimately determines the choice -- not God. So if that is the case, I am lost at how God is responsible for a choice not ultimately determined by Him?
      According to Molinism, God indirectly determined the LFW choice by determining to instantiate a universe in which that particular LFW choice occurred, rather than instantiating a universe in which the opposite choice occurred. Mind you, I'm not the best defender of Molinism, which I consider unnecessary, unhelpful, and unbiblical. See Joel's post #22 above, in which he argues that it's just not possible for God to create universes containing certain permutations of human choices. But I don't want to press this further since Joel has declared the discussion off-topic for his thread.

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      • #33
        Originally posted by RBerman View Post
        Since I do not want to derail your thread, I am uncertain as to whether I should respond to the three paragraphs in your post that followed the one I quote here.
        Go ahead and respond. I did at least mention the problem of evil in my OP and I am curious what your response would be. And nobody so far seems interested in arguing that God does plan everything.

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        • #34
          Originally posted by Joel View Post
          Go ahead and respond. I did at least mention the problem of evil in my OP and I am curious what your response would be. And nobody so far seems interested in arguing that God does plan everything.
          I would so argue, and would furthermore say that God's comprehensive plan poses no problem for the existence of human free will, properly defined, i.e. without the nonsensical concept of "libertarian" free will, which seems philosophically suspect and biblically indefensible.

          Originally posted by Joel View Post
          But there are possible answers to such objections for the Molinist. There might have been no situations in which the man chooses to become a Christian. Or if there were, it may be that no possible world has all people choosing to to be saved (similar to Plantinga's "transworld depravity" argument). That is, given the set of all people who have some situation in which they would choose to become a Christian, it might not be possible to instantiate a world in which all of those situations occur. These are possibilities for Molinism, but not for those who suppose that God controls what people choose.
          I detect a lot of "may" and "might" in your answers. An appeal to "that is impossible for God" seems suspect as well, unless clearly shown to be impossible for reasons of contradicting definitions, e.g. "married bachelor" or "square circle." For instance, it would clearly be impossible for God to create a universe in which everyone chooses to be saved while still creating a universe in which at least some people are objects of God's wrath. But that involves a sort of supralapsarianism from which Molinists usually shy away. Other than that, you seem to be stuck with a guess that certain combinations of human choices must be definitionally impossible for reasons obscure to us.

          Not to mention that God didn't have to save anyone. Even if God didn't save anyone, that doesn't make him responsible for human evil. Men chose to do evil. If the man hadn't already chosen to do evil, he would have no need of salvation. And God may justly punish the man. And, as Phat points out, whatever situation God puts a person in, it's still the person's free choice, and not God's. God may prefer that the person in that situation would choose otherwise than the person does. In which case God would likely have chosen to instantiate a different, better world. Then the reason why that better world is not possible is the man's free choice, not God's choice.
          As I said, I am not convinced by this line of thought, which involves a highly speculative appeal to hypothetical universes which we can confirm through neither observation of nature nor exegesis of Scripture. But even if correct, you are saying that God still felt it "better" to instantiate that universe than another, so God's concept of "better" (and thus God's nature) is still at the root of why the universe chosen for instantiation is the one in which that person rejected God instead of accepting God. The defense you suggests seems the moral equivalent of the observation that you cannot make an omelet without breaking a few eggs. It's still a version of, "God has decided to create a universe in which your choices lead you to Hell," which is exactly the view that non-Calvinists allegedly abhor.

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          • #35
            Originally posted by RBerman View Post
            Originally posted by Joel
            nobody so far seems interested in arguing that God does plan everything.
            I would so argue
            Then please do so. (That takes the highest priority in this thread.)

            I detect a lot of "may" and "might" in your answers.
            Sure. Similar to Plantinga's "transworld depravity" argument, the point is not to prove that that is the case, but to point out a possibility thus proving that there exists a counter-example to the argument from evil. It doesn't preclude their being other counter-examples (any one of which might be actual).

            An appeal to "that is impossible for God" seems suspect as well, unless clearly shown to be impossible for reasons of contradicting definitions, e.g. "married bachelor" or "square circle." For instance, it would clearly be impossible for God to create a universe in which everyone chooses to be saved while still creating a universe in which at least some people are objects of God's wrath. But that involves a sort of supralapsarianism from which Molinists usually shy away. Other than that, you seem to be stuck with a guess that certain combinations of human choices must be definitionally impossible for reasons obscure to us.
            The reasons aren't obscure. My point is that each situation-and-choice is not selected in isolation, independent from the others. They have definite relationships (e.g. causal, temporal, spatial) to each other, part of a unified space-time continuum.

            One person's life, for example, includes a sequence of choices in a definite order. Each choice affects/constrains future situations in which the person will choose. So if God chooses to put the person into a situation S, that constrains the choice of future situations in which to put the person.

            Likewise with interaction between humans. One person's actions can affect/constrain a second person's situation(s). It's a massive interconnected web.

            So creating an integrated world using middle knowledge would be a giant constraint-satisfaction problem, to which not every possible set of situations is a solution.

            You might object that God can act in the world too, to bring about any of the situations. For example, if the person P in situation S chooses to commit suicide, then in the ordinary course of things that eliminates lots of possible future situations in which P might make choices. But you might say that God could intervene to bring P back to life (for example) so that P can be placed in a future situation. But situations include the person's memory and understanding and so on. If God frequently acts in such ways then his and others' memories will be different and thus be in different situations and thus may make different choices. Also their understandings about the world (such as laws of physics and the world being orderly--generally following constant rules) would be different and thus be in different situations. So this too would constrain the possible sets of situations.

            As I said, I am not convinced by this line of thought, which involves a highly speculative appeal to hypothetical universes which we can confirm through neither observation of nature nor exegesis of Scripture. But even if correct, you are saying that God still felt it "better" to instantiate that universe than another, so God's concept of "better" (and thus God's nature) is still at the root of why the universe chosen for instantiation is the one in which that person rejected God instead of accepting God. The defense you suggests seems the moral equivalent of the observation that you cannot make an omelet without breaking a few eggs. It's still a version of, "God has decided to create a universe in which your choices lead you to Hell," which is exactly the view that non-Calvinists allegedly abhor.
            That's not what non-Calvinists abhor. Even open theists agree that God created a world in which there exists some humans He created whose choices will lead them to Hell.

            I think the main non-Calvinist objection is to God causing people to do evil (thus seemingly doing evil Himself). (And then perhaps lesser questions raised like: If God causes/decides everyone's choices why didn't God cause everyone to do only good and never evil? Why not make the omelet without breaking any eggs if there is no such constraint?)


            But besides all that, do you not agree that it is not the offer of salvation (or its rejection) that causes the person to go to Hell? The person was already justly going to Hell prior to any offer of salvation. Otherwise what's the point of salvation?

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            • #36
              Originally posted by Joel View Post
              Sure. Similar to Plantinga's "transworld depravity" argument, the point is not to prove that that is the case, but to point out a possibility thus proving that there exists a counter-example to the argument from evil. It doesn't preclude their being other counter-examples (any one of which might be actual).
              OK. My objection to Molinism has not so far been that I find it impossible. But I do find it over-complicated and unnecessary.

              The reasons aren't obscure. My point is that each situation-and-choice is not selected in isolation, independent from the others. They have definite relationships (e.g. causal, temporal, spatial) to each other, part of a unified space-time continuum. One person's life, for example, includes a sequence of choices in a definite order. Each choice affects/constrains future situations in which the person will choose. So if God chooses to put the person into a situation S, that constrains the choice of future situations in which to put the person. Likewise with interaction between humans. One person's actions can affect/constrain a second person's situation(s). It's a massive interconnected web. So creating an integrated world using middle knowledge would be a giant constraint-satisfaction problem, to which not every possible set of situations is a solution.

              You might object that God can act in the world too, to bring about any of the situations. For example, if the person P in situation S chooses to commit suicide, then in the ordinary course of things that eliminates lots of possible future situations in which P might make choices. But you might say that God could intervene to bring P back to life (for example) so that P can be placed in a future situation. But situations include the person's memory and understanding and so on. If God frequently acts in such ways then his and others' memories will be different and thus be in different situations and thus may make different choices. Also their understandings about the world (such as laws of physics and the world being orderly--generally following constant rules) would be different and thus be in different situations. So this too would constrain the possible sets of situations.
              Those sound like reasons that getting "the world He intends" would be very complicated for God, but no one disputes that God can do things that are complicated beyond our comprehension. It just doesn't seem Christian to say, "The world we have is the best one God could come up with under the circumstances; sorry."

              That's not what non-Calvinists abhor. Even open theists agree that God created a world in which there exists some humans He created whose choices will lead them to Hell.
              Sure, but Open Theists deny that God made this universe knowing that specific people would certainly reject God and, in effect if not in explicit intention, choose Hell. Whereas Molinists say that God deemed this world in particular to be the best one, out of various possible worlds, even while knowing which specific people in that world would go to Hell. That right there aligns Molinism more with Calvinism than Open Theism. But Molinism's stated reason (God desires humans to have LFW more than he desires for humans to obey him or to avoid Hell) strikes me as entirely without biblical basis. That is the part of this discussion that I would suspect didn't come up constantly in eras past.

              I think the main non-Calvinist objection is to God causing people to do evil (thus seemingly doing evil Himself). (And then perhaps lesser questions raised like: If God causes/decides everyone's choices why didn't God cause everyone to do only good and never evil? Why not make the omelet without breaking any eggs if there is no such constraint?)
              I appreciate that and don't have an answer, because God has not supplied us with one. I just find no biblical warrant to say that the answer is that God was constrained.

              But besides all that, do you not agree that it is not the offer of salvation (or its rejection) that causes the person to go to Hell? The person was already justly going to Hell prior to any offer of salvation. Otherwise what's the point of salvation?
              Sin and God's adverse judgment of sin are what send someone to Hell. As you say, rejecting salvation is simply rejecting the remedy which would prevent that adverse judgment. But often Arminians (including Molinists) have acted toward me as if they thought they were scoring some sort of rhetorical points by saying that, in my belief, when God ordained this particular universe, he was ordaining certain specific individuals to certainly go to Hell. Well, that seems to be what Molinism teaches as well, under all of the speculation about feasible vs possible worlds, constraint-satisfaction problems, etc. What's good for the goose is good for the gander.

              Comment


              • #37
                Originally posted by Zymologist View Post
                FWIW, I'm pretty sure that RC Sproul Jr. has stated that [God is the author of sin], or something very similar.
                See R.C. Sproul Jr., Almighty over All: Understanding the Sovereignty of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999). Many Calvinists are horrified at the book because Sproul Jr. (himself a Calvinist) is actually willing to connect the dots: If God has exhaustively determined/foreordained all things without exception including sin, God is indeed the author of evil. There is simply no getting around it. I am actually grateful for Sproul Jr.'s honesty.

                Edited to add: It looks like phat beat me to the punch.
                Last edited by The Remonstrant; 04-10-2014, 02:14 AM.
                For Neo-Remonstration (Arminian/Remonstrant ruminations): <https://theremonstrant.blogspot.com>

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                • #38
                  Originally posted by RBerman View Post
                  Those sound like reasons that getting "the world He intends" would be very complicated for God, but no one disputes that God can do things that are complicated beyond our comprehension. It just doesn't seem Christian to say, "The world we have is the best one God could come up with under the circumstances; sorry."
                  What it's saying is that:
                  If it's the best one God could come up with, then it's the best one possible. And the reason it isn't better than it is, is not because any lack of capability in God, but because creatures chose to to evil. (Also implying that the world would have been better if creatures had used their freedom to make better choices.) It's all very common sense.

                  But Molinism's stated reason (God desires humans to have LFW more than he desires for humans to obey him or to avoid Hell) strikes me as entirely without biblical basis. That is the part of this discussion that I would suspect didn't come up constantly in eras past.
                  As I said, the real/main objection is to God causing people to do evil (thus seemingly doing evil Himself).

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    Originally posted by Joel View Post
                    What [Molinism is] saying is that: If it's the best one God could come up with, then it's the best one possible. And the reason it isn't better than it is, is not because any lack of capability in God, but because creatures chose to to evil. (Also implying that the world would have been better if creatures had used their freedom to make better choices.) It's all very common sense.
                    "Common sense" can be a cipher for "unsubstantiatable bias." According to Molinism, creatures chose the evils that they chose because God decided to instantiate the particular world in which they used LFW to choose those evils. And, as you say, there's a bias that a world in which people have LFW is better than one in which they don't, although I can't think how Scripture could be used to support that particular claim.

                    As I said, the real/main objection is to God causing people to do evil (thus seemingly doing evil Himself).
                    Depends on what you mean by "God causing people to do evil." But there's no shortage of Bible passages which raise problems along those lines: God hardening Pharaoh's heart; God sending raiders to steal Job's herds (At least, Job attributes it to God, and the frame story in Job 1 seems to make God a passive accomplice of Satan); God inciting David to take an evil census; God telling Habakkuk that the evil Assyrians are being sent to punish Israel and then be punished themselves; and so on. I appreciate the desire to affirm God's goodness and holiness, but we need to be careful not to construct a model of what that entails, which doesn't leave room for the things the Bible shows God actually doing.

                    Comment


                    • #40
                      Originally posted by RBerman View Post
                      According to Molinism, creatures chose the evils that they chose because God decided to instantiate the particular world in which they used LFW to choose those evils.
                      I don't think that's a sufficient "because" for Molinism, in which creatures chose the evil that they chose because that is what they freely chose in that situation that they were in. If they had chosen differently, God could not have instantiated this particular world (according to Molinism).

                      And, as you say, there's a bias that a world in which people have LFW is better than one in which they don't, although I can't think how Scripture could be used to support that particular claim.
                      I didn't say that.

                      Depends on what you mean by "God causing people to do evil." But there's no shortage of Bible passages which raise problems along those lines: God hardening Pharaoh's heart; God sending raiders to steal Job's herds (At least, Job attributes it to God, and the frame story in Job 1 seems to make God a passive accomplice of Satan); God inciting David to take an evil census; God telling Habakkuk that the evil Assyrians are being sent to punish Israel and then be punished themselves; and so on. I appreciate the desire to affirm God's goodness and holiness, but we need to be careful not to construct a model of what that entails, which doesn't leave room for the things the Bible shows God actually doing.
                      The case of Pharaoh is a tricky one, and I'll have to give it more thought (e.g., did God cause the Israelites to remain in slavery longer than they would have? and why or why not is that evil on God's part?). It seems that there are difficult questions in any theology.

                      The others that you list seem less troublesome. There is a difference between causing and not preventing. In every translation I look at, it says Satan incited David to number Israel. And Habakkuk seems consistent with God using the Assyrians' bad choices.

                      Comment


                      • #41
                        Originally posted by Joel View Post
                        I don't think that's a sufficient "because" for Molinism, in which creatures chose the evil that they chose because that is what they freely chose in that situation that they were in. If they had chosen differently, God could not have instantiated this particular world (according to Molinism).
                        Well, only this world contains exactly this set of choices, so if God had instantiated a different world, it would have contained a different set of choices. However, God's choosing to instantiate this world necessary entails all the particular choices made in it, yes? What does that do to your idea of LFW, which as I understand it claims that necessary events are not free?

                        The case of Pharaoh is a tricky one, and I'll have to give it more thought (e.g., did God cause the Israelites to remain in slavery longer than they would have? and why or why not is that evil on God's part?). It seems that there are difficult questions in any theology. The others that you list seem less troublesome. There is a difference between causing and not preventing. In every translation I look at, it says Satan incited David to number Israel. And Habakkuk seems consistent with God using the Assyrians' bad choices.
                        Re: David's census, I'm talking about 2 Samuel 24:1. Again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he incited David against them, saying, “Go, number Israel and Judah.” As you say, 1 Chronicles 21 attributes that same event to the incitement of David by Satan. So which is it? It's both/and, just as Job correctly recognized that ultimately, God was behind the suffering he experienced, which is why Job and his friends spend the remainder of the book of Job discussing why God would do such a thing. They know it doesn't help to identify, even correctly, intermediate agents such as weather or raiders or even Satan who were also involved. God's sovereignty means that morally, God is in some sense responsible for everything, whether actively or passively. As you say, there are difficult questions in theology, and this is one of them.

                        Comment


                        • #42
                          Originally posted by RBerman View Post
                          Well, only this world contains exactly this set of choices, so if God had instantiated a different world, it would have contained a different set of choices. However, God's choosing to instantiate this world necessarily entails all the particular choices made in it, yes? What does that do to your idea of LFW, which as I understand it claims that necessary events are not free?
                          The choices (Molinists might say "the content of Middle Knowledge") are not necessary truths, but contingent--upon LFW choices by creatures. The resulting world is then contingent both upon God's choice of what situation to put the creature into and the creature's choice of what to do in that situation. It is misleading to phrase it as if the Molinist thinks that the result is contingent only upon God's choice.

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                          • #43
                            Originally posted by Joel View Post
                            The choices (Molinists might say "the content of Middle Knowledge") are not necessary truths, but contingent--upon LFW choices by creatures. The resulting world is then contingent both upon God's choice of what situation to put the creature into and the creature's choice of what to do in that situation. It is misleading to phrase it as if the Molinist thinks that the result is contingent only upon God's choice.
                            Are you saying that when God puts the man into the situation, He had some degree of uncertainty as to what choice will ensue? That sounds more like Open Theism than Molinism as I understand it.

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                            • #44
                              Originally posted by RBerman View Post
                              Are you saying that when God puts the man into the situation, He had some degree of uncertainty as to what choice will ensue? That sounds more like Open Theism than Molinism as I understand it.
                              My understanding is that in Molinism God, in some sense, has the creature make its choice(s) first, prior to God's instantiating/actualizing the situation.

                              And my understanding is that Open Theism has more to it than supposing the order is the other way around (choice not prior to the actual situation). It supposes that God did not create time but experiences the passage of time.

                              Comment


                              • #45
                                Originally posted by Joel View Post
                                My understanding is that in Molinism God, in some sense, has the creature make its choice(s) first, prior to God's instantiating/actualizing the situation.
                                I'm sure that Molinism would like to place God's action subsequent to the man's action. But does that actually describe the situation properly? As I understand Molinism, God sees all the possible universes (defined in part by the panoply of human LFW choices) like books in a library, only one of which will actually be opened, meaning that only one universe will actually be instantiated. God chooses the "best" book according to his divine criteria. In that choice of book, God chooses the specific set of LFW actions which will then unfold over time. Once the book is chosen, the choices are all determined. It doesn't make sense to speak of the creature making its choice first in a scenario like that; the creature doesn't even exist when God, in eternity, is deciding which universe will instantiate. You might say that the creature exists conceptually or hypothetically, but in that case there's another version of the creature which exists to that same degree, but which made different choices, and it's God choice as to which set of human choices will actually be instantiated.
                                Last edited by RBerman; 04-14-2014, 12:20 PM.

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