How can there be human moral culpability without libertarian free will?

[dacristoy]

I have little quarrel with those who feel that since Scripture does not explicitly address these sorts of philosophical questions, our time is not well spent debating them.

Whither we know the answer to that question or not, {we do not} it still cannot negate the truths stated in the Thess passages. The scriptural answer is stated in verse 10 And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. That's the only why that God gave us, his grace is sufficient for those that love him...

Mr. Berman, the merits of whither it is worth debating the issue at hand is not a thought or even a consideration in my response; my response was intended to indicate that whither or not we know why one person responds affirmatively and another negatively to God's gift of salvation does not negate the truth in scripture that the choice is made according to scripture.

[RBerman]

Mr. Berman, the merits of whither it is worth debating the issue at hand is not a thought or even a consideration in my response; my response was intended to indicate that whither or not we know why one person responds affirmatively and another negatively to God's gift of salvation does not negate the truth in scripture that the choice is made according to scripture.

That is certainly true. None of these intramural philosophical discussions about the nature of free will should obscure the necessity of choosing to trust in Christ and follow him.

[Joel]

I do not share the opinion that LFW is essential for moral responsibility.

I know. That's why I started this thread, so you could explain to me how human moral responsibility can be without LFW, given the compelling reasons to think otherwise. You need to give argument, rather than re-stating your position.

As I said previously, if LFW is either incoherent or nonbiblical and thus does not exist, then it cannot very well be essential for anything! ...I have not argued that LFW is bad; as you say, that would assume that it exists. If it's not a coherent concept then it makes no sense to then discuss whether it's biblical. My point was that both criteria would need to be satisfied: both coherent, and biblical.

I believe I have adequately answered all your arguments that LFW is incoherent. If I haven't then you need to explain where I'm wrong and why it is incoherent. Otherwise, it seems perfectly coherent.

As for nonbiblical, you would need to show that the Bible says that LFW does not exist (e.g., that LFW is contradicted by the Bible). If the Bible does not say whether we have LFW (which is perhaps debatable), then LFW is at least consistent with the Bible and thus open for discussion.

But even if you succeeded in proving that LFW doesn't exist, you still need to argue the thread topic: explain how human moral culpability is possible without LFW.

At this point, based on your explanations, I'm not even sure how you think LFW differs from the Calvinistic notion that we act according to our nature and the circumstances in which we find ourselves, with our will being the mediating faculty which processes the situation and outputs a decision.

I have clearly explained the distinction I'm talking about: whether the causal chain originates within the agent (LFW) or external to the agent (not LFW).
(see post #9).

[Joel]

Then I have to ask, why are we even using the term? Perhaps this is why I don’t see how the term is helpful for discussion. If LFW is everyone’s normal conception of free will, then why aren’t we just calling it ‘free will’? Tacking on ‘libertarian’ led me to believe that you wished to be more specific (and thus restrictive) than the normal concept that comes to mind when people consider ‘free will’.

The reason why the qualification becomes necessary is that Calvinists (like RBerman) claim to believe that humans have something that Calvinists call "free will", which is not the same thing as what people naturally think of as "free will", and so we are unfortunately forced to make a distinction somehow between the two concepts.

Personally, I would prefer to refer to LFW as "free will" and to refer to the Calvinists' "free will" as "unfree will" or simply "will". I think "libertarian free" is just redundant.

If it helps, in Post #11 I provided an example to illustrate the distinction between the Calvinist concept and the normal concept (using Superman, Lex Luthor, and Braniac). In the Calvinist concept, Kryptonite makes Superman's will less "free" by weakening Superman. In the normal concept, weak people have just as much free will, but free will is removed/reduced when, say, Braniac controls Superman through via Braniac's mental superpowers. In the RBerman's concept, Superman doing an action (such as flying) is equally "free will" whether Braniac is controlling him or not.

I suppose that’s why I’m suspicious of the very wordy definitions of the term I’ve read. One specified that people don’t have a true ‘free choice’ if the decision is influenced by anything, including human nature. I don’t see a reason for restricting free will to such narrow confines, other than the abrogation of moral responsibility in everyday living. If my human nature prevents me from having free will, then I'm just an automaton here on Earth, and shouldn't be held responsible for anything I do. And that, quite frankly, sounds like a load of crap.

In the normal concept, it is acknowledge that a person has a variety of competing desires and impulses and inclinations that may influence one's choice, but there still can exist the ability to choose among them, resist them, etc. In fact, morality is often a matter of resisting the passions.

What I am arguing is that the logical implication of RBerman's denial of LFW (normal free will) is that humans are just automatons (controlled by external causes such as God, the laws of physics), and I'm asking how they can then be held responsible for anything they do.

[RBerman]

I know. That's why I started this thread, so you could explain to me how human moral responsibility can be without LFW, given the compelling reasons to think otherwise. You need to give argument, rather than re-stating your position.

I base human moral responsibility on Scripture; God holds us responsible for our sin, so we are. No appeal to LFW is necessary. I hope Scripture is a compelling reason for you!

I have clearly explained the distinction I'm talking about: whether the causal chain originates within the agent (LFW) or external to the agent (not LFW).
(see post #9).

You said that much in post #9. Then in post #11 you explained your terms by way of a superhero-themed illustration:

•LFW and your "free will" (e.g., Superman LFW chooses to fly and does so.)
•LFW and your "unfree will" (e.g., Lex Luthor physically debilitates Superman with kryptonite--e.g. so he can't fly.)
•not-LFW and your "free will" (e.g., Braniac controls Superman, causing him to fly.)
•not-LFW and your "unfree will" (e.g., Braniac controls Superman the same time Lex Luthor debilitates him with kryptonite.)

But it's not clear what "control" consists of, since you have previously said, in post #48 of the "Is everything part of God's plan?" thread, that:

"In situation T, creature C selects option Y"

If these are the only inputs into the act of choosing, then it would seem that in "not-LFW," the "Creature C" who does the selecting has stopped being Superman, and has become Braniac. Superman's nature no longer enters into the equation at all; it has been replaced by Braniac's nature. That doesn't sound at all like the situation I am describing. God does not choose for us. But God did create us as Creature C and place us in situation T, in which we then necessarily choose option Y rather than ~Y.

So it's not at all clear to me how, in your LFW scenario, it can be said that "the causal chain originates within the agent" when both of the relevant factors (Creature C and situation T) arise from outside the creature/agent.

[The Remonstrant]

Moral culpability and libertarian human freedom?

*yawn*

[myth]

The reason why the qualification becomes necessary is that Calvinists (like RBerman) claim to believe that humans have something that Calvinists call "free will", which is not the same thing as what people naturally think of as "free will", and so we are unfortunately forced to make a distinction somehow between the two concepts.

Personally, I would prefer to refer to LFW as "free will" and to refer to the Calvinists' "free will" as "unfree will" or simply "will". I think "libertarian free" is just redundant.

If it helps, in Post #11 I provided an example to illustrate the distinction between the Calvinist concept and the normal concept (using Superman, Lex Luthor, and Braniac). In the Calvinist concept, Kryptonite makes Superman's will less "free" by weakening Superman. In the normal concept, weak people have just as much free will, but free will is removed/reduced when, say, Braniac controls Superman through via Braniac's mental superpowers. In the RBerman's concept, Superman doing an action (such as flying) is equally "free will" whether Braniac is controlling him or not.


In the normal concept, it is acknowledge that a person has a variety of competing desires and impulses and inclinations that may influence one's choice, but there still can exist the ability to choose among them, resist them, etc. In fact, morality is often a matter of resisting the passions.

What I am arguing is that the logical implication of RBerman's denial of LFW (normal free will) is that humans are just automatons (controlled by external causes such as God, the laws of physics), and I'm asking how they can then be held responsible for anything they do.

Thanks for the clarification. Sorry if I muddied the waters in my ignorance.

[dacristoy]

You said that much in post #9. Then in post #11 you explained your terms by way of a superhero-themed illustration:


•LFW and your "free will" (e.g., Superman LFW chooses to fly and does so.)
•LFW and your "unfree will" (e.g., Lex Luthor physically debilitates Superman with kryptonite--e.g. so he can't fly.)
•not-LFW and your "free will" (e.g., Braniac controls Superman, causing him to fly.)
•not-LFW and your "unfree will" (e.g., Braniac controls Superman the same time Lex Luthor debilitates him with kryptonite.)

I would like to see freewill or even libertarian freewill defined reasonably and perhaps logically in such a way that any of the above brain teasers can be even remotely applied in a way that makes sense. Then I would like to debate the issue...

Superman is not real, kryptonite is not real, who or what is a Braniac, he is not real, Lex Luther is not real. FREEWILL IS A REAL BIBLE DOCTRINE...

[RBerman]

I would like to see freewill or even libertarian freewill defined reasonably and perhaps logically in such a way that any of the above brain teasers can be even remotely applied in a way that makes sense. Then I would like to debate the issue...

Superman is not real, kryptonite is not real, who or what is a Braniac, he is not real, Lex Luther is not real. FREEWILL IS A REAL BIBLE DOCTRINE...

It is a real doctrine, though not one that has anything to do with the "freewill offerings" mentioned in the Old Testament. The question is what we mean by "free will." What Joel describes as "free will" sounds like Calvinism, which is just fine to a Calvinist like me.

[dacristoy]

It is a real doctrine, though not one that has anything to do with the "freewill offerings" mentioned in the Old Testament. The question is what we mean by "free will." What Joel describes as "free will" sounds like Calvinism, which is just fine to a Calvinist like me.

How does the freewill OT offerings differ from the principles of freewill exercised in the rest of the bible. How is the word {Freewill} different from one place to another.

[RBerman]

How does the freewill OT offerings differ from the principles of freewill exercised in the rest of the bible. How is the word {Freewill} different from one place to another.

Every word is defined by its context. The Hebrew word translated into English freewill has the idea of "voluntary." The OT uses this term in specific contrast to mandatory offerings, required to be given due to sin, or as a sort of taxation, etc. OT discussions about "freewill offerings" have as much to do with this thread's discussion of the philosophical topic of "free will" (two words) as "butter" has to do with a "butterfly."

[Joel]

I base human moral responsibility on Scripture; God holds us responsible for our sin, so we are. No appeal to LFW is necessary. I hope Scripture is a compelling reason for you!

Yes, as you say, Scripture tells us that "God holds us responsible for our sin, so we are." No one is disputing that.

But that doesn't answer the question of whether LFW exists or whether LFW is necessary for human moral responsibility. If it is, then we'd have to conclude that we have LFW.

You said that much in post #9. Then in post #11 you explained your terms by way of a superhero-themed illustration:

•LFW and your "free will" (e.g., Superman LFW chooses to fly and does so.)
•LFW and your "unfree will" (e.g., Lex Luthor physically debilitates Superman with kryptonite--e.g. so he can't fly.)
•not-LFW and your "free will" (e.g., Braniac controls Superman, causing him to fly.)
•not-LFW and your "unfree will" (e.g., Braniac controls Superman the same time Lex Luthor debilitates him with kryptonite.)

But it's not clear what "control" consists of, since you have previously said, in post #48 of the "Is everything part of God's plan?" thread, that:

"In situation T, creature C selects option Y"

If these are the only inputs into the act of choosing, then it would seem that in "not-LFW," the "Creature C" who does the selecting has stopped being Superman, and has become Braniac. Superman's nature no longer enters into the equation at all; it has been replaced by Braniac's nature.

As I recall, Braniac can mind control someone without the victim even realizing it. The victim feels the desire to do what he does, and thinks that it's his own desires and choices. For the sake of this thread, if you like, we could suppose that Braniac controls Superman merely by manipulating Superman's desires and passions, to get Superman to do whatever Braniac pleases.

If such a thing means Superman's nature is replaced by Braniac's nature, then it would seem likewise that when God does it to a man, that means the man's nature is replaced by God's nature. That it is really God who does it. If it makes Superman not morally responsible for the actions when Braniac does it, a man seems equally not responsible if God does it. Or if not, what is the difference?

That doesn't sound at all like the situation I am describing. God does not choose for us. But God did create us as Creature C and place us in situation T, in which we then necessarily choose option Y rather than ~Y.

Perhaps you are suggesting that the difference is that Braniac determines Superman's desires in the moment, whereas God sets things in motion at one point in time and then they run their inevitable course forward, so the man is pre-programmed to do what he does? But that doesn't seem like much of a difference. Control is control, whether it is done via a complex rube-goldberg causal chain, or a short causal chain. Just like a man is equally a murderer, if he does it by simple means or an elaborate rube-goldberg device that may take a long time to complete (in fact the latter would probably be used as evidence that the murder should be considered 1st degree). Or if not, what is the difference?

So it's not at all clear to me how, in your LFW scenario, it can be said that "the causal chain originates within the agent" when both of the relevant factors (Creature C and situation T) arise from outside the creature/agent.

In the post you mention in the other thread, the context was a discussion of Molinism. The proposition "In situation T, creature C selects option Y" was supposed to be included in Middle Knowledge. That means that proposition is not intended to describe the inputs, but is describing the output--the result of the creature's free choice. It is the creature freely choosing that causes that proposition (which was not a necessary truth) to be true.

[dacristoy]

It is a real doctrine, though not one that has anything to do with the "freewill offerings" mentioned in the Old Testament. The question is what we mean by "free will." What Joel describes as "free will" sounds like Calvinism, which is just fine to a Calvinist like me.

Calvinism freewill = Compatabalism..

[RBerman]

As I recall, Braniac can mind control someone without the victim even realizing it. The victim feels the desire to do what he does, and thinks that it's his own desires and choices. For the sake of this thread, if you like, we could suppose that Braniac controls Superman merely by manipulating Superman's desires and passions, to get Superman to do whatever Braniac pleases. If such a thing means Superman's nature is replaced by Braniac's nature, then it would seem likewise that when God does it to a man, that means the man's nature is replaced by God's nature. That it is really God who does it. If it makes Superman not morally responsible for the actions when Braniac does it, a man seems equally not responsible if God does it. Or if not, what is the difference?

I don't conceive of Braniac as changing Superman's desires so much as bypassing them altogether; as I recall the story usually concludes with a dramatic battle inside Superman's mind in which he reasserts his own actual desires over and against Braniac's desires for him. Nor is Braniac the same as God; a basic tenet of orthodox Christianity is that the distinction between Creator and creation means that some things which are good for God to do are not good for men to do, precisely because we are not God. It is good for God to be jealous of his own glory. We exist for him, not vice versa. We depend on him, not vice versa.

In the post you mention in the other thread, the context was a discussion of Molinism. The proposition "In situation T, creature C selects option Y" was supposed to be included in Middle Knowledge. That means that proposition is not intended to describe the inputs, but is describing the output--the result of the creature's free choice. It is the creature freely choosing that causes that proposition (which was not a necessary truth) to be true.

I don't see why that matters. The creature doesn't choose himself, or his situation. The output, according to what you said, depends entirely upon inputs which lie outside the creature's control. We call "free will" the mechanism by which the inputs result in the output, but you appeared to be saying that calling it "free will" doesn't mean that, when C and T are held constant, Y would ever result rather than ~Y. So how does your paradigm differ from determinism, apart from the fact that you have labeled the mechanism "free choice"? In your Superman example, what makes his choice to fly LFW?

[Joel]

I don't conceive of Braniac as changing Superman's desires so much as bypassing them altogether; as I recall the story usually concludes with a dramatic battle inside Superman's mind in which he reasserts his own actual desires over and against Braniac's desires for him.

It's been a while since I read any of those stories, so it's possible my memory is faulty. It's also possible that it worked differently in different stories (and/or with different writers) and that you and I read different stories. But what I intended to was more like what I had described. I seem to remember a story where Superman was controlled for weeks without realising that his desires/passions were being controlled by someone else. If my memory is wrong, then what is important is the idea I was trying to convey, rather than the actual stories themselves.

Nor is Braniac the same as God; a basic tenet of orthodox Christianity is that the distinction between Creator and creation means that some things which are good for God to do are not good for men to do, precisely because we are not God. It is good for God to be jealous of his own glory. We exist for him, not vice versa. We depend on him, not vice versa.

The issue was not whether it's good/bad for Braniac or God to do it, but what is the effect on the man. If either does the same thing, then surely the effect is the same, yes?

I don't see why that matters. The creature doesn't choose himself, or his situation. The output, according to what you said, depends entirely upon inputs which lie outside the creature's control. We call "free will" the mechanism by which the inputs result in the output, but you appeared to be saying that calling it "free will" doesn't mean that, when C and T are held constant, Y would ever result rather than ~Y. So how does your paradigm differ from determinism, apart from the fact that you have labeled the mechanism "free choice"?

That's the opposite of what I've said. I've clearly said that LFW means that the causal chain originates in the agent, as opposed to non-LFW where the causal chain(s) originate outside the creature's control. Equivalently, with LFW, "C in S" is not sufficient to determine the output, because the creature can choose any of the options.

Both of these are possible worlds:
"In situation S, creature C selects option O"
"In situation S, creature C selects option ~O"

Both of them are "inputs", and only one is output, determined by C's LFW.
Both are possible, only one is actual. (Thus its actuality is a contingent truth, not a necessary truth. Contingent on the creature's LFW choice.)