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Cogito ergo sum

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Objective Morality (Once More Into The Breach)

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  • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
    Not just a personal belief. And what you think constitutes 'any form of knowledge' is laughably scientistic. Unless you want to qualify it? And just what do you want me to qualify about the fact that we're non-divine minds? That God, if He exists, is the only divine mind? This so-called unqualified assertion isn't just an assertion and it isn't immune to further qualification. And what about your unqualified assertion that what I believe about God isn't knowledge, and is just a purely subjective belief? You commit the same sins you accuse others of committing.
    The weakness of your argument is that it’s dependent upon the conditional “IF”, as in “if He exists”.
    “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
      The weakness of your argument is that it’s dependent upon the conditional “IF”, as in “if He exists”.
      What's weak about my knowledge of the antecedent of the conditional? The fact that I don't kidnap and blindfold knowledge and toss it into the Hippie-Van at the Woodstock for scientism?
      Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
      George Horne

      Comment


      • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
        What's weak about my knowledge of the antecedent of the conditional? The fact that I don't kidnap and blindfold knowledge and toss it into the Hippie-Van at the Woodstock for scientism?
        A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; but you cannot show that in your antecedent: "if God exists", that God is true
        “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
          This thread continues to play in my mind.
          Can I play too?

          The argument against subjective/relative moralism has persisted for some time. But I have yet to find anyone who can make the argument without simply resorting to a tautology: subjective/relative moralism cannot work because it's not objective/absolute/eternal/universal. I'm curious to know if anyone can provide an argument against moral relativism/subjectivism that is NOT tautological?
          Well, there's a ton, actually. Not sure why these arguments are so hard for you to find, and none of them have the structure of relativism is wrong because objectivism is right . . . at all.

          First, you gotta ask yourself what kind of relativism you're talking about: conventional or subjective? These are different theses. The former has to do with

          1. Moral principles being justified because they're accepted by a person.

          The latter has to do with

          2. Moral principles being justified because an entire culture accepts them.

          Both theses are pretty bogus, and therefore relativism has fell on hard times, even among atheistic ethicists working today.

          Consider subjective, ethical relativism. If a moral principle is justified just by virtue of your accepting it, then it's a huge deal for practical application: interpersonal moral criticism or moral judgments are logically impossible in a moral conflict (keep in mind that practicality is one trait of moral principles that the majority of ethicists believe to be a fundamental feature of a moral principle, along with prescriptivity, universalizability, overridingness, and publicity). It's logically impossible because 1 is necessarily true. Now, ask yourself: if 1 is true, then the guy who tortures a little kid to death for the fun of it IS MORAL just by virtue of the fact that he accepted that as a principle in his moral code. YOU would have to say the psycho is moral! Why? Because the psycho is acting in accordance with 1. And this applies to anyone you happen to be in moral conflict with.

          In this scenario, good/bad/right/wrong don't have interpersonal meaning, and so there can be no such thing as moral evaluation. Suppose you call the pyscho a moral monster! Well, to be practically consistent, you have to deny that 1 is necessarily true, which means that subjective/ethical relativism is necessarily false.

          You could appeal to moral intuitions and try to do a reductio of the view as well. Suppose you think it's moral to want to have a proper way to resolve interpersonal conflict and perhaps improve the "human predicament". Well, 1 isn't going to help you at all. 1 doesn't have to do with social agreement on whatever principle you're advocating or on an objective set of norms (of course!). By definition, 1 implies that everyone is as moral as they could be if and only if they're in accordance with 1. The view reduces to moral solipsism wherein each individual makes their own moral universes. This is why nobody really defends this view anymore. Ethicists have realized that we're not little, isolated billiard balls colliding here and there; we morally develop in families, communities, societies, etc . . .

          That's why the majority of ethical relativists are conventional ethical relativists, committed to 2. These guys are typically commmited to

          3. Moral right/wrong changes from society to society; there's no cross-cultural universal moral standards.

          and

          4. Moral principles are valid if accepted by the culture.

          4 is similar to 2, but I'll stick with 4. 3 is a statement of anthropology. But the same problem that afflicted subjective relativism afflicts conventional relativism. Cross-cultural moral criticism becomes logically impossible, because conventional relativism is committed to the necessary truth of 4. Genocide, racism, oppression of the poor, slavery, and torture becomes morally right for that culture if and only if 4 is necessarily true. And our culture, if committed to 4, COULD NOT say that that psychotic culture is wrong in any way, because the psychotic culture is, like us, committed to the necessary truth of 4!

          Try to make sense of moral reformers like Martin Luther King. If Dr. King were committed to 4, then according to 4, if the culture despised what King was trying to do, then King would be violating 4 in the process of reforming the larger culture, and thus, per conventional relativism, would be "wrong", in a technical sense. If the attempted reformation "failed", then King, per 4, would have been necessarily wrong.

          Or think about evil subcultures. Given conventional relativism, and their committment to 4, the Ku Klux Klan is actually morally obligated to hate Jews, Catholics, and African Americans, and it's morally permissible (even obligated!) to break laws protecting such people groups, per 4. In fact, since the laws protect such people group's protection, the Ku Klux Klan, per 4, can interpret their savagery in terms of civil disobedience!

          The practical application of 4 is hopelessly complicated in a pluralistic society like ours. I could be a member of several subcultures at once! Suppose a racist moron who is a member of a racist organization and a member of a university in which racism is condemned. Per 4, the racist moron is morally obligated to carry out contradictory moral principles. Another key principle of an ethical theory is that it has to be action-guiding (violating the condition of prescriptivity); the racist moron doesn't get any help from 4 as to how to carry out his actions. If you say the racist moron determines his culture by choosing the dictates of one membership over another, it gets worse: you literally, morally justify any act you want by forming a group that is okay with it. Given all this counterintuitive nonsense, the burden of proof lands squarely on the relativist's shoulders to explain what makes up a cultural basis for producing moral values and principles. Until then, the objectivist is within her epistemic rights to deem a cultural a moral authority only if that cultural is legitimized by something objective that isn't just culture.

          But 3 may even be over-exaggerated. What culture disagrees with these? Not very many . . .
          5. Murder is different than execution or killing in war.
          6. Incest isn't a good thing.
          7. Lying is a bad thing in certain circumstances.
          8. Restituition and reciprocity.
          9. Mutual obligations between parents and offspring.

          But even if this is mistaken, 3 is compatible with objectivism, so there's no problem, and you have to remember that universality doesn't imply objectivity anyways. Besides, anthropologists and sociologists have been more apt to attribute cultural diversity to the application of moral principles, not the moral principles themselves. But the relativist needs to provide evidence of the latter without it being explained as a disguised case of the former.

          So, these are some debilitating reasons why many ethical philosophers are now trying to defend some form of naturalistic, moral realism, since the price is too high to pay to be a philosophically coherent, ethical view. In other words, the typical traits given to successful and fruitful ethical theories have to be sacrificed if ethical relativism is to be endorsed, a route that is so counterintuitive that, if they were to be consistent in other areas of intuition, would result in extreme forms of ontological solipsism regarding the external world, as it would cultural or individual moral solipsism in the moral world.
          Last edited by mattbballman31; 02-20-2018, 11:31 PM.
          Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
          George Horne

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
            A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; but you cannot show that in your antecedent: "if God exists", that God is true
            Yes, I can. I'm not a narrow-minded adherent of scientism, so I can show the truth of metaphysical propositions using the methodologies deployed in metaphysics. And you never answered my question. Do you know what such methodologies even are?
            Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
            George Horne

            Comment


            • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
              I can show the truth of metaphysical propositions using the methodologies deployed in metaphysics.
              But you don't do you.
              “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                Can I play too?

                Well, there's a ton, actually. Not sure why these arguments are so hard for you to find, and none of them have the structure of relativism is wrong because objectivism is right . . . at all.

                First, you gotta ask yourself what kind of relativism you're talking about: conventional or subjective? These are different theses. The former has to do with

                1. Moral principles being justified because they're accepted by a person.

                The latter has to do with

                2. Moral principles being justified because an entire culture accepts them.

                Both theses are pretty bogus, and therefore relativism has fell on hard times, even among atheistic ethicists working today.

                Consider subjective, ethical relativism. If a moral principle is justified just by virtue of your accepting it, then it's a huge deal for practical application: interpersonal moral criticism or moral judgments are logically impossible in a moral conflict (keep in mind that practicality is one trait of moral principles that the majority of ethicists believe to be a fundamental feature of a moral principle, along with prescriptivity, universalizability, overridingness, and publicity). It's logically impossible because 1 is necessarily true. Now, ask yourself: if 1 is true, then the guy who tortures a little kid to death for the fun of it IS MORAL just by virtue of the fact that he accepted that as a principle in his moral code. YOU would have to say the psycho is moral! Why? Because the psycho is acting in accordance with 1. And this applies to anyone you happen to be in moral conflict with.

                In this scenario, good/bad/right/wrong don't have interpersonal meaning, and so there can be no such thing as moral evaluation. Suppose you call the pyscho a moral monster! Well, to be practically consistent, you have to deny that 1 is necessarily true, which means that subjective/ethical relativism is necessarily false.

                You could appeal to moral intuitions and try to do a reductio of the view as well. Suppose you think it's moral to want to have a proper way to resolve interpersonal conflict and perhaps improve the "human predicament". Well, 1 isn't going to help you at all. 1 doesn't have to do with social agreement on whatever principle you're advocating or on an objective set of norms (of course!). By definition, 1 implies that everyone is as moral as they could be if and only if they're in accordance with 1. The view reduces to moral solipsism wherein each individual makes their own moral universes. This is why nobody really defends this view anymore. Ethicists have realized that we're not little, isolated billiard balls colliding here and there; we morally develop in families, communities, societies, etc . . .
                I have emphasized where I believe your argument jumps the rails. Personal morality is just that: personal. We each evaluate actions as moral/immoral on the basis of what we value. If we value life, we will generally find acts that protect/enhance life moral, and acts that compromise life immoral. The list goes on. But we do not make that evaluation only for ourselves - we make it for all actions. So I do not have to agree that the guy who tortures a child for fun is acting morally just because he happens to think so. I evaluate according to my moral code, and he evaluates according to his. While that would appear to provide no logical path to discussion, there is one: address the underlying value, or logical flaws in their own moralizing (e.g., if they do not value life or health, explore the consequences of not valuing these things. If they do value life and health, examine the moral reaosning that led them to think torture fits with valuing those things). That does not mean resolution can be achieved - it is possible there is no path to resolution, in which case they will go on believing their act is moral and I will go on believing it is immoral. At that point, when reasoning is no long possible, the process advances to separation/isolation and possibly to conflict.

                Your argument seems to reduce, again, to the lack of a universal framework to resolve discord, which would apparently provide a basis for logical exchange. That seems, to me, to be another form of "it's not universal/eternal/absolute/objective.

                Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                That's why the majority of ethical relativists are conventional ethical relativists, committed to 2. These guys are typically commmited to

                3. Moral right/wrong changes from society to society; there's no cross-cultural universal moral standards.

                and

                4. Moral principles are valid if accepted by the culture.

                4 is similar to 2, but I'll stick with 4. 3 is a statement of anthropology. But the same problem that afflicted subjective relativism afflicts conventional relativism. Cross-cultural moral criticism becomes logically impossible, because conventional relativism is committed to the necessary truth of 4. Genocide, racism, oppression of the poor, slavery, and torture becomes morally right for that culture if and only if 4 is necessarily true. And our culture, if committed to 4, COULD NOT say that that psychotic culture is wrong in any way, because the psychotic culture is, like us, committed to the necessary truth of 4!

                Try to make sense of moral reformers like Martin Luther King. If Dr. King were committed to 4, then according to 4, if the culture despised what King was trying to do, then King would be violating 4 in the process of reforming the larger culture, and thus, per conventional relativism, would be "wrong", in a technical sense. If the attempted reformation "failed", then King, per 4, would have been necessarily wrong.

                Or think about evil subcultures. Given conventional relativism, and their committment to 4, the Ku Klux Klan is actually morally obligated to hate Jews, Catholics, and African Americans, and it's morally permissible (even obligated!) to break laws protecting such people groups, per 4. In fact, since the laws protect such people group's protection, the Ku Klux Klan, per 4, can interpret their savagery in terms of civil disobedience!

                The practical application of 4 is hopelessly complicated in a pluralistic society like ours. I could be a member of several subcultures at once! Suppose a racist moron who is a member of a racist organization and a member of a university in which racism is condemned. Per 4, the racist moron is morally obligated to carry out contradictory moral principles. Another key principle of an ethical theory is that it has to be action-guiding (violating the condition of prescriptivity); the racist moron doesn't get any help from 4 as to how to carry out his actions. If you say the racist moron determines his culture by choosing the dictates of one membership over another, it gets worse: you literally, morally justify any act you want by forming a group that is okay with it. Given all this counterintuitive nonsense, the burden of proof lands squarely on the relativist's shoulders to explain what makes up a cultural basis for producing moral values and principles. Until then, the objectivist is within her epistemic rights to deem a cultural a moral authority only if that cultural is legitimized by something objective that isn't just culture.

                But 3 may even be over-exaggerated. What culture disagrees with these? Not very many . . .
                5. Murder is different than execution or killing in war.
                6. Incest isn't a good thing.
                7. Lying is a bad thing in certain circumstances.
                8. Restituition and reciprocity.
                9. Mutual obligations between parents and offspring.

                But even if this is mistaken, 3 is compatible with objectivism, so there's no problem, and you have to remember that universality doesn't imply objectivity anyways. Besides, anthropologists and sociologists have been more apt to attribute cultural diversity to the application of moral principles, not the moral principles themselves. But the relativist needs to provide evidence of the latter without it being explained as a disguised case of the former.

                So, these are some debilitating reasons why many ethical philosophers are now trying to defend some form of naturalistic, moral realism, since the price is too high to pay to be a philosophically coherent, ethical view. In other words, the typical traits given to successful and fruitful ethical theories have to be sacrificed if ethical relativism is to be endorsed, a route that is so counterintuitive that, if they were to be consistent in other areas of intuition, would result in extreme forms of ontological solipsism regarding the external world, as it would cultural or individual moral solipsism in the moral world.
                I would take the entire premise of "moral concepts are valid if accepted by a culture" to be off-base. Moralizing is an individual activity. What a culture/group finds to be moral/immoral is an expression of what the majority of it's members find to be moral/immoral. Individual members of that culture/society/group can/do disagree with some of the culture/society/group's moral precepts. But there IS a feedback loop. Since what we perceive as moral is rooted in identifying actions that protect what we value - the question becomes: how do we come to value. We come to value initially as influenced by family, community, culture. As we grow through childhood, the bulk of what we value is strongly influenced by these sources. As we mature (if we mature), we begin to sort through those influences, examine them more closely, and perhaps shift these values as we engage with other adults, or gain exposure to new cultures/communities/groups. As those underlying valies shift (if they do), the moralizing based on them likewise shifts.

                We see this dynamic at work all the time. In the U.S., the fairly recent shift towards acceptance and rights for the LGBTQ community is the most recent example, but there have been others throughout history. We also see it in the abortion debate.
                The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

                I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

                Comment


                • I'm going to quote you piece-meal, so you get a better feel for where I'm coming from. I'm not sure that you're understanding the argument. But that's okay.

                  Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
                  I have emphasized where I believe your argument jumps the rails. Personal morality is just that: personal. We each evaluate actions as moral/immoral on the basis of what we value.
                  Okay, but that's not what I'm saying. Let me try to be clear here, because this is an important point.

                  Agreed. Personal morality is personal. Agreed. We evaluate actions as moral on the basis of what we value. Agreed. Agreed. Agreed. The objectivist has no problem here. You're providing a descriptive, not a prescriptive, analysis. So, I'll hold on for now until I get to the end of your post, and then I'll write more as needed.

                  But we do not make that evaluation only for ourselves - we make it for all actions. So I do not have to agree that the guy who tortures a child for fun is acting morally just because he happens to think so. I evaluate according to my moral code, and he evaluates according to his.
                  Okay, let me stop here. Agreed. Descriptively, we make evaluations for ourselves and all actions everyday. Now recall my argument. You have the principle,

                  1. Moral principles are justified because they're accepted by a person.

                  In ethical philosophy, this is the core principle that ethical, subjective relativists are committed to.

                  Now, you say you don't "have to agree that the guy who tortures a child for fun is acting morally just because he happens to think so", and that you "evaluate according to" your "moral code, and he evaluates according to his." Now, again: descriptively, we're in total agreement. Even objectivists could be on board here, depending on how "according to a moral code" is cashed out.

                  But here's the rub. You're tacitly denying 1. And that's okay, if you want to do that. But denying 1 implies denying ethical, subjective relativism, by definition. If you deny 1 purely on a "descriptive" basis, we're no longer even talking about ethics; we're talking about social science, sociology, or anthropology. You're recording facts about values, not proposing an ethical theory, which is what ethical, subjective relativism is attempting to do.

                  Let me stop there and move on.

                  While that would appear to provide no logical path to discussion, there is one: address the underlying value, or logical flaws in their own moralizing (e.g., if they do not value life or health, explore the consequences of not valuing these things.
                  Well, the logical point I was making is dropped if 1 is denied. Per your descriptive tactic, it's not at all logically impossible to discuss 'facts' about underlying values.

                  The mentioning of 'logical flaws in their own moralizing' is odd, because the objectivist is the one who appeals to logical flaws. The objectivist believes that we come to know morality and/or moral application via reason. Subjective, ethical relativists affirm 1, which by definition implies that an individual is moral even if there are logical flaws in their own moralizing, since 1 implies that by virtue of their mere acceptance, a moral principle is justified, fallacious or not.

                  That does not mean resolution can be achieved - it is possible there is no path to resolution, in which case they will go on believing their act is moral and I will go on believing it is immoral. At that point, when reasoning is no long possible, the process advances to separation/isolation and possibly to conflict.
                  I don't think we mean the same thing by 'resolution'. No. Per your descriptive view (which is no longer ethics simpliciter), resolution could be achieved if you changed the torturer's mind and got him to stop torturing and be a good member of society. If none of that happens, then, agreed, there's no 'resolution' relative to cohesion within a society.

                  That's not the kind of resolution I'm talking about. I'm talking about the kind of resolution that involves a lack of practical contradiction. Per 1 (above), it is a contradiction to simultaneously affirm 1 and act in a way that gets the torturer to stop torturing, AND succeed in being moral per ethical, subjective relativism.

                  You either have to give up 1 (along with ethical, subjective relativism), or give up prescriptive ethics and go for mere descriptive anthropology/sociology, or affirm objectivism.

                  Your argument seems to reduce, again, to the lack of a universal framework to resolve discord, which would apparently provide a basis for logical exchange. That seems, to me, to be another form of "it's not universal/eternal/absolute/objective.
                  No, it's an argument from the practical contradiction inherent in the core principle of ethical, subjective relativism itself; and therefore it's in violation of some of the necessary conditions for an ethical theory to be an ethical theory to begin with.

                  I would take the entire premise of "moral concepts are valid if accepted by a culture" to be off-base. Moralizing is an individual activity. What a culture/group finds to be moral/immoral is an expression of what the majority of it's members find to be moral/immoral. Individual members of that culture/society/group can/do disagree with some of the culture/society/group's moral precepts.
                  That's fine. But the majority of ethical philosophers who try to buttress relativism lean more toward the conventional side. But objectivists agree with you that it just turns into subjective relativism in the end.

                  But there IS a feedback loop. Since what we perceive as moral is rooted in identifying actions that protect what we value - the question becomes: how do we come to value. We come to value initially as influenced by family, community, culture. As we grow through childhood, the bulk of what we value is strongly influenced by these sources. As we mature (if we mature), we begin to sort through those influences, examine them more closely, and perhaps shift these values as we engage with other adults, or gain exposure to new cultures/communities/groups. As those underlying valies shift (if they do), the moralizing based on them likewise shifts.
                  Right. I made this descriptive point in so many words in my last post, and was the reason that the intuitions of ethical philosophers have been shifting over to conventional relativism. This 'feedback loop' is acknowledged by them. But how we come to value what we value is, again, mere description, and therefore not ethics.
                  Last edited by mattbballman31; 02-21-2018, 07:55 PM.
                  Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                  George Horne

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
                    But you don't do you.
                    I will as soon as you stop stalling and answer the question I've asked you a billion times.
                    Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                    George Horne

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                      I'm going to quote you piece-meal, so you get a better feel for where I'm coming from. I'm not sure that you're understanding the argument. But that's okay.

                      Okay, but that's not what I'm saying. Let me try to be clear here, because this is an important point.

                      Agreed. Personal morality is personal. Agreed. We evaluate actions as moral on the basis of what we value. Agreed. Agreed. Agreed. The objectivist has no problem here. You're providing a descriptive, not a prescriptive, analysis. So, I'll hold on for now until I get to the end of your post, and then I'll write more as needed.

                      Okay, let me stop here. Agreed. Descriptively, we make evaluations for ourselves and all actions everyday. Now recall my argument. You have the premise,

                      1. Moral principles are justified because they're accepted by a person.

                      In ethical philosophy, this is the core principle that ethical, subjective relativists are committed to.

                      Now, you say you don't "have to agree that the guy who tortures a child for fun is acting morally just because he happens to think so", and that you "evaluate according to" your "moral code, and he evaluates according to his." Now, again: descriptively, we're in total agreement. Even objectivists could be on board here, depending on how "according to a moral code" is cashed out.

                      But here's the rub. You're tacitly denying 1. And that's okay, if you want to do that. But denying 1 implies denying ethical, subjective relativism, by definition. If you deny 1 purely on a "descriptive" basis, we're no longer even talking about ethics; we're talking about social science, sociology, or anthropology. You're recording facts about values, not proposing an ethical theory, which is what ethical, subjective relativism is attempting to do.

                      Let me stop there and move on.
                      So this is a good place for me to interject. I am indeed rejecting your 1) as you expressed it. You see, hidden in your sentence is what I usually find: a hidden universal/absolute. Your statement is:

                      1. Moral principles are justified because they're accepted by a person.

                      Hidden in front of the "justified" is "universally" or "absolutely." Of course, I am going to point out that this is just a restatement of the definition of subjective/relative morality. If we rewrite the sentence as follows:

                      1. Moral principles are justified to the individual expressing them because they're accepted by that person.

                      Then I have no problem with the sentence. Unfortunately, it doesn't really say all that much. It seems rather redundant to suggest that find the things I accept to be justified. Yet that is the nut of it: we each believe our moral code is justified because we do indeed accept it. I think it would be more substantive to say:

                      1. Moral principles are justified to the individual expressing them because they are seen as protecting/enhancing something valued by that person.

                      Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                      Well, the logical point I was making is dropped if 1 is denied. Per your descriptive tactic, it's not at all logically impossible to discuss 'facts' about underlying values.

                      The mentioning of 'logical flaws in their own moralizing' is odd, because the objectivist is the one who appeals to logical flaws. The objectivist believes that we come to know morality and/or moral application via reason. Subjective, ethical relativists affirm 1, which by definition implies that an individual is moral even if there are logical flaws in their own moralizing, since 1 implies that by virtue of their mere acceptance, a moral principle is justified, fallacious or not.
                      And that is where I think you err. If moral principles are rooted in protecting/enhancing what we have come to value, then there are two avenues to showing a moral principle espoused by an individual to be irrational:

                      1) Demonstrate to them that their moral principle does NOT protect/enhance the thing they value.
                      2) Make a case for changing what is valued.

                      The first is the easier road, if there is indeed a logical flaw in the moral code. The second is extremely difficult. What people value is rooted in upbringing, culture, psychology, religion, and typically does not change unless there is a seismic shift (i.e., the proverbial paradigm shift) in a person. That can happen as the result of a conversion experience, or a major trauma, or a significant change in circumstances (e.g., new culture, etc.). Simply making an argument for valuing differently, in my experience, rarely results in a significant shift. But it has happened, so it is possible.

                      Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                      I don't think we mean the same thing by 'resolution'. No. Per your descriptive view (which is no longer ethics simpliciter), resolution could be achieved if you changed the torturer's mind and got him to stop torturing and be a good member of society. If none of that happens, then, agreed, there's no 'resolution' relative to cohesion within a society.

                      That's not the kind of resolution I'm talking about. I'm talking about the kind of resolution that involves a lack of practical contradiction. Per 1 (above), it is a contradiction to simultaneously affirm 1 and act in a way that gets the torturer to stop torturing, AND succeed in being moral per ethical, subjective relativism.
                      Since I reject 1) as you articulated it, I don't flaw your logic here. If I affirmed 1), there would be a problem. As for resolution, a moral conflict between two individuals (or cultures) can be "resolved" (i.e., eliminating the conflict) in several ways.

                      1) Appeal to reason leading to an alignment of the moral codes of the two individuals.
                      2) Dismissal (e.g., if the moral issue is a minor one, two people/cultures can simply elect to live with their differences)
                      3) Separate/Isolation (e.g., if the two individuals cannot agree on a major issue, then they will likely separate. If it an individual within a community, they will likely be isolated/rejected)
                      4) Domination (e.g., in the worst-case scenario - there will be open conflict and the contender with the greater power will bend the other individual/culture to their will, either preventing from enacting their moral code or requiring them to enact the moral code of the stronger. Strictly speaking, this does not eliminate the conflict - it suppresses it).

                      Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                      You either have to give up 1 (along with ethical, subjective relativism), or give up prescriptive ethics and go for mere descriptive anthropology/sociology, or affirm objectivism.

                      No, it's an argument from the practical contradiction inherent in the core principle of ethical, subjective relativism itself; and therefore it's in violation of some of the necessary conditions for an ethical theory to be an ethical theory to begin with.

                      That's fine. But the majority of ethical philosophers who try to buttress relativism lean more toward the conventional side. But objectivists agree with you that it just turns into subjective relativism in the end.

                      Right. I made this descriptive point in so many words in my last post, and was the reason that the intuitions of ethical philosophers have been shifting over to conventional relativism. This 'feedback loop' is acknowledged by them. But how we come to value what we value is, again, mere description, and therefore not ethics.
                      I hesitate to do this, because I get harped on frequently for it, but I'm going to go back to the definition of the terms.

                      Ethics: moral principles that govern a person's behavior or the conducting of an activity.

                      I see no basis in this definition for rejecting any of what I have said from the realm of "ethics." Indeed, it is completely about governing behavior. I see no reason to dismiss it as "mere description."

                      BTW - I'm enjoying the discussion thus far. Civil - and respectful. I hope you see my posts in the same light.
                      Last edited by carpedm9587; 02-21-2018, 08:19 PM.
                      The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

                      I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
                        I am indeed rejecting your 1) as you expressed it. You see, hidden in your sentence is what I usually find: a hidden universal/absolute.
                        We have to define our terms here.

                        Universal: A moral value applies to all people.
                        Absolute: A moral value is true without reference to individuals or cultures.
                        Objective: A moral statement states a fact about the act or state of affairs.

                        A moral can be universal without being absolute, and therefore be compatible with ethical subjectivism.

                        Thus, 1 could be considered by ethical subjectivists to be universal (a necessary condition for an ethical theory), without saying that 1 is absolute.

                        Hidden in front of the "justified" is "universally" or "absolutely."
                        Not absolutely. Universally.

                        Of course, I am going to point out that this is just a restatement of the definition of subjective/relative morality.
                        Nope. Denying 1 implies denying ethical, subjective relativism, per the literature.

                        1. Moral principles are justified to the individual expressing them because they're accepted by that person.
                        Still has the same problems with practicality. All those caveats were already latent in 1.

                        Then I have no problem with the sentence. Unfortunately, it doesn't really say all that much. It seems rather redundant to suggest that find the things I accept to be justified.
                        Then you're subject to the practical contradiction argument. That third sentence is worded awkardly. The stipulation of 1 is that the 'moral principle' is justified.

                        1. Moral principles are justified to the individual expressing them because they are seen as protecting/enhancing something valued by that person.
                        Still doesn't change anything.

                        And that is where I think you err. If moral principles are rooted in protecting/enhancing what we have come to value, then there are two avenues to showing a moral principle espoused by an individual to be irrational:

                        1) Demonstrate to them that their moral principle does NOT protect/enhance the thing they value.
                        2) Make a case for changing what is valued.
                        Don't see the error.

                        Going about demonstrating the irrationality between the moral principle held and it protecting/enhancing the thing valued implicitly denies 1, even your latest reformulation, because it is 'seen as' protecting/enhancing the thing valued. All that's going on here is that, descriptively, the moral principle doesn't have the desired protection/enhancement properties thought to inhere in the principle espoused; but that's completely compatibile with it being such that someone is morally obliged to accept it, per 1. This is one of the main reasons Sam Harris wants such protection/enhancement properties (i.e. 'well-being') of moral principles to correlate with moral obligations and morally good states of affairs; otherwise, per the ethical, subjective relativist, you could have a number of inverse relationships between the absence of protection/enhancement properties of a moral principle and the idea that, per 1, I'd be morally obliged to go along with it.

                        The first is the easier road, if there is indeed a logical flaw in the moral code.
                        This is dangerously close to moral objectivism, despite descriptive cases of relativism. If there can be logical flaws in moral codes, then the moral codes with logical flaws are necessarily false, since logic deals in necessity.

                        The second is extremely difficult. What people value is rooted in upbringing, culture, psychology, religion, and typically does not change unless there is a seismic shift (i.e., the proverbial paradigm shift) in a person. That can happen as the result of a conversion experience, or a major trauma, or a significant change in circumstances (e.g., new culture, etc.). Simply making an argument for valuing differently, in my experience, rarely results in a significant shift. But it has happened, so it is possible.
                        This is more the tact you want to go with. However, going about it, practically applying yourself to it, will commit you to, per my argument, a practical contradiction.


                        Since I reject 1) as you articulated it, I don't flaw your logic here.
                        And since I don't think your re-articulation of 1 does anything to change the argument, there's still a problem.

                        1) Appeal to reason leading to an alignment of the moral codes of the two individuals.
                        Again, dangerously close to objectivism, since reason dictates which moral codes are afflicted with legitimate logical flaws, and the moral codes with the logical flaws are necessarily false.

                        2) Dismissal (e.g., if the moral issue is a minor one, two people/cultures can simply elect to live with their differences)
                        This is a way out. Per 1, dismissal is obligated.

                        3) Separate/Isolation (e.g., if the two individuals cannot agree on a major issue, then they will likely separate. If it an individual within a community, they will likely be isolated/rejected)
                        Yup. But 1 would oblige the community to see such a rejected/isolated individual as moral, since, per 1, such an individual is morally justified in acting in accord with the moral principles he's prescribed for himself.

                        4) Domination (e.g., in the worst-case scenario - there will be open conflict and the contender with the greater power will bend the other individual/culture to their will, either preventing from enacting their moral code or requiring them to enact the moral code of the stronger. Strictly speaking, this does not eliminate the conflict - it suppresses it).
                        Domination would be, per 1, practically impossible for an ethical, subjective relativist.


                        I hesitate to do this, because I get harped on frequently for it, but I'm going to go back to the definition of the terms.

                        Ethics: moral principles that govern a person's behavior or the conducting of an activity.

                        Yea, it's way more complicated than this, and as it stands, it's merely descriptive ethics. Ethical, subjective relativism is a view in normative ethics. You also got metaethics, dealing with the meaning/reference of moral terms and the structure of moral reasoning and justification.

                        It seems to me you keep using theses in descriptive ethics as a reason/justification for a normative ethic, and descriptive ethics is just the historical, sociological, or anthropological fact that individuals have different moral codes (or, have varying applications of a universal or absolute code, as the case may be).

                        I see no basis in this definition for rejecting any of what I have said from the realm of "ethics." Indeed, it is completely about governing behavior. I see no reason to dismiss it as "mere description."
                        It's a mere description of the factual status of the moral codes governing behavior. But ethical, subjective relativism is a normative ethic, an ethical theory for interpreting the normative meaning of the descriptions.

                        BTW - I'm enjoying the discussion thus far. Civil - and respectful. I hope you see my posts in the same light.
                        Cool. I have no reason to act otherwise.
                        Last edited by mattbballman31; 02-21-2018, 09:39 PM.
                        Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                        George Horne

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post


                          I would take the entire premise of "moral concepts are valid if accepted by a culture" to be off-base. Moralizing is an individual activity. What a culture/group finds to be moral/immoral is an expression of what the majority of it's members find to be moral/immoral. Individual members of that culture/society/group can/do disagree with some of the culture/society/group's moral precepts. But there IS a feedback loop. Since what we perceive as moral is rooted in identifying actions that protect what we value - the question becomes: how do we come to value. We come to value initially as influenced by family, community, culture. As we grow through childhood, the bulk of what we value is strongly influenced by these sources. As we mature (if we mature), we begin to sort through those influences, examine them more closely, and perhaps shift these values as we engage with other adults, or gain exposure to new cultures/communities/groups. As those underlying valies shift (if they do), the moralizing based on them likewise shifts.

                          We see this dynamic at work all the time. In the U.S., the fairly recent shift towards acceptance and rights for the LGBTQ community is the most recent example, but there have been others throughout history. We also see it in the abortion debate.
                          The “feedback loop" is the key. Of course one cannot claim that ‘moral concepts are valid if accepted by a culture”. Just as one cannot claim that the views of individual members that disagree with some communal concepts are necessarily valid. The two components interact with each other. This is what it means to be a member of a social species and this is why moral values change over time...such as the recent rights for the LGBT community and the changing role for women over the past century.
                          “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            We have to define our terms here.

                            Universal: A moral value applies to all people.
                            Absolute: A moral value is true without reference to individuals or cultures.
                            Objective: A moral statement states a fact about the act or state of affairs.

                            A moral can be universal without being absolute, and therefore be compatible with ethical subjectivism.

                            Thus, 1 could be considered by ethical subjectivists to be universal (a necessary condition for an ethical theory), without saying that 1 is absolute.

                            Not absolutely. Universally.

                            Nope. Denying 1 implies denying ethical, subjective relativism, per the literature.
                            So agreed up to here. Just a note on the last sentence. We are not in the realm of science and peer-reviewed studies. We're in the realm of philosophy. So I'm not all that stuck to "the literature." If "the literature" has decided that "ethical subjective relativism," requires acceptance of 1), then so be it. We'll need a new name for what I believe. So I believe:

                            1) Moral principles are derived by the individual and are justified on the basis of the belief that they protect/enhance things valued by that individual.
                            2) The individual applies their moral code universally (i.e., they use it to judge their own actions and the actions of others).
                            3) The moral norms of cultures and societies is simply the collective expression of the moral norms of its individuals
                            4) Individuals tend to gather/cluster in groups separated by their moral norms.

                            To me, that is "subjective" (which means "based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions" or "dependent on the mind or on an individual's perception for its existence." It is also relative, which means "considered in relation or in proportion to something else." If "the literature" has already appropriated the term "subjective relativism" for something else, so be it. Propose a term for what I believe and I'll be happy to use it for our discussions.

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            Still has the same problems with practicality. All those caveats were already latent in 1.
                            Your suggestion that I must accept that another person's actions are moral based on THEIR moral code suggests otherwise. You appear to want individuals to accept the moral codes of all other individuals as "moral." That would result in massive, constant, contradiction.

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            Then you're subject to the practical contradiction argument. That third sentence is worded awkardly. The stipulation of 1 is that the 'moral principle' is justified.

                            Still doesn't change anything.

                            Don't see the error.

                            Going about demonstrating the irrationality between the moral principle held and it protecting/enhancing the thing valued implicitly denies 1, even your latest reformulation, because it is 'seen as' protecting/enhancing the thing valued. All that's going on here is that, descriptively, the moral principle doesn't have the desired protection/enhancement properties thought to inhere in the principle espoused; but that's completely compatibile with it being such that someone is morally obliged to accept it, per 1. This is one of the main reasons Sam Harris wants such protection/enhancement properties (i.e. 'well-being') of moral principles to correlate with moral obligations and morally good states of affairs; otherwise, per the ethical, subjective relativist, you could have a number of inverse relationships between the absence of protection/enhancement properties of a moral principle and the idea that, per 1, I'd be morally obliged to go along with it.
                            The error lies in asserting that there is no logical way to address someone with a differing moral code. I have presented two. I have already rejected 1) as written and provided how I would express it. Our difference appears to lie in the assertion that one individual must accept another individual's moral code as "moral."

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            This is dangerously close to moral objectivism, despite descriptive cases of relativism. If there can be logical flaws in moral codes, then the moral codes with logical flaws are necessarily false, since logic deals in necessity.
                            I would agree that, if someone values X, has moral code Y because they believe it "protects/enhances X," but it can be shown that moral code Y does not actually protect/enhance X, then their moral code has a logical flaw in it and is internal inconsistent - it is a false moral code. The individual is accepting as moral a behavior that threatens what they value.

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            This is more the tact you want to go with. However, going about it, practically applying yourself to it, will commit you to, per my argument, a practical contradiction.
                            Although, as I noted, it is difficult to alter what a person values, it is not impossible. I see no contradiction in attempting to.

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            And since I don't think your re-articulation of 1 does anything to change the argument, there's still a problem.

                            Again, dangerously close to objectivism, since reason dictates which moral codes are afflicted with legitimate logical flaws, and the moral codes with the logical flaws are necessarily false.

                            This is a way out. Per 1, dismissal is obligated.

                            Yup. But 1 would oblige the community to see such a rejected/isolated individual as moral, since, per 1, such an individual is morally justified in acting in accord with the moral principles he's prescribed for himself.
                            Here is where we part company. The individual, and the collective society, measure morality according to their own moral code, not the moral code of the "other." This is why I reworded 1). The best that ccan be said is that the individual is "possibly acting morally according to their own moral code" (though we can never know if the person is folowing their own moral code or breaking it with any given action). The individual will not be acting according to the observer's moral code.

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            Domination would be, per 1, practically impossible for an ethical, subjective relativist.
                            And yet, it is the almost inevitable outcome of a serious disconnect between moral codes between individuals and/or society. If Person A believes "personal property" is a good to be valued, person A will have moral precepts against stealing. If Person B does not even recognize "personal property" as a reality (which occurs in some cultures), so sees no value in it, they will not even have the concept of "theft" in their moral code. Put "Person B" in "Person A's culture, and you will have a clash of moral codes that will have Person B consistently committing acts considered "theft" by Person A and the larger society. If all attempts to convince Person B that the value of "personal property" fail, and Person be keeps "stealing," Person A will take steps to isolate: gates, locks, "keep out" signs, etc. If all of that fails, Person A will invoke society's legal structure (which is likely tohave a law against theft if it is a widely held moral principle), and Person B will be incarcerated. The stronger society dominates the individual. We see this dynamic all the time - and I see no contradiction in it.

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            Yea, it's way more complicated than this, and as it stands, it's merely descriptive ethics. Ethical, subjective relativism is a view in normative ethics. You also got metaethics, dealing with the meaning/reference of moral terms and the structure of moral reasoning and justification.

                            It seems to me you keep using theses in descriptive ethics as a reason/justification for a normative ethic, and descriptive ethics is just the historical, sociological, or anthropological fact that individuals have different moral codes (or, have varying applications of a universal or absolute code, as the case may be).

                            It's a mere description of the factual status of the moral codes governing behavior. But ethical, subjective relativism is a normative ethic, an ethical theory for interpreting the normative meaning of the descriptions.
                            Here you have dropped into a philosophical language that I have long since left behind, and have to admit I do not have a significant interest in getting tangled back into it again. If it is a requirement for continued discussion, then we should perhaps consider ending the discussion here.

                            Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                            Cool. I have no reason to act otherwise.
                            The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

                            I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
                              So agreed up to here. Just a note on the last sentence. We are not in the realm of science and peer-reviewed studies. We're in the realm of philosophy. So I'm not all that stuck to "the literature." If "the literature" has decided that "ethical subjective relativism," requires acceptance of 1), then so be it.
                              I know we're not in the realm of science. And you do know that philosophy has peer-review, right?

                              Australasian Journal of Philosophy
                              Journal of Philosophy
                              Mind
                              Noûs
                              Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
                              Philosophical Review
                              Philosophical Studies
                              Analysis
                              Erkenntnis
                              Monist
                              Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
                              Philosophers' Imprint
                              Philosophical Quarterly
                              Philosophical Topics
                              Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
                              American Philosophical Quarterly
                              Canadian Journal of Philosophy
                              Continental Philosophy Review
                              Dialectica
                              European Journal of Philosophy
                              Philosophy Compass
                              Ratio
                              Review of Metaphysics
                              Southern Journal of Philosophy
                              Synthese
                              Biology and Philosophy
                              British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
                              British Journal of Aesthetics
                              British Journal for the History of Philosophy
                              Economics and Philosophy
                              Ethics
                              Journal of Consciousness Studies
                              Journal of the History of Ideas
                              Journal of the History of Philosophy
                              Journal of Philosophical Logic
                              Journal of Symbolic Logic
                              Journal of Value Inquiry
                              Linguistics and Philosophy
                              Mind and Language
                              Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
                              Philosophia Mathematica
                              Philosophy and Public Affairs
                              Philosophy East and West
                              Philosophy of Science
                              Phronesis
                              Review of Symbolic Logic
                              Studia Logica
                              Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
                              Theory and Decision
                              Vivarium

                              There is a position in normative ethics called ethical, subjective relativism, and the position has been written about voluminously. If you want to defend or espouse another position, that's fine by me.

                              We'll need a new name for what I believe. So I believe:

                              1) Moral principles are derived by the individual and are justified on the basis of the belief that they protect/enhance things valued by that individual.
                              Cool. Do you think there's an objective right and wrong way to maximize the protection/enhancement properties of a value relative to the structure of a given moral code?

                              2) The individual applies their moral code universally (i.e., they use it to judge their own actions and the actions of others).
                              Cool. I affirm this as well.

                              3) The moral norms of cultures and societies is simply the collective expression of the moral norms of its individuals
                              Descriptive ethics, since objectivists, absolutists, universalists, subjectivists, emotivists, could all agree here.

                              4) Individuals tend to gather/cluster in groups separated by their moral norms.
                              More descriptive ethics. Sociologists, historians, and anthropologists would be nodding in aggreement, while the ethicists would just be getting started.

                              To me, that is "subjective" (which means "based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions" or "dependent on the mind or on an individual's perception for its existence."
                              Okay, cool. The former is different from the latter. I could agree with the former and still be an objectivist, on the descriptive level. As for the latter, that's pretty good; I'd add that, for the subjectivist, moral statements express info about the speaker, which would be the mind. Cool, so far.

                              It is also relative, which means "considered in relation or in proportion to something else."
                              Well, that's almost trivially true. If morality is subjective, it'll be relative to subjects. But look closer. See what's happening at this point? If morality is subjective (normative ethics), then it'll be relative to subjects (descriptive ethics). Now, you want to distinguish your view from the ethical, subjective relativism I've been articulating. Okay. But your 4 points don't do anything to distinguish it. We've landed back to, "Since morality is subjective, it's also relative." Cool. Provide an analysis, different from mine, of the "morality is subjective" part that's sufficiently distinct from how I've articulated it thus far.

                              If "the literature" has already appropriated the term "subjective relativism" for something else, so be it. Propose a term for what I believe and I'll be happy to use it for our discussions.
                              A term for what you believe is somewhere along the lines of an, as yet, unanalyzed notion of normative subjectivity justifying various trivial theses of descriptive ethics. You're mixing your drinks in such a way that your mixing the glass with the drink.

                              Your suggestion that I must accept that another person's actions are moral based on THEIR moral code suggests otherwise. You appear to want individuals to accept the moral codes of all other individuals as "moral." That would result in massive, constant, contradiction.
                              Correct. That's what happens when you're dealing with subjectivity on a 'normative' level. Look at it from this angle.

                              Actions come from decisions, decisions come from judgements, judgments come from principles, principles come from values, values come from forms of life, forms of life come from rational justifications . . . . rational justifications can also come from forms of life, and forms of life can come from values. That's the feedback loop.

                              Now, the 'values' part of this schema is what you want to render subjective. Cool.

                              As a view in ethical theory (not your view, ostensibly), ethical, subjective relativism renders subjective the values, while also posing 1 as a rational justification, which leads to a practical contradiction between the rational justification and the principle (which informs duties). It leads to the practical contradiction between everyone, per the ethical, subjective relativist, having the same rational justification underlying any subjective value they pick, which implies action-guiding principles that clash with the rational justification.

                              The error lies in asserting that there is no logical way to address someone with a differing moral code.
                              Careful. No practically logical way. There are possible worlds in which one can 'act out' practically impossible behavior, but it would be on pain of irrationality.


                              I have presented two. I have already rejected 1) as written and provided how I would express it. Our difference appears to lie in the assertion that one individual must accept another individual's moral code as "moral."
                              Yet your re-expression wasn't sufficient enough, per the above. You're attempting to reject the original normative thesis, by re-expressing the original normative thesis as implying various aspects in descriptive ethics. I think what you need to do is cut off, out of the schema, the idea of rational justification, and endorse something like moral non-cognitivism, because the moment you reintroduce rational evaluations of differing moral codes, you're reintroducing objectivity, since moral codes can 'really' live up to, or fall short of, their capacity to realize (or maximize?) protection/enhancement properties, a view that's almost synonymous with Sam Harris' natural, moral realism in terms of well-being.

                              To which you say . . .

                              I would agree that, if someone values X, has moral code Y because they believe it "protects/enhances X," but it can be shown that moral code Y does not actually protect/enhance X, then their moral code has a logical flaw in it and is internal inconsistent - it is a false moral code. The individual is accepting as moral a behavior that threatens what they value.
                              Cool. That's an endorsement of moral objectivism, since there really are correct and incorrect moral codes depending on whether they display internal, 'moral', consistency. This jives with the schema perfectly, since rational justification is the foundation that begins the schematic feedback loop. It's also an endorsement of moral realism, since you're committed to real, mind-independent protection/enhancement properties that may or may not inhere in a moral code depending on the aforesaid logical consistency.

                              Although, as I noted, it is difficult to alter what a person values, it is not impossible. I see no contradiction in attempting to.
                              Descriptively, you can alter whatever person's values you want. Descriptively, you can succeed. But it's on pain of practical contradiction. Therefore, if your descriptions of the 'altering process' leave out the latent practical contradiction, your descriptions will be false, per the argument.

                              Here is where we part company. The individual, and the collective society, measure morality according to their own moral code, not the moral code of the "other."
                              More descriptive ethics. Nothing to do with the, as yet, unanalyzed normative theory of subjectivism which you think implies such descriptions.

                              And yet, it is the almost inevitable outcome of a serious disconnect between moral codes between individuals and/or society.
                              Cool. More descriptions.

                              If Person A believes "personal property" is a good to be valued, person A will have moral precepts against stealing.
                              Good.

                              If Person B does not even recognize "personal property" as a reality (which occurs in some cultures), so sees no value in it, they will not even have the concept of "theft" in their moral code.
                              Good.

                              Put "Person B" in "Person A's culture, and you will have a clash of moral codes that will have Person B consistently committing acts considered "theft" by Person A and the larger society.
                              Good.

                              If all attempts to convince Person B that the value of "personal property" fail, and Person be keeps "stealing," Person A will take steps to isolate: gates, locks, "keep out" signs, etc.
                              Yup.

                              If all of that fails, Person A will invoke society's legal structure (which is likely tohave a law against theft if it is a widely held moral principle), and Person B will be incarcerated.
                              Yep.

                              The stronger society dominates the individual. We see this dynamic all the time - and I see no contradiction in it.
                              And there it is. You don't see a contradiction because you keep surreptitiously justifying a normative theory with descriptive ethics. I think you want to deny all of normative ethics and do history, sociology, or anthropology. I think what you really want to do is to deny cognitive theories of ethics altogether, and go for more non-cognitive theories like emotivism or imperativalism, because you don't sound like a subjectivist at all. But then you sound like a cognitivist again when you do things like reintroduce back into the equation variables like 'logical-internal-consistency' and 'protection/enhancement' properties. You need to work out this inconsistency.

                              Here you have dropped into a philosophical language that I have long since left behind, and have to admit I do not have a significant interest in getting tangled back into it again.
                              Well . . . I'm tempted to repeat what I said last time in our last conversation. It's really simple. If you don't know, ask. You seem like a reasonable guy. Take your time. No pressure. But if you're done talking about it, no problem. At least you're honest, and don't dodge like Shunyadragon and Tassman,

                              If it is a requirement for continued discussion, then we should perhaps consider ending the discussion here.
                              Cool. No problem. See ya around.
                              Last edited by mattbballman31; 02-22-2018, 07:57 PM.
                              Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                              George Horne

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
                                The “feedback loop" is the key. Of course one cannot claim that ‘moral concepts are valid if accepted by a culture”. Just as one cannot claim that the views of individual members that disagree with some communal concepts are necessarily valid. The two components interact with each other. This is what it means to be a member of a social species and this is why moral values change over time...such as the recent rights for the LGBT community and the changing role for women over the past century.
                                That was so bad Shunya didn't even 'amen' it . . .
                                Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                                George Horne

                                Comment

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