Morality or Obedience?

[carpedm9587]

I disagree. Qualia simply refer to the internal and subjective component of sense perceptions, arising from stimulation of the senses by phenomena. And whilst language is of great assistance in determining this among fellow humans, it is not impossible relying on observation and experiments alone among the higher primates and ohter animals...as per my previous link.

A lot of world has been done in this area by the likes of Frans de Waal: “Virtually every characteristic that has been claimed to be uniquely human has eventually turned out to have some kind of a precursor in a close relative. As De Waal explains in a series of engaging accounts, language, self-recognition, tool making, empathy, co-operative behaviour, mental time-travel, culture and many other traits and abilities have turned out not to be exclusively human. This is hardly surprising, given that we evolved from an ape ancestor not so long ago: we share behaviour with our relatives, just as we share anatomy”.

https://www.theguardian.com/books/20...de-waal-review

We may not be able “to find a way to transfer our "mind" into their "body", as you say, but we can recognize that something approaching human qualia exists in other species.

I know from experience that Seer's objection to experiential qualia in animals is based on his religious belief that man is unique, not scientific objections. He will object to the notion whatever evidence one can provide.

We cannot be fully aware of another human's "actual experience of qualia" either, even with the advantage of language. But we can know that they experience it, just as we can know that the higher animals experience it.

I think you are agreeing with what I am saying (and what Seer is saying) pretty strongly. All three of us are saying that it is possible to know THAT a being (any kind of animal, including homosapiens) experiences qualia. What we cannot do is EXPERIENCE the qualia of another being. We can never know exactly what that experience is like for that being. For example, we can know that a being is receiving light at a particular wavelength; we can see that the visual cortex is lighting up in response; we can even compare the pattern of that activity with the pattern of our own activity at the same optical wavelength. What we cannot know is whether the two beings experience that color identically. We can only experience our own qualia, by definition. We cannot experience that of another being.

[JimL]

I think you are agreeing with what I am saying (and what Seer is saying) pretty strongly. All three of us are saying that it is possible to know THAT a being (any kind of animal, including homosapiens) experiences qualia. What we cannot do is EXPERIENCE the qualia of another being. We can never know exactly what that experience is like for that being. For example, we can know that a being is receiving light at a particular wavelength; we can see that the visual cortex is lighting up in response; we can even compare the pattern of that activity with the pattern of our own activity at the same optical wavelength. What we cannot know is whether the two beings experience that color identically. We can only experience our own qualia, by definition. We cannot experience that of another being.

Well we can't know because anothers actual experience is theirs alone, but we can be fairly certain, I think, that if the cause of an experiential effect upon an object, and the nature of the object being effected are basically the same in multiple cases, then the qualia, or the personal experience would most likely be the same in each case. In other words the experience of "red" would most likely be the same in each case in which the cause and the object effected are basically the same. No?

[carpedm9587]

Well we can't know because anothers actual experience is theirs alone, but we can be fairly certain, I think, that if the cause of an experiential effect upon an object, and the nature of the object being effected are basically the same in multiple cases, then the qualia, or the personal experience would most likely be the same in each case. In other words the experience of "red" would most likely be the same in each case in which the cause and the object effected are basically the same. No?

No. We can infer similarity. But how can you show that your experience of a particular wavelength of light is exactly the same as mine? That is the issue with qualia - it is individual. We cannot KNOW, in the way that we know 2+2=4, that someone else's experience is identical to ours, or even how much different it is. Even if they self-report - we do not know if they are lying, using confusing language, or unable to convey the experience accurately. For the purpose of practical functioning, we assume other people's experience approximates our own, and that they are honest with us in relating their experiences.

[JimL]

No. We can infer similarity. But how can you show that your experience of a particular wavelength of light is exactly the same as mine? That is the issue with qualia - it is individual. We cannot KNOW, in the way that we know 2+2=4, that someone else's experience is identical to ours, or even how much different it is. Even if they self-report - we do not know if they are lying, using confusing language, or unable to convey the experience accurately. For the purpose of practical functioning, we assume other people's experience approximates our own, and that they are honest with us in relating their experiences.

Right, we can't show it, and we can't know it, but we do have reason to believe that the experience of "red" say, is the same for you as it is for me. Afaics at least, there is no reason to believe that the experience isn't the same.

[Tassman]

Where did I ever deny that animals could have subjective experiences? What I have said and maintain, is that we can not know what those experiences are like for them.

So you agree with Carp that "all three of us are saying that it is possible to know THAT a being (any kind of animal, including homosapiens) experiences qualia"?

Right and that is beyond science,

It is not beyond science. Neuroscience is making great advances in the area

and this is evidence that reductionism is false...

“Reductionism” from what?

[Tassman]

I think you are agreeing with what I am saying (and what Seer is saying) pretty strongly. All three of us are saying that it is possible to know THAT a being (any kind of animal, including homosapiens) experiences qualia.

I think you will find that seer believes humans to be unique and that non-humans do NOT experience qualia...which is primarily why I entered the discussion. You and I acknowledge that they do whereas seer, in my experience, does not.

What we cannot do is EXPERIENCE the qualia of another being. We can never know exactly what that experience is like for that being. For example, we can know that a being is receiving light at a particular wavelength; we can see that the visual cortex is lighting up in response; we can even compare the pattern of that activity with the pattern of our own activity at the same optical wavelength. What we cannot know is whether the two beings experience that color identically. We can only experience our own qualia, by definition. We cannot experience that of another being.

You are arguing against a strawman. I have never suggested that we can experience the qualia of others. What I’ve been doing is expand the notion of the qualia experience to include other animals. You seemed initially to be excluding non-humans on the basis of their lack of language, but now seem to agree that “any kind of animal, including homosapiens experiences qualia”.

[seer]

So you agree with Carp that "all three of us are saying that it is possible to know THAT a being (any kind of animal, including homosapiens) experiences qualia"?

Yes, I think it is possible for other animals to have subjective experiences. I don't see why not. We just could never know what those experiences are like for them.

It is not beyond science. Neuroscience is making great advances in the area

Of course it is, that is why you don't understand the problem.

[carpedm9587]

Right, we can't show it, and we can't know it, but we do have reason to believe that the experience of "red" say, is the same for you as it is for me. Afaics at least, there is no reason to believe that the experience isn't the same.

We have reason to believe that the experience is highly similar. IMO, we have no reason to believe it is exactly the same. Indeed, it would seem an odd idea that two completely separate neurological systems, with two completely separate "input devices" governed by two different genomes in two people with different historical experiences would be identical.

[carpedm9587]

I think you will find that seer believes humans to be unique and that non-humans do NOT experience qualia...which is primarily why I entered the discussion. You and I acknowledge that they do whereas seer, in my experience, does not.

That is not what I hear Seer saying. Trust me - I would challenge him if I thought he was wrong.

You are arguing against a strawman. I have never suggested that we can experience the qualia of others. What I’ve been doing is expand the notion of the qualia experience to include other animals. You seemed initially to be excluding non-humans on the basis of their lack of language, but now seem to agree that “any kind of animal, including homosapiens experiences qualia”.

Actually, I never did anything of the kind. I have always been sure "self-awareness" is a continuum, and qualia (though I did not know the term before) is as well. I could not think of a way to determine if other animals did indeed experience qualia (if that's not redundant), but the experiment outlined in one of the papers seems to have been an elegant solution to that problem. I simply have taken the same position as Seer - that one being cannot experience another's qualia and there is no way to know if the qualia of two separate beings is equivalent.

It is possible we are all agreeing violently. It certainly would not be the first time.

Of course, if Sparko was here, I'd probably be told that I was "backpedaling" and he'd tell me what I actually thought. MM would probably label my discussion, "like jello."

(and yes, I know those are examples of the "what if" statements I don't usually engage in. But a little tweek now and then doesn't hurt....)

[Tassman]

Yes, I think it is possible for other animals to have subjective experiences.

We know that they do.

I don't see why not. We just could never know what those experiences are like for them.

Nor can we know exactly what those experiences are like for our fellow humans. One human being cannot experience another's qualia and there is no way to know if the qualia of two humans are the same. We can assume that they are similar just as we can with the higher animals.

Of course it is, that is why you don't understand the problem.

Why would you think it is beyond the examination and resolution of neuroscience?

[Tassman]

That is not what I hear Seer saying. Trust me - I would challenge him if I thought he was wrong.

Settle this for us please seer. Do you believe that humans are the same in principle as chimpanzees in experiencing the internal, subjective components of sense perceptions that we refer to as qualia?

Actually, I never did anything of the kind. I have always been sure "self-awareness" is a continuum, and qualia (though I did not know the term before) is as well. I could not think of a way to determine if other animals did indeed experience qualia (if that's not redundant), but the experiment outlined in one of the papers seems to have been an elegant solution to that problem. I simply have taken the same position as Seer - that one being cannot experience another's qualia and there is no way to know if the qualia of two separate beings is equivalent.

The observable qualities of altruism, empathy, gratitude and reciprocal behaviour among say, chimpanzees all indicate experiential qualia to some degree. I agree that there is no way to know if the qualia of two separate beings, whether human or simian, are equivalent but neuroscience may well provide the answers in due course.

It is possible we are all agreeing violently. It certainly would not be the first time.

Well you and I are......

Of course, if Sparko was here, I'd probably be told that I was "backpedaling" and he'd tell me what I actually thought. MM would probably label my discussion, "like jello."

They would indeed. <wry smile>

[seer]

Settle this for us please seer. Do you believe that humans are the same in principle as chimpanzees in experiencing the internal, subjective components of sense perceptions that we refer to as qualia?

Tass are you being dense on purpose? I said I have no problem with animals having subjective experiences. But I don't KNOW that they do, and neither do you. And if they do that I don't know if it is anything like ours. Heck I can't even demonstrate that your subjective experience is the same as mine

The observable qualities of altruism, empathy, gratitude and reciprocal behaviour among say, chimpanzees all indicate experiential qualia to some degree. I agree that there is no way to know if the qualia of two separate beings, whether human or simian, are equivalent but neuroscience may well provide the answers in due course.

Nonsense, how is that possible even in principle without self reporting?

We know that they do.

How do you KNOW that? If my dog seems sad for instance, how do you know he is really having a subjective experiences of sadness, rather that just showing behavior that had adaptive benefit, with no subjective experience attached?

[JimL]

We have reason to believe that the experience is highly similar. IMO, we have no reason to believe it is exactly the same. Indeed, it would seem an odd idea that two completely separate neurological systems, with two completely separate "input devices" governed by two different genomes in two people with different historical experiences would be identical.

So would you think that the experience of "red" is different for each of us? Would you guess that we are all experiencing a different color while calling it "red."?

[element771]

So would you think that the experience of "red" is different for each of us? Would you guess that we are all experiencing a different color while calling it "red."?

The interesting part of this question is that we will never know. This is something that could never be analyzed or shown.

[carpedm9587]

So would you think that the experience of "red" is different for each of us? Would you guess that we are all experiencing a different color while calling it "red."?

I think it is highly likely that there is enormous variation in the experience of "red" - in much the same way that the same color code can manifest differently on different television screens. However, as Element noted, this is not something I can even conceive of a way of testing or verifying. That is the "private" part of qualia.