Free will defense?

[Adrift]

I have read the article, and I have to disagree with the author. There is a slight-of-hand that happens in this article. The author narrowly defines "free" as "our choices are not determined by causal factors outside our own volitional powers." But his focus is exclusively on the choice we DO make, and he completely ignores the possibility of our choosing otherwise. My ignorance of my choice constraint does not alter the fact that I am actually constrained, which is essentially what he is arguing. Take the case of the man who stands in a long hallway, believing himself free to choose to go in either direction. However, in one direction lies a transparent wall that prohibits him from proceeding in that direction. The fact that he chooses to walk in the direction unimpeded by a wall does not alter the fact that the wall IS there and the man is actually NOT free to walk in either direction. He MUST walk in the one possible direction, rendering the freedom of choice academic.

When we talk about moral principles, the inability to realize an evil choice is a serious constraint on free will, and calls into question the "morality" of the person in question. If I can only chose what is good, it does not seem to me that I can be called a "moral actor." I am merely a moral robot.

Hmm. I'm not sure what you mean by the questioner ignoring the possibility of our choosing otherwise. It seems to me that both writers understand that concept. And if we're referring to an omniscient God, and his free will, then there isn't really anything outside of himself that could constrain him, so that seems like a non-issue. Also, your long hall analogy doesn't sound too dissimilar to the questioner's secretly implanted electrodes analogy. So, I'm not really sure I see the issue there. I also don't see how one's inability to realize an evil choice would seriously constrain one's free will. That doesn't at all seem obvious to me.

[carpedm9587]

Hmm. I'm not sure what you mean by the questioner ignoring the possibility of our choosing otherwise. It seems to me that both writers understand that concept. And if we're referring to an omniscient God, and his free will, then there isn't really anything outside of himself that could constrain him, so that seems like a non-issue. Also, your long hall analogy doesn't sound too dissimilar to the questioner's secretly implanted electrodes analogy. So, I'm not really sure I see the issue there. I also don't see how one's inability to realize an evil choice would seriously constrain one's free will. That doesn't at all seem obvious to me.

The writer focuses on the choice made by the person, heavily leveraging the fact that the chooser is oblivious to the constraints on them. That I am oblivious to my constraints does not alter the fact that they are there - and that I am NOT, in reality, free to choose. In other words, the choice is an illusion. Take the scenario they paint and expand it to all of humanity. Across the face of humanity, you would expect some people to choose good, and others to choose evil. It has always been thus. But in the writers world, everyone would choose good, because no one actually CAN choose evil. Do you see the problem?

And your observation about god, to me, cements the contradiction. You have a being outside of which there is nothing that can constrain him/her/it - and yet that being ALWAYS must act morally and cannot act immorally. I do not see how that being is exempt from the observation that, without the ability to choose to act evilly, you are reduced to a form of moral robot. They are, after all, all powerful - yet they are apparently constrained - and that constraint is themselves? It seems to me to go in circles.

[Adrift]

The writer focuses on the choice made by the person, heavily leveraging the fact that the chooser is oblivious to the constraints on them. That I am oblivious to my constraints does not alter the fact that they are there - and that I am NOT, in reality, free to choose. In other words, the choice is an illusion. Take the scenario they paint and expand it to all of humanity. Across the face of humanity, you would expect some people to choose good, and others to choose evil. It has always been thus. But in the writers world, everyone would choose good, because no one actually CAN choose evil. Do you see the problem?

No, frankly I don't. I'm sorry. I'm not even certain you're framing what the writer wrote correctly, or that you're getting his point. At least it doesn't seem so to me. It may just be that I'm misunderstanding your point though.

And your observation about god, to me, cements the contradiction. You have a being outside of which there is nothing that can constrain him/her/it - and yet that being ALWAYS must act morally and cannot act immorally. I do not see how that being is exempt from the observation that, without the ability to choose to act evilly, you are reduced to a form of moral robot. They are, after all, all powerful - yet they are apparently constrained - and that constraint is themselves? It seems to me to go in circles.

There are other free will choices other than evil choices. Deciding between creating a man, and a lizardman is still a freewill choice. I believe both the questioner and Craig actually discuss that in the linked website (not that exact example of course). Again, unless I'm missing something really obvious, I almost feel like you haven't read the linked page. Just to make sure we're on the same page, I'll post the question and reply here:

Q

Afreedom of the will per se

(emphasis mine)

[carpedm9587]

No, frankly I don't. I'm sorry. I'm not even certain you're framing what the writer wrote correctly, or that you're getting his point. At least it doesn't seem so to me. It may just be that I'm misunderstanding your point though.

I'll give some thought to another way to frame it. Right now, I'm not finding one. I WILL note, however, that I have always enjoyed chatting with you. The exchanges are respectful and deliberative, even when we disagree. In this age of incredible polarization, it is refreshing.

There are other free will choices other than evil choices. Deciding between creating a man, and a lizardman is still a freewill choice. I believe both the questioner and Craig actually discuss that in the linked website (not that exact example of course). Again, unless I'm missing something really obvious, I almost feel like you haven't read the linked page. Just to make sure we're on the same page, I'll post the question and reply here:

freedom of the will per se

(emphasis mine)

I chose not to reprint the whole thing. The slight of hand here is jumping from one type of choices to another. So let us take the notion of that hallway, and claim that the Person A has "freedom of choice with respect to direction." But the fact is, they do not. They are oblivious to this, but they cannot make either choice and act on it! The moment they try to choose other than what is "permitted," they will find themselves opposed. So you see the external constraint exists. It remains potential until someone tries to make that choice - then it becomes actual. But it exists nonetheless.

Now I recognize that no "freedom" is absolute. It is true that I still have a constrained level of "free will" (maybe we should call it "constrained will" because "free will" simply does not exists - there are always constraints) if I can choose from a subset of options. But the question at hand is "what defines "moral goodness." I would say it is defined by someone making morally good choices. We call the person who makes good moral choices a morally good person, and the person who makes bad moral choices a morally compromised or "bad" person. But if you eliminate the entire set of choices that are "for evil," and limit the person to only the subset of choices that are "good," then the difference between morally good and morally bad is academic - it is never realized - all are limited to making morally good choices, so how can anyone be said to be a morally good person? Even if they are unaware of their constraints, the constraint remains. It is not forcing them to choose - it is preventing them from choosing otherwise. The net result is the same, as far as I can tell.

[mattbballman31]

I often hear people say that evil is in the world because God had to allow free will. "Love must be free" is another way to state this, this is the "free will defense" to the problem of evil, yet love in heaven will be free, without the possibility of sinning. God's love is free, even though he cannot sin (see Heb. 6:18).

Soft-libertarianism accounts for all this. It was set in motion by the hard-libertarianism that Adam and Eve had.

And "We love because he first loved us" (1 John 4:19). Not because we chose to!

We choose to receive grace by faith. The opportunity to do that is a gift. So, God's love is the condition for our loving Him. How is this incompatible with choosing to receive God's grace by faith?

I believe that only believers are free (John 8:34,36), free will thus does not explain the problem of evil.

Different kind of freedom. Believers are able not to sin. Unbelievers are able to be able not to sin. But this has nothing to do with the problem of evil. People could construct a utopia where no moral evil happens at all! The good deeds would still be filthy rags. So, moral and spiritual evil are different.