Free will defense?

[Adrift]

I have read the article, and I have to disagree with the author. There is a slight-of-hand that happens in this article. The author narrowly defines "free" as "our choices are not determined by causal factors outside our own volitional powers." But his focus is exclusively on the choice we DO make, and he completely ignores the possibility of our choosing otherwise. My ignorance of my choice constraint does not alter the fact that I am actually constrained, which is essentially what he is arguing. Take the case of the man who stands in a long hallway, believing himself free to choose to go in either direction. However, in one direction lies a transparent wall that prohibits him from proceeding in that direction. The fact that he chooses to walk in the direction unimpeded by a wall does not alter the fact that the wall IS there and the man is actually NOT free to walk in either direction. He MUST walk in the one possible direction, rendering the freedom of choice academic.

When we talk about moral principles, the inability to realize an evil choice is a serious constraint on free will, and calls into question the "morality" of the person in question. If I can only chose what is good, it does not seem to me that I can be called a "moral actor." I am merely a moral robot.

Hmm. I'm not sure what you mean by the questioner ignoring the possibility of our choosing otherwise. It seems to me that both writers understand that concept. And if we're referring to an omniscient God, and his free will, then there isn't really anything outside of himself that could constrain him, so that seems like a non-issue. Also, your long hall analogy doesn't sound too dissimilar to the questioner's secretly implanted electrodes analogy. So, I'm not really sure I see the issue there. I also don't see how one's inability to realize an evil choice would seriously constrain one's free will. That doesn't at all seem obvious to me.

[carpedm9587]

Hmm. I'm not sure what you mean by the questioner ignoring the possibility of our choosing otherwise. It seems to me that both writers understand that concept. And if we're referring to an omniscient God, and his free will, then there isn't really anything outside of himself that could constrain him, so that seems like a non-issue. Also, your long hall analogy doesn't sound too dissimilar to the questioner's secretly implanted electrodes analogy. So, I'm not really sure I see the issue there. I also don't see how one's inability to realize an evil choice would seriously constrain one's free will. That doesn't at all seem obvious to me.

The writer focuses on the choice made by the person, heavily leveraging the fact that the chooser is oblivious to the constraints on them. That I am oblivious to my constraints does not alter the fact that they are there - and that I am NOT, in reality, free to choose. In other words, the choice is an illusion. Take the scenario they paint and expand it to all of humanity. Across the face of humanity, you would expect some people to choose good, and others to choose evil. It has always been thus. But in the writers world, everyone would choose good, because no one actually CAN choose evil. Do you see the problem?

And your observation about god, to me, cements the contradiction. You have a being outside of which there is nothing that can constrain him/her/it - and yet that being ALWAYS must act morally and cannot act immorally. I do not see how that being is exempt from the observation that, without the ability to choose to act evilly, you are reduced to a form of moral robot. They are, after all, all powerful - yet they are apparently constrained - and that constraint is themselves? It seems to me to go in circles.

[Adrift]

The writer focuses on the choice made by the person, heavily leveraging the fact that the chooser is oblivious to the constraints on them. That I am oblivious to my constraints does not alter the fact that they are there - and that I am NOT, in reality, free to choose. In other words, the choice is an illusion. Take the scenario they paint and expand it to all of humanity. Across the face of humanity, you would expect some people to choose good, and others to choose evil. It has always been thus. But in the writers world, everyone would choose good, because no one actually CAN choose evil. Do you see the problem?

No, frankly I don't. I'm sorry. I'm not even certain you're framing what the writer wrote correctly, or that you're getting his point. At least it doesn't seem so to me. It may just be that I'm misunderstanding your point though.

And your observation about god, to me, cements the contradiction. You have a being outside of which there is nothing that can constrain him/her/it - and yet that being ALWAYS must act morally and cannot act immorally. I do not see how that being is exempt from the observation that, without the ability to choose to act evilly, you are reduced to a form of moral robot. They are, after all, all powerful - yet they are apparently constrained - and that constraint is themselves? It seems to me to go in circles.

There are other free will choices other than evil choices. Deciding between creating a man, and a lizardman is still a freewill choice. I believe both the questioner and Craig actually discuss that in the linked website (not that exact example of course). Again, unless I'm missing something really obvious, I almost feel like you haven't read the linked page. Just to make sure we're on the same page, I'll post the question and reply here:

Q

An acquaintance of mine recently asked me why it is necessary that we be able to choose evil for us to have free will, while it is not necessary that God be able to choose evil for Him to have free will. He thinks there is no answer to this question, and thus he has identified a logical inconsistency within Christian theism that counts against its veracity.

I responded by challenging his understanding of freedom, as well as his assumption that genuine freedom of the will necessitates the capacity to choose evil. Regarding the latter I wrote:

Your objection assumes that a necessary requisite for freedom of the will is the ability to choose evil as well as good. I see no reason to accept this as true, not only of God, but also of humans. While it is factually true that freedom of our will includes our ability to choose evil, it is not necessarily true. For the will to be free only requires that our choices are not determined by causal factors outside our own volitional powers. One can be free even if they can only choose good, and not evil.

William Lane Craig offers an insightful thought experiment to demonstrate that one need not be able to choose B in order to make their choice of A free and meaningful:

‘Imagine a man with electrodes secretly implanted in his brain who is presented with a choice of doing either A or B [for our purposes, we’ll let A stand for good and B stand for evil]. The electrodes are inactive so long as the man chooses A; but if he were going to choose B, then the electrodes would switch on and force him to choose A. If the electrodes fire, causing him to choose A, his choice of A is clearly not a free choice. But supposed that the man really wants to do A and chooses it of his own volition. In that case his choosing A is entirely free, even though the man is literally unable to choose B, since the electrodes do not function at all and have no effect on his choice of A. What makes his choice free is the absence of any causally determining factors of his choosing A. This conception of libertarian freedom has the advantage of explaining how it is that God’s choosing to do good is free, even though it is impossible for God to choose sin, namely, His choosing is undetermined by causal constraints. Thus, libertarian freedom of the will does not require the ability to choose other than as one chooses.’

A limitation in the range of choices is not the same as having no choice at all. If A, B, and C are good choices, and D, E, and F are evil choices, one’s inability to choose D, E, or F does not negate the fact that he can choose A, B, or C. When I go to the grocery store to buy ice-cream, they may only have 15 out of 100 flavors ice-cream comes in. The fact that I cannot choose 85 of those flavors does not negate the fact that I can choose any one of the 15 options before me. Likewise, God’s lack of ability to choose evil does not mean God lacks freedom of will. At best it means His range of free choices is more restrictive than ours.

While it seems right to me that human freedom does not require the capacity to choose evil, this conflicts with the free-will theodicy (that I have always found persuasive). The free-will theodicy argues that it is logically impossible for God to create a world in which humans enjoy free will, and yet are unable to use that will to choose evil. On this account, the ability to choose evil is not only factually true, but necessarily true. But as I argued above, it seems to me that God could have made us free without the capacity to choose evil.

I face a dilemma. In the process of answering my friend’s objection I have “unsolved” the problem of evil. Furthermore, I cannot explain why, if God could create us free without the capacity to choose evil, He did not do so (especially given the fact that we are created in His image, and He is unable to choose evil). Is it because we are finite? If so, since we are necessarily finite, it would follow that our capacity to choose evil is necessary as well. While that saves the free-will theodicy, it conflicts with my argument that the capacity to choose evil is not necessary for genuine freedom of the will.

Where does the problem lie? Is it in my argument that human freedom does not necessitate the capacity to choose evil? Is it in my understanding of the free-will theodicy? Both? I would appreciate your input.

A

I think I can resolve your dilemma, Jason! But first let me say what a nice job you did in responding to your friend’s question. I’ll want to make just a minor adjustment.

Let me say, too, that the illustration I gave isn’t original with me but is the brainchild by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt, whose work has spawned a great deal of discussion of illustrations of this sort. Notice, too, how helpful Frankfurt’s analysis of libertarian freedom is for understanding Christ’s freely resisting temptation. As the second person of the Trinity, Christ was impeccable (i.e., incapable of sin). Nevertheless, he freely resisted temptation. How is this possible? Because in his state of humiliation (his pre-resurrection incarnate state) he experienced cognitive limits consistent with a genuine human consciousness and so felt the allure of temptation. This he freely resisted in that he of his own power withstood it without external causal influence.

Now how is this compatible with the claim of the Free Will Defense that “it is logically impossible for God to create a world in which humans enjoy free will, and yet are unable to use that will to choose evil?” Notice that the Free Will Defense doesn’t entail such a claim. It’s consistent with the Free Will Defense that although there are possible worlds such as you describe, they have other overriding deficiencies that make them less preferable to worlds in which humans can choose both evil and good. The atheist has to prove that, necessarily, God would prefer a world without evil (for whatever reason) over any world with evil if he’s to prove that God and evil are logically incompatible.

Nevertheless, I think it’s dubious that God could create a creature which has the ability freely to choose only the Good. Such an ability seems to belong properly only to a nature which has the property of moral perfection, a property that belongs to God alone. A free being which possesses a nature which is characterized by less than complete moral perfection (N.B. that moral perfection differs from mere innocence!) lacks the power to choose infallibly the Good. For God to create a being which has the ability to choose infallibly the Good would be, in effect, to create another God, which is logically impossible, since God is essentially uncaused; and, of course, omnipotence does not entail the ability to bring about the logically impossible.

This is not to say that it’s logically impossible that as matter of fact human beings always happen to choose the Good and never sin. That is a logically possible world. Rather it is to say that humans have the inherent ability to choose evil or, better, lack the inherent ability to choose infallibly the Good. Even if they don’t sin, they can.

In response to this position, you voice the worry: “Since we are necessarily finite, it would follow that our capacity to choose evil is necessary as well. While that saves the free-will theodicy, it conflicts with my argument that the capacity to choose evil is not necessary for genuine freedom of the will.” No, it doesn’t! You responded to your friend “by challenging his understanding of freedom, as well as his assumption that genuine freedom of the will necessitates the capacity to choose evil.” Both those challenges stand. So you need only adjust the sentences in your opening paragraph in which you assert that humans could have the ability to choose only the Good. You’ve answered your friend’s objection by showing that freedom of the will per se doesn’t necessitate freedom to do evil and explaining why it is that in the case of finite persons like human beings freedom to make significant moral choices necessarily implies the ability to choose evil as well as good.

(emphasis mine)

[carpedm9587]

No, frankly I don't. I'm sorry. I'm not even certain you're framing what the writer wrote correctly, or that you're getting his point. At least it doesn't seem so to me. It may just be that I'm misunderstanding your point though.

I'll give some thought to another way to frame it. Right now, I'm not finding one. I WILL note, however, that I have always enjoyed chatting with you. The exchanges are respectful and deliberative, even when we disagree. In this age of incredible polarization, it is refreshing.

There are other free will choices other than evil choices. Deciding between creating a man, and a lizardman is still a freewill choice. I believe both the questioner and Craig actually discuss that in the linked website (not that exact example of course). Again, unless I'm missing something really obvious, I almost feel like you haven't read the linked page. Just to make sure we're on the same page, I'll post the question and reply here:

"You’ve answered your friend’s objection by showing that freedom of the will per se doesn’t necessitate freedom to do evil and explaining why it is that in the case of finite persons like human beings freedom to make significant moral choices necessarily implies the ability to choose evil as well as good.

(emphasis mine)

I chose not to reprint the whole thing. The slight of hand here is jumping from one type of choices to another. So let us take the notion of that hallway, and claim that the Person A has "freedom of choice with respect to direction." But the fact is, they do not. They are oblivious to this, but they cannot make either choice and act on it! The moment they try to choose other than what is "permitted," they will find themselves opposed. So you see the external constraint exists. It remains potential until someone tries to make that choice - then it becomes actual. But it exists nonetheless.

Now I recognize that no "freedom" is absolute. It is true that I still have a constrained level of "free will" (maybe we should call it "constrained will" because "free will" simply does not exists - there are always constraints) if I can choose from a subset of options. But the question at hand is "what defines "moral goodness." I would say it is defined by someone making morally good choices. We call the person who makes good moral choices a morally good person, and the person who makes bad moral choices a morally compromised or "bad" person. But if you eliminate the entire set of choices that are "for evil," and limit the person to only the subset of choices that are "good," then the difference between morally good and morally bad is academic - it is never realized - all are limited to making morally good choices, so how can anyone be said to be a morally good person? Even if they are unaware of their constraints, the constraint remains. It is not forcing them to choose - it is preventing them from choosing otherwise. The net result is the same, as far as I can tell.

[mattbballman31]

I often hear people say that evil is in the world because God had to allow free will. "Love must be free" is another way to state this, this is the "free will defense" to the problem of evil, yet love in heaven will be free, without the possibility of sinning. God's love is free, even though he cannot sin (see Heb. 6:18).

Soft-libertarianism accounts for all this. It was set in motion by the hard-libertarianism that Adam and Eve had.

And "We love because he first loved us" (1 John 4:19). Not because we chose to!

We choose to receive grace by faith. The opportunity to do that is a gift. So, God's love is the condition for our loving Him. How is this incompatible with choosing to receive God's grace by faith?

I believe that only believers are free (John 8:34,36), free will thus does not explain the problem of evil.

Different kind of freedom. Believers are able not to sin. Unbelievers are able to be able not to sin. But this has nothing to do with the problem of evil. People could construct a utopia where no moral evil happens at all! The good deeds would still be filthy rags. So, moral and spiritual evil are different.